In re Miguel R. CA4/2 ( 2022 )

Filed 9/22/22 In re Miguel R. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re MIGUEL R., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
E078528
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super.Ct.No. J279577)
v.
OPINION
MIGUEL R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Bryan K. Stodghill,
Judge. Affirmed.
Gerald J. Miller, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Robin Urbanski and Donald W. Ostertag, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
1
A juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a)) was filed
January 30, 2019, alleging that Miguel R., then age 17, committed one count of murder
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211),
and one count of attempted second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211 & 664). The
People filed a motion to transfer Miguel to adult criminal court. (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 707, subd. (a)(1).) Following a hearing over several days, the juvenile court determined
that Miguel “is not amenable to the care, treatment, and training programs available
through the juvenile court system” and ordered him transferred to adult criminal court.
Miguel appeals the transfer order (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 801, subd. (a)), arguing that the
juvenile court’s ruling was based on improper evidence and a misapplication of the
statutory criteria. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3); unlabeled statutory references
are to this code.) Finding no error, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. The Alleged Offense1
On Sunday evening, January 27, 2019, S.N. and his wife, K.N., were taking one of
their regular walks near their home in Ontario when they saw three male teenagers
approaching, dressed alike in black pants and black hoodies. S.N. told K.N. to get behind
him and placed himself between the teenagers and his wife. The teens stopped in front of
them, blocking their path, and the one in the middle, later identified as Miguel, pointed a
gun at S.N.’s head. K.N. heard the gunman and one of the other two say, “‘Hey,
1 The facts of the offenses are taken from the probation report, which summarized
the relevant police reports.
2
motherfucker, what you got?’” S.N. lunged toward the gunman, and a struggle ensued.
K.N. saw a flash, heard S.N. yell, and realized he had been shot. S.N. was taken to the
hospital, where he died during surgery.
An officer searching the area shortly after the shooting stopped three teenagers
matching the suspects’ description, two of whom were detained, while the third fled on
foot. Other officers searching in the area where the third suspect had fled found a clean
white T-shirt that appeared to have been recently discarded in an alley. Nearby was a
black backpack containing a loaded .38-caliber revolver with one spent casing under the
hammer, a black T-shirt, a black sweatshirt, a cell phone, and other items. In a parking
lot nearby, officers found a wallet containing Miguel’s California identification card, and
a few feet away were six additional bullets matching the rounds in the revolver.
After initially providing officers with false information, both of the two detained
coparticipants made statements incriminating Miguel, identified the backpack containing
the gun as Miguel’s, and identified Miguel as the shooter in photo lineups. Miguel was
arrested at school the following morning. A search of Miguel’s home revealed shoes and
other clothing matching those worn by the shooter, as well as a box of .38-caliber
ammunition matching that found in the revolver.
Text messages found on Miguel’s cell phone and statements by his mother
revealed that Miguel had texted his mother shortly after the shooting, saying he was
hiding from the police. He could see police nearby and a helicopter overhead. She told
him not to come out of hiding and drove to find him in Ontario, where she saw police and
3
blocked streets. Their text messages included four maps showing locations where Miguel
was hiding, and their communications continued over the course of almost four hours
before Miguel’s mother was able to pick him up and bring him home. Miguel’s mother
identified the backpack, wallet, and identification found by police as belonging to
Miguel, but she denied having seen the gun or ammunition before.
Surveillance video obtained by police showed Miguel, wearing a backpack
matching that found by police, boarding a bus heading towards Ontario with his two
coparticipants a few hours before the shooting. All three are wearing black hooded
sweatshirts, dark jeans, and black shoes. They can be seen sitting together and talking
before exiting the bus together. Other surveillance videos show the three youths at
various locations in the vicinity before and after the shooting.
B. The Juvenile Court Transfer Proceedings
The prosecution filed a motion to transfer Miguel to criminal court, and Miguel
filed a written opposition. The probation department submitted a report pursuant to
subdivision (a)(1) of section 707, recommending transfer to criminal court. The juvenile
court began its transfer hearing on April 14, 2021, with testimony from the sole
prosecution witness, Cynthia Diaz, the probation officer who prepared the report. Diaz
explained her methodology, the interviews she conducted, and the records she reviewed
in preparing the report. The report recommended transfer to criminal court on the basis
of four of the five statutory criteria: the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by
the minor, whether the minor can be rehabilitated before expiration of the juvenile court’s
4
jurisdiction, the success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the
minor, and the circumstances and gravity of the offense. Diaz also reviewed a number of
the detention behavior summaries documenting Miguel’s conduct in juvenile hall over
the two years since her report had been filed. She noted that Miguel was involved in
eight incidents described as “code reds,” all but one of which involved assaultive
behavior on other minors. Although Miguel had obtained his high school diploma and
enrolled in online community college courses, Diaz testified that Miguel was currently
“suspended until further notice” from participating in the college program for having
accessed unauthorized websites, and he had previously been suspended for a semester
because of a plagiarism incident. On the basis of her review of Miguel’s detention
behavior summaries, Diaz continued to believe that Miguel was not amenable to
treatment by juvenile services and should be transferred to adult court.
After several continuances to allow Miguel to obtain his complete education and
medical records and retain an expert witness to perform an evaluation, the hearing
resumed on December 13, 2021, with testimony from the sole defense witness, Shannon
Johnson, Psy.D., a staff psychologist at Patton State Hospital. Johnson met with Miguel
for about two hours in July and submitted a psychological evaluation report on July 20,
2021. She met with him a second time the following month for roughly 90 minutes and
submitted a risk assessment report dated August 28, 2021.2
2Because Johnson had not been instructed to avoid interviewing Miguel about the
circumstances of the charged offense, the parties stipulated that the risk assessment report
would be redacted by defense counsel to remove any information regarding the
[footnote continued on next page]
5
Johnson testified that Miguel had demonstrated insight and expressed regret and
remorse for the impact of his behavior on his family and on the victim’s family, which
Johnson believed was honest and genuine. She testified that Miguel had made progress
in his rehabilitation, as evidenced by his ability to view his detention as an opportunity to
recreate himself and consider how he would like his life to be in the future. Regarding
her risk assessment evaluation, Johnson opined that Miguel was unlikely to seek out
violence and that his strong family support mitigated his risk of reoffending, although if
Miguel were subjected to violent conduct by someone, he was likely to defend himself.
She testified that transferring Miguel to an adult incarceration setting would be
destabilizing and have a negative impact on his functioning and eventual reintegration
into the community. When asked if Miguel would present a low risk of reoffending or
engaging in violence if he were treated in a juvenile facility, Johnson assessed Miguel’s
risk as “moderate” rather than “low.”
On cross-examination, Johnson acknowledged that Miguel had continued to
engage in violent behavior during his detention, but she described that behavior as largely
“situational” and related to the incarcerated setting. Johnson conceded that Miguel’s
ongoing use of aggression to manage conflict did increase his risk of reoffending and that
he is likely to respond with violence if he is challenged or approached in an aggressive
way.
circumstances of the offense that may have been obtained from Johnson’s discussions
with Miguel. Johnson was also admonished not to testify as to any specific facts
concerning the offense or Miguel’s participation that she may have learned from Miguel
during her evaluation.
6
Johnson was also asked during cross-examination about an incident on October 9,
2021, when a staff member had redirected Miguel to take it easy on the other team during
a soccer tournament, and Miguel responded: “‘You are telling me to chill out[?] You
know I’m a murderer on the set.’” When questioned about his response, Miguel said,
“‘I’m a murderer. I kill people. So what?’” Johnson acknowledged that the statement
was not something that Miguel would have said during their meetings, and she stated that
if he had said that to her, it would have changed her opinion. Defense counsel objected
to the line of questioning, arguing that it assumes facts not in evidence, there was no
information provided about the context or tone of the statement, and it constituted
inadmissible hearsay. The court overruled the objections, explaining that although the
court had not received evidence of the statements, the court understood that the report of
the incident “is evidence that is going to be presented later,” and if not, the testimony
would be subject to a motion to strike. The court further stated that it would not consider
Miguel’s statement for its truth and would allow the question as a hypothetical regarding
Johnson’s opinion: If Miguel had made such statements, how would that impact her
evaluation, recommendation, and diagnosis?
When asked if the statement showed Miguel’s lack of remorse and lack of
empathy, Johnson said she could not tell without knowing more about the “situational
factors” and circumstances in which the incident occurred. The remark may have been
made “in a very escalated state” in order to posture for his peers and establish the pecking
order so they “would not mess with him in the future.” Alternatively, the statement could
7
have been “made in hopelessness,” to express “‘I’m never going to get out of here
because things like this keep happening. I give up.’”
At the conclusion of Johnson’s testimony, the prosecution offered to recall the
probation officer, Diaz, as a rebuttal witness to testify regarding the detention behavior
summary that reported Miguel’s October 2021 statements and also to establish that
Miguel was again not enrolled in college classes that semester. Defense counsel renewed
his hearsay objection, and the court again overruled it. The court explained that the
statements are not hearsay because they are not offered for their truth, because the
question of whether Miguel is in fact a murderer is not at issue in the transfer hearing.
The court admitted the statements as evidence of Miguel’s state of mind, his behavior
while detained in juvenile hall, and “what that indicates about his future prospects for
rehabilitation and for offending.” The court found the detention behavior summaries to
be reliable and admissible as government records. It explained that the summaries were
reviewed by Diaz and provided part of the basis for the probation report she prepared,
and they also contained many positive reports of Miguel’s custodial behavior and
accomplishments. The court stated that it would consider all of the detention behavior
summaries, including the report containing Miguel’s October 2021 statements. Defense
counsel agreed, stating: “Judge, given the Court’s explanation of the admissibility, I’m
comfortable simply submitting on the document given the fact that the Court is
considering it for—appropriately for the evidentiary purposes. So I am fine with that,
8
Judge.” The court responded: “Then that detention behavior summary is a part of the
court file the Court will review.”
Both counsel agreed to submit on the document containing the October 2021
statements and stipulated to the fact that Miguel was not attending online college classes
that semester, so Diaz was not recalled. After accepting some character reference letters
submitted by the defense, the juvenile court heard argument on the transfer motion from
both counsel and took the matter under submission.
C. The Juvenile Court’s Ruling on the Transfer Motion
On January 21, 2022, the court issued its ruling on the transfer motion. It found
Miguel was not amenable to the care and treatment in the juvenile justice system and
ordered him transferred to criminal court. After describing the offense and the
investigation, the court addressed each of the five statutory criteria in detail.
As to the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(A)), the court found that factor weighed in favor of transferring Miguel to
criminal court. The court found that Miguel had armed himself, participated in a
preplanned armed robbery that was inherently dangerous and showed indifference to
human life, and willfully shot the victim for his failure to comply. The court also found
that Miguel’s conduct after the shooting exhibited a higher level of criminal
sophistication in that he fled, attempted to conceal his involvement by changing his
clothing and appearance, and then lied to police about his involvement.
9
On the second criterion, whether the minor can be rehabilitated before expiration
of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)), the court discussed in detail
the programs that are offered at the secure youth treatment facility to which Miguel could
be committed by the juvenile court, the timeframe of less than five years that remained
available for treatment and rehabilitation, Miguel’s past response to services offered
while on probation for his prior offenses, and Miguel’s rehabilitation progress in
detention since the shooting. The court noted that Miguel had been the subject of a
March 2016 petition alleging that he committed burglary and vandalism, and he was
initially granted deferred entry of judgment, which he failed to complete. He was
declared a ward of the court and placed on formal probation with electronic monitoring in
December 2017, but he failed to comply with the probation terms and was ordered into
placement in May 2018. After successfully completing a six-month placement at Boys
Republic, Miguel was maintained on house arrest for 60 days beginning in November
2018. Although it appeared he was making rehabilitative progress, he planned and
committed the instant offense shortly after his release from house arrest despite nearly
three years of rehabilitative services and court supervision. The court found that history
strongly suggested that Miguel was unlikely to have a positive response to further
juvenile court services.
The court described Miguel’s conduct during detention on the instant offense as
“diverse.” While he did have numerous positive reports, graduated from high school,
attended college courses, participated in numerous rehabilitative programs, and achieved
10
honors for several months, he also physically and verbally assaulted peers and staff, was
involved in several “code red[]” incidents, and was banned from attending college
courses because of his negative behaviors. The court described the October 2021
incident in which Miguel said, “‘I’m a murderer. I kill people. So what?’” as “[p]erhaps
the most egregious” incident of Miguel’s negative behavior in detention. The court
acknowledged that Miguel’s custodial conduct had improved in 2021 and that he appears
to have benefitted from rehabilitative services, suggesting his amenability to
rehabilitation in juvenile court, but stated that the October 2021 incident indicates a lack
of remorse and calls into question whether his apparent progress has been genuine.
Given Miguel’s negative behavior while on deferred entry of judgment and probation for
the prior offenses, in contrast to his substantially positive and improving pattern of
behavior during detention, the court determined that the “evidence is simply insufficient
for the Court to draw a conclusion as to whether or not the minor can be rehabilitated and
as to whether there is enough time for rehabilitation.” The court accordingly found that
the prosecution had not carried its burden of proving that this factor weighed in favor of
transfer to criminal court.
On the third statutory factor, the minor’s previous delinquent history (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(C)), the court found it weighed in favor of remaining in juvenile court. The
court found that Miguel’s criminal history was minimal, consisting of a single petition in
2016 alleging two nonviolent felony counts, and that although Miguel had trouble
complying with the terms of probation, his violations were not due to criminal conduct.
11
Regarding the fourth factor, the success of previous attempts by the juvenile court
to rehabilitate the minor (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)), the court found it weighed in favor of
transfer to criminal court. The court found that Miguel had been provided the entire
spectrum of services, including probation, community service, wraparound services,
classes including gang intervention, house arrest, and a six-month out-of-home placement
that included counseling, but none of it succeeded in modifying his behavior.
Regarding the fifth criterion, the circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged
in the petition (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)), the court found it weighed heavily in favor of
transfer to criminal court. The court noted that not only did Miguel willingly engage in
highly dangerous activity but he also was seemingly committed to completing it at all
costs, resulting in irreparable consequences—the death of S.N. The court further found
that there were no mitigating factors regarding Miguel’s participation in the offense.
In conclusion, the court found three of the five statutory criteria—the degree of
criminal sophistication, the success of previous attempts at rehabilitation, and the gravity
and circumstances of the offense—weighed in favor of transfer to criminal court, only
Miguel’s minimal delinquency history weighed against, and the likelihood of
rehabilitation was neutral. The court found that Miguel’s minimal delinquency history
was complicated by his poor performance while on probation, his failure to complete
probation, and the fact that he was still on probation when he committed the instant
offense, all of which reduced the degree to which that criterion supported denial of the
transfer motion. In contrast, the court found the high degree of criminal sophistication,
12
the failure of previous rehabilitative efforts, and the grave consequences of his action in
the alleged offense were dispositive and weighed heavily in favor of transfer to criminal
court. Accordingly, the court found Miguel is not amenable to the care and treatment of
the juvenile justice system and ordered him transferred to criminal court.
DISCUSSION
“When a minor has been charged in the juvenile court with any felony allegedly
committed when he or she was 16 years of age or older, the prosecutor ‘may make a
motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction.’
(§ 707, subd. (a)(1).) Upon the making of such a motion, the juvenile court must order
the probation department to prepare ‘a report on the behavioral patterns and social history
of the minor.’ (Ibid.)” (J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 711 (J.N.).)
At the hearing on the prosecution’s motion, the court must consider the probation report
and “any other relevant evidence that the petitioner or the minor may wish to submit.”
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3).)
In making the determination whether the minor is “a fit and proper subject to be
dealt with” by the juvenile court or should be transferred to criminal court, the court must
consider five criteria set forth in section 707, subdivision (a)(3). (§§ 606, 707,
subd. (a)(3).) “Those factors are the minor’s degree of criminal sophistication, whether
the minor can be rehabilitated in the time before the juvenile court would lose jurisdiction
over the minor, the minor’s prior history of delinquency, the success of prior attempts by
the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor, and the circumstances and gravity of the
13
charged offense. [Citation.]” (J.N., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 711.) The weight that
the juvenile court assigns to each of those factors rests within its sound discretion. (C.S.
v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1034-1035 (C.S.).) The juvenile court
must clearly and explicitly articulate its evaluative process by detailing how it weighed
the evidence and by identifying the facts that persuaded the court to reach its decision.
(Id. at p. 1035.) “Whether the youth committed the act alleged in the petition is not the
issue in such a determination; the sole question is whether he would be amenable to
treatment in the event that he is ultimately adjudged a ward of the court.” (People v. Chi
Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 716.) Effective January 1, 2022, subdivision (a) of
section 801 provides for immediate appellate review of a juvenile court’s transfer order.
(§ 801, subd. (a), added by Stats. 2021, ch. 195, § 1.)
We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer motion for error under an abuse
of discretion standard. (People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 680
(Jones).) “The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it
calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial
court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712, fns.
omitted.) The juvenile court’s findings with respect to each of section 707’s five criteria
are findings of fact reviewed for substantial evidence. (Jones, supra, 18 Cal.4th at
pp. 682-683) “The standard is deferential: ‘When a trial court’s factual determination is
14
attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an
appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire
record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support
the determination . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 681.)
Miguel argues that the transfer order must be reversed because the juvenile court
relied on “[i]mproper [e]vidence” (boldface omitted), namely, the detention behavior
summary describing the October 2021 incident when Miguel told staff, “‘I’m a murderer.
I kill people. So what?’” Miguel argues that absent any evidence as to the “tone” or
“context” of the remarks, they are “worthless as an indication of appellant’s purported
state of mind.” We disagree.
First, insofar as Miguel argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by
admitting the evidence, he has forfeited the argument by expressly withdrawing his
objections in the juvenile court. For the same reason, he has forfeited any claim that the
juvenile court was prohibited from relying on the evidence because it was not “formally
admitted.” When defense counsel withdrew his objections, he also expressly conceded
that the juvenile court was properly considering the report containing Miguel’s
statements. In any event, the court’s evidentiary ruling was correct for the following
reasons: The statements were offered as nonhearsay evidence of Miguel’s state of mind,
not to prove that he was in fact a murderer; the statements were admissible as party
admissions; and the report containing the statements was admissible as a business record
or an official record of the probation department. (Evid. Code, §§ 1200, 1220, 1271,
15
1280.) Miguel argues that there was no testimony establishing that the report satisfies the
foundational requirements for admissibility as a business record (Evid. Code, § 1271),
but that is why the forfeiture rule applies—if defense counsel had not withdrawn the
objection, the prosecution could have introduced evidence to address it. Regardless, the
report is also presumptively admissible as an official record (Evid. Code, §§ 664, 1280)
unless the objecting party presents evidence that it lacks trustworthiness, which Miguel
did not. (People v. Hall (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 831, 842-844; People v. Martinez (2000)
22 Cal.4th 106, 125-127.) Moreover, after withdrawing his objections, defense counsel
relied on the detention behavior summaries in arguing that Miguel’s custodial conduct
demonstrates that he “has the right state of mind to being rehabilitated,” stating that
“there are far more positive [detention behavior] summaries than there are negative
summaries” and that “the Court has them and can review them. I think that is important
in considering whether or not he is amenable to further treatment in the juvenile justice
system.” Having expressly withdrawn his objections and urged the juvenile court’s
consideration of the evidence, Miguel cannot now argue that the evidence was
inadmissible or otherwise not a proper subject of the court’s consideration. (People v.
Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1255; People v. Sledge (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1089, 1097-
1098 [hearsay statements properly admitted where contained in reports that were
prepared by probation officers performing official duties and that were relied upon by
both parties without objection].)
16
Second, we disagree with Miguel’s argument that the absence of evidence as to the
tone or context of the statements renders them “worthless as an indication of” Miguel’s
state of mind reflecting a lack of remorse. Miguel suggests the remarks may have been
made “out of mere frustration, or in sarcastic response to what [Miguel] may have viewed
as an incongruous request that he ‘chill out’ or ‘take it easy on the other team.’” At
bottom, Miguel’s arguments concerning the tone and context of the statements simply
point out their ambiguity. “Defendant is correct that the statement is ambiguous, but the
ambiguity does not render it inadmissible . . . .” (People v. Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th 905,
927.) “Defendant’s contention that the challenged statement was ambiguous and
equivocal ‘concerns only the weight of this evidence, not its admissibility, which does
not require complete unambiguity.’” (Ibid.; People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398,
438.)
Moreover, contrary to Miguel’s claim that the lack of evidence of tone and context
prevented the court from considering other possible interpretations of the October 2021
statements, the record shows the juvenile court did just that. When asked if the statement
showed a lack of remorse or empathy, Johnson testified that “situational factors” relating
to the “incarcerated setting” influence “what you chose to say” and that “the
circumstances [surrounding the statements] are somewhat lacking.” Johnson suggested
that Miguel’s statements may have been “posturing for the peers” so they “would not
mess with him in the future,” or the statements may have been an expression of
hopelessness, but she could not tell from the statements alone “without knowing the full
17
scale of that moment.” The juvenile court, in discussing Miguel’s statement,
acknowledged “that sometimes people say things that they don’t really mean[,] and the
Court accepts that this may be a possibility.” Nonetheless, the court stated that “the
minor’s statements, regardless of the reasons he made them, reflect a callous mindset and
call[] into question whether he has made any real rehabilitative progress.” As the finder
of fact, the juvenile court was free to reject the interpretations proffered by the defense’s
expert witness. (People v. Engstrom (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 174, 187.) Instead, it took
the statements at face value, making the reasonable inference that Miguel’s statement,
“‘I’m a murderer. I kill people. So what?’” expresses a lack of remorse. Where
conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence, “‘the reviewing court must
accept the inference drawn by the trier of fact so long as it is reasonable.’” (Herpel v.
County of Riverside (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 96, 100.)
We also reject Miguel’s related argument that the juvenile court unduly focused on
“the isolated October 9, 2021[,] comment,” allowing it to “obscure” and “minimize[] the
various factors favoring” Miguel’s retention in the juvenile court. The juvenile court did
not consider the October 2021 statements in isolation; rather, it viewed the incident as
only Miguel’s “most prominent negative conduct” while in detention, which also
included “physically and verbally assaulting peers and staff and refusing to cooperate
with staff directives,” being “involved in at least five code reds,” and being “banned from
attending college courses due to his negative behavior.” Even before the October 2021
incident, Johnson’s risk assessment report acknowledged that despite Miguel’s “insight
18
and reported change in perspective,” he “has continued to engage in acts of aggression”
in custody, including a recent “code red” incident in which Miguel used violence on
another minor and a taser was deployed to gain his compliance. We also note that the
custodial misconduct continued even after the juvenile court cautioned Miguel directly
that the court was carefully observing his behavior in juvenile hall, that he needed to turn
around his negative behavior to demonstrate his overall rehabilitation, and that his
detention conduct would be evaluated at the transfer hearing, “which has the potential of
sending you to adult court.” In addition to Miguel’s negative custodial conduct, as
previously mentioned, the court also took into consideration his poor response to juvenile
court services after the 2016 petition, noting that Miguel’s behavior had escalated the
matter from deferred entry of judgment to wardship and formal probation to out-of-home
placement, all of which had failed to deter the instant offense from occurring while he
was still on probation.
The record also does not support Miguel’s claim that the court minimized or
ignored contrary evidence. The court stated that Miguel had “demonstrated perfect
conduct . . . on numerous occasions,” and the court listed many other “exceptional
accomplishments” of his, including having “graduated from high school, attended college
courses, participated in numerous rehabilitative programs and counseling” as well as “a
program in which he makes beanies and blankets for the homeless,” and having
“achieved honor room status” and been named “citizen of the month for the last four
months.” The court gave Miguel “significant credit for his continually improving
19
custodial behavior,” which it called “the single most compelling and substantial factor
weighing in favor of the minor remaining in the juvenile court.” However, the court
found the overall positive trend in Miguel’s detention conduct was “neutralized by his
significant and periodic negative behavior.” In sum, the court’s factual findings were
supported by substantial evidence, and the weight assigned to the various positive and
negative factors was well within the court’s discretion.
Miguel also contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that the criminal
sophistication criterion weighs in favor of transfer to criminal court, arguing the offense
was a “simple case of an attempted robbery gone bad.” We disagree. Miguel never
addresses the juvenile court’s analysis of the criminal sophistication finding, which was
well supported by the record. The court relied on the evidence showing Miguel’s willing
participation in a preplanned armed robbery, his preparation by arming himself with a
loaded firearm, his willingness to shoot the victim when the victim did not comply, his
subsequent flight, his attempts to change his clothing and appearance, and his lies to
police to conceal his involvement. The juvenile court was not obligated to agree with
Miguel’s claim that his conduct does not “reflect[] premeditation or planning,” given the
overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
Miguel also contends the court “unduly emphasized the gravity of the charged
offense.” The argument is meritless. The weight to be accorded to each of the statutory
criteria is left to the discretion of the juvenile court (C.S., supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1034-1035), and Miguel has not shown an abuse of discretion. The court determined
20
that three factors weighed in favor of transfer, one weighed against, one was neutral, and
the balance favored transfer. All of those determinations were supported by the record,
and Miguel has not shown that the court’s weighing of the gravity of the offense
constituted an abuse of discretion.
Finally, Miguel attempts to liken this case to J.N., in which the appellate court
held that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s finding that the
circumstances and gravity of the offense favored transfer to criminal court. (J.N., supra,
23 Cal.App.5th at p. 724.) Miguel’s claim that, “as in J.N., there was evidence that the
shot was fired only as a result of a struggle between appellant and the victim” is a gross
misrepresentation of that case. There was no struggle between the appellant and the
victim in J.N. because J.N. was unarmed and “did not kill anyone.” (Id. at p. 711.) “J.N.
was not the shooter” and “did not have any intent to kill.” (Id. at p. 724.) “J.N. was
shocked when the killing occurred and stood frozen” (ibid.) during the struggle between
another minor and an adult rival gang member. (Id. at p. 712.) J.N. also presented
“[e]xtensive evidence” of trauma affecting his mental and emotional development to
mitigate the gravity of the offense. (Id. at pp. 716, 724.) Miguel’s two-page discussion
of J.N. omits all of those highly relevant distinguishing facts. We consequently are not
persuaded that J.N. offers any support for Miguel’s argument that the juvenile court
accorded undue weight to the gravity of the offense.
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ
J.
We concur:
MILLER
Acting P. J.
SLOUGH
J.
22