People v. Webb CA4/1 ( 2015 )


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  • Filed 6/23/15 P. v. Webb CA4/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    THE PEOPLE,                                                         D066276
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCD250639)
    CARLA RUTH WEBB,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Laura H.
    Parsky, Judge. Affirmed.
    Robert H. Rexrode, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
    General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric Swenson and William M.
    Wood, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    Early on the day set for her trial on possession of heroin charges, defendant and
    appellant Carla Ruth Webb, who had not been held in custody, made a Marsden motion,
    which the trial court denied. Thereafter, proceedings continued and, after a lunch break,
    Webb moved to continue the trial so she could find and retain private counsel. The trial
    court denied Webb's motion for a continuance. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm
    her conviction.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Early in the morning of April 29, 2013, Webb was stopped while driving on
    Imperial Avenue in San Diego. Webb was searched and police found a small bottle in
    her bra that contained a usable amount of heroin.
    Webb was charged in an information with possession of a controlled substance.
    (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350.) The information alleged Webb had suffered one prior
    conviction within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370, subdivision (a)
    and two or more probation denial prior convictions. (Health & Saf. Code, § 1203,
    subd. (e)(4).) Webb was released from custody on her own recognizance on March 9,
    2014. A preliminary hearing was conducted on May 13, 2014, and trial was set for July
    2, 2014.
    On the morning of July 2, 2014, Webb and her appointed counsel appeared for
    trial and Webb made a Marsden1 motion. After the court denied the motion, the parties
    and counsel discussed a number of pretrial procedural issues, and, at 11:00 a.m., the trial
    court took a lunch break and resumed proceedings at 1:56 p.m. At that point, Webb's
    1      See People v. Marsden (1970) 
    2 Cal.3d 118
    , 123-126.
    2
    counsel advised the trial court that Webb wanted a jury trial on her prior convictions.
    The prosecutor estimated it would take a half-day to prove the priors. Counsel then
    moved to continue the trial. Counsel stated that Webb wanted additional time to retain
    private counsel; the prosecutor objected to Webb's request and stated that she had
    subpoened witnesses and was ready to proceed and that she was not sure what scheduling
    problems her witnesses would face if the trial was continued.
    The trial court denied the motion for a continuance. Webb herself then addressed
    the court and requested that, instead of commencing proceedings the following morning,
    July 3, 2014, trial resume the following afternoon. Webb explained she was the caretaker
    for a senior citizen and had obligated herself to help him pay his bills on the third of
    every month. The trial court stated: "Well, that would not be good cause for a
    continuance anyway." In response, Webb stated: "I didn't want to continue it. It's just,
    you know, I'm obligated to, you know, do that." The trial court then denied Webb's
    request.
    The jury convicted Webb of possession of a controlled substance; Webb admitted
    her prior conviction within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370,
    subdivision (a), and the parties agreed the probation denial convictions were superseded
    by the Health and Safety Code section 11370, subdivision (a) allegation and Webb's
    admission of it. Webb was sentenced to three years' probation and a drug treatment
    program.
    DISCUSSION
    As her sole contention on appeal, Webb argues the trial court abused its discretion
    3
    in denying her motion to continue the trial. We find no abuse and affirm her conviction.
    1. Legal Principles
    We review for abuse of discretion the court's denial of a continuance to substitute
    retained counsel for appointed counsel. (People v. Pigage (2003) 
    112 Cal.App.4th 1359
    ,
    1367.) A defendant's right to counsel includes the right to retain counsel of choice, which
    must be balanced "'against other values of substantial importance, such as that seeking to
    insure orderly and expeditious judicial administration, with a view toward
    accommodation reasonable under the facts of the particular case.'" (People v. Courts
    (1985) 
    37 Cal.3d 784
    , 790.) We look to the circumstances of the case, particularly the
    reasons the defendant presented to the trial judge when the request for continuance was
    denied. (Id. at p. 791.) If the defendant is "'unjustifiably dilatory' in retaining counsel, or
    'if he arbitrarily chooses to substitute counsel at the time of trial,'" the court acts within its
    discretion in denying a continuance. (Id. at pp. 790–791.) Circumstances where the
    continuance request is "premised on the accused's representation that he would eventually
    be able to hire counsel of his own choosing," or where "participation by a particular
    private attorney was still quite speculative at the time the motion for continuance was
    made" are "to be sharply contrasted" with circumstances where private counsel has been
    found and retained, or at least good faith, diligent efforts to do so can be shown. (Id. at
    pp. 791–792 & fn. 3.) "[A] defendant who desires to retain his own counsel is required to
    act with diligence and may not demand a continuance if he is unjustifiably dilatory or if
    he arbitrarily desires to substitute counsel at the time of trial." (People v. Blake (1980)
    
    105 Cal.App.3d 619
    , 623–624.)
    4
    2. Analysis
    Here, Webb did not indicate in any manner that she would be seeking private
    counsel until trial proceedings had actually commenced; indeed, her later request for time
    to pay bills for the person for whom she was providing care casts some doubt on the bona
    fides of her desire for new counsel as opposed to a simple desire to delay proceedings.
    We also note that Webb had not been incarcerated in the weeks before trial and had not
    taken any steps during that time to retain counsel. In light of the prejudice the
    prosecution would suffer in attempting to bring witnesses to a continued trial, the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to continue.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
    BENKE, Acting P. J.
    WE CONCUR:
    HUFFMAN, J.
    HALLER, J.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: D066276

Filed Date: 6/23/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/23/2015