Pub. Employment Relations Bd. v. Bellflower Unified School etc. ( 2018 )


Menu:
  • Filed 12/4/18
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FOUR
    PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT                        No. B288594
    RELATIONS BOARD,
    (Los Angeles County
    Plaintiff and Respondent,         Super. Ct. No. BS161585)
    v.
    BELLFLOWER UNIFIED
    SCHOOL DISTRICT,
    Defendant and Appellant;
    CALIFORNIA SCHOOL
    EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
    CHAPTER NO. 32,
    Real Party in Interest.
    APPEAL from order granting petition for writ of
    mandate. Mary H. Strobel, Judge. Affirmed.
    Law Offices of Eric Bathen, Eric J. Bathen, and
    Richard D. Brady for Defendant and Appellant Bellflower
    Unified School Distrct.
    J. Felix DeLaTorre, General Counsel, Wendi L. Ross,
    Deputy General Counsel, Laura Z. Davis and Sheena J.
    Farro, Regional Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent
    Public Employment Relations Board.
    Andrew J. Kahn, Chief Counsel and Christina C.
    Bleuler, Deputy Chief Counsel, for Real Party in Interest
    California School Employees Association.
    _________________________________________
    Real party in interest California School Employees
    Association (CSEA), the exclusive representative of most
    classified employees employed by appellant Bellflower
    Unified School District (the District), filed two unfair
    practice charges against appellant in 2010 and 2013 under
    the Education Employment Relations Act (Govt. Code,
    § 3540 et seq., EERA).1 After notice and hearing, respondent
    Public Employment Relations Board (PERB or the Board),
    the agency charged with interpreting and administering the
    EERA, issued two decisions and orders requiring, among
    other things, that appellant post two specific notices to its
    employees. After the decisions and orders became final in
    1       Undesignated statutory references are to the Government
    Code.
    2
    2015, appellant refused to post the notices, claiming that
    they were out of date and misleading. PERB filed the
    underlying enforcement proceeding, and the trial court
    issued a writ of mandate instructing appellant to comply
    with the Board’s two orders. Appellant appeals, contending
    that PERB failed to prove the decisions and orders were
    issued pursuant to its established procedures, and that
    PERB’s General Counsel abused his discretion under a
    regulation authorizing him to conduct an investigation or
    hearing prior to filing an enforcement proceeding.
    We find substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
    conclusion that the decisions and orders were issued
    pursuant to PERB’s procedures, and that there was no abuse
    of discretion on the part of the General Counsel.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A. Decision and Order No. 2385
    During the 2009 to 2010 school year, appellant decided
    to close one of its elementary schools, Las Flores, at the end
    of the school year. The proposed closure had the potential to
    eliminate some classified positions. On multiple occasions
    CSEA demanded a meeting to negotiate the effects of the
    proposal, but no meeting occurred. On November 10, 2010,
    CSEA filed an unfair practice charge with PERB, alleging
    that appellant failed to negotiate the closure, and that the
    3
    closure caused layoffs and reductions in hours, in violation of
    section 3543.5, subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of the EERA.2
    The unfair practice charge was assigned to PERB’s
    Office of General Counsel (OGC) for investigation and
    review. The attorney to whom it was assigned notified
    appellant that the charge was being reviewed and gave
    appellant an opportunity to file a response.
    On January 20, 2012, PERB issued a complaint,
    alleging that appellant had committed an unfair practice
    and had violated section 3543.5, subdivisions (a) through (c)
    of the EERA, by failing to meet and bargain in good faith
    with CSEA over the effects of the proposed layoffs, and that
    appellant had implemented layoffs and reductions in hours
    for its employees. The OGC convened an informal
    conference with the parties to explore the possibility of
    settling the complaint. The matter did not settle.
    2       Section 3543.5, subdivisions (a) through (c) provide: “It is
    unlawful for a public school employer to do any of the following:
    [¶] (a) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals on employees, to
    discriminate or threaten to discriminate against employees, or
    otherwise to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees because
    of their exercise of rights guaranteed by this chapter.
    . . .[¶] (b) Deny to employee organizations rights guaranteed to
    them by this chapter. [¶] (c) Refuse or fail to meet and negotiate
    in good faith with an exclusive representative. Knowingly
    providing an exclusive representative with inaccurate
    information, whether or not in response to a request for
    information, regarding the financial resources of the public school
    employer constitutes a refusal or failure to meet and negotiate in
    good faith.”
    4
    The matter was assigned to an administrative law
    judge (ALJ) for resolution. At a noticed hearing on July 10,
    2012, CSEA presented evidence. Appellant appeared, but
    declined to present evidence. On October 12, 2012, after the
    parties submitted closing briefs, the ALJ issued a proposed
    decision, finding that appellant had violated the EERA by
    failing to bargain in good faith with CSEA over the effects of
    its proposed layoffs.
    Both sides filed “exceptions” to the ALJ’s proposed
    decision, causing the matter to be sent to PERB for a final
    decision. On June 30, 2014, the Board issued Decision No.
    2385, essentially adopting the ALJ’s findings of fact and
    conclusions of law and rejecting both parties’ exceptions.
    Included with the decision was Order No. 2385, requiring
    appellant to cease and desist from: (1) failing to bargain in
    good faith with CSEA over the foreseeable impact of the
    closure of Las Flores and the abolishment of classified
    positions, and (2) denying classified bargaining unit
    members the right to be represented by CSEA. It required
    appellant to take the following affirmative actions: (1) meet
    and negotiate in good faith with CSEA, (2) provide affected
    bargaining unit members with limited back pay, (3) post a
    specific “Notice to Employees” both at employee work
    locations and by electronic means for 30 consecutive work
    days, and (4) provide PERB with written notification of the
    5
    actions taken to comply with the order.3 Requirement (2),
    the “limited backpay remedy,” required CSEA to “submit its
    3      The appended Notice to Employees stated that appellant
    would “CEASE AND DESIST” from: “1. Failing to bargain in
    good faith with CSEA over the foreseeable impacts of the closure
    of Las Flores and the abolishment of classified positions; [¶]
    2. Denying classified bargaining unit members the right to be
    represented by CSEA; [¶] 3. Denying CSEA the right to represent
    its members.” It said appellant would take the following
    “AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO EFFECTUATE THE
    POLICIES OF THE EERA”: “1. Within twenty (20) days of the
    service of a final decision in this matter, meet and negotiate in
    good faith with CSEA, upon receipt of CSEA’s proposals
    addressing the foreseeable effect of the May 2010, decision to
    close Las Flores and abolish classified positions. [¶] 2.
    Compensate at their normal rate, any CSEA bargaining unit
    members who were affected by layoffs resulting from the May 6,
    2010, decision by the District’s Board of Education . . . to close
    Las Flores and abolish classified positions. CSEA shall submit
    its bargaining proposals within twenty (20) days following the
    service of this decision and order. Should CSEA fail to submit
    such proposals within this twenty (20)-day time frame, this
    limited backpay remedy shall not go into effect. Provided CSEA
    submits its proposals, payments shall remain in effect until the
    earliest of the following conditions: (1) the date the parties reach
    an agreement on those subjects pertaining to the effects of the
    May 2010 [decision], by the District School Board to close Las
    Flores and abolish classified positions; (2) the parties[] exhaust
    the [‘]negotiating an impasse[’] procedures prescribed by EERA;
    or (3) subsequent failure by CSEA to bargain in good faith.” The
    notice stated it was an “official notice” that “must remain posted
    for at least thirty (30) consecutive workdays from the date of
    posting” and “must not be reduced in size, defaced, altered or
    covered with any other material.”
    6
    bargaining proposals within twenty (20) days following the
    service of this Decision and Order,” and stated that if CSEA
    failed to submit such proposals within the requisite time
    frame, “this limited backpay remedy shall not go into effect.”
    Appellant’s petition for review in the Court of Appeal
    was denied. Its petition in the Supreme Court was also
    denied. After Decision No. 2385 became final, CSEA
    withdrew its request to bargain, eliminating requirements
    (1) and (2) of the order. This left requirements (3) and (4) --
    posting the Notice to Employees and notifying PERB of the
    actions taken to comply with the order.
    In August 2015, PERB advised appellant by letter that
    Decision No. 2385 was final, giving appellant until
    September 15, 2015 to comply by filing a statement
    describing the dates the notice to Employees was posted and
    a computation of the days deemed to be work days.
    Appellant responded, stating that it had no location “where
    notices ‘customarily are posted,’” and that it had sent no
    electronic notices because, in its view, it had no employees to
    whom the notice applied. Appellant reported that it had,
    however, posted a modified notice in its personnel office.4 In
    4        The notice posted by appellant stated: “After a hearing in
    Unfair Practice Case No. LA-CE-5508, California School
    Employees Association and its Chapter 32 v. Bellflower Unified
    School District, in which all parties had the right to participate; it
    has been found that the Bellflower Unified School District
    (District) during the 2009-2010 school year violated the [EERA]
    . . . . [¶] As a result of this conduct, we have been ordered to post
    (Fn. is continued on the next page.)
    7
    subsequent letters, appellant contended that posting the
    Notice to Employees required by the decision “would be very
    misleading to all classified employees because of CSEA’s
    decision not to request bargaining or compensation.” The
    OGC responded that appellant had a “fundamental
    misunderstanding . . . regarding the remedial purpose of a
    notice posting. The purpose of a notice posting is not solely
    to inform those directly affected by a respondent’s unlawful
    act. As the Board explained in Trustees of the California
    State University (1988) PERB Decision No. HO-U-335-H
    [1988 Cal. PERB LEXIS 49] “Order No. Ad-174-H[] . . . : [¶]
    ‘[T]he purpose of a posting requirement is to inform all who
    would naturally be concerned (i.e., employees of the District,
    as well as management and supervisory personnel who carry
    out District policies) of activity found to be unlawful under
    the Act in order to provide guidance and prevent a
    reoccurrence.’”5
    PERB made multiple attempts to obtain appellant’s
    compliance. On March 2, 2016, the OGC advised appellant
    this notice.” Appellant offered at a later point to post a modified
    notice containing the cease and desist portion of the notice to
    Employees appended to Decision No. 2385.
    5     CSEA sent a letter emphasizing that the notice would
    “inform[] the unit employees of the protections afforded by PERB
    in [events such as] actions by [appellant] to close schools or lay off
    employees without negotiating with their exclusive
    representative.”
    8
    that the Board had authorized it to seek enforcement of
    Order No. 2385 in superior court.6
    B. Decision and Order No. 2455
    In 2012, CSEA received information indicating
    appellant had failed to pay certain employees who had
    worked in July for the July 4th holiday. CSEA asked the
    district superintendent for a list of all unit members
    performing summer work for appellant and for their salary
    warrants. The superintendent initially did not respond and
    later sent a letter claiming to have no obligation to respond,
    but ultimately supplied a list CSEA believed to be
    incomplete.
    On January 11, 2013, CSEA filed an unfair practice
    charge with PERB, alleging that appellant had violated
    section 3543.2, subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of the EERA by
    changing its holiday pay policy without giving CSEA notice
    or an opportunity to bargain. PERB advised appellant of the
    charge and offered it an opportunity to provide a response.
    Appellant filed a preliminary response.
    6     In one of its letters, the General Counsel stated: “[T]he
    General Counsel does not have the authority to make any
    modification to the Board’s orders. On the contrary, I am
    obligated by the [EERA] and PERB’s regulations to insure
    compliance with the orders as written and, if authorized by the
    Board, to initiate an enforcement action in the superior court.
    [Citation.]”
    9
    On June 3, 2013, after investigation and review, PERB
    issued a complaint, alleging that appellant had committed
    an unfair practice by changing its holiday policy without
    affording CSEA an opportunity to negotiate the decision. An
    informal settlement conference convened by the OGC did not
    resolve the matter.
    A noticed hearing was held on May 30 and July 22,
    2014 at which CSEA presented evidence. Appellant again
    appeared but presented no evidence. On June 22, 2015,
    after receipt of the parties’ post-hearing briefs, the ALJ
    issued a proposed decision and order, finding that appellant
    had violated the EERA by unilaterally changing its policy
    regarding holiday leave pay and failing to timely respond to
    CSEA’s requests for information. Appellant filed exceptions
    to the proposed decision.
    On September 30, 2015, the Board issued Decision No.
    2455, adopting the ALJ’s proposed decision. The Board
    specifically rejected appellant’s contention that certain
    employees, such as bus drivers who did not work 12-month
    assignments, were not entitled to holiday pay, finding that
    “[u]nder the [collective bargaining agreement], employees
    included within the bargaining unit are entitled to holiday
    pay whether they work the holiday or not so long as they are
    on paid status on the working day immediately preceding or
    succeeding the holiday. The District’s attempt to remove bus
    drivers and other CSEA-represented bargaining unit
    employees from coverage under the [collective bargaining
    agreement] by referring to them as ‘as needed’ or to their
    10
    assignments as ‘extra-duty or summer session’ or ‘beyond
    their “regular” assignments’ fails. These distinctions are
    nowhere to be found in the parties’ negotiated labor
    agreement.”
    The decision included a remedial order. Order No.
    2455 required appellant to cease and desist from: (1) failing
    to negotiate in good faith by enacting unilateral policy
    changes and failing to timely respond to requests for
    information, (2) interfering with the right of unit employees
    to be represented by CSEA, and (3) denying CSEA its right
    to represent unit employees. The order required appellant to
    take the following affirmative actions: (1) rescind the policy
    change regarding holiday leave and abide by the terms of the
    parties’ collective bargaining agreement; (2) make whole the
    affected employees for financial losses suffered; (3) either
    provide a complete response to CSEA’s request for
    information or verify, in writing, to CSEA that the responses
    already provided were complete; (4) post a specific Notice to
    Employees in the form appended to the decision, both at
    employee work locations and electronically for 30
    consecutive work days; and (5) provide PERB with written
    notification of the actions taken to comply with the order by
    a certain deadline.7 Appellant did not seek judicial review of
    Decision No. 2455.
    7      The appended Notice to Employees stated that appellant
    would “cease and desist” from: “1. Failing to negotiate in good
    faith by enacting unilateral policy changes concerning issues
    within the scope of representation and by failing to timely
    (Fn. is continued on the next page.)
    11
    On November 5, 2015, PERB sent a letter informing
    appellant that Decision No. 2455 was final, and identifying
    the remedial action to be taken by appellant to comply with
    Order No. 2455: posting the Notice to Employees in the
    appropriate places for the requisite number of days and
    describing the steps taken to rescind the holiday pay policy
    change, make all unit employees affected by the change
    whole, and provide a complete response to CSEA’s request
    for information or certify the previous response was
    complete. The letter instructed appellant to file a
    respond to requests for necessary and relevant information by
    CSEA [¶] 2. Interfering with the rights of unit employees to be
    represented by CSEA. [¶] 3. Denying CSEA its right to represent
    unit employees.” It further stated that appellant would take the
    following “affirmative actions designed to effectuate the policies
    of EERA”: “1. Rescind the policy change regarding payment of
    holiday leave pay and abide by the terms under the July 1, 2007-
    June 30, 2010 collective bargaining agreement . . . . [¶] 2. Make-
    whole unit employees . . . for financial losses suffered as a result
    of the District’s unlawful action who were working and in paid
    status on either July 3, 2012 or July 5, 2012. Any financial losses
    should be augmented with interest at a rate of 7 percent per
    annum. [¶] 3. Either: (1) provide a complete response to CSEA’s
    request for information dated September 19, 2012; or (2) verify,
    in writing, to CSEA that the responses provided thus far are
    complete.” Like the prior notice, the notice required by Order No.
    2455 stated it was an “OFFICIAL NOTICE” that “MUST
    REMAIN POSTED FOR AT LEAST THIRTY (30)
    CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING”
    and “MUST NOT BE REDUCED IN SIZE, DEFACED,
    ALTERED OR COVERED WITH ANY OTHER MATERIAL.”
    12
    compliance statement by November 19, 2015. PERB
    extended the deadline several times thereafter.
    Appellant responded by stating that it had not posted
    the requisite Notice to Employees because it had no “place
    where it customarily post[s] items for CSEA unit members,”
    and because the notice “does not represent the current
    status of the case and would mislead employees that they
    would be entitled to some compensation . . . .” Appellant
    further stated that it had “already paid the one employee
    [who] requested and was entitled to compensation for July 4,
    2012 . . . .”8
    During the exchange of letters, appellant proposed
    posting a modified notice containing only the cease and
    desist language from the Notice to Employees appended to
    Decision No. 2455. The General Counsel reiterated: “[T]he
    General Counsel does not have the authority to make any
    modifications to the Board’s orders.” The OGC reminded
    appellant that the purpose of a notice posting was not solely
    to inform those directly affected by a respondent’s unlawful
    act, but also to “‘inform all who would naturally be concerned
    . . . of activity found to be unlawful under the Act in order to
    provide guidance and prevent a reoccurrence.’” On March 2,
    8      CSEA disputed that contention, stating in a March 2016
    letter to the OGC that appellant had “failed and refused to make
    whole the affected employees for their financial losses with
    interest.” CSEA further represented that appellant had failed to
    respond to its information requests.
    13
    2016, the OGC informed appellant it had been authorized by
    the Board to seek enforcement of Order No. 2455.
    C. Petition for Writ of Mandate
    On April 1, 2016, PERB filed a petition for writ of
    mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 and
    Government Code section 3542, subdivision (d), seeking to
    enforce its two orders by obtaining a writ instructing
    appellant to comply with the terms and directives set forth
    in the orders.9 The petition asserted that appellant had a
    clear, present and ministerial duty to comply with the
    orders.
    Appellant demurred, contending the matter should
    have been brought as a petition for administrative writ
    under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 and that if
    governed by that provision, the petition was untimely. The
    9      Section 3542, subdivision (d), provides: “If the time to
    petition for extraordinary relief from a board decision has
    expired, the board may seek enforcement of any final decision or
    order in a district court of appeal or a superior court in the
    district where the unit determination or unfair practice case
    occurred. The board shall file in the court the record of the
    proceedings certified by the board, and appropriate evidence
    disclosing the failure to comply with the decision or order. If,
    after hearing, the court determines that the order was issued
    pursuant to procedures established by the board and that the
    person or entity refused to comply with the order, the court shall
    enforce such order by writ of mandamus. The court shall not
    review the merits of the order.”
    14
    court overruled the demurrer, finding that the petition
    sought “to compel [appellant] to comply with . . . PERB’s
    lawful orders and is therefore governed by CCP section
    1085.” After filing an answer, appellant sought to depose a
    number of witnesses and propounded other discovery
    requests, contending discovery was necessary to determine
    whether the orders were issued “‘pursuant to procedures
    established by the [B]oard . . . .’” (Quoting § 3542, subd. (d).)
    The trial court issued a protective order quashing the
    discovery requests, finding that the determination whether
    an order was issued pursuant to PERB’s procedures “would
    generally be based on an administrative record.”
    Relying on the administrative record and the facts set
    forth above, PERB moved for issuance of the requested writ
    of mandate. Appellant opposed, contending that PERB had
    failed to establish that its “enormously complex” procedures
    had been followed prior to issuing the two decisions and
    orders. It cited a number of PERB regulations, but failed to
    identify any applicable provisions that had been overlooked.
    Appellant also cited section 32980(a) of title 8 of the
    California Code of Regulations (CCR), which provides: “The
    [PERB] General Counsel is responsible for determining that
    parties have complied with final Board orders. The General
    Counsel or his/her designate may conduct an inquiry,
    informal conference, investigation, or hearing, as
    appropriate concerning any compliance matter. The Board
    itself may, based on a recommendation of the General
    Counsel, authorize the General Counsel to seek court
    15
    enforcement of a final Board order.” Claiming to have been
    “encouraging resolution through negotiations” when it
    responded to the letters from PERB and the OGC concerning
    its failure to comply with the two orders, appellant
    contended that the General Counsel had failed to exercise
    discretion in determining whether to undertake any or all of
    the actions authorized by the regulation, and that his actions
    preceding the filing of the petition for writ of mandate were
    “‘unreasonable and arbitrary.’” Finally, appellant contended
    that PERB had not established that it had authorized the
    OGC to file the petition for writ of mandate.
    D. Trial Court’s Order
    The trial court granted the petition. In a detailed
    order, the court first addressed whether Order No. 2385 and
    Order No. 2455 were issued pursuant to procedures
    established by the Board. The court concluded, based on its
    review of the complete administrative record, that PERB
    had met its burden under section 3452, subdivision (d): “The
    administrative record demonstrates that PERB followed its
    regulation[s] when ‘issuing’ both orders. For Order No.
    2385, following investigation of the underlying unfair
    practice charge . . . , PERB issued a complaint finding that
    [appellant] had committed an unfair practice under EERA. .
    . . ; Reg. § 32620.[] PERB held a formal administrative
    hearing on the complaint, which resulted in the issuance of a
    proposed decision by a PERB ALJ. . . ; Regs. §§ 32168,
    32170, 32180, 32212, 32215.[] Both [appellant] and CSEA
    16
    appealed the proposed decision to the Board. . . ; Regs.
    §§ 32300, 32310.[] In accordance with Reg. 32320, on June
    30, 2014, the Board issued Decision No. 2385, which
    included Order No 2385, and served a copy on each party via
    U.S. mail. [Citation.] [¶] For Order No. 2455, following
    investigation of the underlying [unfair practice charge],
    PERB issued a complaint finding that [appellant] had
    committed unfair practices under EERA. . . ; Reg. § 32620.[]
    PERB held a formal administrative hearing which resulted
    in the issuance of a proposed decision by a PERB ALJ. . . ;
    Regs. §§ 32168, 32170, 32180, 32212, 32215.[] The District
    subsequently appealed the proposed decision to the Board. . .
    ; Regs. §§ 32300, 32310.[] In accordance with Reg. 32320, on
    September 30, 2015, the Board issued Decision No. 2455,
    containing Order No. 2455, and served it on the parties via
    U.S. mail. [Citation.]”
    The court observed that appellant had failed to identify
    any specific procedures PERB had failed to follow, and found
    that appellant had, in any event, waived any objections to
    the procedural regularity of the orders by failing to litigate
    the issue earlier.
    With respect to the requirement of section 3542,
    subdivision (d), that the petitioner establish noncompliance,
    the court found that appellant had “effectively concede[d]
    that it ha[d] not complied [with either of the two orders].”
    The court next addressed the contention that the
    General Counsel abused the discretion afforded by CCR, title
    8, section 32980. It found no such abuse: “The provision
    17
    that ‘[t]he General Counsel . . . may conduct an inquiry,
    informal conference, investigation, or hearing, as
    appropriate,’ clearly provides the General Counsel’s Office
    with discretion to use a range of tools to effectuate
    compliance with the Board’s decisions and orders.
    [Citation.] . . . [Appellant’s] argument that alternative
    notices should have been negotiated is contrary to the
    mandates of the orders and the language contained in the
    Notices themselves, requiring [appellant to] post unaltered
    copies of the Notices appended to the decisions.
    Furthermore, the record reflects that PERB’s OGC
    conducted an inquiry and investigation into whether
    [appellant] was complying with the orders, by exchanging
    several rounds of correspondence among the parties, and
    holding a teleconference. [Citations.] The District made
    clear in its communications with PERB that it was electing
    not to comply with the orders. [Citations.]” The court
    observed that in any event, “[a] post hoc agreement between
    only [appellant] and PERB to modify the Board’s final orders
    arguably would interfere with CSEA’s right to have the
    orders enforced. [Citation.]”
    The court also addressed appellant’s contention that
    “significant events have occurred since PERB issued the
    [two] Orders so that PERB’s General Counsel should have
    negotiated with [appellant] and acceded to [appellant’s]
    demands to revise the notices.” The court was “not
    persuaded that [appellant’s] reasons for refusing to comply
    with the Orders are appropriately asserted in this
    18
    enforcement proceeding,” citing section 3542, subdivision
    (d)’s directive that the court “‘shall not review the merits of
    the order,’” and noting appellant’s failure to “cite[]
    authorities that would permit the court to assess whether
    the passage of time or other events ha[d] made the orders
    ‘out of date’” or to present “evidence or argument that the
    time delay or other events have entirely mooted the remedial
    purposes of the Notices . . . .” (Italics omitted.) The court
    specifically found appellant’s argument that the two orders
    would be misleading to employees to be “speculative and
    unpersuasive”: “The notices contain the dates of the unfair
    labor practices, so there should be no confusion regarding
    the underlying events. [Citation.]”
    Finally, the court found sufficient evidence that the
    Board had authorized the filing of the enforcement action in
    the OGC’s representations that it had sought and obtained
    such authorization.
    The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate
    directing appellant to “1. Comply with the Board’s order in
    . . . PERB Decision No. 2385, and [¶] 2. Comply with the
    Board’s order in . . . PERB Decision No. 2455,” and to file a
    return to the writ within 30 days, setting forth all measures
    taken to comply with it. This appeal followed.
    DISCUSSION
    A. Standard of Review
    A writ of mandate lies under Code of Civil Procedure
    section 1085 “‘to compel the performance of a legal duty
    19
    imposed on a government official’” or “a public body.”
    (James v. State of California (2014) 
    229 Cal. App. 4th 130
    ,
    136; accord, Hayes v. Temecula Valley Unified School Dist.
    (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 735, 746 (Hayes).) “To obtain relief
    under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, ‘“the petitioner
    must show there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
    remedy; the respondent has a clear, present, and ministerial
    duty to act in a particular way; and the petitioner has a
    clear, present and beneficial right to performance of that
    duty. [Citation.] A ministerial duty is one that is required
    to be performed in a prescribed manner under the mandate
    of legal authority without the exercise of discretion or
    judgment.”’ [Citation.]” 
    (Hayes, supra
    , at p. 746.)
    “In reviewing a judgment granting or denying a writ of
    mandate petition, ‘“we apply the substantial evidence
    standard of review to the court’s factual findings . . . .”’”
    
    (Hayes, supra
    , 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 746.) Factual findings
    are examined for substantial evidence and any conflicts in
    the evidence are resolved in favor of the prevailing party.
    (Ibid.) However, “[o]n questions of law, including statutory
    interpretation, the appellate court applies a de novo review
    and makes its own independent determination.” (Ibid.)
    More fundamentally, we apply the rule that “an
    appealed judgment or order is presumed to be correct” and
    “error must be affirmatively shown.” (Eisenberg et al., Cal.
    Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group
    2017) ¶ 8:15, p. 8-5, italics omitted.) In addition,
    “‘[a]ppellate briefs must provide argument and legal
    20
    authority for the positions taken. “When an appellant fails
    to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with
    reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the
    point as waived.”’ [Citation.]” (Cahill v. San Diego Gas &
    Electric Co. (2011) 
    194 Cal. App. 4th 939
    , 956.) “‘We are not
    bound to develop appellants’ argument for them. [Citation.]
    The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority
    allows this court to treat the contention as waived.’
    [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
    B. The Board’s Compliance with Procedural
    Requirements
    Section 3542, subdivision (d), permits the Board to seek
    enforcement of any final decision or order in superior court.
    The court must issue a writ of mandamus if, after a hearing,
    it determines that “the order was issued pursuant to
    procedures established by the board and that the person or
    entity refused to comply with the order.” Section 3542,
    subdivision (d), specifically prohibits the court from
    “review[ing] the merits of the order.” Appellant contends
    PERB failed to prove that its “complex and extensive”
    procedures were followed. The trial court found otherwise.
    Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding.
    Preliminarily, we observe that section 3542,
    subdivision (d), instructs PERB to submit two things to the
    court to establish entitlement to the requested writ of
    mandate: “the record of the proceeding” and “appropriate
    evidence disclosing the failure to comply with the decision or
    21
    order.” This suggests that the Legislature intended section
    3542, subdivision (d) enforcement hearings to be relatively
    streamlined, not requiring the parties to rehash arguments
    concerning procedural irregularities that were or should
    have been made to the Board when the complaints were filed
    and the hearings conducted. This was the conclusion in
    Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Tex-Cal Land
    Management, Inc. (1985) 
    192 Cal. App. 3d 1530
    , judgment
    affirmed and ordered published (1987) 
    43 Cal. 3d 696
    (Tex-Cal
    I), where the Court of Appeal considered the similar
    language of Government Code section 1160.8.10 The issue
    was whether writs and orders issued under section 1160.8
    were appealable. (Tex-Cal 
    I, supra
    , at p. 1535.) Acknowled-
    ging “the desirability of prompt enforcement of final
    [Agricultural Labor Relations Board] orders in labor
    disputes,” the court nonetheless held that orders issued
    under section 1160.8 were appealable. (Tex-Cal 
    I, supra
    , at
    pp. 1537, 1538.) The court went on to state, however: “As
    we view it, most appeals of such judgments will be frivolous
    in nature. Only two findings are required by the superior
    10    Labor Code section 1160.8 permits the Agricultural Labor
    Relations Board to “apply to the superior court in any county in
    which the unfair labor practice occurred” for enforcement of its
    orders, and requires the court to enforce such orders “by writ of
    injunction or other proper process” if it determines that “the
    order was issued pursuant to procedures established by the board
    and that the person refuses to comply with the order . . . .”
    22
    court as a condition to the issuance of the ‘writ of injunction
    or other proper process’ enforcing the order. These are (1)
    the procedural regularity of the order and (2) the refusal of
    the party subject to the order to comply therewith. . . . By
    the time the enforcement judgment is entered in the typical
    case, any serious question of procedural regularity will have
    long since been corrected or waived by a failure to object to
    the irregularity in a petition for review in the Court of
    Appeal. The question of refusal to comply with the Board
    order is a fact question for the superior court which seldom
    will be overturned on appeal. Normally, Board declarations
    of noncompliance and notice will be sufficient evidence to
    support a ‘refusal’ finding in this context. Thus, it is difficult
    to imagine a case where an appeal from the judgment will be
    filed for any purpose other than to delay the enforcement of
    the judgment.” (Id. at p. 1538.)11
    11     In Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Tex-Cal Land
    Management, Inc. (1987) 
    43 Cal. 3d 696
    (Tex-Cal II), the Supreme
    Court affirmed the holding that section 3542, subdivision (d)
    enforcement actions were appealable, and echoed the Court of
    Appeal’s sentiments: it “sympathize[d] with the Board’s desire
    for prompt enforcement of its final order once the order is beyond
    review on the merits,” “recognize[d] the potential for delay in
    frivolous appeals from superior court enforcement judgments,”
    and agreed that “the issues on appeal from a superior court
    enforcement judgment will be limited. Procedural regularity and
    refusal to comply are the only points which can be raised.” (Tex-
    Cal I
    I, supra
    , at pp. 705-706.) The Supreme Court took the
    unusual step of ordering the Court of Appeal decision published
    notwithstanding its review because “significant Court of Appeal
    (Fn. is continued on the next page.)
    23
    The current appeal falls into the category the court in
    Tex-Cal I warned against: filed for no discernible purpose
    other than to delay the enforcement of the judgment.
    Appellant raised no issues of procedural irregularity in its
    appearances before the Board, in its post-hearing briefs or in
    the petitions seeking review of Decision No. 2385, and offers
    no excuse for its failure to do so. Hence, any objections to
    procedural deficiencies that preceded the issuance of the
    final PERB decisions and orders were “long since . . . waived”
    (Tex-Cal 
    I, supra
    , 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 1538), and the sole
    issue before the court was whether the decisions and orders
    themselves were issued and served in accordance with
    established procedures. The trial court conducted a
    meticulous review of the administrative record, and found
    that PERB had established its compliance with all pertinent
    regulations from the dates the CSEA charges were filed until
    the final decisions and orders were issued. The record amply
    supports that conclusion.
    In the underlying proceeding, PERB provided the
    complete administrative record from which its compliance
    with its procedures prior to issuing the two orders could be
    easily established. Moreover, as it does in its brief on
    appeal, it also summarized in detail the factual and
    opinions should be available as citable precedent with respect to
    issues not reached by us on subsequent review,” and the
    appellate court’s opinion was “beneficial and worthy of
    publication in that regard . . . .” (Id. at 709, fn. 12.)
    24
    procedural history of the two CSEA matters, resolving any
    potential doubt. The record shows that after CSEA filed the
    unfair practice charges, PERB assigned them to the OGC for
    investigation and review. The attorneys to whom they were
    assigned notified appellant and gave it an opportunity to
    respond. (See CCR, title 8, § 32620 [Processing of Case].)
    Settlement conferences were held. (See 
    id., § 32650
    [Informal Conference].) After determining that the charges
    had merit, PERB filed and served a complaint. (See 
    id., §§ 32140
    [Service], 32640 [Issuance of Complaint].) Noticed
    hearings were held before PERB ALJ’s. (See 
    id., §§ 32168
    [Conduct of Hearing], 32170 [Powers and Duties of
    Board Agent Conducting a Hearing].) The parties appeared
    and were given an opportunity to present evidence. (See 
    id., § 32180
    [Rights of Parties].) After the conclusion of the
    hearings, the parties were given an opportunity to file, and
    did file, post-hearing briefs. (See 
    id., § 32212
    [Briefs and
    Oral Argument].) The ALJs’ issued proposed decisions. (See
    
    id., § 32215
    [Proposed Decision].) One or both of the parties
    filed exceptions, requiring the Board to review the proposed
    decisions. (See 
    id., § 32300
    [Exceptions to Board Agent
    Decision].) The Board issued and served decisions and
    orders affirming the ALJ’s proposed decisions. (See 
    id., § 32320
    [Decision of the Board Itself].)
    Both below and on appeal, appellant contended that
    PERB regulations are complex and cited a number of the
    regulations, but made no attempt to demonstrate that any
    relevant regulation had been overlooked or disregarded. For
    25
    example, appellant cited CCR, title 8, section 32620, which
    requires charges to be “assigned to a Board agent for
    processing” and describes the duties of the Board agent,
    including assisting the charging party to state the charge in
    proper form, advising the charging party of any deficiencies
    in the charges in a warning letter, answering the procedural
    questions of both parties, facilitating communications and
    the exchange of information between the parties, and
    dismissing any charge where the evidence is insufficient.
    Neither below nor on appeal, however, has appellant
    suggested -- much less demonstrated -- that any part of the
    regulation was violated. And neither below nor on appeal
    has appellant identified any relevant regulation that was not
    followed.12
    In sum, as the evidence was undisputed that PERB
    followed its procedures prior to issuing the subject decisions
    12     Appellant also cited, and continues to cite, patently
    irrelevant regulations: CCR, title 8, sections 32621 governing
    amendment of charges, 32625 governing withdrawal of charges
    and 32649 governing answers to amended charges. Clearly,
    these regulations have no applicability where CSEA neither
    amended nor withdrew any unfair practice charges. Appellant
    provides no explanation for its citation to inapplicable PERB
    regulations; to the extent it suggests that meeting the burden of
    proof in an enforcement action requires PERB to place a copy of
    its regulations into the record and go through each of them, line
    by line, explaining to the trial court exactly how it was followed
    or why it was irrelevant, we decline to ascribe such an absurd
    meaning to section 3542, subdivision (d)’s requirements.
    26
    and orders, the trial court’s finding was necessarily
    supported by substantial evidence. To the extent appellant
    suggests that section 3542, subdivision (d), requires a more
    rigorous inquiry than that conducted by the trial court, we
    disagree. To the extent appellant suggests that procedural
    irregularities occurred, its failure to support the argument
    with citations to specific examples and reasoned argument
    constitutes a waiver of any such contention.
    C. OGC’s Responsibilities Under CCR, Title 8, Section
    32980
    CCR, title 8, section 32980 gives the General Counsel
    responsibility for determining whether the parties have
    complied with final Board orders. As discussed, it permits
    the General Counsel or his or her designate to “conduct an
    inquiry, informal conference, investigation, or hearing as
    appropriate, concerning any compliance matter.” Appellant
    contends the General Counsel abused his discretion in
    refusing to negotiate over the wording of the notices or to
    allow appellant to post modified notices.
    Initially, we observe that to the extent appellant
    contends the General Counsel’s post-decision actions can be
    raised as a defense to an enforcement action, its position is
    contrary to the statute. Section 3542, subdivision (d),
    specifically permits the trial court to consider only two
    factors: whether the order was issued pursuant to the
    procedures established by the Board, and whether the
    respondent refused to comply with the order. (See Tex-Cal 
    I, 27 supra
    , 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 1358; Tex-Cal I
    I, supra
    , 43
    Cal.3d at p. 706.) In any event, the record disclosed no
    abuse of discretion by the General Counsel. As the trial
    court noted, the OGC conducted an inquiry and investigation
    into appellant’s compliance. It did so under a regulation
    that was expressly permissive: “The General Counsel . . .
    may conduct an inquiry, informal conference, investigation,
    or hearing, as appropriate, concerning any compliance
    matter.” (CCR, tit. 8, § 32980, italics added.) As the General
    Counsel correctly advised appellant, nothing in the
    regulation authorized him to modify a Board order.
    Nor did appellant provide a justification for
    modification of the orders by anyone. With respect to the
    Notice to Employees in Decision No. 2385, appellant
    contends that “[a] very significant event had occurred” since
    its issuance: CSEA had withdrawn its request to bargain,
    rendering the language of the notice “no longer relevant” and
    “moot.” In fact, this event was anticipated by the parties
    and the Board, and the decision expressly dealt with what
    would happen if CSEA failed to initiate a “meet and
    negotiate” session: the limited backpay remedy would not go
    into effect. Appellant had an opportunity, prior to the
    issuance of the decision and order, to propose a modified
    notice if the meet and negotiate did not take place and
    appellant believed its nonoccurrence would render any
    language of the notice misleading. It neither did so nor
    sought review on any ground related to the wording of the
    notice.
    28
    With respect to the Notice to Employees required by
    Decision No. 2455, appellant simply attempts to relitigate
    the merits of the decision. Despite appellant’s contention
    that “there was never any change to the payment of holiday
    pay policy in the District and the one employee who was
    entitled to holiday pay has been paid” both the ALJ and the
    Board found there had been a change. (Underscoring
    omitted.) Appellant had the opportunity to seek review of
    that decision, but declined to do so. Appellant also failed to
    place evidence before the Board concerning the number of
    employees affected. Accordingly, the Board found CSEA’s
    allegations true, and ordered appellant to pay all affected
    employees and provide CSEA the information needed to
    establish which employees were affected. The Notice to
    Employees demanded by Order No. 2455 requires appellant
    to inform employees that it will rescind the holiday pay
    policy change, make whole all affected employees, and
    provide CSEA the information it needs to protect those it
    represents. Appellant remains under that obligation.
    Moreover, as PERB has frequently explained, the point
    of the posting requirement is not only to ensure that affected
    employees are aware of past violations, but also to ensure
    that all employees are aware of their rights under the EERA
    and to influence those who have the authority to prevent
    violations from reoccurring. (See City of Sacramento (2013)
    PERB Dec. No. 2351-M [2013 Cal. PERB LEXIS 44] at
    pp. *74-*75 [“The Board’s authority to inform employees of
    their rights, and its discretion to determine the
    29
    circumstances and methods for accomplishing this task, are
    both well-settled. [Citation.] Since the earliest days of this
    agency, PERB remedial orders have required offending
    parties to post notice of their unlawful conduct to ensure
    that all employees affected by the Board’ s decision and
    order are notified of their rights. [Citation.] . . . [¶] We
    believe that physically posting notice of the Board’s remedial
    orders in the workplace remains an essential tool of
    remedying unfair practices and further the polices of the
    statutes we administer.”]; Trustees of the California State
    
    University, supra
    , PERB Dec. No. HO-U-335-H at [1988 Cal.
    PERB LEXIS 49] at p. *1 [“The purpose of a posting
    requirement is to inform all who would naturally be
    concerned (i.e., employees of the District, as well as
    management and supervisory personnel who carry out
    District policies) of activity found to be unlawful under the
    Act in order to provide guidance and prevent a reoccurrence.
    The furtherance of the central purpose of the EERA,
    harmonious labor relations, depends upon awareness of
    what the statute demands of all parties . . . [and] the
    purposes of that Act are best effectuated by districtwide
    posting.”]; Belridge School District (1980) PERB Dec. No. 157
    [1980 Cal. PERB LEXIS 24] at p. *13 [“The District argues
    that posting should not be ordered in this case because of the
    length of time that has passed since the conduct found to be
    an unfair practice occurred. It contends that posting would
    only disrupt the atmosphere that now exists in the District.
    The Board acknowledges these concerns, but nevertheless
    30
    finds that posting is an appropriate remedy here. Posting
    ensures that employees affected by this decision are
    informed of their rights under the EERA. The fact that the
    case has been delayed does not lessen the importance of that
    remedy as a means of effectuating policies of the EERA.”].)
    Regardless of whether appellant is required to provide
    additional restitution or backpay, the notices will be helpful
    to employees who may have information pertinent to new
    violations of their rights under the EERA under similar
    circumstances, and should serve as reminders to those in
    authority to avoid unilateral action that violates the EERA.
    31
    DISPOSITION
    The order granting the petition for writ of mandate is
    affirmed. Respondent and real party are awarded their costs
    on appeal.
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    MANELLA, P. J.
    We concur:
    WILLHITE, J.
    MICON, J.*
    ________________________________________________________
    *Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court assigned
    by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
    California Constitution.
    32
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B288594

Filed Date: 12/4/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/4/2018