In re Amaya B. CA2/7 ( 2015 )


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  • Filed 8/10/15 In re Amaya B. CA2/7
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SEVEN
    In re AMAYA B., a Person Coming Under                                B259770
    the Juvenile Court Law.                                              (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. TJ21473)
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    AMAYA B.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
    Catherine J. Pratt, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed as corrected with directions.
    Mary Bernstein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
    and Appellant.
    No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    __________________________________
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    After Amaya B. (then 13 years old) punched, kicked, and hit a middle school
    classmate with a belt, the People filed a petition alleging that she had committed assault
    by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)).
    Amaya denied the allegation and filed a motion pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
    Code section 700.1 to suppress her statements to David Llamas, a Los Angeles School
    Police Officer, in which she admitted beating up J.J. (then 12 years old) after school.
    Amaya argued that Officer Llamas obtained her statements in violation of the Fourth
    Amendment.
    The court heard the suppression motion in conjunction with the jurisdiction
    hearing. Officer Llamas testified that he interviewed J.J. the day after the incident. J.J.
    said he saw his attacker during the assault but did not know her name. Nor was he able to
    find her photograph in the school yearbook. J.J. explained to the officer, however, that he
    had since learned from others that his attacker’s name was Amaya.
    Officer Llamas testified that he spoke to Amaya on the campus of the middle
    school. Before commencing the interview, Officer Llamas advised Amaya of her right to
    remain silent, to the presence of an attorney and, if indigent, to appointed counsel.
    (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 
    384 U.S. 436
     [
    16 L.Ed.2d 694
    , 
    86 S.Ct. 1602
    ].) Amaya
    waived her rights and made incriminating statements.
    Following argument by counsel, the juvenile court denied the motion to suppress
    and Officer Llamas’ testimony resumed. He testified Amaya admitted to him that she
    had beat up J.J. because he had called her names, and she described the assault in detail.
    J.J. also testified about the attack. Amaya presented no evidence in her defense.
    At the conclusion of the jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found the
    allegation true, declared the offense a felony, and sustained the petition. The court
    ordered Amaya home on probation and awarded her one day of predisposition credit.
    Amaya filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging the denial of her suppression motion.
    2
    DISCUSSION
    We appointed counsel to represent Amaya on appeal. After examination of the
    record counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues. On April 29, 2015 we advised
    Amaya that she had 30 days within which to submit any contentions or issues she wanted
    us to consider. We have received no response.
    We have examined the record and are satisfied Amaya’s attorney on appeal has
    fully complied with the responsibilities of counsel and there are no arguable issues.1 (See
    Smith v. Robbins (2000) 
    528 U.S. 259
    , 277-284 [
    120 S.Ct. 746
    , 
    145 L.Ed.2d 756
    ]; People
    v. Kelly (2006) 
    40 Cal.4th 106
    , 112-113; People v. Wende (1979) 
    25 Cal.3d 436
    , 441.)
    When the juvenile court sustained the delinquency petition and placed Amaya on
    probation, however, the court did not adjudicate her a ward of the court. Although the
    clerk’s minute order indicates Amaya was declared a ward of the court, “[w]hen there is a
    discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order, the oral
    pronouncement controls.” (People v. Morales (2014) 
    224 Cal.App.4th 1587
    , 1594.)
    “‘The clerk cannot supplement the judgment the court actually pronounced by adding a
    provision to the minute order. . . . [Citation.] . . . [T]he clerk’s minutes must accurately
    reflect what occurred at the hearing.’” (Ibid., quoting People v. Zackery (2007) 
    147 Cal.App.4th 380
    , 387.) In addition, the minute order does not reflect that the juvenile
    court orally awarded Amaya one day of predisposition credit. (See In re A.M. (2014) 
    225 Cal.App.4th 1075
    , 1085 [“[i]n a juvenile delinquency proceeding, ‘a minor is entitled to
    credit against his or her maximum term of confinement for the time spent in custody
    1
    Amaya did not argue in her suppression motion that the waiver of her Miranda
    rights was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. (See People v. Scott (2011) 
    52 Cal.4th 452
    , 482 [Miranda claim forfeited where “Miranda was not one of the several
    grounds upon which defendant challenged the admissibility of this statement below,” and
    “[a]s a result, the trial court had no opportunity to resolve material factual disputes and
    make necessary factual findings”]; People v. Holt (1997) 
    15 Cal.4th 619
    , 667 [“[h]aving
    failed to make [Miranda as a] basis for exclusion clear either in his written motion or at
    the hearing on that motion, defendant has waived the right to assert error on those
    grounds now”].)
    3
    before the disposition hearing,’” and “‘[i]t is the juvenile court’s duty to calculate the
    number of days earned, and the court may not delegate that duty’”].)
    DISPOSITION
    The cause is remanded for the juvenile court to declare Amaya B. a ward of the
    court and to prepare a corrected disposition order reflecting an award of one day of
    predisposition credit. In all other respects, the order is affirmed.
    SEGAL, J.
    We concur:
    PERLUSS, P. J.
    ZELON, J.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B259770

Filed Date: 8/10/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021