In re James J. CA4/1 ( 2014 )

Filed 1/10/14 In re James J. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re JAMES J., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
D063949
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J227875)
v.
JAMES J.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Browder A. Willis III, Judge. Affirmed.
Steven J. Carroll, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., and Quisteen S.
Shum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The juvenile court made a true finding on a petition filed under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 602 that James J. (1) unlawfully took and drove a vehicle (Veh.
Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); (2) unlawfully received stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496,
subd. (d)); and (3) drove a vehicle without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)).
James appeals from the judgment, contending that insufficient evidence supports a
finding that he unlawfully took and drove a vehicle and unlawfully received stolen
property. He also contends that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to
him. We conclude that James's arguments are without merit, and accordingly we affirm
the judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 15, 2013, while responding to a complaint about a loud party, a police
officer discovered that one of the vehicles parked near the party had been reported as
stolen. The vehicle was a 2006 Lincoln Town Car that had been taken from a used car lot
either late on March 11 or early on March 12, with the thief having apparently gained
access to the car keys.
James and another male, M., approached the vehicle while the police officer was
investigating. Believing that the vehicle was going to be towed, James and M. asked the
officer if there was something wrong with the vehicle and stated that they would like to
remove some personal property from inside of it. James's cell phone and backpack were
inside the vehicle. When the police officer asked James about his connection to the
vehicle, he lied, stating that someone named Jay possessed the vehicle and had given him
2
a ride to the party. M. told the police officer the same false story about Jay giving him a
ride. A few minutes later, after additional police questioning, James admitted that he
made up the story about Jay, and no such person existed. The key to the vehicle was
found in James's pocket.
As James told the police officer, and as he later testified, he first came into contact
with the vehicle on March 13 when his friend D. showed it to him. According to James,
D. told him that "some girls had gave it to him off the lot." According to James, the girls
gave the vehicle to D. because they did not have driver's licenses or know how to drive.
D. was a juvenile and did not have a job.
According to James, on March 14, D. and James drove in the car to meet their
probation officers. D. was taken into custody by the probation officer and therefore
asked James to take possession of the car. James drove the car home, and the next night
drove the car to the party. James did not have a driver's license.
A petition was filed alleging that James unlawfully took or drove a vehicle (Veh.
Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), unlawfully received stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496,
subd. (d)), and drove a vehicle without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)).
James testified before the trial court and denied knowing or believing that the
vehicle was stolen.
The trial court made a true finding on all of the counts alleged against James. In
the course of announcing its findings, the court explained that it was undisputed that the
vehicle was stolen and that James had driven the vehicle, and thus the only remaining
issue was whether James knew the vehicle was stolen. The trial court stated, "Your
3
statement of denial is before the court. So it becomes a question of whether or not the
statement of denial is a credible statement. . . . [T]he story about Jay just sticks in my
brain as hard to massage and digest. And that coupled with the nuances associated with
how [D.] presented the vehicle to you, how you accepted the representation that two girls
got it from a lot. . . . But when I piece all the facts together they chip away at your
credibility to where I don't find your denial credible. I find the issue of knowledge
established."
The trial court continued James as a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 602 and placed him under the supervision of the probation
officer.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports a Finding That James Knew the Vehicle Was Stolen
James contends that because the People did not establish that he knew the vehicle
was stolen, insufficient evidence supports the true findings that he unlawfully took and
drove a vehicle and unlawfully received stolen property.
"Our review of the minors' substantial evidence claim is governed by the same
standard applicable to adult criminal cases. . . . 'In reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence, we must determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." . . .' . . . ' "[O]ur role on appeal is a
limited one." . . . Under the substantial evidence rule, we must presume in support of the
4
judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably have deduced
from the evidence. . . . Thus, if the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's
findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably
be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment.' " (In re
V.V. (2011) 51 Cal. 4th 1020, 1026, citations omitted.)
The true findings that James unlawfully took or drove a vehicle and that he
unlawfully received stolen property are premised on the trial court's finding that James
knew the vehicle was stolen. Specifically, the conviction for unlawfully driving or taking
a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851) requires a finding that James intended to deprive the
owner of title or possession without the owner's consent. "The elements necessary to
establish a violation of section 10851 of the Vehicle Code are the defendant's driving or
taking of a vehicle belonging to another person, without the owner's consent, and with
specific intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of title or possession."
(People v. Green (1995) 34 Cal. App. 4th 165, 180 (Green).) "[K]nowledge that the
vehicle was stolen" is "one of various alternative factors evidencing an intent to deprive
the owner of title and possession." (Ibid.) Similarly, the elements of receiving stolen
property include "knowledge that the property was stolen." (People v. Sanchez
(2003) 113 Cal. App. 4th 325, 332.)
Therefore, the issue before us is whether substantial evidence supports a finding
that James knew the vehicle was stolen. In analyzing that issue, we must necessarily
focus on circumstantial evidence. With respect to the crime of receiving stolen property,
"[t]he knowledge element of receiving stolen property is normally proved not by direct
5
evidence but by an inference from circumstantial evidence." (People v. Alvarado (1982)
133 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 1019.) "[P]ossession of stolen property, accompanied by no
explanation, or an unsatisfactory explanation, or by suspicious circumstances, will justify
an inference that the goods were received with knowledge that they had been stolen.
Only slight corroboration is necessary to turn the inference into a verdict supported by
substantial evidence." (People v. Perez (1974) 40 Cal. App. 3d 795, 799.) "Our Supreme
Court has indicated that the slight corroboration that permits an inference that the
possessor knew that the property was stolen may consist of no explanation, of an
unsatisfactory explanation, or of other suspicious circumstances that would justify the
inference." (People v. O'Dell (2007) 153 Cal. App. 4th 1569, 1575 (O'Dell).)
This principle applies equally to the crime of unlawfully driving or taking a
vehicle. (O'Dell, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1574.) " 'Specific intent to deprive the
owner of possession of his car may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. Once the unlawful taking of the vehicle has been established, possession
of the recently taken vehicle by the defendant with slight corroboration through
statements or conduct tending to show guilt is sufficient to sustain a conviction of
Vehicle Code section 10851.' " (Green, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 181.)
Here, there is no dispute that the vehicle was stolen. Therefore, only slight
corroboration, based on suspicious circumstances or a false explanation to law
enforcement, is necessary to support a finding that James J. knew the vehicle was stolen.
As we will explain, ample evidence of suspicious circumstances gave rise to an inference
that James J. did not innocently possess the vehicle.
6
First, when confronted by police, James J. gave a false explanation about his
connection to the vehicle. Specifically, instead of admitting that he had possession of the
vehicle, he fabricated a story that the vehicle belonged to "Jay," who drove him to the
party. As noted above, a false explanation by a defendant in possession of a stolen
vehicle is sufficient to give rise to an inference that the defendant knew the vehicle was
stolen. (Green, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 181 [" 'Where recently stolen property is
found in the conscious possession of a defendant who, upon being questioned by the
police, gives a false explanation regarding his possession . . . an inference of guilt is
permissible.' "].)
Second, a reasonable trier of fact could find suspicious circumstances based on
James's claim that he did not suspect the vehicle was stolen after D. told him that "some
girls," who could not drive, got the vehicle "off of a lot" and then simply gave the car to
D. A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that given the explanation proffered by D.,
James would not actually believe the vehicle was lawfully obtained.
James argues that in light of the fact that he approached the police officers and
identified himself as associated with the vehicle, no reasonable trier of fact would infer
that James knew the car was stolen. We disagree. Regardless of whether James chose to
identify himself to the police, he would have been associated with the vehicle because his
cell phone and backpack were inside of it. His purpose in approaching the police appears
to have been to try to regain possession of those identifying items. Further, when
questioned by police about his connection with the vehicle, James denied that he was in
possession of the vehicle and made up a lie about someone named "Jay" owning the car.
7
Under those circumstances, James' decision to approach the police about the vehicle does
not preclude a finding that James knew the car was stolen.
In sum, based on the suspicious circumstances surrounding James's possession of
the stolen vehicle, we conclude that substantial evidence supports a finding that James
knew the car was stolen, and accordingly sufficient evidence supports the true finding
that James unlawfully took and drove a vehicle and unlawfully received stolen property.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Improperly Shift the Burden of Proof to James to Prove
His Innocence
James contends that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to James
to establish his innocence rather than requiring the People to prove the allegations of the
petition beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 368 [juveniles,
like adults, are constitutionally entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt when they are
charged with violation of a criminal law].)
James contends that the trial court improperly shifted the burden to James to prove
his innocence because it focused on whether it believed James's testimony that he did not
know the vehicle was stolen. James claims that "the trial court went beyond weighing
the evidence and instead placed the burden on [James] to prove to the court that [he] was
not guilty." As we will explain, the argument is without merit.
As the trier of fact, the court was entitled to determine James's credibility. (People
v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal. 4th 804, 849 ["[I]t is the exclusive province of the trial judge or
jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon
which a determination depends."].) As we read the record, in discussing whether it
8
believed James's testimony that he thought the car was lawfully obtained, the trial court
was simply explaining its determination on the issue of James's credibility. Contrary to
James's argument, we see no reason to conclude that the trial court made a true finding
that James unlawfully took and drove a vehicle and unlawfully received stolen property
based solely on its rejection of James's denial. Instead, as the trial court explained, its
conclusion that James knew the car was stolen was based on the suspicious circumstances
surrounding James's possession of the car, namely, the fact that (1) James lied to the
police about his connection with the car, and (2) unreasonably claimed to believe the car
was lawfully obtained after D. told him that "some girls had gave it to him off the lot."
Therefore, instead of placing the burden on James to convince the trial court of his
innocence, the trial court properly focused on the evidence presented by the People,
consisting of the suspicious circumstances surrounding James's possession of a stolen
vehicle, to conclude that James committed the crimes that were alleged against him.
In a variation of his argument about the insufficiency of the evidence, James also
contends that the trial court must have shifted the burden of proof to him to prove his
innocence because the evidence would otherwise not have supported a true finding
against him. Specifically, James argues that because "the trial court rejected the very
definitive actions of [James] which demonstrated his lack of awareness of the stolen
vehicle, in favor of the speculative 'nuances' of lying to the police officer . . . and how
[James] was told by his friend how the car was obtained," the trial court must have held
him "to a standard of proving his innocence." We reject this argument for the same
reason that we rejected James's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. As we have
9
explained, ample circumstantial evidence supports a finding that James knew the car was
stolen, and the trial court was within its discretion as the trier of fact to rely on that
evidence to make a true finding that James committed the crimes alleged against him.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
O'ROURKE, J.
10