In re Anthony W. CA4/1 ( 2013 )

Filed 12/20/13 In re Anthony W. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re ANTHONY W., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
D063379
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. JCM232543)
v.
ANTHONY W.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Carolyn M.
Caietti, Judge. Affirmed.
Cynthia A. Grimm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr. and Randall D.
Einhorn, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The court found true the allegations in the People's petition that Anthony W.
committed robbery (Pen. Code,1 § 211; count 1); commercial burglary (§ 459; count 2);
grand theft (§ 487, subd. (c); count 3); and simple battery (§ 242; count 4).
On appeal, Anthony contends the court erred when, over his objection, it admitted
statements he contends were coerced in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S.
436 (Miranda). Specifically, he contends police deliberately undermined his Miranda
rights with a two-step interrogation tactic in violation of Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542
U.S. 600 (Seibert) when police arrested him and ordered him to retrieve incriminating
evidence without first giving him a Miranda warning and when police later interrogated
him at the police station after he received and waived his Miranda rights. Anthony thus
seeks to suppress the incriminating statements he made at the police station.
Anthony also contends the probation condition requiring him to take psychotropic
medication if prescribed infringes upon his constitutional right to privacy and protected
liberty interest under the due process clause.
As we explain, we reject Anthony's contentions and affirm the order of the court.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2012, Donna Ollic was working the night shift at a convenience store
when two black males entered the store. One was dressed in a black hoodie sweatshirt
and the other in a long-sleeved striped hoodie. The two males stayed inside the store for
about 10 minutes before making a purchase. When Ollic opened the register to make
change, they attempted to take money from the register. A struggle ensued, and the two
males fled the scene with $42.
Officer James Joyce responded to a radio call that two black males had stolen a
large amount of $1's and $5's from the register of a convenience store. As Joyce was
driving to the location of the robbery, he noticed a car with three black males traveling in
the opposite direction. As a result of the timing of the radio call and the location of the
car to the crime scene, Joyce conducted a traffic stop of the car. Joyce explained to the
occupants that a robbery had just occurred and that they matched the description of the
assailants. Joyce asked if any of the occupants had any money on them. One of the
occupants responded he had a "wad of ones" and showed the money to the officer.
As Joyce ordered the occupants out of the car, he received a call from another
officer who informed Joyce he had made contact with two black males near the location
of the robbery and needed code cover.2 Joyce took down the license plate number of the
car and told the three males they were "free to leave."
2 The record shows one of the subjects began fighting with the officer, and he
requested all available units respond to his location immediately.
3
While on his way to provide assistance to the other officer, Joyce received a call
and learned the two black males stopped by the other officer were not suspects in the
robbery. Joyce testified his "heart dropped" when he heard this information because he
"figured [he] had the three [responsible] individuals sitting on the curb and . . . [had] just
let them go."
Joyce next proceeded to the scene of the robbery and watched the store's
surveillance video. Joyce identified the subjects in the video as two of the occupants of
the car he had just stopped. Joyce testified that one of the black males in the video was
wearing a long-sleeved striped hoodie, which was the same or similar hoodie worn by
one of the occupants in the car pulled over by Joyce. This individual was later identified
as Anthony.
Joyce ran the license number of the car and found it belonged to Rene Littlefield.
Joyce drove to the Littlefield residence, found the three occupants of the car inside the
residence and placed them under arrest. After handcuffing Anthony and before reading
the minor his Miranda rights, Joyce told Anthony to get the "clothing he was wearing"
during the robbery as well as "any money he possibly had from the robbery."
Once at the police station, Joyce for the first time read Anthony his Miranda
rights. Anthony waived those rights and told Joyce that he and his friend were "joking
about doing a robbery at a [convenience store]. They parked about two blocks away.
[Anthony] and [another minor] . . . were going to purchase a bag of donuts, and they
pushed the clerk away and took ones and fives."
4
After denying Anthony's motion to exclude evidence (discussed post), the court at
the adjudication hearing made true findings as to all counts but stayed sentence on counts
3 and 4 under section 654. The court ordered, among other things, that Anthony comply
with several probation conditions including to "participate in psychiatric/psychological
counseling and if prescribed, take psychotropic medication as directed."
DISCUSSION
A. Miranda Violation
At the adjudication hearing, Anthony moved to exclude the statements he made at
the police station because he contends they allegedly were made in violation of his
Miranda rights. The court denied the motion, finding that even though Joyce should have
given Anthony a Miranda warning before instructing the minor to get the clothes he was
wearing during the robbery and any money from the robbery, there was no showing of
coercion by Joyce. As such, the court ruled to admit the statements.
1. Guiding Principles
Constitutional protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require all
custodial interrogations be preceded by a warning of an individual's Miranda rights.
(Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436.) A two-step interrogation procedure occurs when an
officer questions a suspect and deliberately withholds Miranda warnings until the suspect
confesses, at which time the officer gives Miranda warnings, obtains a waiver and elicits
a confession repetitive of the first unwarned confession. (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at
pp. 604, 609-611 (plur. opn. of Souter, J.).) This sort of question-first interrogation is
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used essentially "to get a confession the suspect would not make if he understood his
rights at the outset." (Id. at p. 613.)
In Seibert, the court found the two-step procedure was deliberately used to
undermine a suspect's Miranda rights. There, the defendant was questioned at the police
station for about 30-40 minutes while an officer squeezed the defendant's arm until she
finally admitted to killing a young man in a fire. She was then given a 20-minute break
before officers "turned on a tape recorder, gave Seibert Miranda warnings, and obtained a
signed waiver of rights from her." (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 605.)
In determining that the two-step procedure was deliberately used, the court looked
at how, where and to what extent the interrogation took place. The court concluded
"[t]he unwarned interrogation was conducted in the station house, and the questioning
was systematic, exhaustive, and managed with psychological skill. When police were
finished there was little, if anything, of incriminating potential left unsaid. The warned
phase of questioning proceeded after a pause of only 15 to 20 minutes, in the same place
as the unwarned segment." (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 616.) Thus, the court
concluded police deliberately used the two-step procedure "to undermine the Miranda
warnings." (Ibid.)
The "[f]ailure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of
compulsion . . . [and] unwarned statements that are otherwise voluntary . . . must
nevertheless be excluded from evidence under Miranda." (Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470
U.S. 298, 307 (Elstad).) Although "Miranda requires . . . unwarned admission[s] must be
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suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn . . . on whether it is
knowingly and voluntarily made." (Id. at p. 309.) Thus, "absent deliberately coercive or
improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, . . . subsequent administration of
Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement
ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier
statement." (Id. at p. 314.)
In Elstad, the court concluded the two-step interrogation procedure was not
deliberately used to undermine Miranda and therefore the defendant's statements were
admissible. There, the police went to the young suspect's house to take him into custody
on a charge of burglary and, before the arrest, one of the officers had a brief encounter
with the suspect. (Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 315.) The court characterized the
officer's omission of Miranda warnings in Elstad as "unaccompanied by any actual
coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise
his free will." (Id. at p. 309.)
In sum, the rule we apply is the following: if police deliberately use a two-step
interrogation procedure, then Seibert applies and the postwarned statements of a
defendant must be excluded. However, if the two-step procedure was not deliberately
used, then Elstad applies and the postwarned statements may still be admissible so long
as they were voluntarily given.
To determine deliberateness, the court first determines whether there is "objective
evidence and any available subjective evidence, such as an officer's testimony, [to]
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support an inference that the two-step procedure was used to undermine the Miranda
warning." (United States v. Williams (9th Cir. 2006) 435 F.3d 1148, 1158, fn. omitted.)
Objective evidence includes the "timing, setting and completeness of the prewarning
interrogation, the continuity of police personnel and the overlapping content of the pre-
and postwarn[ed] statements." (Ibid.)
In reviewing a challenge to evidence based on Miranda, we first review the factual
basis for the trial court's decision under the substantial evidence standard of review.
(People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) Once the facts have been determined, we
review the decision to admit the statements under the de novo review standard. Under
that standard, we independently determine whether the statements were lawfully admitted
into evidence. (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 918.)
2. Analysis
The record shows Officer Joyce placed Anthony under arrest and asked him to
retrieve his clothes and any money from the robbery. Joyce knew from the vehicle stop
as well as from watching the surveillance video from the convenience store that Anthony
had changed his clothes after the robbery. Joyce did not ask Anthony any questions
while at the Littlefield residence. Instead, the record shows Joyce questioned Anthony
for the first time at the police station after he read Anthony his Miranda rights.
We conclude the court's finding that Joyce did not coerce Anthony while at the
Littlefield residence is amply supported by the evidence in the record. Indeed, unlike the
defendant in Seibert, who was subject to interrogation for 30 or 40 minutes while an
8
officer squeezed her arm, in the instant case Joyce merely told Anthony to retrieve certain
items of evidence after Anthony was placed under arrest. We thus independently
conclude Officer Joyce's request of Anthony is similar to the conduct of police in Elstad,
as it was "unaccompanied by any actual coercion . . . calculated to undermine the
suspect's ability to exercise his free will." (See Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 309.) As
such, we reject Anthony's contention he was subject to a deliberate, two-step
interrogation procedure designed by police to circumvent his Miranda rights.
But that does not end our inquiry. We next turn to the issue whether Anthony
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights when he spoke to Joyce at the police station.
"The essence of voluntariness is whether the government obtained the statements
by physical or psychological coercion such that the defendant's will was overborne."
(United States v. Rith (10th Cir. 1999) 164 F.3d 1323, 1333.) The standard of review for
voluntariness challenges is similar to the standard we employ for purposes of Miranda,
discussed ante: "We review independently a trial court's determinations as to whether
coercive police activity was present and whether the statement was voluntary. [Citation.]
We review the trial court's findings as to the circumstances surrounding the confession,
including the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation, for
substantial evidence. [Citation.] '[T]o the extent the facts conflict, we accept the version
favorable to the People if supported by substantial evidence.' [Citation.]" (People v.
Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1093.)
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Anthony contends the court erred when it found he voluntarily waived his
Miranda rights at the police station. We disagree. Rather, the record shows that Joyce
read Anthony his Miranda rights at the station; that Anthony indicated he understood
those rights; and that Anthony in response stated he was willing to speak with Joyce.
Anthony then provided statements regarding the details of the robbery. We thus conclude
substantial evidence supports the finding of waiver and independently conclude the
statements were lawfully admitted into evidence. (See People v. Weaver, supra, 26
Cal.4th at p. 918.)
B. Probation Condition
Anthony contends the probation requirement that he take all prescribed
psychotropic medication if prescribed is unconstitutional and should be stricken.
1. Additional Background
At the detention hearing, defense counsel stated Anthony was currently taking
medication and seeing a psychiatrist. Anthony's mother, however, stated her son was not
currently taking any medication but understood he should be taking certain medication.
According to the probation officer's report, Anthony's mother told probation she
had spoken with Anthony about the incident and "he explained to her that he was there
during the offense, but did not feel like he was really 'there.' He told his mother it felt
like an out of body experience." Anthony's mother also told probation about a time when
she "heard the minor talking to himself," and Anthony also told his mother "he hears
voices." Anthony's mother expressed a concern for Anthony's mental health due to the
10
long history of schizophrenia in her family and Anthony's exposure to abuse while living
with his father.
Anthony was evaluated by a doctor, but the doctor did not prescribe any
medication at that time. According to the probation social study report, the doctor was
scheduled to meet with Anthony again two weeks later, but the record does not indicate
whether this occurred or whether any medication was prescribed.
During the disposition hearing, the court imposed a number of probation
conditions on Anthony. One condition it imposed was to order Anthony to "participate in
psychiatric/psychological counseling and if prescribed, take psychotropic medication as
directed." (Italics added.) The record shows defense counsel objected to the imposition
of other probation conditions but did not object to this particular condition.3
2. Guiding Principles and Analysis
Welfare and Institutions Code section 727, subdivision (a) provides: "If a minor is
adjudged a ward of the court on the ground that he or she is a person described by Section
601 or 602, the court may make any reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody,
conduct, maintenance, and support of the minor, including medical treatment, subject to
further order of the court." (Italics added.)
A court's discretion in ordering a condition of probation upon a minor must be
reasonable and must serve justice and the rehabilitation and reform of the minor. (See In
3 We need not decide whether Anthony forfeited this claim, as the People contend,
because, as discussed post, we conclude this issue is not ripe for decision on the basis of
the limited record before us.
11
re Antonio C. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1033; see also In re Daniel R. (2006) 144
Cal.App.4th 1, 6.) A probation condition is considered invalid when "it '(1) has no
relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct
which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably
related to future criminality . . . .'" (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486.)
Here, the court ordered Anthony to undergo a psychological evaluation and if
ordered to do so, take any prescribed psychotropic drugs. Significantly, the record is
silent regarding whether Anthony was placed on any medications. Given the mental
health issues and concerns raised at the hearing, including by his own mother, we
conclude the court properly exercised its discretion when it ordered Anthony to undergo
psychiatric/psychological counseling. (See In re Luis F. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 176,
192 [noting probation condition requiring the minor to take prescribed medication was
not unlawful and noting the minor could petition the court for modification of the terms
of probation requiring this condition if the minor in the future "decide[s] that 'the side
effects outweigh the benefits of his prescribed [medication]'"].)
However, because the record is silent regarding whether Anthony was in fact
prescribed any medication(s) as a result of the counseling, we further conclude his
challenge to this probation condition is not ripe. (See Hunt v. Superior Court (1999) 21
Cal.4th 984, 998 [noting the "ripeness requirement prevents courts from issuing purely
advisory opinions, or considering a hypothetical state of facts in order to give general
guidance rather than to resolve a specific legal dispute"]; see also People v. Johnson
12
(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 776, 789, fn. 4 [noting the ripeness doctrine "'is rooted in the
fundamental concept that the proper role of the judiciary does not extend to the resolution
of abstract differences of legal opinion'"].)
In reaching this conclusion, we note that if medications are subsequently
prescribed by Anthony's doctor and Anthony opposes taking such medications as a
condition of his probation, Anthony can then challenge this condition in the trial court,
where a full and complete record—including the necessary medical information—can be
developed on this issue.4
4 In reaching our decision, we are not unaware of Anthony's contention that he has a
constitutionally-protected privacy and liberty interest in avoiding the coerced
administration of psychotropic drugs, citing United States v. Williams (9th Cir. 2004) 356
F.3d 1045, 1053-1055 (Williams) among other cases. We agree with the reasoning of the
court in In re Luis F., which, under facts somewhat similar to those before us, rejected the
procedural requirements imposed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal in Williams in
connection with various federal statutes it interpreted regarding the supervised release of
a defendant who had been voluntarily taking "'antipsychotic' or 'neuroleptic' drugs"
(Williams, supra, 356 F.3d at p. 1047, fn. 2) that were causing the defendant to suffer
significant and unwanted side effects: "[There are] significant differences between this
case [i.e., In re Luis F.] and Williams that lead us to decline to adopt, in the context of
this case, a blanket requirement of 'necessity' for a medication condition of probation,
explicit consideration of less restrictive alternatives, or 'on-the-record, medically-
grounded findings' as a matter of federal constitutional imperative. First, we are dealing
with a juvenile offender, not an adult. Second, Williams reached its conclusion about the
required procedures under the federal statutes pertaining to supervised release, which of
course do not govern our determination. Third, to the extent Williams called for
independent medical evaluation, and to the extent such input is statutorily required in
other contexts [citation], that input was supplied in this case . . . . Fourth, and as noted
above, there is no evidence in the record before us that the medications subject to [the
minor's] condition of probation cause serious side effects comparable to those discussed
in Williams, nor do they implicate the invasion of bodily privacy and sexual function . . . .
Finally, because [the minor] was already taking psychotropic medications for depression
and social anxiety disorder—and apparently had no objection to continuing to do so
[citation]—the aspect of involuntary administration of unwanted mind-altering drugs
does not come into play here." (In re Luis F., supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at pp. 187-188.)
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
AARON, J.
IRION, J.
14