Quality First Home Improvement v. Williams CA3 ( 2023 )

Filed 2/21/23 Quality First Home Improvement v. Williams CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
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QUALITY FIRST HOME IMPROVEMENT, INC., C095316
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 34-2018-
00241333-CU-BC-GDS)
v.
DASHENA WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
Respondent Quality First Home Improvement, Inc. (QFHI) filed suit against
appellant Dashena Williams, seeking to recover the balance owed on a home
improvement contract. The trial court entered judgment in favor of QFHI following a
court trial.
On appeal, appellant argues the trial court erred in denying her oral request to
continue the trial. Appellant contends we may presume the trial court abused its
discretion because the record does not show it considered the factors affecting a motion
to continue trial. Appellant further avers the trial court failed to consider whether she
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qualified for referral under the Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, Government Code
section 68650 et seq.1 (Shriver Act).
We affirm the trial court’s judgment and deny QFHI’s request for sanctions.
BACKGROUND
Appellant contracted with QFHI to install a concrete deck and patio cover at her
residence for $35,000. QFHI completed the project, but appellant paid only $1,000.
After failed efforts to collect payment, QFHI recorded a mechanic’s lien 2 against
appellant’s home. It also sued appellant for breach of contract and sought to foreclose the
mechanic’s lien.
Appellant appeared in propria persona at the court trial. Both appellant and QFHI
allege in their briefs that appellant orally requested a continuance in order to obtain
counsel, which the trial court denied. The record does not contain appellant’s
continuance request or the trial court’s ruling on the request. But we treat QFHI’s
allegations as factual admissions because, while briefs are outside the record, they are
reliable indications of a party’s position on the facts, and we may use statements therein
as admissions against a party. (Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d
1125, 1152; Moore v. Powell (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 583, 586, fn. 2 [“A factual statement
in a brief may be treated as an admission or stipulation when adverse to the party making
it.”].)
At trial, appellant claimed QFHI’s work was substandard, and she had an oral
agreement with QFHI to reduce the contract price to $17,000. The trial court ruled for
QFHI on both causes of action. Appellant timely appealed.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.
2 Civil Code section 8400 et seq.
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DISCUSSION
Appellant raises two claims on appeal. First, she contends the matter must be
remanded because the trial court’s ruling provided no evidence that it considered factors
affecting its decision on her request to continue trial. Second, appellant argues the trial
court abused its discretion in denying her request because nothing in the record shows the
trial court considered her qualification for appointed counsel under the Shriver Act. We
disagree.
I
Trial Continuance
On appeal, we presume a trial court’s judgment to be correct. (Nielsen v. Gibson
(2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 318, 324.) “ ‘ “All intendments and presumptions are indulged
to support [the judgment] on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be
affirmatively shown.” ’ ” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140.) It is the
appellant’s burden to provide an adequate record to show reversible error on appeal.
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.) “ ‘Failure to provide an adequate record
on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].’ ” (Ibid.)
Here, the record is silent on the reasons behind the trial court’s denial of
appellant’s request. It contains no reporter’s transcript, or any written order by the trial
court denying appellant’s continuance request. Appellant contends a silent record
supports the conclusion that the trial court failed to consider relevant factors and abused
its discretion. As stated above, established law holds otherwise. Appellant fails to carry
her burden of affirmatively demonstrating error on appeal. We must therefore presume
the trial court properly considered and weighed the factors affecting trial continuances,
and correctly denied appellant’s request. Appellant’s pro. per. status in the trial court
does not lower her burden of proof on appeal. (Gamet v. Blanchard (2001)
91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1285 [“propria persona litigants are not entitled to any special
treatment from the courts”].)
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II
The Shriver Act
In 2009, the Legislature enacted the Shriver Act, creating a pilot project to provide
legal counsel to “low-income parties in civil matters involving critical issues affecting
basic human needs.” (§ 68651, subd. (a); Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem.
Bill No. 590 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 12, 2009, p. 1.) These issues
include housing-related matters such as evictions and foreclosures where low-income
individuals face the loss of their homes. (§ 68651, subd. (b)(1); Sen. Rules Com., 3d
reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 330 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 9,
2019, pp. 1, 6; Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 590 (2009-2010
Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 12, 2009, p. 4.)
The Shriver programs are available at selected courts approved by the Judicial
Council. (§ 68651, subd. (b)(1).) These courts refer low-income persons to legal
services agencies, which in turn determine the individuals’ eligibility for counsel.
(§ 68651, subd. (b)(4), (7).) Due to scarce funding, “eligibility for representation shall be
limited to clients whose household income falls at or below 200 percent of the federal
poverty level.” (§ 68651, subd. (b)(1).)
The record does not show that the Shriver program was available at Sacramento
County Superior Court at the time of the trial. The trial court could not make a Shriver
program referral when it was not a participating court selected by the Judicial Council.
In any event, this is not a housing-related matter under the Shriver Act. It involves
a dispute over the improvement to appellant’s home, not an eviction or foreclosure of
appellant’s house. The record contains no evidence showing QFHI’s allegedly
unsatisfactory work affected appellant’s basic human needs or put appellant at risk of
losing her home.
Moreover, the record shows appellant ordered a $35,000 upgrade to her residence.
At trial, Williams argued she had an oral agreement with QFHI to pay $17,000, and that
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QFHI’s substandard work was not worth $35,000. Appellant made no claims, however,
that she could not afford the payment or that she was indigent. Based on the record, even
if the Shriver program were available, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude
appellant was not indigent and did not qualify for referral under the Shriver Act. (See
Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1140 [all presumptions are indulged to support
the trial court’s judgment on a silent record].)
Appellant’s requests that we extend the application of the Shriver Act to require
trial courts to “address the merits of the court requiring or permitting a court appointed
counsel for civil litigants (a ‘Gideon’ Attorney) when a pro-se litigant requests an
attorney and where the case effects [sic] the pro-se litigant’s shelter, sustenance, safety,
health, and/or child custody.” This directly contradicts the plain language of section
68651, subdivision (b)(4). Under this subdivision, legal services agencies authorized by
the Judicial Council, rather than trial courts, are responsible for making determinations of
eligibility and providing representation. (§ 68651, subd. (b)(4).) When the statutory
language is clear, we must follow its plain meaning. (Mendoza v. Fonseca McElroy
Grinding Co., Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1118, 1125.)
III
Motions for Sanctions
By written motion, QFHI requests monetary sanctions consisting of attorney’s fees
it incurred on appeal and an additional $15,000. It contends both of appellant’s
arguments on appeal are frivolous, showing a bad faith intent to delay the effect of the
trial court’s adverse judgment.
On motion of a party or on its own motion, an appellate court may impose
sanctions on a party or an attorney for taking a frivolous appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 907;
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(1).) “[A]n appeal should be held to be frivolous only
when it is prosecuted for an improper motive—to harass the respondent or delay the
effect of an adverse judgment—or when it indisputably has no merit—when any
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reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without merit.”
(In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650.) But “[a]n appeal that is simply
without merit is not by definition frivolous and should not incur sanctions.” (Ibid.)
Here, appellant’s arguments are meritless, but this alone does not give rise to
sanctions. The record contains no evidence that this appeal was made to harass QFHI or
to delay the effect of the trial court’s judgment. The appeal was timely filed, and
appellant did not seek an extension of time to file her briefs. Based on the record, the
high standard of sanctions has not been met.
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment. QFHI’s request for sanctions is denied. QFHI shall
recover costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).) This matter is remanded
to the trial court to determine the amount of costs. On remand, QFHI may file a motion
to seek attorney’s fees it incurred in defending this case on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.1702(c).)
\s\ ,
MCADAM, J.*
We concur:
\s\ ,
DUARTE, Acting P. J.
\s\ ,
KRAUSE, J.
* Judge of the Yolo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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