Ramos v. Frey's Electronics CA2/7 ( 2014 )


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  • Filed 11/17/14 Ramos v. Frey’s Electronics CA2/7
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SEVEN
    LEO RAMOS,                                                           B246404
    Plaintiff and Appellant,                                    (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BC486879)
    v.
    FRY’S ELECTRONICS, INC.,
    Defendant and Respondent.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Anthony J.
    Mohr, Judge. Reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings.
    Matthew & George, Abraham Matthew, Jacob George and Mazyar Mazarei, for
    Plaintiff and Respondent.
    Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Richard J. Simmons and Matthew M.
    Sonne, for Defendant and Appellant.
    _______________________
    Leo Ramos brought a class action complaint against his employer, Fry’s
    Electronics, for unpaid overtime and other violations of the Labor Code. The complaint
    also alleged a representative claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act
    of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, §§ 2698 et seq.)1 on behalf of all aggrieved employees.
    Fry’s filed a petition to compel arbitration asserting that Ramos had entered into an
    employment agreement that required him to arbitrate all of his claims on an individual
    basis. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that: (1) the agreement’s class
    arbitration waiver was unenforceable pursuant to Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 
    42 Cal.4th 443
     (Gentry); and (2) any waiver of Ramos’s right to pursue a representative
    PAGA claim was contrary to public policy and unenforceable. Fry’s appealed.
    During the pendency of the appeal, the California Supreme Court issued
    Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 
    59 Cal.4th 348
     (Iskanian),
    which held that: (1) the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts Gentry’s rule against
    class arbitration waivers in employment contracts; and (2) the FAA does not preempt
    California’s rule prohibiting the waiver of representative PAGA claims. In light of
    Iskanian, we reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A. Events Preceding Fry’s’s Petition to Compel Arbitration
    1. Ramos’s arbitration agreement
    In January of 2010, defendant Fry’s Electronics hired plaintiff Leo Ramos as a
    customer service representative and car electronics technician. On the day Ramos was
    hired, a Fry’s employee requested that he sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of
    his employment. The agreement stated, in part: “[Ramos and Fry’s] hereby agree that
    any and all disputes between [Ramos and Fry’s] (including related disputes between
    [Ramos] and other [employees] or agents of [Fry’s] . . . ) arising from or in any way
    related to [Ramos’s] employment by [Fry’s] including but not limited to claims for
    damages and violations of state or federal laws and regulations related to harassment,
    1      Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory citations are to the Labor Code.
    2
    wrongful termination and/or discrimination . . . . shall be determined and decided by final
    and binding arbitration pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act
    [FAA]and to state law to the extent state law would otherwise be allocable, consistent
    with the [FAA]. . .”
    The agreement described procedures that were to govern various aspects of the
    arbitration, including the selection of the arbitrator, discovery, the filing of pleadings and
    motions and the award of remedies. The agreement further provided that the arbitrator
    was to issue a written award and statement of decision “specifying the applicable factual
    and legal findings and conclusion on which the award is based.” The agreement was
    silent on other issues relating to the arbitration, including judicial review of the
    arbitrator’s award and allocation of the costs of the arbitration.
    2. Ramos’s complaint
    On June 19, 2012, Ramos filed a class action complaint against Fry’s for unpaid
    overtime (§§ 510, 1194 and 1198) and various other Labor Code violations, including
    failure to reimburse business expenses (§§ 2800, 2802), failure to pay wages in a timely
    manner (§ 204) and failure to provide accurate wage statements (§ 226). Ramos further
    alleged that each of these acts constituted an “unlawful business practice” within the
    meaning of Business and Professions Code section 17200 (section 17200) and requested
    an order for restitution and injunctive relief. Ramos sought to bring each of these claims
    “individually, as well as on behalf of each and all other persons similarly situated.”
    In addition to his claims for damages and restitution, Ramos alleged a
    representative action under the PAGA seeking to collect penalties for each Labor Code
    violation “on behalf of all aggrieved employees in his capacity as private attorney
    general.”
    B. Fry’s’s Petition to Compel Arbitration
    1. Summary of Fry’s’s petition
    On July 26, 2012, Fry’s filed a petition to compel Ramos to arbitrate each of his
    claims on an individual basis. Fry’s argued the language of the parties’ agreement made
    3
    clear Ramos had agreed to arbitrate any claim arising from his employment. Fry’s
    further asserted that because the agreement contained no language suggesting that the
    parties had contemplated class or representative arbitration, Ramos was required to
    arbitrate all of his claims on an individual basis.
    In his opposition, Ramos argued there were numerous reasons the court should
    deny the petition. First, Ramos asserted Fry’s had failed to make a “prima facie”
    showing that the parties had entered into a binding contract. Although Ramos admitted
    he had signed the arbitration agreement, he contended there was no evidence the parties
    had mutually consented to the agreement or that the agreement was supported by
    adequate consideration. In support, Ramos provided a declaration stating that was not
    given a chance to review the document and was not told the document was an arbitration
    agreement that would waive his right to a judicial forum.
    Second, Ramos argued that even if Fry’s had established a binding arbitration
    contract, his Labor Code claims fell outside the scope of the agreement. Ramos
    contended that “[f]or an arbitration clause to operate for individual statutory claims, there
    must be a clear and unmistakable waiver of a judicial forum.” According to Ramos, his
    agreement with Fry’s did not meet that standard because it did not specifically reference
    “statutory claims or identify any statutes.”
    Third, Ramos argued that, under California law, a plaintiff has a right to pursue
    statutory claims for unpaid wages in court regardless of any agreement to arbitrate. (See
    § 229.) Although Ramos acknowledged the FAA preempted this rule of state law, he
    argued the FAA was inapplicable because Fry’s had presented no evidence showing that
    the agreement “involve[d] interstate commerce.” Rather, according to Ramos, the
    evidence showed only that Fry’s was headquartered in California, that he was a citizen of
    California and that he had never worked in a Fry’s location outside of California.
    Fourth, Ramos argued that even if Fry’s had established the existence of an
    enforceable arbitration agreement governed by the FAA, the agreement was
    unenforceable because it was unconscionable. Ramos contended the agreement was
    procedurally unconscionable because it was a “nonnegotiable contract of adhesion” that
    4
    failed to “specify or attach the rules that govern the arbitration.” He argued the
    agreement was “substantively unconscionable” because it did not “permit for judicial
    review of the arbitrator’s decision.”
    Fifth, Ramos argued that even if the agreement was generally valid, it had no
    effect on his PAGA claim or his claim for injunctive relief under section 17200. Ramos
    contended the agreement contained no language indicating he had consented to arbitrate
    representative actions brought on behalf of the Attorney General. He further argued that,
    even if the agreement could be read to extend to representative PAGA claims, Brown v.
    Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 
    197 Cal.App.4th 489
     (Brown), made clear that “PAGA
    waivers” were unenforceable as a matter of public policy. Ramos raised a similar
    argument regarding his claim for injunctive relief under section 17200, asserting that
    Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 
    30 Cal.4th 303
     (Cruz), had held that such
    claims are not arbitrable and that the FAA does not preempt this rule of state law.
    Finally, Ramos argued that if the court intended to compel arbitration, “the action
    must be ordered to class arbitration.” Ramos argued he was permitted to arbitrate his
    Labor Code claims on a classwide basis because the arbitration agreement did not
    specifically preclude class proceedings. He further argued that even if the agreement
    included an implied waiver of his right to class arbitration, such a waiver was
    unenforceable under Gentry, supra, 
    42 Cal.4th 443
    .
    In its reply, Fry’s argued that all of Ramos’s arguments lacked merit. First, it
    asserted that the signed arbitration agreement, combined with Ramos’s admission he
    signed the document, was sufficient to prove the existence of a valid contract. Second, it
    argued that the language in the agreement stating that the parties agreed to arbitrate all
    claims “arising from” or “related to” Fry’s’s employment extended to alleged violations
    of the Labor Code. Third, Fry’s argued that the failure to include a specific provision
    permitting judicial review was insufficient to render the agreement unconscionable.
    Fry’s also asserted the FAA was applicable to the parties’ employment agreement
    because the transaction related to “interstate commerce.” In support, Fry’s provided a
    5
    declaration demonstrating that it was a national electronics retailer and that its California
    stores sold merchandise acquired from vendors in numerous different states.
    Fry’s further asserted that because the agreement was governed by the FAA, the trial
    court was required to apply recent decisions from the United States Supreme Court that
    had broadly interpreted the FAA’s preemption provisions.
    Fry’s argued that under Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp. (2010) 
    559 U.S. 662
     (Stolt-Nielsen), a party could not be compelled to engage in class or
    representative arbitration in the absence of an express provision demonstrating that it had
    agreed to do so. Fry’s contended that because the parties’ agreement was silent on class
    or representative arbitration proceedings, the parties were presumed to have waived the
    right to use consolidated arbitration proceedings and agreed only to “bilateral
    arbitration.”
    Fry’s also argued that, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 
    131 S.Ct. 1740
     (Concepcion), the Supreme Court made clear that the FAA preempts any state rule
    that would render class or representative action waivers in arbitration agreements
    unenforceable. Fry’s argued that although Concepcion did not directly overrule the rule
    set forth in Gentry, its holding and its logic demonstrated that Gentry’s rule precluding
    employment class action waivers was preempted by the FAA. Finally, Fry’s argued that
    Concepcion’s rationale also implicitly overruled the “Cruz rule” (see Cruz, 
    supra,
     
    30 Cal.4th 303
    ) precluding arbitration of section 17200 claims seeking injunctive relief.
    2. Trial court ruling
    After a hearing, the trial court issued an order denying Fry’s’s petition to compel
    arbitration. The order initially considered and rejected Ramos’s assertions that Fry’s had
    failed to show the existence of a valid arbitration agreement; that the agreement did not
    cover alleged violations of the Labor Code; or that the agreement was not governed by
    the FAA. The court also agreed with Fry’s’s assertion that because the agreement did not
    reference class or representative proceedings, it effectively required Ramos to arbitrate
    his Labor Code and PAGA claims on an individual basis.
    6
    The court further concluded, however, that: (1) class and representative arbitration
    waivers are unenforceable under California law; and (2) the FAA does not preempt these
    rules, which are predicated on public policy. In support, the court cited to Brown, supra,
    
    197 Cal.App.4th 489
    , which held that the FAA does not preempt California’s rule
    prohibiting the enforcement of arbitration “PAGA waivers,” and Gentry, 
    supra,
     
    42 Cal.4th 443
    . The court acknowledged that Concepcion had cast significant doubt on the
    continuing validity of Gentry, but believed it was compelled to apply Gentry until the
    California Supreme Court resolved the issue.
    As a result of these rulings, and in light of the fact that Fry’s’s petition sought an
    order compelling arbitration on an individual basis only, the court denied the petition.
    DISCUSSION
    A. Standard of Review
    “An order denying a petition to compel arbitration is appealable. (Code Civ.
    Proc., § 1294, subd. (a).) “In general, ‘[t]here is no uniform standard of review for
    evaluating an order denying a [petition] to compel arbitration. [Citation.] If the court’s
    order is based on a decision of fact, then we adopt a substantial evidence standard.
    [Citations.] Alternatively, if the court’s denial rests solely on a decision of law, then a
    de novo standard of review is employed. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Laswell v. AG Seal
    Beach, LLC (2010) 
    189 Cal.App.4th 1399
    , 1406.)
    On appeal, Fry’s concedes that, under California law, Ramos could not be
    compelled to arbitrate his Labor Code claims or his PAGA claim in his individual
    capacity, nor could he be compelled to arbitrate his claim for injunctive relief under
    section 17200. Fry’s argues, however, that: (1) the parties’ arbitration agreement is
    governed by the FAA; (2) under the FAA, the parties’ arbitration agreement implicitly
    waived Ramos’s ability to arbitrate his claims in a class or representative capacity and
    waived his right to a judicial forum on his injunctive relief claim; (3) to the extent such
    waivers are unenforceable as a matter of California public policy, the FAA preempts
    those state law rules.
    7
    Ramos, however, contends that we should affirm the trial court’s ruling because:
    (1) Fry’s failed to establish the arbitration agreement constitutes a binding contract or
    that it extends to statutory hours and wages claims; (2) the FAA does not govern the
    arbitration agreement; (3) even if the FAA applies, the agreement permits class and
    representative proceedings; (4) if the agreement impliedly waives the right to proceed
    with class or representative actions, those waivers are unenforceable; (5) the arbitration
    agreement has no effect on his claim for injunctive relief under section 17200.
    B. Fry’s Demonstrated the Existence of a Binding Arbitration Agreement that
    Is Governed by the FAA
    Before addressing the impact of the FAA on the parties’ arbitration agreement, we
    assess Ramos’s preliminary contentions that: (1) Fry’s failed to establish the existence of
    a valid arbitration agreement; (2) the agreement does not cover violations of the Labor
    Code; and (3) Fry’s did not demonstrate the arbitration agreement is governed by the
    FAA.
    1. Fry’s established the existence of a binding arbitration agreement
    Ramos initially contends that “Fry’s has failed to establish a prima facie case that
    an agreement to arbitrate exists.” Although Ramos admits he signed the arbitration
    agreement Fry’s attached to its petition to compel arbitration, he contends no contract
    was formed because there was no mutual assent. In support, Ramos cites to statements in
    his declaration explaining that, on the day he was hired, a Fry’s assistant manager handed
    him the form and told him he was required to sign it as a condition of his employment.
    According to Ramos, the assistant manager did not give him “an opportunity to read the
    form,” did not tell him the document was an arbitration agreement and did not tell him he
    was waiving his right to a judicial forum. Fry’s provided a counter declaration from a
    customer service supervisor stating that she presented the agreement to Ramos, instructed
    him to read the document and told him she would answer any questions he might have.
    “Mutual assent to contract is based upon objective and outward manifestations of
    the parties; a party’s ‘subjective intent, or subjective consent, therefore is irrelevant.’
    [Citation.]” (Stewart v. Preston Pipeline Inc. (2005) 
    134 Cal.App.4th 1565
    , 1587.) The
    8
    general rule in California is that “a party who fails to read a contract but nonetheless
    objectively manifests his assent by signing it – absent fraud or knowledge by the other
    contracting party of the alleged mistake – may [not] later rescind the agreement on the
    basis that he did not agree to its terms.” (Id. at p. 1589; Marin Storage & Trucking, Inc.
    v. Benco Contracting and Engineering, Inc. (2001) 
    89 Cal.App.4th 1042
    , 1049
    [“ordinarily one who signs an instrument which on its face is a contract is deemed to
    assent to all its terms. A party cannot avoid the terms of a contract on the ground that he
    or she failed to read it before signing”].) This general rule of contract law applies equally
    to arbitration agreements. (Brookwood v. Bank of America (1996) 
    45 Cal.App.4th 1667
    ,
    1674.) In this case, Ramos has not alleged that Fry’s misled him about the contents of
    the arbitration agreement or that Fry’s was otherwise aware he did not understand what
    he was signing. The mere fact that Ramos did not read or understand the agreement
    before signing it is insufficient to demonstrate lack of mutual consent.
    Ramos also argues the arbitration agreement is unenforceable because he received
    no consideration for his promise to arbitrate claims arising from his employment. Ramos
    appears to assert the agreement amounted to a unilateral promise for which he received
    nothing in return. This argument, however, overlooks that the agreement is in fact
    bilateral in nature, requiring both parties to arbitrate any claims they may have against the
    other that arise from Fry’s’s employment. As explained in Strotz v. Dean Witter
    Reynolds, Inc. (1990) 
    223 Cal.App.3d 208
    , 216 [overruled on other grounds, Rosenthal v.
    Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 
    14 Cal.4th 394
    ]: “[W]hatever the law may
    be regarding unilateral waiver of the right to select a judicial forum, it is not instructive in
    the context of a bilateral agreement to arbitrate. Where an agreement to arbitrate exists,
    the parties’ mutual promises to forego a judicial determination and to arbitrate their
    disputes provide consideration for each other. Both parties give up the same rights and
    thus neither gains an advantage over the other.”
    9
    2. Ramos’s statutory wage and hour claims fall within the scope of the
    arbitration agreement
    Ramos next argues that his statutory wages and hour claims fall outside the scope
    of the arbitration agreement. He asserts that “[f]or an arbitration clause to operate for
    individual statutory claims,” the agreement must “expressly” reference statutory claims
    and identify each statutory claim that is subject to arbitration. In support, he cites two
    cases involving the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements (CBA’s) that
    contained provisions requiring the arbitration of any dispute “arising” out of the CBA.
    (See Vasquez v. Superior Court (2000) 
    80 Cal.App.4th 430
    , 433; Hoover v. American
    Income Life Ins. Co. (2012) 
    206 Cal.App.4th 1193
    , 1208 (Hoover).) In both cases, the
    courts applied special rules pertaining to the interpretation of arbitration provisions
    within “union-negotiated” CBAs (Vasquez, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 434): “‘In the
    collective bargaining context, the parties “must be particularly clear’ about their intent to
    arbitrate statutory [employment] claims.’ [Citation.] A waiver in a collective bargaining
    agreement is sufficiently clear if it . . . contain[s] a clear and unmistakable provision
    under which the employees agree to submit to arbitration all [state and federal statutory]
    causes of action arising out of their employment.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.; see also Hoover,
    supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1208.) Both courts concluded that a general provision
    requiring the arbitration of disputes “arising” out of the CBA did not satisfy those
    requirements. (Vasquez, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at pp. 435-436; Hoover, supra, 206
    Cal.App.4th at p. 1208.)
    Vasquez and Hoover have no relevance here. First, this case does not involve the
    interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Thus, the special rules of
    construction at issue in Vasquez and Hoover do not apply. Second, unlike in Vasquez or
    Hoover, the language in Ramos’s agreement does not merely require the arbitration of
    disputes “arising” out of the parties’ contract. Rather, the agreement states that the
    parties would arbitrate “any and all disputes . . . arising from or in any way related to
    [Ramos’s] employment by Fry’s, including but not limited to claims for damages and
    violation of state or federal laws . . . .” Each of Ramos’s claims, all of which are
    10
    predicated on alleged violations of the Labor Code, clearly arises from the conditions of
    his employment. Accordingly, his claims fall within the scope of the agreement.
    3. Fry’s provided evidence demonstrating the arbitration agreement is
    governed by the FAA
    Ramos argues that even if Fry’s established the existence of an enforceable
    agreement to arbitrate statutory wage and hour claims, it failed to show the agreement is
    governed by the FAA. Section 2 of the FAA (
    9 U.S.C. § 2
    ) states that the federal statute
    applies to any “written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving
    commerce.” The United States Supreme Court has “interpreted the term ‘involving
    commerce’ in the FAA as the functional equivalent of the term ‘affecting commerce’ –
    words of art that ordinarily signals the broadest permissible exercise of Congress’
    commerce clause power. [Citation.]” (Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc. (2003) 
    539 U.S. 52
    , 56 (Citizens Bank); Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc. (2007) 
    148 Cal.App.4th 1092
    , 1097 (Shepard).) Under this broad interpretation, “application of the
    FAA [is not] defeated because the individual [transaction], taken alone, did not have a
    ‘substantial effect on interstate commerce.’ [Citation.]. Congress’ Commerce Clause
    power ‘may be exercised in individual cases without showing any specific effect upon
    interstate commerce’ if in the aggregate the economic activity in question would
    represent ‘a general practice . . . subject to federal control.’ [Citations.] Only that
    general practice need bear on interstate commerce in a substantial way. [Citations.]”
    (Citizen's Bank, supra, 539 U.S. at pp. 56-57.)
    As the party asserting the applicability of the FAA, Fry’s had the burden to
    produce evidence showing the contract involved interstate commerce. (Shepard, supra,
    148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1101; Hoover, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1207.) In the trial
    court, Fry’s submitted a declaration stating the following facts: Fry’s is an “electronics
    retailer” that is headquartered in California and operates retail stores located in nine
    states; the inventory sold in Fry’s’s California stores “is purchased from vendors in 44
    states and the District of Columbia”; Fry’s maintains an “e-commerce” website that ships
    goods to all 50 states from a distribution center located in Tennessee. The trial court
    11
    concluded these facts were sufficient to demonstrate that Fry’s was a “nationwide retailer
    and affects interstate commerce, even if Ramos individual position did not require
    interaction outside of California.” In support, the court cited Peleg v. Neiman Marcus
    Group, Inc. (2012) 
    204 Cal.App.4th 1425
    , 1447, which held that the defendant’s status as
    a national retailer provided an adequate basis to demonstrate the FAA applied to its
    employment arbitration agreements.
    Ramos does not explain why Fry’s’s evidence is insufficient to demonstrate the
    applicability of the FAA nor does he attempt to distinguish Peleg. Instead, he asserts the
    FAA is inapplicable because “he is not aware of any facts suggesting that the employee-
    employer relationship between Ramos and Fry’s had a specific effect or bearing on
    interstate commerce in a substantial way.’” As explained above, however, the
    Supreme Court has clarified that “application of the FAA [is not defeated] because the
    individual . . . transaction[], taken alone, did not have a ‘substantial effect on interstate
    commerce.’” (Citizens Bank, 
    supra,
     539 U.S. at pp. 56-57.) Rather, the question is
    whether the Fry’s’s employment relationships with its employees, considered in the
    aggregate, affect interstate commerce.
    Fry’s’s evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of FAA coverage
    for two reasons. First, the evidence shows Fry’s employed personnel and sold
    merchandise at least nine states. (See generally Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001)
    
    532 U.S. 105
    , 109 [FAA applied to employment agreement entered into with “national
    retailer of consumer electronics”].) Second, the evidence shows the employees in Fry’s’s
    California retail stores (which includes Ramos) sell merchandise that Fry’s acquires from
    vendors located in 44 states. (See Shepard, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1100-1101
    [evidence that “construction of plaintiff’s house involved the receipt and use of building
    materials that were manufactured and/or produced outside California” sufficient to
    demonstrate FAA governed estate purchase arbitration agreement].)
    The only authority Ramos cites in support of his assertion that Fry’s failed to
    demonstrate FAA coverage is Hoover, supra, 
    206 Cal.App.4th 1193
    . In Hoover,
    however, the court held that the defendant had “waived the right to seek arbitration by
    12
    actively litigating th[e] action for more than a year and causing prejudice to [plaintiff.]”
    (Id. at p. 1203.) The court further explained that even if defendant “had not waived its
    right to assert arbitration, [the court] would [have] decide[d] [defendant] could not
    compel arbitration” (id. at p. 1206) of plaintiff’s wage and hour claims because California
    law provides a judicial forum for such claims “‘without regard to the existence of any
    private agreement to arbitrate . . .’” (Id. at p. 1207 [citing Labor Code, § 229].) The court
    noted that although this state law is inapplicable “when there is federal preemption under
    the FAA,” the defendant had failed to provide evidence demonstrating its contract with
    plaintiff had any effect on interstate commerce. (Id. at pp. 1207-1208.) According to the
    court, the only “facts” defendant had established were that plaintiff “was a California
    resident who sold life insurance policies” and that the defendant was “based in Texas.”
    (Ibid.) The court concluded that, standing alone, such facts were insufficient to
    “demonstrate FAA coverage.” (Ibid.)
    To the extent the Hoover’s discussion of FAA coverage amounted to anything
    more than dicta, the case is distinguishable. Unlike Fry’s, the defendant in Hoover did
    not present any evidence that it employed people throughout the country, that it sold its
    products to consumers located throughout the country or that its California employees
    sold products acquired from vendors in numerous other states.
    C. Ramos Is Required to Arbitrate his Labor Code Claims in his Individual
    Capacity, but Is Entitled to Pursue a Representative PAGA Claim
    Having concluded that Fry’s demonstrated the existence of an enforceable
    arbitration agreement governed by the FAA, we next consider whether the agreement
    required Ramos to arbitrate his Labor Code and PAGA claims on an individual (rather
    than class or representative) basis.
    13
    1. Summary of case law governing employment arbitration agreements and
    class arbitration waivers
    a. Summary of California law prior to Stolt–Nielsen and Concepcion
    More than 30 years ago, the California Supreme Court held in Keating v. Superior
    Court (1982) 
    31 Cal.3d 584
    , that trial courts have the authority to order classwide
    arbitration in appropriate cases. “The arbitration agreement in Keating had no specific
    provision permitting or precluding classwide arbitration, but the high court held that a
    trial court has the discretionary authority to order classwide arbitrations where the
    interests of justice would be served. [Citations.]” (Truly Nolen of America v. Superior
    Court (2012) 
    208 Cal.App.4th 487
    , 498 (Truly Nolen).) Following Keating, class
    arbitration became a “well accepted” method for resolving disputes in California.
    (Discover Bank v. Superior Court (2005) 
    36 Cal.4th 148
    , 152 (Discover Bank).)
    Almost two decades after Keating was decided, the California Supreme Court
    addressed the enforceability of an employment agreement requiring the arbitration of
    wrongful termination claims arising under the California Fair Employment and Housing
    Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.). (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare
    Services, Inc. (2000) 
    24 Cal.4th 83
     (Armendariz).) Armendariz concluded that although
    FEHA statutory claims are unwaivable, “such claims are in fact arbitrable if the
    arbitration permits an employee to vindicate his or her statutory rights.” (Id. at p. 90.)
    The Court explained that, “[i]n order for such vindication to occur, the arbitration must
    meet certain minimum requirements, including neutrality of the arbitrator, the provision
    of adequate discovery, a written decision that will permit a limited form of judicial
    review, and limitations on the costs of arbitration.” (Id. at p. 91.)
    Armendariz further ruled that even if an arbitration agreement satisfies each of
    these minimum requirements (or does not pertain to unwaivable statutory rights), the
    agreement may be invalidated if it is found to be unconscionable. As explained in
    Armendariz, “[u]nconscionability analysis begins with an inquiry into whether the
    contract is one of adhesion. . . . If the contract is adhesive, the court must then determine
    whether ‘other factors are present which, under established legal rules – legislative or
    14
    judicial – operate to render it [unenforceable].’ [Citation.] [¶] . . . [¶] ‘[U]nconscionability
    has both a “procedural” and a “substantive” element,’ the former focusing on
    ‘“oppression”’ or ‘“surprise”’ due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on ‘“overly
    harsh”’ or ‘“one-sided”’ results. [Citation.] ‘The prevailing view is that [procedural and
    substantive unconscionability] must both be present in order for a court to exercise its
    discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of
    unconscionability.’ [Citation.] But they need not be present in the same degree. . . .”
    (Id at pp. 113-114.)
    Thus, Armendariz concluded that an agreement requiring the arbitration of
    unwaivable statutory rights may be unenforceable under two theories. First, the
    agreement may be found to lack an essential element necessary to effectuate the
    unwaivable statutory rights at issue, thereby rendering the agreement unenforceable as
    “contrary to public policy.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 99.) Second, the
    agreement may be unenforceable under principles of unconscionability. (Ibid.) The
    Court also concluded that the FAA permitted states to invalidate arbitration agreements
    based on these general principles of contract law. In support, the Court cited the FAA’s
    savings provision, which states that arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and
    enforceable “‘save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
    any contract.’ (
    9 U.S.C. § 2
    ).” (Id. at p. 98.)
    In Discover Bank, supra, 
    36 Cal.4th 148
    , the Court “considered an issue
    unaddressed in Keating – whether an express ‘class action waiver may be unenforceable
    as contrary to public policy or unconscionable.’ [Citation.]” (Truly Nolen, supra, 208
    Cal.App.4th at p. 499.) The plaintiff filed a class action complaint alleging a credit card
    company had improperly imposed late fee payments. The defendant sought an order
    compelling plaintiff to arbitrate his claim on an individual basis, citing a provision in the
    parties’ credit card user agreement that expressly waived the right to proceed by class
    arbitration. Plaintiff opposed the petition, arguing that “class action or arbitration
    waivers in consumer contracts . . . should be invalidated as unconscionable under
    California law.” (Discover Bank, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 160.)
    15
    The Court agreed, holding that some forms of consumer class action waivers are
    unconscionable: “[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a
    setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small
    amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining
    power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of
    individually small sums of money, then . . . the waiver becomes in practice the exemption
    of the party ‘from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or
    property of another.’ [Citation.] Under these circumstances, such waivers are
    unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced.” (Discover Bank,
    supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 162-163.)
    As in Armendariz, the Court further concluded that this rule of state law was not
    preempted by the FAA: “‘Under section 2 of the FAA, a state court may refuse to
    enforce an arbitration agreement based on “generally applicable contract defenses, such
    as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”’ [Citation.] . . . In the present case, the principle
    that class action waivers are, under certain circumstances, unconscionable as unlawfully
    exculpatory is a principle of California law that does not specifically apply to arbitration
    agreements, but to contracts generally. In other words, it applies equally to class action
    litigation waivers in contracts without arbitration agreements as it does to class arbitration
    waivers in contracts with such agreements.” (Discover Bank, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 65.)
    Two years later, in Gentry, 
    supra,
     
    42 Cal.4th 443
    , the Court “consider[ed] whether
    class arbitration waivers in employment arbitration agreements may be enforced to
    preclude class arbitrations by employees whose statutory rights to overtime pay pursuant
    to Labor Code sections 500 et seq. and 1194.” (Id. at p. 450.) The agreement at issue
    contained an express waiver stating that the arbitrator “shall not consolidate claims of
    different [employees] into one proceeding . . . [or] have the power to hear arbitration as a
    class action.” (Id. at p. 451.)
    In its analysis, the Court explained that, unlike in Discover Bank, the plaintiff’s
    claim was predicated on his unwaivable statutory right to overtime pay. As a result, even
    if the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable, the class arbitration waiver
    16
    provision was unenforceable on public policy grounds if it would “‘undermine the
    vindication of the employees’ . . . statutory rights.’” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at
    p. 363.)
    The Court concluded that a class arbitration waiver would impermissibly interfere
    with employees’ ability to vindicate overtime rights “under some circumstances.”
    (Gentry, 
    supra,
     42 Cal.4th.at p. 457.) The Court explained that when a plaintiff seeks a
    class action alleging unpaid overtime “notwithstanding an arbitration agreement that
    contains a class arbitration waiver, the trial court must consider [four] factors” (id. at
    p. 463): (1) the modest size of the potential individual recovery; (2) the potential for
    retaliation against members of the class; (3) the fact that absent class members may be ill
    informed about their rights; and (4) other real world obstacles to the vindication of class
    members’ statutory rights. (Ibid.) The Court held that if the “trial court determines,
    based on [these] factors . . ., that class action arbitration would be a significantly more
    effective way of vindicating the rights of affected employees than individual arbitration,”
    the court must invalidate the class arbitration waiver. (Id. at p. 450.)
    The Court also concluded that a rule “invalidating [some forms of employment]
    class arbitration waivers” was not preempted by the FAA because it did not
    “discriminate[] against arbitration.” (Gentry, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 465.) Rather,
    according to the Court, “[t]he principle that in the case of certain unwaivable statutory
    rights, class action waivers are forbidden when class actions would be the most effective
    practical means of vindicating those rights is an arbitration-neutral rule: it applies to class
    waivers in arbitration and nonarbitration provisions alike.” (Ibid.)
    b. Stolt–Nielsen and Concepcion
    In 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided Stolt–Nielsen, supra, 
    559 U.S. 662
    , “which concerned the issue whether a court/arbitrator has the authority under the
    FAA to order classwide arbitration in a situation where there is no agreement to engage
    in class arbitration. [Citation.]” (Truly Nolen, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 502.) The
    parties agreed that although the arbitration agreement did not contain an explicit class
    action waiver provision, they had not agreed to class arbitration. The arbitration panel,
    17
    however, concluded the agreement implicitly permitted class arbitration because there
    was no provision explicitly precluding consolidated proceedings.
    The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that “a party may not be compelled
    under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for
    concluding that both parties agreed to do so.” (Stolt–Nielsen, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 684.)
    The Court explained that “[a]n implicit agreement to authorize class-action arbitration . . .
    is not a term that the arbitrator may infer solely from the fact of the parties’ agreement to
    arbitrate. This is so because class-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to
    such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to
    submit their disputes to an arbitrator.” (Id. at p. 685.)
    One year later, the United States Supreme Court decided Concepcion, supra, 
    131 S.Ct. 1740
    , which abrogated Discover Bank. The plaintiff in Concepcion brought a class
    action challenging a cell phone carrier’s imposition of sales tax on a free phone. The
    defendant moved to compel individual arbitration of the claim pursuant to a clause in the
    plaintiff’s consumer contract that included an express waiver of the right to class
    arbitration. Relying on Discover Bank, the lower courts refused to enforce the class
    action waiver clause under California law. The United States Supreme Court granted
    certiorari to consider “whether [the FAA] preempts California’s [Discovery Bank] rule
    classifying most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable.”
    (Id. at p. 1746.)
    As summarized by the California Supreme Court: “[t]he high court in Concepcion
    invalidated Discover Bank and held that ‘[r]equiring the availability of classwide
    arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme
    inconsistent with the FAA.’ [Citation.] According to Concepcion, classwide arbitration
    ‘sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration – its informality – and makes the process
    slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.’
    [Citation.] . . . . The court concluded that ‘[b]ecause it “stands as an obstacle to the
    accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,”
    18
    [citation], California’s Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA.’ [Citation.]”
    (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 362.)
    c. Iskanian
    In Iskanian, supra, 
    59 Cal.4th 348
    , the California Supreme Court addressed
    Concepcion’s effect on the enforceability of class and representative arbitration waivers
    in employment agreements. Plaintiff filed a class action complaint for unpaid overtime
    and various other Labor Code violations. The complaint also alleged a representative
    action under the PAGA seeking penalties for each violation of the Labor Code on behalf
    of all aggrieved employees. The defendant moved to compel individual arbitration based
    on an employment agreement that precluded either party from pursuing any “class action
    or representative action claims . . . in arbitration or otherwise.” (Id. at pp. 360-361.)
    Citing Concepcion, the trial court granted employer’s petition, ordering the case into
    individual arbitration and dismissing the class and representative claims. The appellate
    court affirmed.
    The California Supreme Court initially summarized Concepcion, explaining the
    decision had held that: (1) the FAA preempts state rules that are incompatible with the
    fundamental attributes of arbitration; and (2) requiring classwide arbitration interfered
    with numerous attributes of arbitration, including its expediency and informality. 2 The
    Court concluded that, under the principles of Concepcion, Gentry’s rule against some
    2       In Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 
    57 Cal.4th 1109
    , the Court clarified
    that Concepcion does not prevent states from applying general rules of contract law that
    have a “disproportionate impact” on arbitration: “[A] facially neutral state law rule is not
    preempted simply because its evenhanded application ‘would have a disproportionate
    impact on arbitration agreements.’ [Citation.] . . . . Under Concepcion, a state law rule is
    preempted when its impact is such that it interferes with fundamental attributes of
    arbitration.” (Id. at p. 1144.) The court reaffirmed these principles in Iskanian. The
    Ninth Circuit has reached a different conclusion, holding that, under Concepcion,
    “generally applicable state-law rules are preempted if in practice they have a
    ‘disproportionate impact’ on arbitration or ‘interfere[] with fundamental attributes of
    arbitration and thus create[] a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.’ [Citation.]”
    (Mortensen v. Bresnan Communications, LLC (9th Cir. 2013) 
    722 F.3d 1151
    , 1159
    [emphasis added].)
    19
    forms of employment class arbitration waivers was preempted under the FAA. (Id. at
    p. 362.)
    The Court next considered whether the plaintiff was required to arbitrate his
    PAGA claim on an individual basis. The Court began by summarizing the PAGA
    provisions: “‘Under the legislation, an “aggrieved employee” may bring a civil action
    personally and on behalf of other current or former employees to recover civil penalties
    for Labor Code violations. [Citation.] Of the civil penalties recovered, 75 percent goes
    to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency, leaving the remaining 25 percent for
    the “aggrieved employees.” [Citations.]. [¶] Before bringing a civil action for statutory
    penalties, an employee must . . . give written notice of the alleged Labor Code violation
    to both the employer and the Labor and Workforce Development Agency. . . . If the
    agency elects not to investigate, the employee may commence a civil action. [Citation.]’
    [Citation.]” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 380.) According to the Court, these
    provisions demonstrated that a PAGA representative action is “a type of qui tam action”
    (id. at p. 382) that permits “aggrieved employees, acting as private attorneys general, to
    recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations, with the understanding that labor law
    enforcement agencies were to retain primacy over private enforcement efforts.” (Id. at
    p. 379.)
    The Court then addressed whether California law prohibited the waiver of
    representative PAGA claims and, if so, whether such a rule was enforceable under the
    FAA. The Court first concluded that such claims were unwaivable: “an employment
    agreement [that] compels the waiver of representative claims under the PAGA . . . is
    contrary to public policy and unenforceable as a matter of state law.” (Iskanian, supra,
    59 Cal.4th at p. 384.) In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected defendant’s assertion
    that the particular waiver at issue was not against public policy because the plaintiff
    retained his right to arbitrate his PAGA claim on an individual basis: “[W]hether or not
    an individual claim is permissible under the PAGA, a prohibition of representative claims
    frustrates the PAGA’s objectives . . . [because] a single-claimant arbitration . . . for
    individual penalties will not result in the penalties contemplated under the PAGA to
    20
    punish and deter employer practices that violate the rights of numerous employees under
    the Labor Code. That plaintiff and other employees might be able to bring individual
    claims for Labor Code violations in separate arbitrations does not serve the purpose of the
    PAGA, even if an individual claim has collateral estoppel effects. [Citation.] Other
    employees would still have to assert their claims in individual proceedings.’ [Citation.]”
    (Ibid.)
    The Court then explained that the FAA did not preempt this rule of California law:
    “Concepcion made clear [that] a state law rule may be preempted when it ‘stands as an
    obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.’ [Citation.] . . . [T]he rule
    against PAGA waivers does not frustrate the FAA’s objectives because . . . the FAA aims
    to ensure an efficient forum for the resolution of private disputes, whereas a PAGA
    action is a dispute between an employer and the state Agency.” (Iskanian, supra, 59
    Cal.4th at p. 384.) The Court concluded: “Nothing in the text or legislative history of the
    FAA nor in the Supreme Court’s construction of the statute suggests that the FAA was
    intended to limit the ability of states to enhance their public enforcement capabilities by
    enlisting willing employees in qui tam actions.” (Id. at p. 387.)
    Finally, the court addressed what remedy was appropriate in light of its holding
    that the arbitration agreement’s class arbitration waiver was enforceable, but its PAGA
    waiver was not: “Although the arbitration agreement can be read as requiring arbitration
    of individual claims but not of representative PAGA claims, neither party contemplated
    such a bifurcation. [Plaintiff] has sought to litigate all claims in court, while [defendant]
    has sought to arbitrate the individual claims while barring the PAGA representative claim
    altogether. In light of the principles above, neither party can get all that it wants.
    [Plaintiff] must proceed with bilateral arbitration on his individual damages claims, and
    [the defendant] must answer the representative PAGA claims in some forum. The
    arbitration agreement gives us no basis to assume that the parties would prefer to resolve
    a representative PAGA claim through arbitration. [¶] This raises a number of questions:
    (1) Will the parties agree on a single forum for resolving the PAGA claim and the other
    claims? (2) If not, is it appropriate to bifurcate the claims, with individual claims going to
    21
    arbitration and the representative PAGA claim to litigation? (3) If such bifurcation
    occurs, should the arbitration be stayed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
    1281.2? [Citation.] The parties have not addressed these questions and may do so on
    remand.” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 391-392.)
    2. Ramos has failed to establish the arbitration agreement is unconscionable
    Ramos initially contends that, under Armendariz, the entire arbitration agreement
    is unenforceable based on principles of unconscionability. Ramos asserts the agreement
    is procedurally unconscionable because “it is an adhesion contract based on a
    standardized non-negotiable form, drafted and imposed by a party of superior bargaining
    position, i.e., Fry’s.” Ramos argues the agreement is substantively unconscionable
    because “the Agreement does not permit judicial review of the arbitrator’s decision.”
    Regardless of whether the agreement exhibits some level of procedural
    unconscionability, Ramos has failed to demonstrate that the agreement’s terms are
    substantively unconscionable. Contrary to Ramos’s suggestion, the agreement does not
    prohibit judicial review of the arbitrator’s award. Rather, the agreement is silent on the
    issue of judicial review. The agreement does, however, provide that the arbitration shall
    be conducted “pursuant to the provisions of the [FAA] and to state law to the extent state
    law would otherwise be applicable . . .” Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA (
    9 U.S.C. §§ 10
    ,
    11) and sections 1286.2 and 1286.6 of the California Arbitration Act (Code Civ. Proc.,
    §§ 1286.2, 1286.6) provide for limited judicial review of arbitration awards governed by
    their respective provisions. Nothing in the arbitration agreement denies either party the
    benefit of that review. Consequently, the agreement is not unconscionable merely
    because it does not explicitly provide for judicial review. (See Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc.
    (2003) 
    29 Cal.4th 1064
    , 1075, fn. 1 [“the fact that an arbitration agreement does not
    explicitly provide for judicial review is no basis for invalidating it. [Citation.]”].)
    22
    3. Ramos is required to arbitrate his Labor Code claims on an individual
    basis
    The trial court ruled that, under Gentry, Ramos could not be compelled to arbitrate
    his Labor Code claims on an individual basis. Fry’s argues that, in light of Iskanian, it is
    now clear that the FAA preempts the “Gentry rule” and that Ramos must therefore be
    ordered to arbitrate his claims individually as required under the terms of the arbitration
    agreement. Ramos disagrees, arguing that: (1) the arbitration agreement does not
    preclude class arbitration; and (2) to the extent that it does, he satisfied all of the factors
    set forth in Gentry, thereby rendering any class action waiver unenforceable.
    a. The arbitration agreement does not permit class arbitration3
    Ramos contends that, unlike the arbitration agreements at issue in Concepcion,
    Gentry and Iskanian, the agreement at issue here does “not explicitly reject class
    arbitration.” According to Ramos, the absence of any such language demonstrates “an
    implied agreement to class arbitration exists.” We disagree, concluding this argument is
    foreclosed by Stolt-Nielsen.
    The agreement between Ramos and Fry’s does not reference class arbitration.
    Rather, the agreement states only that “[Ramos and Fry’s] hereby agree that any and all
    disputes between [Ramos and Fry’s] (including disputes between [Ramos] and other
    [employees] or agents of [Fry’s] and entities legally related to [Fry’s]) arising from or in
    any way related to [Ramos’s] employment by [Fry’s] . . . shall be determined and decided
    by final and binding arbitration.”
    3
    Neither party has argued that the trial court lacked authority to determine whether
    their agreement permits class arbitration. (See Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc. (2014)
    
    228 Cal.App.4th 65
    , 78 [“the question whether the parties agreed to class arbitration in
    cases where the arbitration agreement is silent is determined by the arbitrator”].) Instead,
    both parties invited the trial court (and now invite this court) to decide the issue of class
    arbitrability. Under such circumstances, the court may properly determine whether the
    parties agreed to class arbitration. (See Truly Nolen, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 515
    [court may properly decide question of class arbitrability where both parties requested
    that it resolve the issue].)
    23
    In Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc. (2012) 
    207 Cal.App.4th 1115
    ,
    (Nelsen), the court considered whether a similarly-worded employment arbitration
    agreement operated as a waiver of class arbitration. The plaintiff’s agreement stated: “‘I
    agree that any claim, dispute, or controversy . . . between myself and [the employer] (or
    its . . . agents . . .) arising from . . . my . . . employment by . . . [employer], . . . shall be
    submitted to and determined exclusively by binding arbitration.” (Id. at p. 1120.) The
    court concluded that, under Stolt-Nielsen, this language could not be reasonably
    interpreted as permitting class arbitration. According to Nelsen, Stolt-Nelsen clarified
    that “‘a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless
    there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.’ [Citation.]
    [Although Stolt-Nelsen] did not specify what is affirmatively required in order to show
    there is a ‘contractual basis,’ . . . it did hold that the agreement’s ‘silence on the question
    of class arbitration’ cannot be taken as dispositive evidence of an intent to allow class
    arbitration. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1128.)
    Applying those principles to the agreement at issue, Nelsen found there was no
    language in the contract suggesting the parties had agreed to class arbitration. The court
    explained that “the agreement [only contemplates arbitration] of disputes between ‘[the
    plaintiff and the employer]’. . . A class action by its very nature is not a dispute or
    controversy ‘between [plaintiff and employer].’ In this case (assuming a class was
    certified) it would be a dispute between [employer] and numerous different individuals,
    one of whom is [plaintiff]. Although [employer] agreed with [plaintiff] to arbitrate all
    kinds of disputes that might arise between them, this choice of contractual language, by
    its ordinary meaning, unambiguously negates any intention by [employer] to arbitrate
    claims or disputes to which [plaintiff] was not a party.” (Nelsen, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th
    at p. 1130.)
    In Kinecta Alternative Financial Solutions, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 
    205 Cal.App.4th 506
     (Kinecta), the court considered essentially identical language in a wage
    and hour class action brought by a credit union employee against her former employer.
    The employee’s arbitration agreement covered “‘any claim, dispute, and/or controversy
    24
    that either I may have against the [employer] (or its . . . employees [or] agents . . .) or the
    [employer] may have against me, arising from, related to, or having any relationship or
    connection whatsoever with my . . . employment by, or other association with the
    [employer.]’” (Id. at p. 511, fn. 1.) As in Nelsen, the court applied Stolt-Nelsen and
    concluded there was no basis for finding the agreement authorized class arbitration: “The
    arbitration provision identifies only two parties to the agreement, ‘I, [plaintiff]’ and
    ‘[employer].’ It makes no reference to employee groups or to other employees of
    [employer], and instead refers exclusively to ‘I,’ ‘me,’ and ‘my’ (designating [plaintiff].)”
    (Id. at p. 517.)
    The language in Ramos’s arbitration agreement cannot be meaningfully
    distinguished from the language at issue in Nelsen or Kinecta. As in those cases, the
    agreement states that the parties agreed that “any and all [employment-related] disputes
    between [Ramos] and [Fry’s]” shall be determined by arbitration. For the reasons set
    forth in Nelsen and Kinecta, we conclude this “contractual language . . . contemplates a
    two-party arbitration. No language evinces an intent to allow class arbitration.” (Nelsen,
    supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1131.)
    b. Iskanian has clarified that the FAA preempts the Gentry rule
    Ramos argues that even if the arbitration agreement impliedly waives class
    arbitration, that waiver is unenforceable because he has satisfied all of the factors set
    forth in Gentry. Iskanian, however, concluded that the reasoning in Concepcion made
    clear that “the FAA preempts the Gentry rule.” (Iskansian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 366.)
    Therefore, under Iskanian and Concepcion, Ramos must “proceed with bilateral
    arbitration on his individual damages claims.” (Id. at p. 391.)4
    4      The California Supreme Court issued Iskanian after Ramos submitted his
    respondent’s brief, but before Fry’s submitted its reply brief. Prior to oral argument, we
    issued a letter to counsel requesting they be prepared to address the effect of Iskanian.
    25
    4. Ramos is entitled to pursue a representative PAGA claim
    We next consider whether Ramos may be compelled to arbitrate his PAGA claim
    on an individual basis. As summarized above, Iskanian held that arbitration provisions
    requiring the waiver of “representative actions brought under the Private Attorneys
    General Act” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 378) are impermissible under state law,
    and further held that the FAA does not preempt this rule.
    Fry’s does not dispute that Iskanian precludes the enforcement of an employment
    agreement provision that expressly waives the arbitration of representative claims under
    the PAGA. It contends, however, that Iskanian is inapplicable here because the
    arbitration agreement does not contain an “explicit . . . representative waiver. . . Rather, .
    . . the agreement is silent with respect to PAGA claims.” According to Fry’s, Ramos is
    therefore “not precluded from pursuing his PAGA claim on an individual basis.” Thus,
    Fry’s essentially argues that, under Iskanian, a plaintiff may be compelled to arbitrate his
    or her PAGA claim on an individual basis where the agreement is silent on the issue of
    representative arbitration proceedings.
    Even if we were to accept Fry’s’s assertion that the agreement included an implied
    representative action waiver requiring Ramos to arbitrate his PAGA claim on an
    individual basis, such a provision would be unenforceable under Iskanian.5
    The defendant employer in Iskanian raised a similar argument, asserting that the
    agreement at issue was not contrary to public policy because it only prohibited
    “representative claims, not individual PAGA claims for Labor Code violations that an
    employee suffered.” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 383.) The California Supreme
    Court disagreed, stating: “[W]hether or not an individual claim is permissible under the
    PAGA, a prohibition of representative claims frustrates the PAGA’s objectives” because
    a “single-claimant arbitration . . . will not result in the penalties contemplated under the
    5      Fry’s appears to argue that, under the reasoning of Stolt-Nielsen, supra, 
    559 U.S. 662
    , an arbitration agreement that does not reference representative claims must be
    interpreted as requiring individual arbitration of any claim that could be brought in a
    representative capacity. We need not decide that issue, concluding that, under Iskanian, a
    provision requiring a plaintiff to arbitrate his PAGA claim on an individual basis is
    unenforceable.
    26
    PAGA to punish and deter employer practices that violate the . . . Labor Code.” (Id. at
    pp. 383-384.) The Court’s analysis makes clear that an arbitration provision that
    precludes representative PAGA claims, but permits individual PAGA claims, is still
    contrary to public policy and therefore unenforceable.6
    D. Ramos’s Claim for Injunctive Relief Under Section 17200 Is not Arbitrable
    Finally, we consider Ramos’s assertion that, under Cruz, 
    supra,
     
    30 Cal.4th 303
    ,
    his claim of injunctive relief under section 17200 is not arbitrable. In Cruz, the
    California Supreme Court held that section 17200 injunctive relief actions that would
    benefit the public are not arbitrable. (Id. at pp. 315-316.) Cruz extended the Court’s
    prior holding in Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans (1999) 
    21 Cal.4th 1066
     (Broughton),
    which held that a claim seeking public injunctive relief under the Consumers Legal
    Remedies Act (CLRA) (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.) was not arbitrable. Broughton
    explained that “the evident purpose of the injunctive relief provision of the CLRA is not
    to resolve a private dispute but to remedy a public wrong.” (Broughton, 
    supra,
     21
    Cal.4th at p. 1080.) According to the Court, a plaintiff seeking an injunction under the
    CLRA “function[s] as a private attorney general, enjoining future deceptive practices on
    behalf of the general public. . . . [U]nder such circumstances arbitration is not a suitable
    forum.” (Id. at pp. 1079-1080.) The Court further explained that such a rule was not
    preempted by the FAA because the federal statute was not intended to govern “‘public
    injunction’ arbitrations.” (Id. at p. 1082.) In Cruz, the Court explained that claims for
    public injunctive relief under the UCL are “indistinguishable from the CLRA [injunctive
    relief] claim that was at issue in Broughton” and are therefore inarbitrable for the same
    reasons. (Cruz, 
    supra,
     30 Cal.4th at p. 315.)
    Fry’s argues that the “Broughton-Cruz rule does not survive Concepcion because
    the rule prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim – claims for broad
    6      Fry’s requests that, in the event we conclude Iskansian permits Ramos to pursue
    his representative PAGA claim, we stay this appeal until the United States Supreme
    Court decides whether to accept a petition for review that was filed in Iskanian on
    September 22, 2014. We decline this request.
    27
    public injunctive relief.’” At least one California court has agreed, concluding:
    “Concepcion adopts a sweeping rule of FAA preemption. Under Concepcion, the FAA
    preempts any rule or policy rooted in state law that subjects agreements to arbitrate
    particular kinds of claims to more stringent standards of enforceability than contracts
    generally. Absolute prohibitions on the arbitration of particular kinds of claims such as
    that reflected in Cruz are the clearest example of such policies . . . since [Cruz] prohibits
    outright the arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief, it is in conflict with the
    FAA.” (Nelsen, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136; see also Kilgore v. KeyBank, N.A.
    (9th Cir. 2012) 
    673 F.3d 947
     [under Concepcion, the Cruz rule is preempted by FAA].)
    Nelsen, however, was decided prior to Iskanian, in which our Supreme Court
    adopted a narrower interpretation of Concepcion. (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 364
    [Concepcion held only that “states cannot require a procedure that interferes with
    fundamental attributes of arbitration”].) As discussed above, Iskanian also held that
    PAGA claims are not governed by the FAA because they are, in effect, disputes between
    the employer and the state. The Broughton-Cruz rule is predicated on analogous
    reasoning. (Broughton, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 1079-1080.)
    In any event, the California Supreme Court has not yet had an opportunity to
    consider Concepcion’s effect on the Broughton-Cruz rule. While the reasoning of
    Concepcion could be read to implicitly disapprove of such a rule, the United States
    Supreme Court did not directly address whether the FAA preempts state rules prohibiting
    the arbitration of statutorily-based public injunctive relief claims. “Under the
    circumstances, we decline to disregard the California Supreme Court’s decision without
    specific guidance from our high court.” (Truly Nolen, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 507.)7
    7       Fry’s has never argued Ramos’s claim for injunctive relief under section 17200
    does not fall within the Cruz rule. At least one court has concluded that, to establish that
    an injunctive relief claim falls within Cruz, the plaintiff must make a factual showing the
    relief sought would “more than incidentally benefit the public.” (Nelsen, supra, 207
    Cal.App.4th at p. 1136.) Because Fry’s has not argued that Ramos failed to show an
    injunction in this case would have more than an incidental benefit to the public, we need
    not address that issue.
    28
    E. Remedy
    In sum, Ramos must proceed with bilateral arbitration on his individual damages
    claims. He is not, however, compelled to arbitrate his PAGA claim on an individual
    basis, nor is he required to arbitrate his claim for injunctive relief under section 17200.
    As in Iskanian, supra, 
    59 Cal.4th 348
    , the arbitration agreement provides no basis to
    determine how the parties would prefer to proceed under these circumstances. On
    remand, the parties may address: (1) whether they will voluntarily agree on a single
    forum for resolving all of their claims; (2) if not, whether it is appropriate to bifurcate the
    claims, with individual claims going to arbitration and the representative PAGA claim
    and section 17200 claim for injunctive relief going to litigation; (3) if such bifurcation
    occurs, whether the trial court should stay the arbitration or litigation. (See Doan v. State
    Farm General Ins. Co. (2011) 
    195 Cal.App.4th 1082
    , 1098-1099 [under Code of Civil
    Procedure section 1281.2, “trial courts have the power to sever arbitrable claims from
    inarbitrable ones and to stay either the arbitration or the judicial proceedings pending the
    outcome of the other”].)
    DISPOSITION
    The trial court’s order denying Fry’s’s motion to compel arbitration is reversed.
    The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each party
    shall bear its own costs on appeal.
    ZELON, J.
    We concur:
    PERLUSS, P. J.                              SEGAL, J.
    
    Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
    article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
    29