People v. Felix CA4/2 ( 2015 )


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  • Filed 8/7/15 P. v. Felix CA4/2
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                       E061973
    v.                                                                       (Super.Ct.No. FWV032490)
    LUIS FERNANDO FELIX,                                                     OPINION
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Jon D. Ferguson,
    Judge. Affirmed.
    Law Office of Zulu Ali and Zulu Ali for Defendant and Appellant.
    Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
    General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Barry Carlton and Christopher
    P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    Defendant and appellant Luis Fernando Felix appeals from the trial court’s ruling
    denying his motion to vacate his 2005 conviction for drug possession. Defendant moved
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    to vacate the conviction on the ground that the trial court did not ensure that he was
    adequately advised of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, as provided for in
    Penal Code section 1016.5.1 For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the court’s
    ruling.
    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On January 6, 2005, defendant pled guilty to one count of felony possession of
    ephedrine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11383,
    subd. (c)(1).) Acknowledgement No. 14 as printed on the plea form states: “I understand
    that if I am not a citizen of the United States, deportation, exclusion from admission to
    the United States, or denial of naturalization may result from a conviction of the
    offense(s) to which I plead guilty . . . .” (Italics added.) However, there is a handwritten
    notation in which the word “may” is crossed out and replaced with “will,” along with
    defendant’s initials, “LF,” directly next to the change.
    A reporter’s transcript of the plea hearing has not been made part of the record on
    appeal, presumably because it is unavailable. The minute order for that hearing reads, in
    relevant part, as follows: “The Court, after readvisement of each of these rights, finds
    that the Defendant understands the charge(s), the possible penalties, right against self-
    incrimination, to confront and cross examine witnesses, to a public and speedy trial, to
    Jury trial, to have an attorney present at all stages of the proceedings and to the Public
    Defender if indigent and to the compulsory process of the court to subpoena witnesses.
    1   All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
    2
    Declaration by Defendant form filed.” The minute order does not specifically report that
    the court re-advised defendant of the possible immigration consequences.
    On May 28, 2014, defendant filed a motion to vacate his conviction on the ground
    that the trial court did not ensure that he was adequately warned before pleading guilty
    that the conviction may result in deportation. The People filed its opposition on July 3,
    2014. The trial court heard the motion on July 15, 2014. The court explained as it denied
    the motion that, without a transcript of the oral proceedings, it must rely on the plea form.
    The court found it “clear and explicit” that defendant was informed of the immigration
    consequences because the word “may” was crossed out and the word “will” was inserted
    in the immigration advisal portion of the plea form.
    Defendant appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    Defendant argues the trial court erred when it determined that the court that took
    his guilty plea ensured he was adequately advised of the immigration consequences of his
    guilty plea.
    Under section 1016.5, a defendant can obtain relief if he or she “demonstrate[s]
    that (1) the court taking the plea failed to advise the defendant of the immigration
    consequences as provided by section 1016.5, (2) as a consequence of conviction, the
    defendant actually faces one or more of the statutorily specified immigration
    consequences, and (3) the defendant was prejudiced by the court’s failure to provide
    complete advisements.” (People v. Chien (2008) 
    159 Cal.App.4th 1283
    , 1287, citing
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    People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 
    23 Cal.4th 183
    , 199-200; People v. Totari
    (2002) 
    28 Cal.4th 876
    , 884.) As discussed below, we agree with the trial court that
    defendant has not met his burden to demonstrate that the original trial court failed to
    comply with section 1016.5.
    Section 1016.5, subdivision (a), requires the following admonishment be given to
    any defendant entering a guilty plea: “If you are not a citizen, you are hereby advised
    that conviction of the offense for which you have been charged may have the
    consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of
    naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.”
    The court is not necessarily required to provide the above warning orally.
    However, it must appear on the record, and it must be given by the court. (People v.
    Gutierrez (2003) 
    106 Cal.App.4th 169
    , 175; People v. Ramirez (1999) 
    71 Cal.App.4th 519
    , 521-522; People v. Quesada (1991) 
    230 Cal.App.3d 525
    , 536; cf. People v.
    Panizzon (1996) 
    13 Cal.4th 68
    , 83 [trial court “may rely upon a defendant’s validly
    executed waiver form as a proper substitute for a personal admonishment” with respect to
    losing right to appeal a sentence after pleading no contest].)
    “[T]he legislative purpose of section 1016.5 is to ensure a defendant is advised of
    the immigration consequences of his plea and given an opportunity to consider them. So
    long as the advisements are given, the language of the advisements appears in the record
    for appellate consideration of their adequacy, and the trial court satisfies itself that the
    defendant understood the advisements and had an opportunity to discuss the
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    consequences with counsel, the legislative purpose of section 1016.5 is met. [Citation.]”
    (People v. Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 522.) “Nor need the statutory
    admonition be given orally. It is sufficient if, as here, the advice is recited in a plea form
    and the defendant and his counsel are questioned concerning that form to ensure that
    defendant actually reads and understands it.” (People v. Quesada, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d
    at p. 536.)
    A trial court’s ruling on a section 1016.5 motion will withstand appellate review
    unless the record shows a clear abuse of discretion. (People v. Superior Court
    (Zamudio), supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 192.) In properly applying the standard of review, an
    appellate court must uphold the trial court’s reasonable inferences and resolution of
    factual conflicts if supported by substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
    to the ruling, and must also accept the court’s credibility determinations. (People v.
    Quesada, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 533.) The trial court’s inferences and conclusions
    here are supported by substantial evidence.
    The advisal required by section 1016.5 is included in acknowledgment No. 14 of
    the plea form, as quoted above. As the trial court points out in denying defendant’s
    motion to vacate, defendant even initialed where the printed form is notated by hand to
    show that deportation “will” result from the guilty plea, rather than “may” result. In
    addition, defendant’s trial counsel signed the attorney statement providing that he
    “personally read and explained the contents of the above declaration to the defendant
    . . . .” Further, the English/Spanish interpreter signed the “certificate of interpreter” that
    5
    stated under penalty of perjury that “I translated the entire contents of this form from
    English to Spanish in the presence of and directly to the defendant . . . .” Finally,
    although we lack the record transcript of the plea hearing, and the minute order of that
    day does not report that the court re-advised defendant of the immigration consequences
    specifically, the minute order does state that: “The Court, after readvisement of each of
    these rights, finds that the Defendant understands the charge(s), the possible penalties
    . . . .”
    Under the case law cited above, we cannot conclude from this record that the trial
    court abused its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion to vacate, or that it based
    its ruling on less than substantial evidence. As the trial court noted, absent a record
    transcript of the plea hearing, we must rely on the face of the plea agreement, along with
    other evidence in the record, such as the minute order. Although the minute order is less
    than conclusive that the court specifically inquired of defendant regarding the
    immigration consequences advisal, the plea form strongly indicates defendant was so
    advised, and defendant points to nothing in the record that suggests otherwise. The
    judgment is affirmed.
    DISPOSITION
    The court’s order denying the motion to vacate is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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    CUNNISON
    J.
    We concur:
    RAMIREZ
    P. J.
    CODRINGTON
    J.
     Retired judge of the Riverside Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
    article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E061973

Filed Date: 8/7/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021