In re Z.R. CA4/2 ( 2023 )

Filed 2/16/23 In re Z.R. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re Z.R. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E079758
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.Nos. J288666 &
J288667)
v.
OPINION
V.B.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Lynn M. Poncin,
Judge. Affirmed.
Gary E. Beeks for Defendant and Appellant.
Tom Bunton, County Counsel, and Kaleigh Ragon, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
The juvenile court terminated defendant and appellant, V.B.’s (mother), parental
rights as to Z.R. (born Sept. 2011) and D.R. (born Feb. 2010) (collectively the children).1
On appeal, mother contends the court erred in declining to apply the beneficial parental
relationship exception to termination of her parental rights. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 9, 2021, the social worker received an emergency response referral
reflecting that mother had learned that C.M. (the boyfriend) had sexually abused Z.R.
Z.R. reported at least three incidents of molestation by the boyfriend including sodomy,
compelling her to rub his private parts with her feet, and placing his private parts on hers.
Mother brought Z.R. to the hospital. Mother then packed up her belongings and moved
the family out of the home into a friend’s residence.
On March 16, 2021, mother went to the police station requesting that the charges
of sexual abuse against the boyfriend be dropped. Mother had moved back into the
home; she reported that the boyfriend no longer lived there. Mother confirmed with the
social worker that she had attempted to have the charges dropped. She said that she and
the boyfriend were expecting a baby in August 2021, and she expected him to be in the
baby’s life.
The social worker informed mother she would need to participate in a safety plan
to keep the children safe; mother would have to ensure that the children would participate
in medical evaluations and interviews, she would have to enroll the children in
1 The court also terminated E.R.’s (father) parental rights. Father is not a party to
the appeal.
2
counseling, and mother would have to keep the boyfriend away from the children.
Mother stated she understood. Mother said she believed Z.R.’s allegations. D.R. denied
any abuse.
Z.R. reported that one time, the boyfriend told mother that he was taking Z.R. to a
father-daughter dance but, instead, took her to a hotel room, where he told her to take her
clothes off “‘and did bad stuff’” to her. Z.R. said she felt safe with mother but not with
the boyfriend. The social worker provided a safety plan to mother.
On March 18, 2021, the social worker attempted an unannounced visit to the
home; a male voice responded. No one would open the door, despite several knocks on
the door and window. The social worker’s calls and texts to mother went unanswered.
The police attempted to conduct a welfare check on March 19, 2021; no one answered the
door. The social worker attempted to conduct a visit on March 21, 2021; no one
answered the door despite there being two cars in the driveway.
After the social worker obtained a detention warrant, she and an officer attempted
to serve it on March 23, 2021; no one answered the door despite mother’s vehicle being
parked in the driveway. On March 24, 2021, the officer and social worker again
attempted to serve the warrant to no avail.
The social worker opined that “mother has no plan to cooperate with [the
department] or [police] regarding the reports of sexual abuse of [the] nine-year-old
daughter. The mother appears to have allowed [the boyfriend] back into the home and he
has had unlimited access to the children, placing them at risk of sexual abuse, harm
and/or neglect.”
3
On March 29, 2021, personnel from plaintiff and respondent, the San Bernardino
County Department of Children and Family Services (the department), filed Welfare and
Institutions Code section 3002 juvenile dependency petitions as to both children alleging,
in pertinent part, that mother failed to protect Z.R. from sexual abuse (b-1); that while in
mother’s care, Z.R. was sexually abused on more than one occasion (d-2); and, as to
D.R., that a sibling, Z.R., had been abused and neglected (b-1). On March 30, 2021, the
court detained the children.
In the jurisdiction and disposition report filed April 15, 2021, the social worker
recommended the court find the allegations true, sustain the petitions, remove the
children, and decline to provide mother reunification services pursuant to section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(6) (severe sexual abuse). The children had been placed in the home of
the maternal great aunt (I.C.) and uncle.
Personnel from the Children’s Assessment Center of San Bernardino conducted a
forensic interview of Z.R., during which she disclosed numerous incidents of abuse. She
said that every time mother would leave the house, the boyfriend would make her take
her clothes off; he would make her rub her feet on his “‘middle part.’” Every day when
he came home, he would bring her into his car where he would have her rub his “‘middle
part’” with her feet. Mother would provide the Vaseline, but did not know of the abuse.
The boyfriend took pictures of Z.R.’s feet. During the father-daughter dance, they stayed
2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
4
overnight in a hotel. “‘He would do it all day, until it was morning.’” One time he
rubbed “‘his middle parts on my privates.’”
After she told mother about the abuse, mother left the home. However, mother
later told her they were going back to the boyfriend, “but that he needed to listen to her
rules.” Z.R. said she felt scared because she was afraid the boyfriend would not listen.
Z.R. said the boyfriend would drink, make fun of D.R, and “‘would always choke my
brother.’” She said the boyfriend hit D.R., which made him bleed all over his mouth, and
he hit D.R. with a belt. Mother did not want to leave because she was pregnant. The
boyfriend hit Z.R., making her feel dizzy. He pulled her hair and also hit mother.
During the forensic interview of D.R., he reported that when mother left to run
errands, the boyfriend would pull Z.R. into a room, lock the door, and force her to do
something. He would hear Z.R. crying. D.R. said he witnessed the boyfriend sexually
abuse Z.R. in the car. The boyfriend would hit D.R. with a belt, causing bruising. He
would “‘choke [D.R.] [and] whenever [the boyfriend] gets drunk, he just wants to hit
everyone,’” including mother.
Mother said she took Z.R. to the hospital the day after Z.R. disclosed the abuse,
but that hospital staff did not find any trauma. Mother said she took the children to Los
Angeles for two weeks after receiving the safety plan and was not at the home. She said
her attempt to drop the charges was “‘just because I wanted to verify if it was true or
not.’” Mother admitted that after returning to the apartment, the boyfriend “‘would come
and go.’” She said she may have left the children alone with him one time after learning
of the allegations. Mother denied seeing the boyfriend physically abuse the children.
5
Mother initially denied any domestic violence, but said, “‘He did grab me a couple
times . . . probably two or three times.’”
The police report reflected that a physician’s assistant at the hospital reported that
Z.R. “disclosed being sodomized on multiple occasions and it hurting.” The social
worker opined: “It is also clear the mother . . . knew or reasonably should have known
about the ongoing sexual abuse imposed on the minor, as there were multiple indications
[Z.R.] was being targeted by [the boyfriend]. It appears [mother] is using denial as a
defense mechanism to eradicate all responsibility of being a protective parent, despite
being given the opportunity to safely maintain the children with a safety plan.” The
social worker further noted: “A safety plan was created with the mother, but the mother
failed to follow the plan. With provision[] of these services, it was not possible to
maintain the child in the home. Due to the serious nature of the abuse suffered, there was
no way to ensure the children’s safety short of removal.” The caregiver reported mother
had three supervised visits with the children; the visits were appropriate; the children
enjoyed their mother’s presence.
On April 19, 2021, personnel from the department amended the juvenile
dependency petitions as to mother to add allegations that mother engaged in acts of
domestic violence with the boyfriend in the children’s presence (b-2), and the children
were physically abused (b-3). On May 17, 2021, they amended to the petition to allege
mother also engaged in domestic violence with father.
In the May 18, 2021, addendum report, the social worker noted that the boyfriend
had been arrested outside mother’s residence on April 21, 2021. Mother said she had no
6
idea how he knew where she was living. She obtained a temporary restraining order
against him on April 23, 2021. Mother called the police when he arrived at her home.
Mother disclosed that the boyfriend would punch, hit, and grab the children; she said he
would punish them by leaving them in the garage for hours.
The boyfriend reported that mother told him to leave the house when he arrived;
she then helped him pay for a hotel. Mother told him that maybe she would allow him to
see his baby girl in the future. Mother would not initiate text exchanges with him, but
she would respond to his. They would talk about the baby; she sent him 3D ultrasound
pictures of the baby.
In an additional information for the court filed June 11, 2021, the social worker
noted that mother had completed seven of eight individual therapy sessions and seven of
12 sessions of parenting and domestic violence classes. Mother’s therapist indicated
mother was doing well as “she is cooperative . . . and has identified she has made bad
choices with partners.” In the July 22, 2021, additional information for the court, the
social worker noted that “the children have expressed having high hopes of returning
home with the mother.” The children continued to disclose additional acts of abuse
including the boyfriend showing D.R. pornographic videos. Z.R. reported he showed her
videos of parents killing their children, in mother’s presence.
At the July 22, 2021, hearing, mother submitted on jurisdiction. The court found
the allegations in the petitions true.
The court held a contested hearing on disposition; mother contested the
recommendation that she not receive reunification services. A psychologist testified that
7
mother had the ability to thrive and benefit from therapy. He testified that although she
had facilitated the abuse, “with the assistance of treatment, she would be able to protect
her children further going forward.”
Mother’s therapist testified: “I do believe that she has gained knowledge and
understanding and would not get involved in a relationship with somebody who is
consuming excessive alcohol and other behavior that would be dangerous to her or the
children.”
Mother testified that she could and would protect her children. She had weekly,
two-hour visitation with the children and never missed a visit. The children would tell
her how much they miss her. They would tell her they love her and want to be with her.
She was six months pregnant with the boyfriend’s child; she believed he should be able
to see his child.
The court found that mother “knew of both the physical abuse and the sexual
abuse. . . . Mother gave her actual or implied consent for both sexual abuse and severe
physical harm—and that was severe sexual abuse—to occur on an ongoing basis. [¶] . . .
[¶] . . . Mother actually consented and knew the physical abuse was going on. Mother had
to have seen the bruises on her children. [¶] . . . There’s no question in this Court’s mind
that Mother actually, or at the very least, impliedly consented to this ongoing sexual abuse
at a minimum of five days a week with respect to going to her car and facilitated . . . sexual
abuse by handing her daughter the keys and the Vaseline every afternoon [the boyfriend]
got home.” The court removed the children and denied mother reunification services
pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6).
8
Mother’s counsel filed a notice of appeal. Mother’s appellate counsel filed a brief
pursuant to In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, requesting this court exercise its
discretion to independently review the record for error. We offered mother the
opportunity to file a supplemental brief, which she did not do. We declined to exercise
our discretion to independently review the record and dismissed the appeal as abandoned.
(See CFS v. V.B. (Oct. 19, 2021, E077511).)
In the January 19, 2022, status review report, the social worker recommended the
court set the section 366.26 hearing with adoption as the permanent plan.3 The children
had been placed with I.C., whose home was approved on July 8, 2021. The children
informed the social worker “that they feel comfortable in [the] current home, and they
choose adoption over legal guardianship with [the] current caregivers.” The social
worker observed that the children “appeared to have a close relationship with their
caregivers. The children were informed and understand that they are not going to reunify
with their mother, and they are in agreement with the permanent plan of adoption with
[the] current caregiver whom they call ‘tia-mama’ [aunty-mama].’” Mother had
supervised visitation with the children every other week for two hours. The children
reported that they enjoyed seeing mother.
At the hearing on January 24, 2022, mother’s counsel noted: “I’m not objecting to
the setting of a .26.” The court terminated father’s reunification services and set the
section 366.26 hearing.
3 The court had granted father reunification services at the disposition hearing.
9
In the May 24, 2022, section 366.26 report, the social worker noted that the
children had been in the care of the maternal great aunt (I.C.) and uncle since March 30,
2021. The children “report feeling safe in the home and have expressed their desire to be
adopted by the applicants.” The maternal great cousin (F.C.) and I.C. planned to adopt
the children together. The prospective adoptive parents reported that “the children have
improved since placement; however, [Z.R.] will occasionally demonstrate dysregulated
behaviors.” The prospective adoptive parents “have demonstrated their ability to meet
the children’s emotional needs by providing transportation to their services as needed.
The [social worker] observed them to demonstrate an ability to communicate with the
children to meet their needs and demonstrate emotional support as needed. [¶] . . .
[¶] . . . This placement allows the children to be raised in the same home as their
younger sibling . . . , who is also under the plan of adoption with the applicants.”4
The report also noted: “There is a mutual attachment between the children and the
adults in the home. They report they are bonded with the children. The children appear
to understand the concept of adoption and report they are in agreement with the plan of
adoption. They demonstrate that they recognize the caregivers as their parental figures.
They refer to [F.C.] as ‘mom.’” This placement allows for all three siblings to be raised
together. The children are “very gentle and loving” with their younger sibling and have a
“positive sibling relationship.” F.C. said, “‘They are my children. I love them.’ When
4 The younger sibling (born Aug. 2021) had been placed with the prospective
adoptive parents and siblings on release from the hospital. (In re E.B. (Nov. 3, 2022,
E078811) [nonpub. opn.].) On April 8, 2022, the juvenile court terminated mother’s
parental rights as to the younger sibling. (Ibid.) We affirmed the judgment. (Ibid.)
10
asked why they want to adopt, the adoptive parents indicated that they love the children
and ‘they are part of our family.’”
The children “seemed to be securely attached and lovingly bonded with their
adoptive parents.” The social worker observed the children “demonstrate appropriate
affection toward the adults in the home.” “They expressed their beliefs that the children
need a caring, competent and loving family, which they believe they are. Both parents
also expressed their desire to do all they can to provide the children with permanency and
stability. They stated they fully understand the legal and financial rights and
responsibilities that accompany adoption.”
At the hearing on May 24, 2022, to set the contested section 366.26 hearing, the
court noted, “there’s very little information on the visits between—visits for the
children . . . .” In a July 5, 2022, additional information for the court, the social worker
reported she had supervised a visit between mother and the children. Mother brought
food and cards to play with the children. The social worker “explained [to] both children
the difference between adoption and legal guardianship.” She informed the children that
“if they are adopted a new birth certificate will be issued by the Court and parental rights
will be terminated. Children were informed that once [the] Court terminates parents’
rights, there will be no more visits, unless the caregiver allows it. Both children stated
that they want to be adopted; [Z.R.] stated that she does not feel safe around her mother,
‘even on visits. . . . I want [F.C.] to be close to me . . . she makes me feel safe.” D.R.
said, “‘I’m afraid that my mom is going to find another boyfriend and the same thing is
going to happen again. . . . I don’t want to go through pain again.’”
11
At the section 366.26 hearing on July 5, 2022, mother’s counsel indicated he did
not plan on calling the social worker to testify. Mother testified the children call her,
“Mom or Mommy in Spanish.” Z.R. had never expressed any fear of being around her.
The children hug her during visits. The children are very comfortable around her. She is
very close to them. During their lives together, they were very close. Mother believed
she could offer the children guidance, support, and someone to trust. Mother wanted the
children in a legal guardianship so that she could have “ongoing input in their lives and
visitation and parental rights as the biological mother.” The parties stipulated that mother
lived with D.R. and Z.R. for nine and 11 years, respectively.
Mother conceded that the children did not trust her and their relationship has
diminished since removal. “I want to be able to regain that trust and show them that
things—that I’ve changed that things are different.” The children never expressed to her
that they wanted to be adopted. If she, herself, heard the children say that they want to be
adopted, then she would “give them that.”
Mother introduced into evidence several photographs of her and the children from
a visit in which the children are smiling. The department noted: “I don’t think they’re
relevant, but they’re just photographs, so I won’t object.” Minor’s counsel argued: “The
fact Mother’s Counsel has produced selfies proves little and can be explained away as the
children not wanting to hurt the mother’s feelings by taking these photos with her.”
Mother “takes the place of a friendly visitor, a mere gift-giver, someone who takes selfies
with the children. And on its face, that’s not someone who takes the role of the mother.”
The department noted: “Counsel talks about the pictures that were presented and how
12
they have . . . nice, fun time at visits. Of course, they do. She’s bringing them gifts.
She’s bringing toys. She brings games. There’s nothing to not like. But if you look at
the statement from the children, it’s only because the caregiver’s there. If she wasn’t
there, the safety goes out the window. Every visit with Mom has been supervised for that
reason. Safety only occurred with the caregiver and not with Mom alone.”
Mother’s counsel argued: “There are photos that we’ve presented which not only
display apparent happiness—sure, they’re having a good time, but they’re also with their
mother—and a closeness. They’re sitting on her lap. They are not afraid. And all of a
sudden, in the last minute social worker visit, we have that the children are afraid, and
they want to be adopted very bluntly.” “The pictures, again, refute any element of fear.”
The court believed the social worker’s statements that Z.R. and D.R. experienced
anxiety when visiting with mother and wanted to be adopted. The court discussed In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.). The court found: “In this case, I’ll note that
[mother] has had regular visitation and contact with the children, but there’s been
insufficient evidence that there’s a positive, emotional attachment between the children
and [mother] such that it would—it would be detrimental to the children to terminate
parental rights. There’s been no evidence presented that either [of the children]
demonstrate emotional dysregulation after the visits, that they are inconsolable or
emotionally upset upon leaving the visits with their mother. The visits do appear to go
well, and [mother] did testify as to her relationship with the children, and the children did
have a significant period of time in their lives when they lived with their mother.”
13
The court continued: “However, . . . both children . . . have indicated that they
feel safer with their caregiver, and both children have expressed a desire to be adopted by
the caregiver. The Court is finding that [mother] has not met the burden of proof as to
establishing the three elements necessary under . . . Caden C. for the Court to deviate
from the legislative preference for adoption.” The court terminated mother’s parental
rights.
II. DISCUSSION
Mother contends the court erred in declining to apply the beneficial parental
relationship exception to the termination of her parental rights. We disagree.
“[T]he goal at the section 366.26 hearing is ‘specifically . . . to select and
implement a permanent plan for the child.’ [Citations.] To guide the court in selecting
the most suitable permanent arrangement, the statute lists plans in order of preference and
provides a detailed procedure for choosing among them. [Citation.] According to that
procedure, the court must first determine by clear and convincing evidence whether the
child is likely to be adopted. [Citation.] If so, and if the court finds that there has been a
previous determination that reunification services be terminated, then the court shall
terminate parental rights to allow for adoption. [Citation.] But if the parent shows that
termination would be detrimental to the child for at least one specifically enumerated
reason, the court should decline to terminate parental rights and select another permanent
plan. [Citation.] As we have previously explained, ‘[t]he statutory exceptions merely
permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than
the norm, which remains adoption.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 630-631.)
14
“The exception at issue in this case is limited in scope. It applies where ‘[t]he
court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to
the child due to one or more of the following circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have
maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship.’ [Citation.] From the statute, we readily discern three
elements the parent must prove to establish the exception: (1) regular visitation and
contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such
that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) It is the parent who must prove all three elements by a
preponderance of the evidence; the parent must “show a ‘compelling reason for
determining that termination would be detrimental to the child . . . .’” (Id. at p. 635.)
Here, the court found that mother had met the first prong of the beneficial parental
relationship exception: mother “has had regular visitation and contact with the children.”
Thus, we address only the second and third prongs, beneficial relationship, and detriment.
A. Beneficial Relationship
On the second element, “the parent must show that the child has a substantial,
positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the
child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 636.) Courts “assess whether ‘the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship.’ [Citation.] Again here, the focus is the child. And the relationship may be
shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life
spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between
15
parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’” (Id. at p. 632.) “[C]ourts often
consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.
[Citations.] Doing so properly focuses the inquiry on the child . . . .” (Ibid.)
We review whether there is a beneficial relationship for substantial evidence.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 639.) “[I]n assessing visitation and the relationship
between parent and child, the court must make a series of factual determinations. These
may range from the specific features of the child’s relationship with the parent and the
harm that would come from losing those specific features to a higher-level conclusion of
how harmful in total that loss would be. The court must also determine, for the particular
child, how a prospective adoptive placement may offset and even counterbalance those
harms. In so doing, it may make explicit or implicit findings ranging from specific
benefits related to the child’s specific characteristics up to a higher-level conclusion
about the benefit of adoption all told. All these factual determinations are properly
reviewed for substantial evidence.” (Id. at p. 640.)
“In reviewing factual determinations for substantial evidence, a reviewing court
should ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve
evidentiary conflicts.’ [Citation.] The determinations should ‘be upheld if . . . supported
by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and
the trial court might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence.’
[Citations.] Uncontradicted testimony rejected by the trial court ‘“cannot be credited on
appeal unless, in view of the whole record, it is clear, positive, and of such a nature that it
cannot rationally be disbelieved.”’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.)
16
Substantial evidence supported the court’s finding that the children did not have a
beneficial relationship with mother. Here, mother had the burden of proving each child
had “a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment
implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) The court properly considered the length of time the children
had previously been in mother’s care and their relationship with mother. However, the
court believed the reports that both children repeatedly stated they wanted to be adopted,
even if that meant they might not be able to visit with mother ever again.
Z.R. stated that she did not feel safe around her mother even on visits. D.R. said,
“‘I’m afraid that my mom is going to find another boyfriend and the same thing is going
to happen again. . . . I don’t want to go through pain again.’” The court made a factual
finding that the children’s statements were true. Indeed, both children had experienced
extensive abuse while in mother’s care. As the court noted that there was no evidence
presented that the children experienced any emotional issues when visits with mother were
over. Sufficient evidence supported the court’s determination that mother failed her
burden of proving that the children had a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to
mother such that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.
Mother contends the exhibits reflect that the children were not afraid of mother;
they were willing to hug and sit in her lap; they both were smiling. Even so, one set of
pictures from one day during a supervised visit does not establish a beneficial relationship.
Mother could have, but did not, request a bonding study, which may have helped
her establish an evidentiary basis for determining there was such a bond. (Caden C.,
17
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633, fn. 4 [“courts should seriously consider, where requested . . . ,
allowing for a bonding study”], italics added.) Moreover, mother could have requested
the case logs, requested more detailed reports regarding the nature of the visits, and
requested the social worker and caregivers testify at the section 366.26 hearing about the
quality of visits. (In re Mary C. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 793, 801 [By failing to object in
the juvenile court to specific defects in the reports, parents forfeit any challenge to them
on appeal.].) Here, mother failed her burden of establishing a beneficial bond such that
the court’s order was supported by substantial evidence.
B. Detriment
“[I]n assessing whether termination would be detrimental, the trial court must
decide whether the harm from severing the child’s relationship with the parent outweighs
the benefit to the child of placement in a new adoptive home. [Citation.] By making this
decision, the trial court determines whether terminating parental rights serves the child’s
best interests.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) “Because terminating parental
rights eliminates any legal basis for the parent or child to maintain the relationship, courts
must assume that terminating parental rights terminates the relationship. [Citations.]
What courts need to determine, therefore, is how the child would be affected by losing
the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive
home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Id. at p. 633.) “[T]he question is just
whether losing the relationship with the parent would harm the child to an extent not
outweighed, on balance, by the security of a new, adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 634.)
18
“[W]hether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child due to
the child’s relationship with his parent—is discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse
of discretion.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) “A court abuses its discretion
only when ‘“‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’”’ [Citation.] But ‘“‘[w]hen two
or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no
authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’”’” (Id. at p. 641.)
The court acted within its discretion in finding that termination of mother’s
parental rights would not be detrimental to the child. Here, as discussed ante, mother
failed to establish a beneficial relationship between her and the children.
On the other hand, the children had spent approximately 15 months in the care of
the prospective adoptive parents. The social worker observed that the children “appeared
to have a close relationship with their caregivers.” “There is a mutual attachment
between the children and the adults in the home. They report they are bonded with the
children.” The children referred to F.C. as “‘mom,’” and she said, “‘They are my
children. I love them.’” “When asked why they want to adopt, the adoptive parents
indicate that they love the children and ‘they are part of our family.’” The children
repeatedly expressed a desire to be adopted by the prospective adoptive parents. The
placement allowed the children to be raised in the same home as their younger sibling,
with whom the children had a “positive sibling relationship.”
19
Mother failed to make a compelling showing that the loss of the children’s
relationship with her would harm them to an extent not outweighed, on balance, by the
security of a new, adoptive home with their prospective adoptive parents. Thus, the court
acted within its discretion in determining the circumstances were not exceptional, such
that the termination of mother’s parental rights would not be detrimental to the children.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
FIELDS
J.
20