Jacobs v. Ramachandran CA6 ( 2023 )

Filed 2/14/23 Jacobs v. Ramachandran CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JAMES LEO JACOBS et al., H048127
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and Super. Ct. No. 17CV312418)
Respondents,
v.
SATISH RAMACHANDRAN,
Defendant, Cross-complainant and
Appellant.
This appeal involves a residential boundary dispute between appellant Satish
Ramachandran and respondents James Leo Jacobs and Pamela Lawrie Jacobs. Following
a bifurcated bench trial, the trial court issued judgments in favor of the Jacobses.
Ramachandran contends the trial court erred as a matter of law in relying on the
Jacobses’ survey to establish the location of the disputed boundary.1 He asserts that the
survey did not comply with timing requirements set forth in Business and Professions
1
Ramachandran was represented by counsel in the trial court. Prior to completion
of the record on appeal, his appellate counsel filed a motion to be relieved as his counsel,
which this court granted on October 6, 2021. Ramachandran represented himself in his
appellate briefing but was represented by counsel at oral argument.
Code section 8762,2 requiring reversal of the trial court’s judgments. For the reasons
explained further below, we affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ramachandran and the Jacobses have been neighbors in Los Altos for
approximately 30 years. The Jacobses own residential real property located on Santa Rita
Avenue in Los Altos, also referred to as Santa Clara County Assessor’s Parcel Number
(“APN”) 167-18-072 (hereafter, Jacobs property). Ramachandran’s property is east of
the Jacobs property and is also located on Santa Rita Avenue (also referred to as Santa
Clara County APN 167-18-060) (hereafter, Ramachandran property).
In 2014, neighbors to the west of the Jacobs property (who are not parties here)
informed the Jacobses that a structure on the Jacobs property was encroaching on their
land. In response, in November 2014 the Jacobses hired a licensed land surveyor, Bryan
Taylor. Taylor performed a survey of the Jacobs property in 2015 and prepared both a
boundary and topographic survey and a record of survey.3
Taylor’s survey showed that the Jacobses’ fences did not correspond with their
property boundaries. In relevant part, the survey revealed that the Jacobs property
extended slightly further east and south than the fencing, and that an accessory structure
in the southeast of the Jacobs property (accessory structure) was approximately one foot
within the Jacobses’ side of their boundary with the Ramachandran property.
Ramachandran did not accept the findings made by Taylor, asserting that a
separate survey showed that the Jacobses’ accessory structure encroached on his
property. The Jacobses and Ramachandran continued to disagree about the location of
their common boundary line, and their dispute escalated.
2Unspecified statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code.
3A “record of survey” is “a map, legibly drawn, printed, or reproduced by a
process guaranteeing a permanent record in black on tracing cloth, or polyester base film,
18 by 26 inches or 460 by 660 millimeters.” (§ 8763.)
2
In 2017, the Jacobses filed a verified complaint to quiet title which asserted
equitable claims against Ramachandran. Ramachandran filed a verified cross-complaint
that asserted similar equitable claims against the Jacobses and, additionally, a number of
tort claims (for nuisance and trespass against the Jacobses and for assault and battery
against James Leo Jacobs).
The Jacobses moved for summary judgment and summary adjudication. In
response, Ramachandran for the first time commissioned his own survey, which was
conducted by Thomas Dougherty in May 2019. Dougherty used an “unmarked iron pipe”
as the starting point of his survey. Dougherty agreed with the Taylor survey’s conclusion
that the Jacobses’ accessory structure did not encroach on Ramachandran’s property.
However, Dougherty’s survey found the eastern wall of the accessory structure was less
than one foot (0.71 feet) within the Jacobs property (rather than sitting one foot from the
property line, as found by Taylor).
The trial court conducted a bench trial in two phases, which occurred over several
days in July 2019. Phase 1 of the trial involved the equitable claims and determination of
the common property line. The trial court heard testimony from a number of witnesses,
including surveyors Dougherty and Taylor. Taylor explained how he had determined the
property lines for the Jacobs property, including describing the field notes and maps he
used to determine the monuments for his survey. In addition to the record of survey, he
prepared a detailed boundary and topographic survey. Taylor disagreed with
Dougherty’s reliance on the unmarked iron pipe. Dougherty also testified to explain his
survey.4
The trial court admitted into evidence Taylor’s record of survey (hereafter, Taylor
survey) and his boundary and topographic survey—all without objection from
Ramachandran.
4We do not further summarize the details of the testimony of the parties and
expert witnesses as their testimony is not relevant to the issue before us.
3
The Taylor survey contains a map of the Jacobs property, and it references the
Professional Land Surveyors’ Act in a number of places. The surveyor’s statement
includes the following: “This map correctly represents a survey made by [Taylor] or
under [Taylor’s] direction in conformance with the requirements of the Professional Land
Surveyors’ Act at the request of Pamela Jacobs” in February 2015 (some capitalization
omitted). The official county surveyor’s statement explains that the map was examined
pursuant to the Professional Land Surveyors’ Act on November 17, 2016. Under the
recorder’s statement, the official county recorder confirms the survey was “filed” on the
following day (November 18, 2016). (Capitalization omitted.) Near the bottom of the
survey, there is a heading titled “Reason for Mandatory Filing” and under that heading it
states “Professional Land Surveyors[’] Act section 8762[, subdivision] (b)(2)[,](4)”
(underlining and some capitalization omitted).
Posttrial, and at the trial court’s request, Taylor and Dougherty each submitted
declarations addressing specific questions posed by the trial court.
The trial court issued a statement of decision relating to phase 1. The trial court
found that Taylor’s testimony was more credible and persuasive than Dougherty’s
testimony and that the Taylor survey correctly set forth the property line between the
Jacobs property and the Ramachandran property. The trial court explained that it was not
persuaded by Dougherty’s reliance on an unmarked iron pipe as the premise for his
survey. It further noted that Taylor had more extensive experience in surveying single
family homes and that he had conducted his survey before any dispute had arisen
between the Jacobses and Ramachandran over their common boundary.
The trial court subsequently issued a statement of decision for phase 2 of the trial,
addressing Ramachandran’s tort claims for nuisance and trespass against the Jacobses
and his assault and battery claims against James Leo Jacobs. The court explained that
Ramachandran’s nuisance claim depended principally upon the asserted encroachment of
the Jacobses’ accessory structure on Ramachandran’s property, and its “adjudication of
4
the boundary dispute in favor of [the Jacobses] forcecloses relief.” The trial court also
ruled against Ramachandran on his trespass, assault, and battery causes of action.
Approximately one month later, the trial court entered judgment in phase 1 of the
bifurcated trial in favor of the Jacobses on all of their causes of action (for quiet title,
declaratory relief, and permanent injunction) against Ramachandran. The judgment also
found in favor of the Jacobses and against Ramachandran on Ramachandran’s
corresponding equitable claims asserted in his cross-complaint for quiet title, declaratory
relief, and injunctive relief. The phase 1 judgment attached the Taylor survey as an
exhibit and stated the Taylor survey “sets forth the property line between” the Jacobs
property and the Ramachandran property.
That same day, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Jacobses in phase 2
of the trial on Ramachandran’s tort claims (nuisance, trespass, assault, and battery).
Ramachandran timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Ramachandran raises a single claim of error. He challenges the
validity of the survey relied upon by the trial court (i.e., the Taylor survey) to decide the
disputed boundary. He claims the surveyor did not timely submit the survey to the
county under section 8762, which defect renders the “judgment” legally invalid.5 The
Jacobses contend Ramachandran forfeited his claim on appeal, because he never raised
the survey issue related to section 8762 in the trial court, did not object to its admission
5 As noted, the trial court issued two judgments, one in phase 1 of the trial dealing
with the parties’ equitable claims and one in phase 2 that addressed Ramachandran’s tort
claims (for nuisance, trespass, assault, and battery). Based on Ramachandran’s briefing
in this appeal, we understand him to challenge only the phase 1 judgment. However, his
civil case information statement attaches both judgments, and Ramachandran’s opening
brief states that he “appeals the Order of judgment rendered against Appellant and in
favor of Respondent for Quiet Title, Declaratory Relief, Permanent Injunction, Nuisance,
Trespass, Assault, and Battery.” As the judgment in phase 2 included a nuisance claim
that the trial court deemed failed based on its resolution of the boundary dispute in phase
1, we consider both judgments in this appeal.
5
into evidence, and relied on the Taylor survey as part of his own case. The Jacobses also
address Ramachandran’s claim on the merits and assert he has failed to demonstrate any
prejudicial error.
Ramachandran challenges the Jacobses’ contention of forfeiture, asserting there
are no disputed facts at issue in his claim on appeal. Ramachandran contends he is not
raising any evidentiary issue but rather a “pure question of law”—namely, whether a trial
court may rely on a survey that violates a timing requirement set forth in section 8762 to
resolve a boundary dispute. He further asserts this is a question of statutory construction
or application of the terms of the statute to undisputed facts.
A. Forfeiture
We first address forfeiture. “In order to preserve an issue for appeal, a party
ordinarily must raise the objection in the trial court. [Citation.] ‘The rule that
contentions not raised in the trial court will not be considered on appeal is founded on
considerations of fairness to the court and opposing party, and on the practical need for
an orderly and efficient administration of the law.’ ” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th
396, 406 (S.C.).) One rationale for the forfeiture rule is that “it is inappropriate to allow
any party to ‘trifle with the courts by standing silently by, thus permitting the proceedings
to reach a conclusion in which the party could acquiesce if favorable and avoid if
unfavorable.’ ” (Ibid.) However, “a party may change the legal theory he relied upon at
trial, so long as the new theory presents a question of law to be applied to undisputed
facts in the record.” (Hoffman-Haag v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 10,
15; Ryan v. Real Estate of the Pacific, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 637, 643–644.)
As Ramachandran’s argument on appeal does not rest on any disputed facts, we
will consider the merits of his claims.
B. Merits
Ramachandran contends the trial court’s reliance on the Taylor survey was
“legally problematic” because Taylor did not timely submit the survey to the county
6
recorder’s office, as required by section 8762. He contends Taylor should have
submitted the survey on or by May 18, 2015, but instead Taylor “physically transported
the survey” to the county recorder’s office in October 2016.6 Ramachandran contends
that the survey “cannot serve as the foundation for the concomitant judgment” as a matter
of law and we must reverse the judgment.
1. Legal Principles
Well-established principles of appellate review guide our analysis. We presume
the trial court’s order was correct. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.)
As the appellant, Ramachandran bears the burden of showing that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment. (Id. at p. 609.) “[C]onclusory
claims of error will fail.” (S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) Additionally, an
appellant must establish prejudice. (Id. at p. 407.) A self-represented litigant must also
comply with the fundamental principles of appellate review. (See In re Marriage of
Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830.)
We review a trial court’s interpretation and application of statutes de novo.
(Carmel Development Company, Inc. v. Anderson (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 492, 503.)
Provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure authorize a trial court to adjudicate a
boundary dispute. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 760.020, 760.030.) The trial court may rely
on expert and nonexpert evidence to determine “ ‘the actual location of the monuments,
corners or lines as actually laid out on the ground by the official surveyor.’ ” (Bloxham v.
Saldinger (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 729, 737.)
Section 8762 is part of the Professional Land Surveyors’ Act. Section 8762,
subdivision (b), states that a record of survey “shall” be filed if any of five specified
6 Ramachandran provides no citation to any document in the record that contains a
date of October 2016 related to the survey. The record reflects that Taylor made the
survey in February 2015 and the county recorder’s office “filed” the survey in November
2016. (Capitalization omitted.)
7
circumstances apply. It states that “[n]otwithstanding subdivision (a), after making a
field survey in conformity with the practice of land surveying, the licensed land surveyor
or licensed civil engineer shall file with the county surveyor in the county in which the
field survey was made a record of the survey relating to land boundaries or property lines,
if the field survey discloses” any of the listed circumstances.7 (§ 8762, subd. (b), italics
added.)
Subdivision (c) of section 8762 states that “the record of survey required to be
filed pursuant to this section shall be filed within 90 days after the setting of boundary
monuments during the performance of a field survey or within 90 days after completion
of a field survey, whichever occurs first.” (Italics added.)
2. Analysis
Ramachandran principally argues that because section 8762, subdivision (c), uses
the word “shall,” he has shown error.
We disagree. While Ramachandran quotes from provisions of section 8762 and
cites to case law construing the word “shall” in various contexts, he provides little if any
legal argument beyond these general principles. The case law he points us to primarily
consists of decisions from the United States Supreme Court that do not advance his
argument as they involve interpretations of federal law that have no application here.
The California Supreme Court’s decision in Tarrant Bell Property, LLC v.
Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 538 (Tarrant) also does not assist Ramachandran. He
cites to Tarrant for the proposition that “[s]ettled principles of statutory construction
direct that the word ‘shall’ be construed as mandatory.” However, Tarrant involved a
different statute and context relating to Code of Civil Procedure section 638 (id. at
7 The parties appear to agree that subdivision (b) of section 8762 applies to the
Taylor survey. Indeed, as noted, the Taylor survey stated it was a “mandatory”
(capitalization omitted) filing under subdivision (b)(2) and (b)(4) of section 8762. We
need not decide which of the circumstances are at issue in this case to resolve the issue
before us in this appeal.
8
p. 542), and it does not discuss, let alone mention, section 8762. It therefore does not
support Ramachandran’s argument. “ ‘Cases are not authority for propositions not
considered therein.” (Harris v. University Village Thousand Oaks, CCRC, LLC (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 847, 855.)
In any event, our high court in Tarrant did not purport to hold that all uses of the
word “shall” in a statute make the directive mandatory. To the contrary, our high court
confirmed the principle that the statutory language is the “starting point” for determining
an issue of statutory interpretation and that in “determining whether the Legislature
intended a statute to be mandatory or permissive, use in the statute of ‘may’ or ‘shall’ is
merely indicative, not dispositive or conclusive.” (Tarrant, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 542.)
As Ramachandran does not provide any relevant authority that supports his claim of trial
court error, we reject his claim. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th
270, 277.)
Moreover, even assuming for purposes of argument that there was a failure to
comply with the 90-day timing requirement of section 8762, subdivision (c),
Ramachandran does not provide any authority for his contention that the trial court was
therefore prohibited from relying on that record of survey to resolve the boundary dispute
under such circumstances. He does not explain how this timing error has any relevance
to the disputed issue before the trial court. He does not contend the survey was
inaccurate or that Taylor’s methods or measurements were otherwise legally insufficient
as a matter of law. (Cf. Saunders v. Polich (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 136, 142). Rather, he
simply concludes that the “violation” of the timing requirement under section 8762
“invalidates the survey” and the trial court’s “rulings are, similarly, legally void.” Such a
bare and undeveloped assertion of error provides no basis to reverse the judgment.
(Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 565.)
Assuming for purposes of argument that Ramachandran has demonstrated error,
he must also show prejudice. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co.
9
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 801.) “Unless the error is reversible per se, we apply the
prejudicial error rule even if the trial court failed to follow a statutory mandate.”
(Guardianship of C.E. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1054.) “ ‘To establish prejudice, a
party must show “a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error, a result more
favorable to [it] would have been reached.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Additionally, “[b]ecause of the
need to consider the particulars of the given case, rather than the type of error, the
appellant bears the duty of spelling out in his brief exactly how the error caused a
miscarriage of justice.” (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106.)
Ramachandran does not address prejudice in his briefing. His failure to address
prejudice is also fatal to his claim. Based on our own examination of the record, we have
not identified any prejudice flowing from any purported error by the trial court related to
the timing of the filing of the survey. The trial court heard Taylor’s testimony,
considered the basis for his survey, and explicitly found him credible and expert in the
survey of parcels such as those involved in this case.
We decide Ramachandran has failed to demonstrate any error resulting in a
miscarriage of justice that warrants reversal of either of the judgments against him.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed. Respondents are entitled to recover their reasonable
costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)
10
______________________________________
Danner, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J.
____________________________________
Wilson, J.
H048127
Jacobs et al. v. Ramachandran