R.E. v. Super. Ct. ( 2019 )


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  • Filed 11/20/19
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    R.E.,                                             H046541
    (Santa Clara County
    Petitioner,                               Super. Ct. No. 15JV41464H & I)
    v.
    THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA
    CLARA COUNTY,
    Respondent;
    THE PEOPLE,
    Real Party in Interest.
    Minor R.E. petitions for a writ of mandate challenging respondent court’s order
    granting the People’s motion to transfer him from juvenile court to a court of criminal
    jurisdiction. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1).)1
    On appeal, R.E. argues the juvenile court erred in granting the motion to transfer
    because it incorrectly determined it lacked authority to order him into custody on a
    probation violation once he turns 19. R.E. also argues that the probation department’s
    delay in producing a “ranch failure” report violated his right to due process.
    We agree the juvenile court erred in concluding it would not have the authority to
    order R.E. into custody if he violated probation after turning 19.2 We will therefore issue
    1
    Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
    We therefore do not reach R.E.’s alternative argument that he was prejudiced by
    2
    the delayed disclosure of the ranch failure report.
    a peremptory writ commanding respondent court to vacate the challenged order and issue
    a new order denying the motion to transfer.
    I.     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    In April and June 2018, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed juvenile
    wardship petitions (§ 602, subd. (a)) alleging that petitioner R.E., who was born in June
    2000 and had been a ward of the juvenile court since 2016, committed two separate first
    degree burglaries (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (a)), one in January 2018 and the other in
    April 2018.
    A.     Motion to transfer
    On the basis of the April and June 2018 wardship petitions, the district attorney
    moved to transfer R.E. to adult criminal court. (§ 707, subd. (a); see also Cal. Rules of
    Court, rule 5.766(a).)
    1.      Probation officer’s report
    In July 2018, the probation officer prepared her report for the transfer hearing,
    recommending that R.E. be transferred to adult court. In her report, the probation officer
    recounted R.E.’s juvenile criminal history, which began when he was declared a ward of
    the court in January 2016. R.E. was continued as a ward of the court in February and
    again in April 2016 for violating his probation by not adhering to court orders, failing
    drug tests, refusing to attend school, etc.
    In June 2017, R.E. was ordered to a ranch program following his involvement in
    several offenses including carjacking, vehicle theft, and robbery. He completed the
    custodial portion of the ranch program in December 2017 and was placed on the “Ranch
    Pre-Release program.” However, after testing positive for drugs and missing school,
    R.E. was returned to the ranch in January 2018. R.E. went back and forth between the
    ranch and the pre-release program for the next few months until he was arrested for the
    burglaries alleged in the April and June 2018 juvenile wardship petitions.
    2
    2.   Ranch failure report
    Due to his arrest, R.E. was “failed” from the ranch program, but in the “ranch
    failure” report prepared by Salvador Heredia, R.E.’s supervising probation counselor,
    Heredia recommended that R.E. be returned to the ranch. Heredia’s report was not
    disclosed to or provided to R.E.’s counsel until two weeks before the transfer hearing.3
    3.   Transfer hearing
    Heredia testified4 at the transfer hearing about the ranch failure report, stating that
    when he wrote it in June 2018, R.E. was then 17 years old and would, if returned to the
    ranch, have had until he turned 19 to complete the program. 5 However, Heredia said
    although he recommended in the report that R.E. return to the ranch, his recommendation
    had changed in the interim and he no longer recommended that R.E. return. According to
    Heredia, there would not be enough time for R.E. to complete all of the programming
    before he turned 19, and the ranch and aftercare program could not accommodate
    19-year-olds.
    The juvenile court sought briefing from the parties on whether it would have the
    authority to “hold a minor over the age of 19 in county jail” for a noncriminal probation
    violation. The district attorney relied on In re Jose H. (2000) 
    77 Cal. App. 4th 1090
    (Jose H.) and In re Kenny A. (2000) 
    79 Cal. App. 4th 1
    (Kenny A.) to support the argument
    that a juvenile court may not order county jail confinement as punishment if a ward
    violates juvenile probation after turning 19. R.E., on the other hand, citing In re Charles
    G. (2004) 
    115 Cal. App. 4th 608
    (Charles G.), argued that section 208.5 does authorize the
    sheriff to take custody of any person 19 or older for violating their juvenile probation.
    3
    See footnote 2, ante.
    4
    The parties did not provide a reporter’s transcript of Heredia’s testimony, so we
    rely on the juvenile court’s summary of his testimony as set forth in the order granting the
    motion to transfer.
    5
    According to Heredia, the ranch program consisted of a six- to eight-month
    period at the ranch plus a 10-week aftercare program.
    3
    Following argument, the juvenile court granted the motion to transfer. In its order,
    the juvenile court noted that, despite believing that R.E. was amenable to treatment as a
    juvenile,6 he should be transferred to adult criminal court because it “need[ed] the ability
    to use custody as an incentive for rehabilitation” and “confinement [in county jail] would
    not be an available disposition under juvenile law if [he] were found to have violated
    probation after turning 19.” It wrote, “If the court could hold [R.E.] accountable up until
    the age of 21 with a custodial consequence as a part of the rehabilitation plan it would
    have kept [him] in Juvenile Court.” In the court’s view, Jose H. and Kenny A. “tell[] the
    Juvenile Court Judge that the ability to supervise a case until the age of 21 is allowed, but
    that using [county jail] custody is not an option, therefore the youth must be sent to adult
    court if custody after the age of 19 is needed for the rehabilitation of the youth who has
    committed a series of dangerous but non-violent crimes close to the age of 18.”
    The juvenile court ordered that R.E. remain in juvenile hall “until the age of 19 or
    until the Court of Appeal has decided his Writ or until further court order, whichever
    comes first.” R.E. turned 19 in June 2019.
    II.    DISCUSSION
    R.E. argues the juvenile court erred in granting the motion to transfer because it
    did, in fact, have the authority under the relevant statutes to order his confinement in the
    county jail were he to violate his juvenile probation after he turned 19. We agree.
    A.     Standard of review and relevant statutes
    “ ‘Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law subject to de novo
    review.’ ” (People v. Martinez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 234, 240.) In interpreting a statute,
    6
    In analyzing the five transfer criteria set forth in section 707, subdivision (a), the
    juvenile court found that three of those five criteria (i.e., degree of criminal
    sophistication, delinquency history, and the circumstances and gravity of current
    offenses) supported retaining R.E. in the juvenile court. The remaining two criteria (i.e.,
    the chance of rehabilitating the minor before the juvenile court’s jurisdiction expired and
    the result of the juvenile court’s previous attempts to rehabilitate the minor) militated in
    favor of R.E. being transferred to adult court.
    4
    “ ‘our fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the
    law’s purpose.’ [Citation.] ‘We begin with the plain language of the statute, affording
    the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their
    statutory context, because the language employed in the Legislature’s enactment
    generally is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.’ [Citations.] The plain
    meaning controls if there is no ambiguity in the statutory language.” (People v. Cornett
    (2012) 
    53 Cal. 4th 1261
    , 1265.) “ ‘Additionally, however, we must consider the [statutory
    language] in the context of the entire statute [citation] and the statutory scheme of which
    it is a part.’ ” (Phelps v. Stostad (1997) 
    16 Cal. 4th 23
    , 32.) The words used in a statute
    “ ‘ “ ‘must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of
    the statute where they appear.’ [Citations.] Moreover, the various parts of a statutory
    enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the
    context of the statutory framework as a whole.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
    Section 208.5, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any
    other law, in any case in which a minor who is detained in or committed to a county
    institution established for the purpose of housing juveniles attains 18 years of age prior to
    or during the period of detention or confinement he or she may be allowed to come or
    remain in contact with those juveniles until 19 years of age, at which time he or she, upon
    the recommendation of the probation officer, shall be delivered to the custody of the
    sheriff for the remainder of the time he or she remains in custody, unless the juvenile
    court orders continued detention in a juvenile facility. . . . Notwithstanding any other
    law, the sheriff may allow the person to come into and remain in contact with other adults
    in the county jail or in any other county correctional facility in which he or she is
    housed.”
    Section 202 lists punishment options for a minor who is under the juvenile court’s
    jurisdiction. The statute makes clear that, in the juvenile court context, “ ‘punishment’
    means the imposition of sanctions[,] [but] does not include retribution.” (§ 202,
    5
    subd. (e).) “Permissible sanctions” under the statute include, as relevant here,
    “[c]ommitment of the minor to a local detention or treatment facility, such as a juvenile
    hall, camp, or ranch.” (§ 202, subd. (e)(4).)
    In interpreting the relevant statutes, we must keep in mind the twofold purposes of
    the juvenile delinquency laws: “(1) to serve the ‘best interests’ of the delinquent ward by
    providing care, treatment, and guidance to rehabilitate the ward and ‘enable him or her to
    be a law-abiding and productive member of his or her family and the community,’ and
    (2) to ‘provide for the protection and safety of the public.’ ” (Charles 
    G., supra
    , 115
    Cal.App.4th at p. 614.)
    B.      Analysis
    In Jose H., the juvenile was 17 when he committed the criminal acts which were
    the basis for the juvenile wardship petition but turned 18 shortly before disposition. (Jose
    
    H., supra
    , 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1096.) The juvenile court placed him on probation, but
    further ordered that he serve 120 days in county jail. (Ibid.) This court reversed on the
    ground that county jail is not one of the specified commitment options set forth in
    section 202, subdivision (e)(4). (Jose 
    H., supra
    , at p. 1097.)
    Looking at section 208.5, which provides that when a ward in a juvenile facility
    turns 19, “he or she, upon the recommendation of the probation officer, shall be delivered
    to the custody of the sheriff for the remainder of the time he or she remains in custody”
    (id., subd. (a)), the court construed the statute as “one in a series of statutes regulating the
    custodial segregation of adults and juveniles,” none of which “purport to expand the
    authority of the juvenile court beyond the dispositional alternatives specified in
    section 202, subdivision (e).” (Jose 
    H., supra
    , 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1098.) Although
    we “sympathize[d] with the dilemma of the juvenile court searching for an appropriate
    disposition for an 18-year-old ward” (id. at p. 1099), this court concluded that under the
    plain language of sections 202 and 208.5, “the juvenile court is not authorized to commit
    a ward to county jail.” (Jose 
    H., supra
    , at p. 1099.)
    6
    Similarly, in Kenny A., the appellant was under 18 at the time of his offense but
    had turned 18 by the time of disposition. (Kenny 
    A., supra
    , 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 3.) The
    probation report recommended declaring appellant a ward of the court and directing him
    to serve 180 days in county jail, since “ ‘he cannot utilize many of the Juvenile Probation
    Department’s services.’ ” (Id. at p. 4.) At the end of the disposition hearing, the court
    addressed the assistant principal at appellant’s high school, saying “ ‘I think you can get
    the message back to kids . . . that this is serious business. And if they’re under 18 but
    close to 18 or even 18 at the time of disposition in juvenile court they’re going to spend
    time in the county jail.’ ” (Ibid., italics added.) The court made appellant a ward of the
    court, committed him to juvenile hall for 180 days but then advised appellant’s father,
    “ ‘You’re going to take him down to the juvenile hall. . . . [He] will then be committed to
    the county jail, and remanded to the custody of the Department of Corrections.’ ” (Id. at
    pp. 4-5, italics added.)
    On appeal, this court found the “[t]he [juvenile] court’s comments at the time of
    disposition clearly indicate it intended the disposition to be, for all practical purposes, a
    county jail commitment[] . . . [and] accept[ing] this procedural subterfuge as proper
    would be to condone an unauthorized disposition.” (Kenny 
    A., supra
    , 79 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 8.) Though we recognized that “section 208.5 does permit housing a ward in county
    jail under certain circumstances, . . . it does not allow the juvenile court to commit an
    18-year-old to county jail as part of its disposition order.” (Id. at p. 6, italics added.)
    In Charles G., the Third District Court of Appeal parted ways with Jose H. and
    Kenny A. and concluded that section 208.5 does authorize the juvenile court to order a
    county jail commitment for juvenile probation violations committed by a ward on or after
    he or she turns 19. The appellant in Charles G. was initially adjudged a ward of the
    juvenile court at the age of 15 and, after he had turned 20 years old, the appellant violated
    his juvenile probation. (Charles 
    G., supra
    , 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 612.) The juvenile
    court, after acknowledging “that it could not ‘make a direct commitment to the county
    7
    jail . . . [,]’ . . . noted that section 208.5 authorizes the probation officer to exercise
    discretion to . . . ‘remove [appellant] from juvenile hall to the county jail.’ ” (Id. at
    p. 617.) The juvenile court directed appellant to “serve a specified period of confinement
    ‘in an authorized facility.’ ” (Ibid.)
    On appeal, the court agreed with Jose H. and Kenny A. to the extent they stood for
    the proposition “that a juvenile court cannot commit a ward over the age of 17 directly to
    county jail.” (Charles 
    G., supra
    , 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 618, italics added.) However, the
    court continued, “it does not follow that the court cannot commit a ward 19 years of age
    or older to a juvenile detention facility with the understanding that, because the probation
    officer so recommends, the ward will be delivered to the sheriff for confinement in
    county jail pursuant to section 208.5.” (Id. at pp. 618-619, italics added.) Such a
    disposition does not amount to the “ ‘procedural subterfuge’ ” disapproved of in Kenny A.
    but is rather “a legitimate application of the statutory scheme that allows the now-adult
    ward to be housed in a juvenile detention facility until the age of 19, at which time he or
    she must be delivered to a local adult facility unless the court orders continued detention
    in the juvenile facility. (§ 208.5.)” (Id. at p. 619.)
    The Charles G. court “interpret[ed] section 202, subdivision (e), and section 208.5
    to apply to a person (1) who was declared a ward of the juvenile court while a minor,
    (2) who became an adult upon turning 18 but remained under the jurisdiction of the
    juvenile court, and (3) who violated juvenile court probation after becoming an adult.”
    (Charles 
    G., supra
    , 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 615.) “[W]hen an adult ward violates
    probation while still under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, subdivision (e) of
    section 202 authorizes the court to punish the ward by committing him or her ‘to a local
    detention or treatment facility, such as a juvenile hall, camp, or ranch.’ (§ 202, (e)(4).)”
    (Id. at p. 618.) Since section 208.5 provides that the ward—if 19 or older—may be
    delivered by the sheriff to a local adult detention facility, the court concluded “if the ward
    is found to have violated probation, sections 202 and 208.5 authorize the court to order
    8
    the ward to be confined in a juvenile facility and then, upon recommendation of the
    probation officer, immediately delivered to a local adult facility to serve the period of
    confinement.” (Charles 
    G., supra
    , at p. 612.)
    The court declined to extend the rationale set forth in Jose H. and Kenny A.
    beyond their facts, because doing so “would make a juvenile court reluctant to place a
    ward on probation when the ward is days or months shy of his or her 18th birthday.”
    (Charles 
    G., supra
    , 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 616.) In those circumstances, “hav[ing] no
    option to detain and punish the ward if he or she violated probation after becoming an
    adult[] . . . the juvenile court would be more inclined to commit him or her to the
    California Youth Authority [now DJJ].” (Ibid.) Forbidding commitment of a ward 19
    years of age or older to county jail for violating juvenile probation “generate[s] an absurd
    result, inconsistent with the purpose of the statutory scheme to hold wards ‘accountable
    for their behavior’ by imposing punishment ‘in conformity with the interests of public
    safety and protection.’ (§ 202, subd. (b).)” (Id. at p. 619.)
    We agree that, in the circumstances involved in this case, interpreting the statutes
    to deny juvenile courts the authority to order commitment for wards who violate
    probation on or after their 19th birthdays leads to an inappropriate result. Adult wards
    like R.E., who are accused of less serious non-section 707, subdivision (b) offenses will
    end up in adult criminal court whereas wards with more serious section 707,
    subdivision (b) offenses can be retained in juvenile custody until age 25. (§ 1769.) Such
    a result is inconsistent not only with the detention and commitment options set forth in
    section 202, subdivision (e), and section 208.5, but also “with the best interests of
    delinquent wards and the rehabilitative purpose of the statutory scheme.” (Charles 
    G., supra
    , 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 616.)
    III.   DISPOSITION
    Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue compelling respondent court to vacate its
    order granting the motion to transfer petitioner to criminal court and to enter a new order
    9
    denying the motion to transfer. This opinion is made final as to this court seven days
    from the date of filing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).) The temporary stay
    order shall remain in effect until this decision is final.
    10
    Premo, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    Greenwood, P.J.
    Grover, J.
    R.E. v. Superior Court
    H046541
    Trial Court:                          Santa Clara County Superior Court
    Superior Court No. 15JV41464H & I
    Trial Judge:                          Hon. Katherine Lucero
    Counsel for Real Party in Interest:   Xavier Becerra
    The People                            Attorney General
    Gerald A. Engler
    Chief Assistant Attorney General
    Jeffrey M. Laurence
    Senior Assistant Attorney General
    Laurence K. Sullivan
    Supervising Deputy Attorney General
    René A. Chacón
    Supervising Deputy Attorney General
    Counsel for Petitioner:               By appointment of the Court under the
    R.E.                                  Santa Clara County Independent Defense
    Counsel Office
    Eric Weaver
    Lana M. Kreidie
    Counsel for Respondent:               No appearance for respondent
    Superior Court of Santa Clara
    County, Juvenile Division
    R.E. v. Superior Court
    H046541
    

Document Info

Docket Number: H046541

Filed Date: 11/20/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/20/2019