In re R.G. CA5 ( 2022 )


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  • Filed 5/26/22 In re R.G. CA5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    In re R.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
    Court Law.
    THE PEOPLE,                                                                              F082747
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                          (Super. Ct. No. JJD071612)
    v.
    OPINION
    R.G.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    THE COURT*
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County. John P. Bianco,
    Judge.
    Candice L. Christensen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
    and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
    General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Canzoneri and
    Heather S. Gimle, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    *           Before Levy, Acting P. J., Smith, J. and DeSantos, J.
    -ooOoo-
    R.G., (minor) appeals from a disposition order adjudging him a ward of the
    juvenile court and committing him to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
    Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). On appeal, minor argues that (1) insufficient evidence
    supported the juvenile court’s finding that he was a perpetrator of the charged offenses
    and (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to DJJ. The People
    disagree. We affirm.
    PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
    On June 26, 2018, the Tulare County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship
    petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a)1) alleging minor possessed a folding knife
    on school grounds (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a); count 1).
    On September 18, 2018, minor was granted informal probation (§ 654.3) and was
    warned against further involvement in gang activity.
    On March 12, 2019, the Tulare County District Attorney filed a first amended
    juvenile wardship petition (§ 602, subd. (a)) realleging count 1, and also alleging minor
    committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; count 2) and disturbing the peace
    by fighting (Pen. Code, § 415, subd. (l); count 3). The petition further alleged that minor
    committed count 2 for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22,
    subd. (b)(1)(C)) and count 3 for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code,
    § 186.22, subd. (d)).
    On April 12, 2019, minor admitted the allegations of the first amended petition.
    The juvenile court indicated that it would declare minor a ward of the court and place him
    on probation, and it could grant him a deferred entry of judgment. It calculated minor’s
    maximum term of confinement as four years four months.
    1     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
    otherwise stated.
    2.
    On April 26, 2019, the juvenile court declined to grant minor a deferred entry of
    judgment, finding he was ineligible because he failed informal probation. Instead, it
    declared minor a ward of the juvenile court and placed him on formal probation. The
    court further warned minor that if he did not “stay away from drugs … alcohol, … and
    … gang involvement” that he would be placed “in an in-custody program ….”
    On December 20, 2019, the Tulare County District Attorney filed a
    second amended juvenile wardship petition (§ 602, subd. (a))alleging minor committed
    two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, a knife (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1);
    counts 1 & 6), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code,
    § 245, subd. (a)(4); count 2), attempted first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a),
    664; count 3), and two counts of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2);
    counts 4 & 5). The petition further alleged that minor committed counts 1, 2, and 6 for
    the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B)) and counts 3,
    4, and 5 for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).
    As to counts 3, 4, and 5, the petition further alleged that a principal in the offense
    personally used a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subds. (b), (e)(1)) and minor
    personally used a firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)).
    As to counts 3 and 4, the petition further alleged that minor personally inflicted great
    bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)) and a principal in the offense personally
    discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subds. (c), (d)
    and (e)(1)).
    On January 17, 2020, minor pled no contest to the lesser offense of battery with
    serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)) on count 1 of the second amended
    petition in exchange for dismissal of count 2 and the enhancements alleged in relation to
    counts 1 and 2.
    On the same date, after a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found
    counts 3, 4, and 5 true beyond a reasonable doubt. The juvenile court found that count 6
    3.
    and all the special allegations as to all counts were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt
    and dismissed that count and the allegations.
    On January 31, 2020, minor admitted that he violated the terms of his probation.
    On February 21, 2020, the juvenile court continued minor as a ward of the court,
    removed from the custody of his parent, placed minor on probation, and committed him
    to the long-term program. The juvenile court again warned minor that if he “continue[d]
    to hang around with Norteno[ gang members] while [he was committed to the long-term
    program] and … continue[d] to engage in [assaultive behavior], [he] … will go to DJJ.”
    The court found minor’s maximum term of confinement was life plus five years.
    On December 15, 2020, minor was released from the long-term program to the
    custody of his mother and under the supervision of the probation officer.
    On February 16, 2021, the Tulare County District Attorney filed a petition alleging
    minor was in violation of his probation (§ 777, subd. (a)). The following day the Tulare
    County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition (§ 602, subd. (a)) alleging
    minor committed carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a); count 1) and assault with a
    deadly weapon, a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2). As to count 1, the
    petition further alleged that minor personally used a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.53,
    subd. (b)). As to count 2, the petition further alleged that minor caused great bodily
    injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)).
    On March 11, 2021, after a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court
    found allegations of the violation of probation and wardship petitions, including the
    special allegation, true.
    On April 27, 2021, the juvenile court committed minor to DJJ. It calculated
    minor’s aggregate maximum term of confinement at life plus 28 years.
    On May 6, 2021, minor file a notice of appeal.
    4.
    FACTUAL SUMMARY2
    The People’s Case
    On February 12, 2021, R.R. drove his red 2015 sedan (the sedan) from Orosi to
    Cutler to meet his friend Diana R. at her mother’s apartment. R.R. drove Diana and
    Diana’s female friend to Woodlake. Diana did not know where she wanted to be dropped
    off. She eventually directed R.R. to a location to park. He did so and they waited for
    Diana’s friends to pick her and her female friend up.
    Two males, one approximately five feet and seven inches and the other
    approximately five feet and four to six inches, both wearing black clothing, walked
    toward the sedan. The two males wore hooded sweatshirts or hats and had handkerchiefs
    tied around their faces. R.R. “could barely see their eyes.” R.R. asked Diana if they
    were her friends. She did not answer. One of the males attempted to open the rear
    driver’s side door to the sedan but it was locked. R.R. attempted to drive away but
    Diana, who was sitting in the passenger seat, turned the vehicle off. Both males then
    came to the front driver’s side window, broke the window, pointed handguns at him, and
    said “ ‘Open your door, open your door.’ ”
    One or both of the males opened the front driver’s side door to the sedan by
    reaching through the broken window. One or both of the males then struck R.R.
    five times with a handgun, including three times to the head. They then threw R.R. to the
    ground, got into the sedan, and drove away. R.R. called out to people walking along the
    street. A group stopped and called 911. Soon after, police officers and an ambulance
    arrived.
    R.R. had “been in trouble with the law” “many times.” The last time he got in
    trouble was about 15 years prior to his testimony.
    2     Because minor’s challenges to the disposition relate only to the February 17, 2021,
    wardship petition, we provide only a summary of the facts relating to that petition.
    5.
    On February 12, 2021, City of Woodlake Police Officers Zachary Fleeman and
    Jared Winter responded to the 911 call. They arrived at 9:43 p.m., within one or
    two minutes of the call and about 10 minutes after the carjacking, to find R.R. “in a state
    of panic, crying and screaming, [and] asking for help.” R.R. appeared to be “[v]ery
    injured”; he had a laceration to the back of his head and his shirt and pants were soaked
    with blood.
    On February 12, 2021, just before 10:00 p.m., Tulare County Sheriff’s Deputy
    Robby Hebrard was working a patrol detail when he was advised by a dispatcher to be on
    alert for the sedan. Hebrard and his partner positioned themselves in an area through
    which they expected the driver of the sedan may travel. Hebrard saw the sedan and
    conducted a vehicle stop. When the vehicle came to a stop, he ordered all of the
    occupants to exit. Two males and two females exited the vehicle. Diana was the driver,
    one of the males sat in the front passenger’s seat, minor sat in the rear passenger’s side
    seat, and Diana’s female friend sat in the rear driver’s side seat. The male in the front
    passenger seat wore a black hooded sweatshirt and black jeans; minor wore a black
    hooded sweatshirt and blue jeans.3 Diana’s female friend was found to have a handgun
    in her waistband. The handgun contained a magazine and had a live round loaded in the
    chamber. Hebrard did not notice any blood on the gun.
    At 10:00 p.m., Fleeman and Winter were dispatched to the location where the
    sheriff’s deputies had stopped the sedan. Winter observed minor in the sheriff’s deputies’
    custody, wearing a black hat, black hooded sweatshirt, and jeans. Winter later drove the
    route from where he and Fleeman originally encountered R.R. to where the sheriff’s
    deputies had stopped the sedan. The distance between the two points was 18.4 miles. It
    took Fleeman 23 minutes 45 seconds to drive the route at 9:00 p.m., on a different night
    with very minimal traffic. In the days after minor’s arrest, Winter drove the same route
    3      Hebrard also indicated that minor was wearing “all black.”
    6.
    to see if any evidence had been discarded. He found none. He did not attempt less-direct
    alternate routes.
    Fleeman observed blood on Diana’s sweatshirt when she was taken to the police
    station. He did not recall seeing blood on minor or the other male and did not record
    seeing blood on minor in his report.
    Minor’s Case
    On the day when minor was arrested, he had been “hanging out” at his aunt’s
    house in Yettem. He was going back to Cutler with his friends Robert and Diana in the
    sedan that he believed belonged to his friend Diana’s mother. Diana picked minor up and
    told minor that she had to take the sedan back to her mother. On their way to return the
    sedan to Diana’s mother, they were pulled over. Minor had only been in the sedan for
    about 10 minutes when it was pulled over. He did not remember what time he had been
    picked up.
    DISCUSSION
    I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    Minor contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s
    finding that he committed the charged offenses. Specifically, he argues that the evidence
    was insufficient to establish that he was one of the perpetrators of the offenses. We
    disagree.
    “ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do
    not determine the facts ourselves. Rather, we “examine the whole record in
    the light most favorable to the [disposition order] to determine whether it
    discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of
    solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [the allegation
    true] beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citations.] We presume in support of
    the [disposition order] the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably
    deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] … We do not reweigh evidence or
    reevaluate a witness’s credibility.’ [Citations.] ‘Resolution of conflicts and
    inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of
    fact. [Citation.] Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or
    inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support
    7.
    a [disposition order].’ ” (People v. Brown (2014) 
    59 Cal.4th 86
    , 105−106;
    see In re M.V. (2014) 
    225 Cal.App.4th 1495
    , 1518 [“The standard of
    review in juvenile proceedings involving criminal behavior is the same as
    that required in adult criminal trials ….”].)
    “Where, as here, the [juvenile court’s] findings rest to some degree upon
    circumstantial evidence, we must decide whether the circumstances reasonably justify
    those findings, ‘but our opinion that the circumstances also might reasonably be
    reconciled with a contrary finding’ does not render the evidence insubstantial.” (People
    v. Earp (1999) 
    20 Cal.4th 826
    , 887–888.) Further, if the record contains substantial
    evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
    the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt “the possibility that the trier of fact might
    reasonably have reached a different conclusion does not warrant reversal.” (People v.
    Taylor (2004) 
    119 Cal.App.4th 628
    , 639.)
    The purportedly insufficiently proven element in this case was minor’s identity as
    a perpetrator of the carjacking and assault with a deadly weapon. We disagree that the
    evidence was insufficient to establish minor’s identity as a perpetrator of the offenses.
    Here, substantial circumstantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding
    that minor was a perpetrator of the offenses. Because his assailants were masked and he
    could only see their eyes, R.R. was only able to identify his assailants as males of
    approximately five feet seven inches and five feet four-to-six inches, clad in all black
    with hooded sweatshirts or black hats who drove away in his sedan. Roughly 27 minutes
    8.
    later,4 minor who was five feet four inches tall,5 was found in the stolen sedan wearing
    black clothing and a black hat. The distance from the location of the carjacking to the
    location of the sedan when it was stopped by sheriff’s deputies was 18.4 miles. In very
    light traffic, it took Fleeman about 23 minutes 45 seconds to drive the same route.
    Minor’s presence in the vehicle approximately 27 minutes later, with three others whom
    all met the description provided by R.R. of the vehicle’s occupants, constituted
    substantial evidence of minor’s identity as a perpetrator of the offense.
    Minor argues that the identity evidence was insufficient because R.R. could not
    identify him as a perpetrator of the offense, “there was no substantial evidence to put
    [him] at the crime scene at the time the crime occurred[,]” the location of the stop was
    near to the location from which [he] testified he was picked up, only one firearm was
    found in the vehicle, and “no blood [was] found on [him], only on Diana.” His
    arguments are unpersuasive.
    First, eyewitness identification is but one way to identify a perpetrator. A
    perpetrator’s identity need not be proved with direct evidence; circumstantial evidence
    can suffice. (People v. Abilez (2007) 
    41 Cal.4th 472
    , 504; People v. Catlin (2001) 26
    4       Fleeman and Winter arrived at the scene of the carjacking at 9:43 p.m. Fleeman
    estimated that the carjacking had taken place about 10 minutes before they arrived. At
    10:00 p.m., Fleeman and Winter were dispatched to the location where sheriff’s deputies
    had stopped the sedan. Minor suggests that the “entire time period was not 27 minutes,
    as argued by the prosecution, but 59 minutes.” He reasons “[i]t thus appears that the
    perpetrators left by 2141 hours and were not apprehended until shortly before 2200
    hours.” He appears to have miscalculated the time. By minor’s time estimate—which
    does not appear consistent with the testimony that the carjacking occurred 10 minutes
    before Fleeman and Winter arrived—the vehicle stop actually happened about 19 minutes
    after the carjacking.
    5      The California Bureau of Firearms Report of Firearm Prohibition dated
    February 27, 2020, and April 28, 2021, and the probation officer’s reports filed
    January 30, 2020, and March 23, 2021, all reflect minor’s height as five feet four inches.
    The juvenile court observed minor at the jurisdictional hearing and was in a position to
    see his height.
    9.
    Cal.4th 81, 142; People v. Bean (1988) 
    46 Cal.3d 919
    , 933.) Here, the circumstantial
    evidence of minor’s identity as a perpetrator—his presence in the sedan soon after the
    carjacking with others who met the description of the involved parties, and his
    description matching that of one of the assailants, in both attire and height—was
    compelling.
    Second, minor argues that “there was no substantial evidence to put the minor at
    the crime scene at the time the crime occurred.” He relies upon an incorrect time
    calculation that the carjacking occurred roughly an hour before sheriff’s deputies stopped
    the stolen sedan to support his testimony that he was picked up by Diana about 10
    minutes before the vehicle stop. That argument is unsupported by the record. The
    proximity in time between the carjacking and vehicle stop, minor’s presence in the sedan,
    and minor’s appearance matching R.R.’s description all linked him to the offense and the
    scene of the carjacking.
    Third, minor argues that the evidence suggested it was possible that Diana had
    actually picked minor up from his aunt’s house prior to the vehicle stop. He directs our
    attention to the distance between Yettem (where minor testified his aunt lives) and the
    location of the vehicle stop and again to the miscalculated duration of time between the
    carjacking and the vehicle stop. Even assuming sufficient time existed in which Diana
    could have dropped off one of the perpetrators and picked minor up, the other evidence
    makes such a scenario implausible. Again, the evidence was sufficient for the juvenile
    court to conclude that minor was a perpetrator of the offenses.
    Fourth, minor emphasizes the absence of a second firearm in the vehicle, the fact
    that the firearm was in the possession of another, and the absence of any blood on his
    person at the time of the stop. The absence of a second firearm or visible blood on
    minor’s clothing did not render the evidence before the juvenile court such that a
    reasonable trier of fact could find the allegations of the petition true beyond a reasonable
    doubt. One of the minors could easily have discarded a firearm on the more than18-mile
    10.
    drive from the location of the carjacking to the location of the vehicle stop. The fact that
    police officers did not discover a discarded firearm along the route in the following days
    is not dispositive. As Winter noted, he took only one of the possible routes from the
    carjacking location to the location of the vehicle stop. Nor is the absence of blood on
    minor’s clothing a clear indication that he was not a perpetrator of the offense. As the
    People note, minor wore black clothing and blood may not have been visible on such
    clothing even if it existed.
    In short, sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s determination.
    II. DJJ Commitment
    Minor next argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him
    to DJJ instead of returning him to the long-term program. The People disagree, as do we.
    A. Additional Background
    The probation officer’s report detailed the commitment alternatives the court could
    consider and recommended against them: It recommended against home placement or
    replacement in the long-term program. It explained that placement in the long-term
    program was not suitable because “it appears the minor needs a more restrictive
    placement option to fully address his aggressive behavior” and “a more substantial period
    of time in custody, in order to adequately address his criminogenic needs.” The
    probation officer further noted that while committed to “the Long Term Program[,] the
    minor received five Incident Reports for disruptive behavior, possession of contraband,
    sexual misconduct, failing to follow instructions, and gang behavior and activities.”
    Instead, the probation officer’s report recommended DJJ placement and detailed
    its reasoning: “the length of commitment at the [DJJ], and the available services
    including Aggression Interruption Training (ten-week cognitive behavioral intervention
    to improve social skills and control anger) and Counter Point [sic] (thirty-three session
    cognitive behavioral program with a goal to reduce the risk of reoffending), will allow
    11.
    the minor sufficient time to gain the tools he needs to refrain from further delinquent
    behavior.”
    The juvenile court explained its commitment determination:
    “The Court has, as indicated, considered the probation report. The
    Court has also considered the arguments of counsel.
    “In determining the appropriate disposition, the Court does have to
    look to the least restrictive alternative; however, if that alternative has been
    ineffective or inappropriate, that is what the Court can consider.
    “[Minor] appeared before this Court a little over a year ago. At that
    time the recommendation was DJJ based on rather serious charges that the
    Court heard the trial on. The Court, at that point, determined that because
    [minor] had not received the benefit of a JDF commitment, the Court did
    not follow the recommendation of DJJ, but rather, placed the minor in the
    detention facility in a long-term program.
    “While the minor did not appear to create ⸻ pick up any new
    offenses while in the long-term program, the Court notes that he was
    initially released in aftercare on December 15th of 2020. He was within
    16 days placed on an aftercare hold because he failed to comply with the
    terms of aftercare. He was, again, released and that was on December 31st.
    “He was, again, released into aftercare on January 8th, and then
    within a little over a month he picked up a violation of probation and this
    new offense.
    “The Court believes that the minor has been given an opportunity at
    the detention facility and the minor has failed to reform.
    “The Court notes that the programs offered at DJJ are substantial and
    would be beneficial to the minor.
    “As to the fact that the Senate Bill [No.] 823 [(2019−2020 Reg.
    Sess.) (Senate Bill 823)] and the pending Senate Bill to clean up 823, which
    is pending, contemplate in the near future that the DJJ will close and that
    the responsibility for housing minors who commit serious offenses will be
    local, we are not at that point.
    “The programs that are available have not been approved by the
    State, nor have they even been presented to the Court from Probation as to
    12.
    what programming will be available effective July 1st. Whether the
    programming will, in fact, be available July 1st is questionable.
    “It is not contemplated that DJJ will close on July 1st, but rather, it is
    anticipated that DJJ will continue to operate for at least a few years, at
    which point the minors may be transferred to a local commitment ⸻ a local
    detention facility, if there is one available in that county. But that is not a
    basis ⸻ the fact that Senate Bill 823 passed last year in and of itself is not a
    basis to not commit the minor to DJJ.
    The bottom line is that, [minor], a year ago ⸻ a little over a year
    ago, I told you you needed to make a decision on how you wanted to spend
    your life. If you continued down the path you were going on, hanging
    around with gang members and involving yourself in criminal activity, that
    you’d likely spend the rest of your life behind bars, and you needed to
    make a choice on how you wanted to live your life.
    “I gave you an opportunity to gain some insight at the long-term ⸻
    under the long-term program, and it appears, based on your actions since
    you’ve been released from the detention facility, that you did not change
    your attitude.
    “This was another gang offense in which you seriously assaulted and
    victimized an individual, unrelated to gangs, and it appears to this Court
    that you did not benefit, and that the local detention facility was not
    successful in rehabilitating you.
    “So the Court is going to adopt the recommendation and commit you
    to DJJ.”
    B. Analysis
    We review a juvenile court’s commitment decision for abuse of discretion. (In re
    A.R. (2018) 
    24 Cal.App.5th 1076
    , 1080 (A.R.).) In reviewing a decision for abuse of
    discretion, we make all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s determination.
    (Ibid.) “ ‘A DJJ commitment is not an abuse of discretion where the evidence
    demonstrates a probable benefit to the minor from the commitment and less restrictive
    alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate.’ ” (Ibid.)
    “ ‘Although the DJJ is normally a placement of last resort, there is no absolute rule
    that a DJJ commitment cannot be ordered unless less restrictive placements have been
    13.
    attempted.’ ” (A.R., supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1080–1081; accord, In re Eddie M.
    (2003) 
    31 Cal.4th 480
    , 507; In re Carlos J. (2018) 
    22 Cal.App.5th 1
    , 6.) [“A juvenile
    court may properly consider ‘a restrictive commitment as a means of protecting the
    public safety.’ ”].) “A juvenile court must determine if the record supports a finding that
    it is probable the minor will benefit from being committed to DJJ.” (In re Jonathan T.
    (2008) 
    166 Cal.App.4th 474
    , 486.) There is no requirement that the court expressly find
    exactly how a minor will benefit from the commitment. (Ibid.) Nor must the juvenile
    court expressly state on the record its reasons for rejecting less restrictive placements. (In
    re Nicole H. (2016) 
    244 Cal.App.4th 1150
    , 1159.) But the record must contain some
    evidence that the court concluded DJJ placement would benefit the minor and
    appropriately considered and rejected reasonable alternative placements. (A.R., at
    pp. 1080–1081; Nicole H., at p. 1159; Jonathan T., at p. 486.)
    In reviewing a commitment determination, we remember that “ ‘the primary goal
    behind maintaining separate courts and procedures for adults and minors is to ensure that
    juvenile offenders who have not yet become hardened criminals receive treatment and
    rehabilitation.’ ” (In re Carlos E. (2005) 
    127 Cal.App.4th 1529
    , 1542.) That goal is
    reflected in the mandate that juvenile courts consider “the protection of the public as well
    as the rehabilitation of the minor” in reaching a disposition. (Ibid.) The court is required
    to “consider ‘the broadest range of information’ in determining how best to rehabilitate a
    minor and afford him adequate care.” (In re Robert H. (2002) 
    96 Cal.App.4th 1317
    ,
    1329.)
    Here, the juvenile court considered the programs available for minor at DJJ as
    detailed in the probation officer’s report. The court concluded that the aggression
    interruption training, Counterpoint program, and a longer potential time of confinement
    would be of probable benefit to minor. It considered the program availability at the
    long-term program and determined that DJJ provided a more beneficial set of
    rehabilitative programs.
    14.
    Next, the juvenile court considered less restrictive alternative placements and
    determined that they had failed to reform the minor and provide him with the services he
    needed to be successful. Minor argues that he performed well in the long-term program
    and should have been recommitted. Minor conflates not accruing new wardship petitions
    while in the long-term program with successful reformation through the long-term
    program. In the long-term program, minor had five incident reports. Within 16 days of
    his release from the long-term program, he was placed on an aftercare hold for having
    failed to comply with the terms of aftercare. Roughly a week later, he was released
    again. Approximately a month later, minor committed the present offenses. On that
    record, the juvenile court’s conclusion appears very reasonable.
    We find no abuse of discretion.6
    DISPOSITION
    The disposition order is affirmed.
    6       Minor contends that if we found the disposition order was not supported by
    sufficient evidence or the DJJ placement decision was an abuse of discretion, we would
    be required to direct the juvenile court on remand to consider Senate Bill 823 in reaching
    a new disposition. Because we conclude substantial evidence supported the disposition
    order and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in committing minor to DJJ, we
    need not address that argument.
    We note that in 2020 the Legislature passed “juvenile justice realignment” through
    Senate Bill 823 (Stats. 2020, ch. 337.) “Effective July 1, 2021, newly enacted
    section 736.5 shifts responsibility for convicted youth offenders from DJJ to the county
    level. (§ 736.5, subd. (a).) All wards committed to DJJ prior to July 1, 2021, will remain
    in DJJ custody. (Id., subd. (d).) But pending final closure of DJJ in June 2023, a court
    may only make a DJJ commitment if the minor ‘is otherwise eligible to be committed
    under existing law and in whose case a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court
    to a court of criminal jurisdiction was filed.’ [(Id., subds. (b), (c), (e)]; see also § 733.1,
    subds. (a)–(b).)” (In re Miguel C. (2021) 
    69 Cal.App.5th 899
    , 907.)
    At the time of the disposition in this case, Senate Bill 823 was not yet effective.
    15.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: F082747

Filed Date: 5/26/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/26/2022