South of Market Community etc. v. City and County of San Francisco ( 2019 )


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  • Filed 2/22/19; Certified for Publication 3/25/19 (order attached)
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    SOUTH OF MARKET COMMUNITY
    ACTION NETWORK et al.,
    Plaintiffs and Appellants,                             A151521
    v.                                                              (San Francisco City & County
    CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN                                          Super. Ct. No. CPF-15-514691)
    FRANCISCO,
    Defendant and Respondent;
    FOREST CITY CALIFORNIA
    RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
    et al.,
    Real Parties in Interest and
    Respondents.
    After preparing an environmental impact report (EIR) and holding public hearings,
    the City and County of San Francisco (City) approved a mixed-use business and
    residential project proposed by real parties in interest Forest City California Residential
    Development, Inc. and Hearst Communications, Inc. (collectively Forest City) in the area
    bounded by Mission, Fifth, Howard, and Sixth Streets in San Francisco. In approving the
    project, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors also voted to amend the San Francisco
    general plan to establish a Fifth and Mission Special Use District and approve the
    development agreement. South of Market Community Action Network (SOMCAN),
    Save Our SoMa (SOS), and Friends of Boeddeker Park (collectively plaintiffs)
    challenged the environmental review by filing a petition for writ of mandate in the
    superior court. The trial court denied relief. We affirm.
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Forest City proposed the construction of a mixed-use development, the Fifth and
    Mission Project (the 5M Project or the project), covering four acres in downtown San
    Francisco. The 5M Project seeks to provide office, retail, cultural, educational, and open-
    space uses for the property, primarily to support the region’s technology industry and
    provide spaces for coworking, media, arts, and small-scale urban manufacturing. The
    proposed project site is bounded by Mission Street to the north, Fifth Street to the east,
    Howard Street to the south, and Mary Street and several adjacent properties to the west.
    The existing area is occupied by eight buildings, with approximately 317,700 gross
    square feet (gsf) of office and commercial uses, as well as seven surface parking lots.
    The largest building in the existing space is the Chronicle Building, which is proposed to
    be renovated as part of the 5M Project.
    The San Francisco Planning Department (Planning Department), as the lead
    agency responsible for administering environmental review of the project, released its
    draft EIR (DEIR) on October 15, 2014. The report described two “options” for the 5M
    Project, an “ ‘Office Scheme’ ” and a “ ‘Residential Scheme.’ ” Under both schemes, the
    project would result in new active ground floor space (with office, retail, educational, and
    cultural uses), office use, residential dwelling units, and open space. Both schemes
    would preserve and rehabilitate the Chronicle and Dempster Printing Buildings, demolish
    other buildings on site, and construct four new buildings with heights ranging from 195
    to 470 feet. The overall gross square footage was substantially the same in both schemes,
    with varying mixes of office and residential uses. The office scheme had a larger
    building envelope and higher density than the residential scheme.
    The DEIR discussed nine alternatives to the proposed project, rejecting five of
    them as infeasible. Among the four feasible alternatives, it considered: (1) a “No
    Project” alternative, (2) a “Code Compliant” alternative, (3) a “Unified Zoning”
    alternative, and (4) a “Preservation” alternative. The DEIR concluded the preservation
    2
    alternative was the environmentally superior alternative because it would “achieve some
    of the project objectives regarding the development of a dense, mixed-use, transit-
    oriented, job-creating project” but avoid the “irreversible impact” created by demolition
    of the Camelline Building, avoid regional pollutant impact, and reduce the transportation
    and circulation impacts.
    The San Francisco Planning Commission (Planning Commission) held an
    informational hearing on the DEIR in November 2014 and accepted public comments
    through January 7, 2015. In August 2015, after further informational meetings, the
    Planning Department published its responses to public comments, which, together with
    the DEIR, made up the final EIR (FEIR).
    Following a noticed public hearing, the Planning Commission certified the FEIR
    as complete, finding it to be adequate, accurate, and objective. The same day, the
    Planning Commission (1) adopted CEQA1 findings, a statement of overriding
    considerations, and a mitigation monitoring and reporting program; (2) raised the shadow
    limit for Boeddeker Park (a park near the 5M Project); (3) approved a design for
    development document for the 5M Project; (4) recommended amendments to the general
    plan, San Francisco Planning Code, and zoning map to create the Fifth and Mission
    Special Use District; and (5) recommended adoption of a development agreement for the
    project.
    Plaintiffs appealed the project approvals and certification of the FEIR to the San
    Francisco Board of Supervisors (Board). The Board denied the appeal and affirmed
    certification of the FEIR. Two weeks later, the Board adopted CEQA findings, and
    approved the Fifth and Mission Special Use District, the 5M Project, and the
    development agreement.
    1
    California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et
    seq.).
    3
    In December 2015, plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in
    superior court, alleging CEQA violations and seeking to set aside certification of the
    FEIR and approval of the 5M Project. The court heard argument and denied the petition.
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. CEQA Principles and Standard of Review
    Plaintiffs’ appeal primarily challenges the content and analysis of the EIR. “The
    basic purpose of an EIR is to ‘provide public agencies and the public in general with
    detailed information about the effect [that] a proposed project is likely to have on the
    environment; to list ways in which the significant effects of such a project might be
    minimized; and to indicate alternatives to such a project.’ ” (Sierra Club v. County of
    Fresno (2018) 
    6 Cal.5th 502
    , 511 (Sierra Club).) “ ‘ “The EIR is the heart of CEQA”
    and the integrity of the process is dependent on the adequacy of the EIR.’ ” (Rialto
    Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rialto (2012) 
    208 Cal.App.4th 899
    , 924.)
    “ ‘ “ ‘[A]n EIR is presumed adequate (Pub. Resources Code, § 21167.3), and the
    plaintiff in a CEQA action has the burden of proving otherwise.’ ” ’ ” (Preserve Wild
    Santee v. City of Santee (2012) 
    210 Cal.App.4th 260
    , 275.) As our Supreme Court
    recently explained in Sierra Club: “The standard of review in a CEQA case, as provided
    in sections 21168.5 and 21005, is abuse of discretion. Section 21168.5 states in part: ‘In
    any action or proceeding . . . to attack, review, set aside, void or annul a determination,
    finding, or decision of a public agency on the grounds of noncompliance with this
    division, the inquiry shall extend only to whether there was a prejudicial abuse of
    discretion.’ [Citation.] Our decisions have thus articulated a procedural issues/factual
    issues dichotomy. ‘[A]n agency may abuse its discretion under CEQA either by failing
    to proceed in the manner CEQA provides or by reaching factual conclusions unsupported
    by substantial evidence. (§ 21168.5.) Judicial review of these two types of error differs
    significantly: While we determine de novo whether the agency has employed the correct
    procedures, ‘scrupulously enforc[ing] all legislatively mandated CEQA requirements’
    [citation], we accord greater deference to the agency’s substantive factual conclusions. In
    reviewing for substantial evidence, the reviewing court “may not set aside an agency’s
    4
    approval of an EIR on the ground that an opposite conclusion would have been equally or
    more reasonable,” for, on factual questions, our task “is not to weigh conflicting evidence
    and determine who has the better argument.” ’ ” (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at
    p. 512.)
    The court explained that this “procedural issues/factual issues dichotomy” has
    worked well for courts reviewing agency determinations. (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th
    at p. 512.) Some procedural questions, such as whether the agency has provided
    sufficient notice and opportunity to comment on a draft EIR, or whether it has entirely
    omitted a required discussion, have clear answers. “But the question whether an agency
    has followed proper procedures is not always so clear. This is especially so when the
    issue is whether an EIR’s discussion of environmental impacts is adequate, that is,
    whether the discussion sufficiently performs the function of facilitating ‘informed agency
    decisionmaking and informed public participation.’ ” (Id. at pp. 512–513.)
    After reviewing several of its own decisions and those of the Court of Appeal, the
    court summarized three “basic principles” regarding the standard of review for adequacy
    of an EIR: “(1) An agency has considerable discretion to decide the manner of the
    discussion of potentially significant effects in an EIR. (2) However, a reviewing court
    must determine whether the discussion of a potentially significant effect is sufficient or
    insufficient, i.e., whether the EIR comports with its intended function of including
    ‘ “ ‘detail sufficient to enable those who did not participate in its preparation to
    understand and to consider meaningfully the issues raised by the proposed
    project.’ ” ’ [Citation.] (3) The determination whether a discussion is sufficient is not
    solely a matter of discerning whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency’s
    factual conclusions.” (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 515–516.)
    “The ultimate inquiry, as case law and the CEQA guidelines[2] make clear, is
    whether the EIR includes enough detail ‘to enable those who did not participate in its
    2
    Subsequent references to “Guidelines” are to the CEQA guidelines found in
    title 14 of the California Code of Regulations, section 15000 et seq.
    5
    preparation to understand and to consider meaningfully the issues raised by the proposed
    project.’ ” ( Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 516.) Generally, that inquiry is a mixed
    question of law and fact subject to de novo review, but to the extent factual questions
    (such as the agency’s decision which methodologies to employ for analyzing an
    environmental effect) predominate, a substantial evidence standard of review will apply.
    (Ibid.)
    Further, “ ‘[i]n determining the adequacy of an EIR, the CEQA Guidelines look to
    whether the report provides decision makers with sufficient analysis to intelligently
    consider the environmental consequences of a project. ([Guidelines,] § 15151.) The
    CEQA Guidelines further provide that “the sufficiency of an EIR is to be reviewed in the
    light of what is reasonably feasible. . . . The courts have [therefore] looked not for
    perfection but for adequacy, completeness, and a good faith effort at full disclosure.”
    ([Guidelines,] § 15151.)’ [Citation.] The overriding issue on review is thus ‘whether the
    [lead agency] reasonably and in good faith discussed [a project] in detail sufficient [to
    enable] the public to discern from the [EIR] the “analytic route the . . . agency traveled
    from evidence to action.” ’ ” (California Oak Foundation v. Regents of University of
    California (2010) 
    188 Cal.App.4th 227
    , 262 (California Oak Foundation); see Sierra
    Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 515 [“We also affirm that in reviewing an EIR’s discussion,
    we do not require technical perfection or scientific certainty . . . .”].) “Although an
    agency’s failure to disclose information called for by CEQA may be prejudicial
    ‘regardless of whether a different outcome would have resulted if the public agency had
    complied’ with the law (§ 21005, subd. (a)), under CEQA, ‘there is no presumption that
    error is prejudicial’ (§ 21005, subd. (b)). Insubstantial or merely technical omissions are
    not grounds for relief. [Citation.] ‘A prejudicial abuse of discretion occurs if the failure
    to include relevant information precludes informed decisionmaking and informed public
    participation, thereby thwarting the statutory goals of the EIR process.’ ” (Neighbors for
    Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (2013) 
    57 Cal.4th 439
    , 463;
    
    id.
     at pp. 464–465 [failure to comply with CEQA’s informational mandate “did not
    6
    deprive agency decision makers or the public of substantial information relevant to
    approving the project, and is therefore not a ground for setting that decision aside”].)
    With these principles in mind, we turn to the merits.
    B. Alleged CEQA Violations
    Plaintiffs assert numerous defects in the agency’s CEQA review in this case.
    1. Project Description
    Plaintiffs first argue the EIR is inadequate because it failed to provide a stable,
    accurate project description. They contend because the DEIR presented two alternative
    schemes, the office scheme and residential scheme, it was “confusing” and hampered
    commenters’ ability to understand which project was actually proposed and analyzed.
    A draft EIR must include a project description. (Washoe Meadows Community v.
    Department of Parks & Recreation (2017) 
    17 Cal.App.5th 277
    , 287 (Washoe Meadows).)
    The project description must contain (1) the precise location and boundaries of the
    proposed project; (2) a statement of the objectives sought by the proposed project,
    including the underlying purpose; (3) a general description of the project’s technical,
    economic, and environmental characteristics; and (4) a statement briefly describing the
    intended uses of the EIR. (Guidelines, § 15124.) The description should not, however,
    “supply extensive detail beyond that needed for evaluation and review of the
    environmental impact.” (Ibid.) The description must include the entirety of the project,
    and not some smaller portion of it. (San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Center v. County of
    Merced (2007) 
    149 Cal.App.4th 645
    , 654 (San Joaquin Raptor Rescue).)
    “[A]n accurate, stable and finite project description is the sine qua non of an
    informative and legally sufficient EIR.” (County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1977)
    
    71 Cal.App.3d 185
    , 199 (County of Inyo).) “Only through an accurate view of the project
    may affected outsiders and public decision-makers balance the proposal’s benefit against
    its environmental cost, consider mitigation measures, assess the advantage of terminating
    the proposal . . . and weigh other alternatives in the balance.” (Id. at pp. 192–193.) A
    project description that gives conflicting signals to decision makers and the public about
    the nature of the project is fundamentally inadequate and misleading. (San Joaquin
    7
    Raptor Rescue, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 655–656.) Further, “[a] curtailed,
    enigmatic or unstable project description draws a red herring across the path of public
    input.” (County of Inyo, at p. 198.) “Whether an EIR correctly describes a project is a
    question of law, subject to de novo review.” (Rodeo Citizens Assn. v. County of Contra
    Costa (2018) 
    22 Cal.App.5th 214
    , 219.)
    Plaintiffs’ claim that the DEIR presented “multiple possible Projects rather than a
    finite description of a single project” is specious. Plaintiffs do not dispute the DEIR’s
    project description met CEQA technical requirements, and do not describe any
    information that was required to be included in the project description but was not. (See
    Guidelines, § 15124 [describing information that must be included in EIR].) Nor was the
    information provided in the DEIR confusing, as plaintiffs contend. The DEIR described
    the 5M Project generally as a mixed-use project on a four-acre site in downtown San
    Francisco. The office and residential schemes were “[t]wo project options (with
    substantially the same overall gross square footage but with a varying mix of residential
    and office uses).” Under both the office and residential schemes, the proposed project
    would involve (1) construction of new active ground floor space; (2) similar massing and
    land use except along Howard Street; and (3) retention and rehabilitation of the Chronicle
    and Dempster Printing Buildings, demolition of all other existing buildings on the site,
    and construction of four new buildings ranging in height from 195 to 470 feet. In text
    and table format, the DEIR set forth measurements of gross square footage for both
    schemes,3 and included a table specifying the proposed uses and gross square footage for
    each building under both schemes. It presented site plans, illustrative massing, building
    elevations, cross-sections, and representative floor plans for both options. Further, the
    DEIR evaluated the environmental impacts of each scheme independently.
    3
    The office scheme proposed a total of 1,827,000 gsf comprised of 871,900 gsf of
    office uses, 802,500 gsf of residential uses, 663 parking spaces, and 44,600 gsf of
    publicly accessible open space. The residential scheme would consist of 1,808,800 gsf,
    consisting of 598,500 gsf of office space, 1,057,700 gsf of residential uses, 756 parking
    spaces, and 62,100 gsf of open space.
    8
    Plaintiffs contend the agency’s response to public comments regarding confusion
    over the two schemes was insufficient, because it stated in part that the project has similar
    square footage but with a varying mix of residential and office uses. The agency’s
    response to public comments, however, was far more explicit. The Planning Department
    referenced tables in the DEIR providing a clear description of the proposed uses and
    corresponding square footage for each development option, with the key differences
    between the two schemes further explained on pages 41 through 44 of the DEIR. The
    agency noted the evaluation of environmental impacts in the DEIR focused on the office
    scheme because it “represents the largest development envelope” and the “more
    intensive” of the two schemes, resulting in a “conservative assessment of the [DEIR]
    Project’s impacts.” As the agency explained, the “analysis in the [DEIR] was intended to
    present the development program associated with both design options and to identify the
    associated environmental impacts and required mitigation measures side-by-side and in
    sufficient detail so that decision-makers would have the option of approving either of the
    development schemes as part of the overall project approval.”
    Thus, the record reveals the EIR in this case described one project—a mixed-use
    development involving the retention of two historic buildings, the demolition of all other
    buildings on the site, and the construction of four new buildings and active ground floor
    space—with two options for different allocations of residential and office units. The
    analysis was not curtailed, misleading, or inconsistent. If anything, it carefully
    articulated two possible variations and fully disclosed the maximum possible scope of the
    project. The project description here enhanced, rather than obscured, the information
    available to the public.4
    4
    Plaintiffs cite a comment from Planning Commissioner Kathrin Moore that a
    phased project could have been proposed, which is what occurs in a “normal” approval
    process. Commissioner Moore’s comments, however, do not describe a deficiency in the
    EIR’s project description, nor do they express any confusion over the proposed options
    for the office and residential schemes. Further, as the trial court noted, Commissioner
    Moore voted to certify the EIR.
    9
    Plaintiffs also complain the DEIR was inadequate because it did not include
    renderings showing the specific architectural detailing, “street level” views of the code
    compliant alternative, or perspectives of how the development would appear from
    surrounding neighborhoods. They also argue the use of a “design for development”
    document and references to the proposed Fifth and Mission Special Use District delayed
    disclosure of important details about the project.5 But the EIR provided renderings
    showing the massing of the existing site, the proposed office and residential schemes, the
    revised project, and the alternative schemes, as well as views of the project site from
    various points in the city; plaintiffs generally fail to explain why those renderings were
    inadequate.6 Nor do plaintiffs explain how the absences of additional renderings, use of
    the design for development document, or discussion of the Special Use District concealed
    information that was crucial to a review of the environmental effects of the project, or
    how these purported defects impacted public participation. In any event, when assessing
    the legal sufficiency of an EIR, we do not look for perfection, but “adequacy,
    completeness, and a good faith effort at full disclosure.” (Guidelines, § 15151; Sierra
    Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 515; California Oak Foundation, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 276 [alternatives discussion must be reasonably detailed but not exhaustive; key issue
    is whether discussion encourages informed decisionmaking and public participation].)
    That standard was met here.
    County of Inyo, supra, 
    71 Cal.App.3d 185
    , cited by plaintiffs in support of their
    argument, is distinguishable. There, the City of Los Angeles had been ordered to prepare
    an EIR for a project involving pumping of groundwater for export from the Owens
    5
    This issue is also forfeited because plaintiffs have not shown it was raised
    during the administrative process.
    6
    As to the code compliant alternative, plaintiffs state the axonometric (without
    perspective) drawing looking down on the site made it look misleadingly small. They
    note their request for a complete study and presentation was denied, precluding their
    ability to assess the difference between the proposed scheme and the code compliant
    alternative. It appears the code compliant alternative, however, was rendered in the same
    perspective as the other alternatives, including the preservation alternative, on which the
    revised project was based. Plaintiffs do not explain how that makes comparison difficult.
    10
    Valley via two above-ground aqueducts, but the EIR as prepared had a much narrower
    description of the project as involving only the relatively small increase in pumping of
    water for unanticipated uses in Inyo and Mono Counties. (Id. at pp. 189, 195.)
    Moreover, throughout the EIR process, the project description varied, with the result that
    the “small-scale groundwater project described at the outset was dwarfed by the
    ‘recommended project’ ultimately endorsed” that dealt with “important, large-scale
    phases of the city aqueduct management program.” (Id. at pp. 196–199.) The court
    concluded the agency’s selection of a “narrow project as the launching pad for a vastly
    wider proposal frustrated CEQA’s public information aims.” (Id. at pp. 199–200.) Here,
    there were no similar fluctuations in the project description during the EIR process, nor is
    the initial project description a misleadingly small fragment of the ultimately approved
    project.
    Plaintiffs’ reliance on Washoe Meadows, supra, 
    17 Cal.App.5th 277
    , is also
    misplaced. In that case, the draft EIR identified five “very different” alternatives as
    potential projects. (Id. at p. 281.) Critically, the draft EIR did not identify a preferred or
    proposed project at all, but indicated it would determine “which alternative or
    combinations of features from multiple alternatives” would become the preferred
    alternative after receiving public comments. (Id. at p. 283.) As our colleagues in
    Division Five explained, “[w]hile there may be situations in which the presentation of a
    small number of closely related alternatives would not present an undue burden on
    members of the public wishing to participate in the CEQA process, in this case the
    differences between the five alternative projects was vast, each creating a different
    footprint on public land. Each option created a different set of impacts, requiring
    different mitigation measures. . . . [¶] . . . The [draft EIR] in this case was not simply
    lacking in details that could not be reasonably supplied as yet; rather, it failed to identify
    the project being proposed.” (Id. at pp. 288–289, fn. omitted.) In this case, by contrast,
    the project description clearly identified a mixed-use development project at a specific,
    defined location with two options for allocations of office and residential use.
    11
    Plaintiffs also complain that the FEIR adopted a proposed plan based on neither
    the office scheme nor the residential scheme, but a “revised” project that was a variant of
    the preservation alternative identified in the DEIR. They fail, however, to identify any
    component of the revised project that was not addressed in the DEIR or subject to public
    comment. Further, “[t]he CEQA reporting process is not designed to freeze the ultimate
    proposal in the precise mold of the initial project; indeed, new and unforeseen insights
    may emerge during investigation, evoking revision of the original proposal.” (County of
    Inyo, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 199.) The whole point of requiring evaluation of
    alternatives in the DEIR is to allow thoughtful consideration and public participation
    regarding other options that may be less harmful to the environment. (San Franciscans
    Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City and County of San Francisco (2002)
    
    102 Cal.App.4th 656
    , 695 [CEQA’s purpose is to encourage project sponsors to consider
    and adopt “feasible alternatives and mitigation measures. . . . to lessen or avoid adverse
    environmental impacts”].) “CEQA does not handcuff decisionmakers . . . . The action
    approved need not be a blanket approval of the entire project initially described in the
    EIR. If that were the case, the informational value of the document would be sacrificed.
    Decisionmakers should have the flexibility to implement that portion of a project which
    satisfies their environmental concerns.” (Dusek v. Redevelopment Agency (1985)
    
    173 Cal.App.3d 1029
    , 1041 (Dusek).)7 We do not conclude the project description is
    inadequate because the ultimate approval adopted characteristics of one of the proposed
    alternatives; that in fact, is one of the key purposes of the CEQA process.
    In sum, we conclude the project description was adequate under CEQA.
    2. Cumulative Impacts
    Cumulative impacts are “two or more individual effects which, when considered
    together, are considerable or which compound or increase other environmental impacts.”
    7
    Plaintiffs argue Dusek is factually distinguishable from this case, but do not
    explain why the legal principle that decision makers should have flexibility to adopt
    portions of a project (or environmentally superior alternative) to address environmental
    concerns does not apply.
    12
    (Guidelines, § 15355.) An adequate discussion of significant cumulative impacts may be
    based either on a list of “past, present, and probable future projects producing related or
    cumulative impacts,” or “[a] summary of projections contained in an adopted local,
    regional or statewide plan, or related planning document, that describes or evaluates
    conditions contributing to the cumulative impact.” (Guidelines, § 15130, subd.
    (b)(1)(A)–(B).)
    Plaintiffs argue the EIR used an outdated 2012 project list that was developed
    during the Great Recession to analyze the cumulative impact of probable future projects.
    They point to two comments made during the review process that in the years since 2012,
    San Francisco “ ‘has been subjected to a tremendous uptick in development pressure and
    applications to increase the development potential of property in the vicinity of the
    Project Site’ ” and “ ‘obviously development is rampant right now,’ ” to argue the 2012
    project list is no longer reflective of current conditions and is not an accurate baseline for
    fair assessment of the project’s cumulative impacts.
    Apart from general observations that development is “ ‘rampant’ ” and there has
    been “ ‘a tremendous uptick in development pressure’ ” in San Francisco, however,
    plaintiffs point to no evidence in the record that the Great Recession rendered the project
    list defective or misleading, or that the City ignored “projects that were in the pipeline for
    the purpose of adjudging cumulative impacts.” The DEIR included 17 projects for which
    the Planning Department had received environmental evaluation or similar applications in
    the project vicinity. Though plaintiffs cite one comment from SOMCAN’s director that
    the City failed to account for “major projects” including the Mexican Museum Tower, the
    San Francisco Museum of Modern Art (SFMOMA) expansion, the Moscone Convention
    Center expansion, and the Transit Center District Plan in the EIR, the record reflects each
    of those projects was included in the analysis of cumulative traffic impacts.8 Moreover,
    for the traffic and circulation analysis, the City used two methodologies: (1) a “summary
    8
    The SFMOMA Expansion Project, Mexican Museum, and Moscone Center
    Expansion Project were also listed as reasonably foreseeable projects within the vicinity
    of the site in the DEIR project description.
    13
    of projections approach,” that relied on the San Francisco County Transportation
    Authority’s (SFCTA) San Francisco Chained Activity Modeling Process (SF-CHAMP)
    model to analyze anticipated growth and cumulative traffic and circulation impacts
    through the year 2040, which it then “refined and validated” with (2) a “list-based
    approach.” It is well established an agency has discretion in selecting the methodology to
    be used in evaluating environmental impact, subject to review for substantial evidence.
    (See Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 514.) Plaintiffs have not shown the City’s choice
    of methodologies was unsupported by substantial evidence.
    Nor is plaintiffs’ claim the City should not have relied on a project list from 2012
    persuasive. Indeed, plaintiffs concede that physical conditions existing when the notice
    of preparation is published normally are used to establish the baseline for cumulative
    impacts. (Guidelines, § 15125, subd. (a)(1).) The DEIR was issued in January 2013.
    The City had discretion to determine a reasonable date as a cutoff for which projects to
    include in the cumulative impacts analysis, and plaintiffs have not shown the City’s
    decision to use a 2012 project list was unsupported by substantial evidence. (See, e.g.,
    Communities for a Better Environment v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist.
    (2010) 
    48 Cal.4th 310
    , 328 [agency has discretion to determine existing conditions
    baseline, subject to review for substantial evidence]; Gray v. County of Madera (2008)
    
    167 Cal.App.4th 1099
    , 1128 [county had discretion to set date of application for current
    project as cutoff date for deciding which projects to include in cumulative impacts
    analysis].) Further, though the list of projects was first obtained in 2012, the City
    reviewed the list prior to publication of the DEIR to verify it remained representative of
    past, present, and reasonably foreseeable probable future projects.9 Plaintiffs do not cite
    9
    Plaintiffs also claim the City’s reliance on data from the Draft Central SOMA
    Plan EIR for the 5M Project cumulative impacts analysis was improper “because it
    constituted deferral of analysis to a future plan.” Plaintiffs do not explain this conclusory
    contention, nor is it supported by the authority they cite. Sundstrom v. County of
    Mendocino (1988) 
    202 Cal.App.3d 296
     involved a negative declaration rather than an
    EIR, and discussed improper deferral of mitigation measures, not use of data from a draft
    EIR in a cumulative impacts analysis. (Id. at pp. 306–307.) Plaintiffs cite no authority
    14
    any evidence in support of their claim “up-to-date data” was excluded from the
    cumulative impacts analysis.
    Plaintiffs also claim the EIR “artificially constrained the study area” to only
    include future projects in the vicinity of the site, rather than the entire downtown area.
    An agency’s selection of the geographic area impacted by a proposed development,
    however, falls within the lead agency’s discretion, based on its expertise. (Guidelines,
    § 15130, subd. (b)(3); City of Long Beach v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2009)
    
    176 Cal.App.4th 889
    , 907 (City of Long Beach).) Moreover, discussion of cumulative
    impacts in an EIR “ ‘should be guided by the standards of practically and
    reasonableness.’ ” (City of Long Beach, at p. 912.) Absent a showing of arbitrary action,
    a reviewing court must assume the agency has exercised its discretion appropriately. (Id.
    at p. 908.) Though a court may reject a study area if it is “ ‘so narrowly defined that it
    necessarily eliminates a portion of the affected environmental setting,’ ” no such
    circumstances were shown here. (Id. at p. 907.) Plaintiffs point to nothing in the record
    showing the study area as defined in the EIR excluded a portion of the affected setting or
    that studying the entire “downtown area” would have altered the City’s analysis of
    environmental impacts.
    San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth v. City and County of San Francisco
    (1984) 
    151 Cal.App.3d 61
    , relied on by plaintiffs, is inapposite. In that case, the city
    simultaneously pursued four downtown high-rise projects and produced EIR’s for each
    project that unlawfully ignored the likely impacts of the other three. (Id. at pp. 67–68,
    74–75, 80–81.) The court concluded that by leaving out “closely related projects that
    were currently under environmental review, the Commission applied an unreasonably
    narrow interpretation of the Guidelines, and in so doing, abused its discretion.” (Id. at
    that a lead agency may rely only on data from a completed EIR, and in fact, such a rule
    would be counterproductive to the purpose of CEQA in ensuring a thorough review of all
    reasonably foreseeable probable impacts. We also find this contention somewhat
    puzzling in light of plaintiffs’ argument the EIR was inadequate for failing to identify
    inconsistencies with the Draft Central SoMa Plan, a claim we further discuss below.
    15
    p. 74, fn. omitted.) Here, as discussed above, plaintiffs do not identify closely related,
    foreseeable projects that were actually excluded from the EIR’s cumulative impacts
    analysis.
    Plaintiffs also assert the EIR neither discussed nor analyzed the number of gross
    square feet per office worker of foreseeable additional or modified office development
    and used an “old” methodology for calculating project density, thereby undercounting the
    number of office workers in the cumulative impacts analysis. The EIR explained,
    however, that the City relied on a report by its consultant, Economic & Planning
    Systems, projecting densities between 160 and 275 square feet per employee, with an
    average density of 210 square feet per employee, a higher density than often assumed for
    conventional commercial space, which is about 250 square feet per employee. For
    cumulative traffic impacts, the City used the SF-CHAMP model inputs for future growth
    which were “developed using a square footage per office worker of 200 square feet per
    employee based on Planning Department information on employee density trends.” The
    City was entitled to rely on its own experts and consultants, and the record reveals the
    density calculations were supported by substantial evidence. (See Association of Irritated
    Residents v. County of Madera (2003) 
    107 Cal.App.4th 1383
    , 1397; Ukiah Citizens for
    Safety First v. City of Ukiah (2016) 
    248 Cal.App.4th 256
    , 261 [substantial evidence
    standard of review applies to methodology used for studying an impact].)
    Plaintiffs also contend the project would result in density-related cumulative
    impacts because it did not include a stepdown transition for building heights as proposed
    in the Central SoMa Plan. Plaintiffs forfeited this argument by raising it for the first time
    on appeal.10 In any event, as the EIR explained, the 5M Project is not subject to the
    Central SoMa Plan.
    10
    On reply, plaintiffs argue they raised the issue in their opening brief in the trial
    court by “referenc[ing] the letter from SoMa concerning the lack of a step-down
    transition area.” The letter they reference is one of a string of citations to the
    administrative record in support of the general argument that “The EIR fails to
    adequately analyze cumulative impacts as noted in the DEIR comment letters by
    attorneys Eric Phillips and Susan Brandt-Hawley and by Save our SoMa, South of
    16
    Plaintiffs further claim that it is unclear whether population projections cited in the
    EIR were actually applied to the cumulative traffic impacts analysis and whether a
    memorandum on “Population and Employment Projections for the 5M Development”
    from Michael Nimon and Tepa Banda to Forest City was used in the DEIR to assess
    cumulative traffic impacts. But the record shows that the cumulative traffic impacts
    analysis relied on the SF-CHAMP model, which incorporates, among other things,
    population, housing units, and employment growth assumptions developed by the
    Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) and under the City’s General Plan.
    Plaintiffs further assert the information cited in the Nimon/Banda memorandum should
    have been included in the body of the EIR and not buried in an appendix or some other
    document referenced but not included in the EIR. But the Nimon/Banda memorandum
    was discussed in the DEIR in the project description, and its projected employee and
    resident counts were set forth in the body of the DEIR. Further, the DEIR noted the
    document was available for review at the Planning Department. (Guidelines, § 15150,
    subd. (a) [EIR may incorporate publicly available documents by reference].) The cases
    relied on by plaintiffs are distinguishable, as they involved circumstances in which the
    EIR entirely omitted critical information or made it very difficult to find. (See Vineyard
    Area Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 
    40 Cal.4th 412
    ,
    442 [county could not rely on information not actually incorporated or described and
    referenced in the EIR]; San Joaquin Raptor Rescue, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 659
    [EIR should not force public and decision makers to “sift through obscure minutiae or
    appendices” to determine the “fundamental baseline assumptions” used for the
    environmental analysis]; California Oak Foundation v. City of Santa Clarita (2005)
    
    133 Cal.App.4th 1219
    , 1239–1240 [critical information was added to EIR shortly before
    certification and appeared only in an appendix with inadequate facts and analysis].)
    Market Community Action Network and San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth.” It
    hardly merits mention that a record citation, standing alone, does not suffice to raise a
    legal or factual issue.
    17
    In sum, plaintiffs have failed to show the EIR was deficient for failing to properly
    consider the project’s cumulative impacts.
    3. Traffic and Circulation Impacts
    Plaintiffs next argue the EIR failed to adequately consider traffic and circulation
    impacts from the proposed project. Specifically, plaintiffs argue the City failed to
    (1) include intersections adjacent to impacted ones in its analysis of potentially
    significant impacts, (2) consider the impact of the Safer Market Street Plan, and
    (3) adequately identify or discuss specific mitigation measures and evaluate community-
    proposed alternatives.
    a. Adjacent Intersections
    Plaintiffs argue the EIR failed to adequately analyze traffic impacts by using an
    artificially small study area to avoid review of potentially significant impacts. They
    contend existing traffic conditions will be made worse with the proposed project, and the
    EIR failed to review the traffic impacts at intersections adjacent to the project
    development area and the Interstate 280 on- and off-ramps. After oral argument, we
    asked the parties for additional briefing on the effect, if any, of the Supreme Court’s
    recent Sierra Club decision on plaintiffs’ argument that the EIR failed to adequately
    consider direct traffic and circulation impacts due to use of an artificially small study area
    that avoided review of impacted intersections.
    As discussed above with respect to cumulative impacts, the agency’s selection of
    the geographic area impacted by a proposed development falls within the lead agency’s
    discretion, and “ ‘ “[a]bsent a showing of arbitrary action, we must assume that the
    agencies have exercised this discretion appropriately.” ’ ” (City of Long Beach, supra,
    176 Cal.App.4th at p. 908; Guidelines, § 15130, subd. (b)(3); Ebbetts Pass Forest Watch
    v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2004) 
    123 Cal.App.4th 1331
    , 1351–1353.)
    In City of Long Beach, the lead agency narrowed an initial list of 79 projects down to 11
    projects for the study area, based on their proximity to the project site and potential to
    contribute to traffic volume on surface streets in the area. (Id. at p. 909.) The court
    concluded this was an appropriate exercise of discretion. (Ibid.)
    18
    As in City of Long Beach, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate an abuse of
    discretion in the City’s selection of intersections to analyze for traffic impacts. The
    DEIR set forth detailed significance criteria and an analytical methodology for
    determining adverse traffic and circulation impacts, none of which plaintiffs specifically
    challenge.11 The City selected 21 study intersections “in the vicinity of the project site
    because they would capture the relative change in levels of service that could be
    associated with the project. Project-generated traffic would access and exit the site from
    the surrounding street network and the study intersections are those most likely to
    accommodate project trips.” These were similar to the considerations employed to
    determine the study area in City of Long Beach, and as there, the determination of the
    appropriate traffic study area was not “ ‘ “arbitrary,” ’ ” nor was it “ ‘so narrowly defined
    that it necessarily eliminates a portion of the affected environmental setting.’ ” (City of
    Long Beach, 
    supra,
     176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 907–908.)
    Plaintiffs contend generally that “[t]he area is well known to be severely congested
    with traffic” and argue the traffic and circulation analysis “failed to fully disclose the
    Project’s direct traffic impacts” to other intersections outside the study area. In support
    of this argument, they cite approximately a dozen general comments about how bad
    traffic is in the project vicinity and at intersections studied in the EIR. Apart from
    quoting one specific public comment,12 plaintiffs do not specifically identify the
    11
    In their supplemental brief, plaintiffs assert the FEIR failed to divulge what
    criteria were used by the Planning Department, precluding their ability to evaluate the
    efficacy of that selection. Plaintiffs did not raise this issue in their briefs or at oral
    argument. In any event, it lacks merit, because the DEIR disclosed both the significance
    criteria and analytical methodology used for the traffic analysis.
    12
    One public comment (repeated verbatim by several commenters) stated the
    DEIR failed to analyze impacts to the intersection of Third and Howard Streets, impacts
    to Seventh Street along Folsom Street, Bryant Street or Brannan Street, and impacts to
    the on- and off-ramps near Interstate 280. With respect to the intersection of Third and
    Howard Streets, the City conducted an additional study of traffic impacts following the
    public comment period. The study concluded there was no significant impact at that
    intersection. With respect to Seventh Street, the FEIR explained it was not a primary
    access route to or from the project. And with respect to Interstate 280 ramps, the FEIR
    19
    purportedly impacted intersections outside the study area that they argue should have
    been included. Further, plaintiffs’ argument that adjacent intersections should have been
    included in the study area challenges the City’s method for conducting its traffic analysis,
    not the adequacy of its discussion of traffic impacts in the EIR. (See, e.g., Sierra Club,
    supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 514 [substantial evidence review applies to challenges to
    methodology used for studying an impact, as opposed to question whether discussion of
    environmental impact in EIR is conclusory, which is subject to de novo review]; City of
    Long Beach, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 898 [substantial evidence test applies to
    challenges to methodology].)
    In any event, the FEIR explained why additional intersections were not included:
    “The intersections included for analysis of the [DEIR] Project’s traffic impacts were
    identified based on criteria developed by the Planning Department, and represent a
    reasonable representation of the probable impacts of the [DEIR] (and Revised Project).
    Further from the project site, traffic is dispersed among numerous streets and the project
    vehicle contributions to the intersections further away are decreased. The intersections
    selected for analysis include the intersections adjacent to the project site, the intersections
    used for access to and from the Fifth and Mission Garage, and key intersections to the
    south providing access to and from the nearby [Interstate] 80 and [Interstate] 280
    freeways (the study intersection of Sixth/Brannan includes the [Interstate] 80 ramp
    operations). Seventh Street would not serve as a primary access route to or from the
    project site because Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Streets provide more direct access to the
    project site and the nearby Fifth and Mission Garage.” Though plaintiffs argue it was
    reasonably feasible to include analysis of a larger geographic area, our courts have
    repeatedly emphasized that an EIR must demonstrate a good faith effort at full disclosure;
    it does not require perfection, nor exhaustive analysis. (See Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th
    at p. 515 [courts look for “ ‘ “ ‘adequacy, completeness and a good-faith effort at full
    explained that the Sixth and Brannan study intersection includes the Interstate 280 ramp
    operations.
    20
    disclosure’ ” ’ ”]; Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of
    California (1988) 
    47 Cal.3d 376
    , 415 [“A project opponent or reviewing court can
    always imagine some additional study or analysis that might provide helpful information.
    It is not for them to design the EIR. That further study . . . might be helpful does not
    make it necessary.”].) On this record, we cannot conclude the City abused its discretion
    by failing to consider the traffic impact on additional intersections.13
    b. Safer Market Street Plan
    Plaintiffs also complain the City did not evaluate the significance of the Safer
    Market Street Plan (SMSP) in the EIR. An EIR must consider conditions that are
    present, or reasonably foreseeable, as of publication of the notice of preparation (NOP).
    (Guidelines, § 15125, subd. (a)(1).) The NOP for the 5M Project was published in
    January 2013. The SMSP was approved two and a half years later, in June 2015.
    Plaintiffs cite no evidence the SMSP was a “ ‘probable future project[]’ ” when the NOP
    was published. (Gray v. County of Madera, supra, 
    167 Cal.App.4th 1099
    , 1127 [“[M]ere
    awareness of proposed expansion plans or other proposed development does not
    13
    Plaintiffs also rely on Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1975)
    
    13 Cal.3d 263
    , City of Livermore v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1986)
    
    184 Cal.App.3d 531
    , and City of Antioch v. City Council (1986) 
    187 Cal.App.3d 1325
     for
    the principle that an agency may not limit a study area to avoid review of potentially
    significant impacts. But those cases involved whether an EIR should have been prepared
    at all, not an agency’s purported abuse of discretion in defining the geographic study area
    in an EIR. Nor are we required to consider plaintiffs’ citation to Protect the Historic
    Amador Waterways v. Amador Water Agency (2004) 
    116 Cal.App.4th 1099
    , 1109
    (Protect Waterways), which they cite for the first time in their reply brief. (See In re
    Groundwater Cases (2007) 
    154 Cal.App.4th 659
    , 693 [court ordinarily will not consider
    issues raised for the first time on reply].) In any event, Protect Waterways is
    distinguishable. There, the EIR was inadequate because it failed to explain the agency’s
    conclusion that a reduction in stream flows was an insignificant environmental impact,
    relying only on a threshold of significance from the CEQA Guidelines which the plaintiff
    argued was inadequate because it did not address reduction in stream flows. (Protect
    Waterways, at p. 1111.) Here, by contrast, the EIR analyzed traffic impacts under its
    significance criteria and project methodology (which plaintiffs did not challenge),
    explained its findings under those criteria, and explained why it did not consider
    additional intersections in response to plaintiffs’ comments.
    21
    necessarily require the inclusion of those proposed projects in the EIR. Rather, these
    proposed projects must become ‘probable future projects.’ ”]; City of Maywood v. Los
    Angeles Unified School Dist. (2012) 
    208 Cal.App.4th 362
    , 397–398 (City of Maywood).)
    Further, plaintiffs point to no evidence in the record to indicate the SMSP would have
    any adverse impact on traffic and circulation related to the 5M Project. In support of
    their contention it was “generally known” the SMSP would cause more traffic, plaintiffs
    cite to letters from citizens’ groups, which in turn, fail to cite any traffic studies or similar
    evidence. On this record, we cannot conclude the agency’s failure to consider the SMSP
    in the EIR was an abuse of discretion.
    c. Mitigation Measures
    Plaintiffs next complain the City failed to consider particular mitigation measures
    including: (1) reducing the amount of trip-generating uses, (2) providing funds to
    enhance public transportation service in the area, (3) implementing a transportation
    demand management (TDM) plan that is specific to the project, or (4) reviewing
    alternatives suggested by plaintiffs to reduce the amount of traffic generated by the 5M
    Project. The record reflects otherwise.
    The DEIR determined that both the office and residential schemes of the proposed
    5M Project would cause significant and unavoidable cumulative impacts at nine
    intersections. In the impact analysis of the identified project alternatives, the DEIR
    analyzed the potential for reducing traffic impacts at intersections by reducing the amount
    of trip-generating uses. Specifically, the DEIR concluded three of the feasible
    alternatives explored would generate fewer vehicle trips during the peak weekday hour
    than the proposed project, which would produce 730 vehicle trips under the office
    scheme and 705 vehicle trips under the residential scheme. The code compliant
    alternative would generate 417 vehicle trips, the unified zoning alternative would
    generate 489 vehicle trips, and the preservation alternative would generate 548 vehicle
    trips. As adopted, the revised project described in the FEIR, which was largely based on
    the preservation alternative, further reduced the number of vehicle trips during the peak
    weekday hour to 465 vehicle trips from the 548 identified in the preservation alternative.
    22
    The revised project also reduced the cumulative impacts at three intersections to a less-
    than-significant level; thus reducing the total number of significant and unavoidable
    cumulative impacts from nine to six intersections between the DEIR and the FEIR.
    The DEIR also considered requiring the developers to contribute funds to public
    transportation, but rejected the option because the project did not result in significant
    transit impacts and the project area was already well served by public transit, with
    available capacity to accommodate the additional transit trips generated by the project.
    The City also noted, “Because of the availability of both local and regional transit routes
    in the project vicinity with available capacity, a substantial increase in transit service
    would be needed to shift mode of travel from auto to transit. In addition, providing
    additional funds for transit is not usually considered a feasible mitigation measure in San
    Francisco, the ability of the SFMTA [(San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency)]
    and/or regional transit operators to provide additional transit vehicles and operators
    needed to reduce transit impacts to less than significant levels is uncertain,” and the City
    already imposes “transit-related exactions through its exiting Transit Impact
    Development Fee.”
    Contrary to plaintiffs’ contentions the EIR also addressed a TDM plan. The EIR
    identified a TDM plan as a potential mitigation measure, and noted while it was not
    required, the developer included one as part of the revised project and as part of the
    development agreement. Further, the FEIR specifically discusses the TDM plan’s goal to
    reduce the number of vehicle trips generated by the proposed project by 20 percent,
    belying plaintiffs’ claim it only addressed impacts in the context of air quality.
    Finally, we reject plaintiffs’ claim the City was required to evaluate the
    “Community” and “Zero-Parking” alternatives. “CEQA does not require that an agency
    consider specific alternatives that are proposed by members of the public or other outside
    agencies.” (City of Maywood, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 420; California Native Plant
    Society v. City of Santa Cruz (2009) 
    177 Cal.App.4th 957
    , 999 [“potentially feasible
    alternatives ‘are suggestions which may or may not be adopted by the
    decisionmakers’ ”].) Rather, the City was responsible for selecting a range of project
    23
    alternatives that could feasibly accomplish most of the basic objectives of the project and
    could avoid or lessen one or more of its significant impacts. (Guidelines, § 15126.6.)
    “The range of alternatives required in an EIR is governed by a ‘rule of reason’ that
    requires the EIR to set forth only those alternatives necessary to permit a reasoned
    choice.” (Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (f); see Village Laguna of Laguna Beach, Inc. v.
    Board of Supervisors (1982) 
    134 Cal.App.3d 1022
    , 1029 [EIR need not “ ‘consider in
    detail each and every conceivable variation of the alternatives stated’ ”].)
    Courts will defer to an agency’s selection of alternatives unless the petitioners
    (1) demonstrate that the chosen alternatives are “ ‘ “manifestly unreasonable and . . . do
    not contribute to a reasonable range of alternatives,” ’ ” and (2) submit evidence showing
    the rejected alternative was both “feasible” and “adequate,” because it was capable of
    attaining most of the basic objectives of the project, taking into account site suitability,
    economic viability, availability of infrastructure, general plan consistency, and other
    relevant factors. (Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of Fish & Wildlife
    (2015) 
    234 Cal.App.4th 214
    , 256; Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (f); City of Maywood,
    supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at pp. 421–422.) Here, plaintiffs do not show the nine
    alternatives evaluated in the EIR were manifestly unreasonable.
    Moreover, while they argue the City unreasonably failed to consider their
    proposed “Community” and “Zero-Parking” alternatives, plaintiffs did not meet their
    burden to show those alternatives were feasible and adequate because they were capable
    of attaining most of the basic objectives of the project. The proponents of the
    “Community Preferred Project Alternative” submitted only general descriptions of the
    proposed alternative, and did not provide any renderings of the proposed project until
    after certification of the EIR. Moreover, as Forest City notes, the proponents of the
    community alternative also noted it was substantially similar to the code compliant
    alternative proposed in the DEIR with respect to reducing the number of intersections
    with significant traffic impacts (as well as other proposed mitigation measures). The City
    declined to separately analyze the community alternative, noting (1) the proponents failed
    to “specify the overall development program . . . or how these elements would be
    24
    achieved,” (2) the alternative was similar to those already considered in the DEIR, and
    (3) it was not clear the alternative could meet the basic objectives of the 5M Project.
    Plaintiffs have failed to establish the City abused its discretion in refusing to consider the
    community alternative. (See Bay Area Citizens v. Association of Bay Area Governments
    (2016) 
    248 Cal.App.4th 966
    , 1018–1019 [agency did not abuse discretion by refusing to
    consider alternative proposed by citizens group]; California Native Plant Society v. City
    of Santa Cruz, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 995 [sufficient evidence in administrative
    record as a whole supported agency’s decision concerning which alternatives to analyze
    and which to omit].)
    With respect to the zero-parking alternative, plaintiffs likewise fail to cite any
    evidence it was a feasible, adequate alternative that could meet the objectives of the 5M
    Project. The City considered nine alternatives to the 5M Project, including a “No
    Project” and an “Off-site” alternative, both of which would have contributed no traffic or
    additional parking spaces to the area, but which were rejected for failure to meet the
    objectives of the development program. Plaintiffs fail to explain how their zero-parking
    proposal would have fared better.
    4. Wind Impacts
    Plaintiffs raise several complaints with respect to the EIR’s analysis of wind
    impacts resulting from the 5M Project. First, they argue the EIR inappropriately
    compares the revised project to the office and residential schemes initially proposed,
    rather than to existing conditions as required by CEQA. Second, they complain the
    revised project failed to comply with San Francisco Planning Code section 148, which
    requires an applicant for a project exceeding particular wind effect limits to show that the
    building could not be designed to avoid the exceedance or that redesign would unduly
    restrict the development potential. Third, they complain the EIR inappropriately relies on
    “wind baffling measures” in the design for development document to address wind
    impacts, in contravention of CEQA Guidelines requiring mitigation measures be
    addressed directly in the EIR and not left to future determination.
    25
    As an initial matter, we find these arguments were waived by failure to raise them
    during the administrative process. (Sierra Club v. City of Orange (2008)
    
    163 Cal.App.4th 523
    , 535 [under exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, the
    “ ‘ “exact issue” ’ ” must be presented to agency].) Though plaintiffs note commenters
    raised concerns regarding wind impacts during the public comment period, the remarks
    reflected general concerns about the amount of wind generated by the 5M Project, “wind
    tunnel” effects, and requests for mitigation measures. Such general comments are
    insufficient to raise the specific issues plaintiffs assert on appeal. (See North Coast
    Rivers Alliance v. Marin Municipal Water Dist. Bd. of Directors (2013) 
    216 Cal.App.4th 614
    , 631 [letters that failed to apprise agency of any specific inconsistencies with policies
    or programs in countywide plan did not give agency opportunity to evaluate and respond
    to alleged CEQA violation].)
    Even if the arguments had been adequately raised, however, they fail on the
    merits. Plaintiffs’ complaint that that revised project must be compared to existing
    conditions as opposed to the schemes proposed in the DEIR is addressed in the passage
    they quote at length from the FEIR.14 Though the FEIR discusses improvements in wind
    14
    Plaintiffs quote the following excerpt from the FEIR regarding the project’s
    wind impacts: “Compared to the Draft EIR Project, wind conditions at the project site
    would vary slightly and the intensity of wind impacts would be less under the Revised
    Project given that the 195-foot-tall Building N-2 would not be developed, which would
    allow for an overall reduction in building heights and mass within the interior of the site.
    Under existing conditions, the Draft EIR identified 31 locations (out of 78 evaluated
    locations) that have wind speeds that exceed the pedestrian comfort criterion of winds
    greater than 11 miles per hour (mph) more than 10 percent of the time. The Draft EIR
    Project’s Office Scheme would change wind patterns such that new exceedances would
    occur at 32 locations (Draft EIR page 478). As shown in Figure RTC II-9,[fn. omitted]
    compared to existing conditions, the Revised Project would result in 43 total
    exceedances, or 20 new exceedances compared to existing conditions and nine fewer
    exceedances than the Draft EIR project. Overall, the Revised Project would increase the
    average wind speed at test locations from 12 mph to 12.8 mph, a modest increase and less
    of an increase than the 2 mph increase identified for the Draft EIR Project. The highest
    wind speed (22 mph) would occur at the southwest corner of Fifth and Tehama Streets
    (Location 6), an increase from 17 mph under existing conditions. The 11 mph comfort
    criterion would be exceeded 17.4 percent of the time (compared to 14 percent of the time
    26
    impacts under the revised project compared with the DEIR office scheme, it also
    specifically compares wind impacts to existing conditions.
    We also reject plaintiffs’ argument that Forest City was required to prove that an
    alternative configuration of the project was infeasible under San Francisco Planning Code
    section 148. Section 148 establishes a hazard criterion for wind speed impacts, which is
    a 26-mile-per-hour (mph) wind speed for a single hour of the year, as well as a comfort
    criterion, which is an 11-mph wind speed for 10 percent of the year between the hours of
    7:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. (S.F. Planning Code, § 148.) The City used the 26-mph hazard
    criterion to determine significant effects on wind patterns pursuant to CEQA. The record
    reflects the revised project substantially reduced exceedances over the “hazard” threshold
    when compared with existing conditions.15 Plaintiffs do not assert the CEQA
    significance threshold established by the City was inappropriate, nor argue the City’s
    determination of no significant wind impact was unsupported by substantial evidence.
    Indeed, the technical results described in the EIR constituted substantial evidence not
    contradicted by any other evidence in the record.
    Rather than discuss the CEQA significance criterion for wind impacts, plaintiffs
    instead point to the EIR’s discussion of exceedances of the 11-mph “comfort” threshold
    established by San Francisco Planning Code section 148. As the DEIR explains, the
    comfort criterion is “to be used in the evaluation of proposed buildings,” but in the
    CEQA context, “these comfort criteria are compared to a project’s anticipated wind
    speeds for informational purposes, not to identify significant effects.” (Italics added.)
    Because exceedances of the comfort criterion did not establish significant impacts for
    CEQA purposes, the City was not required to propose mitigation measures to address
    under existing conditions or the 21 percent increase identified for the Draft EIR Project).
    Similar to the Draft EIR Project, the Revised Project would result in a relatively modest
    worsening of wind comfort conditions.”
    15
    Under existing conditions, the three locations with wind speeds over the hazard
    criterion did so for 79 hours a year, while under the revised project, exceedances of the
    hazard threshold would occur for a total of 4 hours per year (a reduction of 75 hours
    compared to existing conditions).
    27
    them. (§ 21100, subd. (b)(3); Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(A) [EIR shall identify
    mitigation measures for each significant environmental effect identified in EIR]; San
    Franciscans for Reasonable Growth v. City and County of San Francisco (1989)
    
    209 Cal.App.3d 1502
    , 1517; Napa Citizens for Honest Government v. Napa County Bd.
    of Supervisors (2001) 
    91 Cal.App.4th 342
    , 360 [once significant effect has been
    identified, EIR must propose mitigation measures].) Accordingly, we reject plaintiffs’
    contentions that the City was required to show the building could not be redesigned to
    address the comfort exceedances and that the reference to wind baffling measures in the
    design for development document was an inadequate description of a proposed mitigation
    measure.
    5. Open Space
    Plaintiffs also argue the project failed to provide adequate onsite open space. In
    particular, they emphasize that the San Francisco Park Recreation and Open Space
    Advisory Committee expressed concern about the lack of a formal presentation on open
    space and passed a resolution requesting the Board postpone the hearing on the Project
    for further studies to be conducted. Further, citizens complained about the lack of
    sunlight/presence of shadow in the planned spaces, exposure to mechanical room noise
    and air return, and lack of landscape drawings or plant lists for the open spaces. Citizens
    and SOMCAN also noted the open space provided on top of the Chronicle Building
    accounts for half the open space provided by the project but is only accessible by
    elevator, and is therefore “substandard” and not “the best option to have sort of equitable
    open space.”
    In response to public comments, the EIR noted the 5M Project provides more open
    space than the San Francisco Planning Code requires,16 and will result in less-than-
    significant environmental impacts related to demand on existing parks and open spaces.
    Plaintiffs complain generally that the open space provided in the project is “inadequate
    16
    The San Francisco Planning Code would require approximately 33,600 gsf of
    open space for the revised project, whereas 59,450 gsf would be provided. Further, the
    revised project would meet the required square footage without the rooftop space.
    28
    and fails to provide asserted benefits,” but they do not explain how these deficiencies
    violate CEQA or cite any legal authority in support of their argument. Thus, we reject
    this contention. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Murphy v. Murphy (2008)
    
    164 Cal.App.4th 376
    , 405–406 [failure to cite pertinent legal authority is grounds for
    appellate court to reject party’s argument].)
    6. Shade and Shadow Impacts
    Plaintiffs contend the EIR is inadequate with respect to the 5M Project’s impacts
    to shade and shadow at two places in San Francisco—Boeddeker Park and Yerba Buena
    Gardens. As to both locations, plaintiffs contend the City failed to proceed in the manner
    required by law when it adopted an EIR that failed to disclose shadow impacts, failed to
    propose adequate mitigation, and failed to consider feasible alternatives.
    Regarding Boeddeker Park, plaintiffs argue the 5M Project will increase the
    absolute and cumulative shadow limits and the City’s decision to raise the threshold for
    those limits rather than considering an alternative configuration is “almost” without
    precedent for a for-profit development. They point to various comments that the shade
    and shadow increase will fall on the park’s vegetable and flower garden. They also argue
    that when it was found the 5M Project would violate City policy mandating “ ‘no net new
    shadow,’ ” mitigation measures or alternatives should have been considered before
    considering the benefits of the project.
    Under the significance criteria for shadow impact in the EIR, a shadow has a
    significant effect if it “substantially affects outdoor recreation facilities or other public
    areas.” Plaintiffs do not challenge that standard for significance nor the City’s authority
    to establish it. (See Guidelines, § 15064, subd. (b).) In the DEIR, the City explained in
    detail the new shadow impacts that would result in Boeddeker Park as a result of the
    project, and why they did not meet that significance threshold: “Under existing
    conditions, Boeddeker Park is shaded about 41.59 percent of the time. (Shadow cast
    under existing conditions and project conditions was calculated in the quantitative study
    conducted, consistent with the protocols Section 295 analysis.) The Office Scheme
    would shade Boeddeker Park only in the early morning hours during the winter months,
    29
    generally between October 25 and November 29, as well as between January 11 and
    February 15, when the sun is at a low angle and extensive shadows are cast by buildings
    in and around Downtown San Francisco. The Office Scheme would not cast shadow
    during other times of the year, including the spring, summer, and fall. On the worst-case
    shadow days, November 8 and February 1, a maximum of 742 square feet of new shadow
    would be cast only before 8:15 a.m. in and around the northern entry gate to the park.
    Implementation of the proposed project would result in a very small (about 0.004
    percent) increase in shadow cast on Boeddeker Park. The net new shadow that would fall
    on Boeddeker Park would cover part of the entry gate area of the park. This entry gate
    area does not contain tables or chairs, and is not expected to be subject to stationary use.
    Because the new net shadow generated by the Office Scheme would cover an area of the
    park that would be used primarily for entering and existing [sic] the park, and because the
    net new shadow would occur during the early morning hours during a time of year when
    park use tends to diminish, the shadow would not adversely affect the use of Boeddeker
    Park.” The EIR thus clearly set forth specific information about the shade and shadow
    impacts, and analyzed why they would not produce a significant environmental effect.
    Plaintiffs have not demonstrated the agency abused its discretion by omitting or failing to
    discuss those impacts, nor do they suggest the City’s discussion precluded participation
    or informed decision making. (See Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 516 [ultimate
    inquiry is whether EIR includes enough detail “ ‘to enable those who did not participate
    in its preparation to understand and to consider meaningfully the issues raised by the
    proposed project’ ”].)
    It is true San Francisco’s Planning Code and General Plan discourage the creation
    of new shadows on parks, plazas, and open spaces. (See S.F. Planning Code, §§ 146,
    147, 295.) It is also true the Planning Commission and Recreation and Park Commission
    adopted a joint resolution authorizing an increase to the shadow limit at Boeddeker Park,
    the Planning Commission approved a motion allocating additional shadow to the 5M
    Project, and the Recreation and Park Commission adopted a resolution recommending the
    5M Project’s new shadow on Boeddeker Park would not be adverse. But the shadow
    30
    limits were policy restrictions, not a CEQA threshold, and the City’s action in raising the
    limits does not establish a CEQA violation.17
    Plaintiffs also argue commenters urged the City to consider the increase in shadow
    limits in the context of Boeddeker Park as a “special and rare resource” in the Tenderloin,
    contending such resources warrant “special emphasis” under the CEQA Guidelines,
    section 15125.18 We reject this argument because plaintiffs do not cite any authority that
    sunlight on a park or open space, even in a dense urban area, constitutes a “rare or
    unique” resource for CEQA purposes. The cases on which they do rely are unhelpful to
    them. Galante Vineyards v. Monterey Peninsula Water Management Dist. (1997)
    
    60 Cal.App.4th 1109
    , 1122, did not discuss the “rare or unique” language in the
    Guidelines, but found the project description inadequate for failure to emphasize the
    importance of wineries and viticulture in the environmental setting. Friends of the Eel
    River v. Sonoma County Water Agency (2003) 
    108 Cal.App.4th 859
    , 874–875, concerned
    an inadequate description of conditions in the water supply system and their impact on an
    endangered species of fish. Preservation Action Council v. City of San Jose (2006)
    17
    Plaintiffs also rely on a comment from Attorney Eric Phillips that the EIR failed
    to disclose that without this special approval to raise the shadow limit on Boeddeker
    Park, the project would result in a significant impact. But Phillips’s comment suffers the
    same logical fallacy of equating the City policies on shade and shadow with CEQA
    criteria for a significant impact without explaining why the shadow would create a
    significant environmental effect. Plaintiffs also assert the City’s increase of the shadow
    limits was “an almost unprecedented action in approving a for-profit development,” but
    the record reflects this was the fifth time the City had authorized shadow increases for
    Boeddeker Park.
    18
    Guidelines, section 15125 regarding the EIR’s description of the physical
    environmental conditions in the vicinity of the project provides, in relevant part:
    “Knowledge of the regional setting is critical to the assessment of environmental impacts.
    Special emphasis should be placed on environmental resources that are rare or unique to
    that region and would be affected by the project. The EIR must demonstrate that the
    significant environmental impacts of the proposed project were adequately investigated
    and discussed[,] and it must permit the significant effects of the project to be considered
    in the full environmental context.” (Guidelines, § 15125, subd. (c), italics added.)
    31
    
    141 Cal.App.4th 1336
    , 1352–1353, concerned preservation of a historic building (and did
    not discuss Guidelines, § 15125 at all).
    As to Yerba Buena Gardens, plaintiffs note the revised project increases the
    shadow effect on Yerba Buena Gardens and the children’s play area to 29 percent
    compared to 21 percent with the schemes proposed in the DEIR, but the FEIR found no
    significant impact. They contend the City failed to proceed in the manner required by
    law when it adopted an EIR without disclosing the shadow impacts to Yerba Buena
    “Park,” but they provide no record citations for that argument. To the contrary, the EIR
    disclosed there would be an increase of 0.09 percent of total shadows cast on Yerba
    Buena Gardens North in the winter months, when the park is least in use. The EIR
    explained the increase is relatively small compared to existing conditions and the use of
    the space would not be adversely affected. Similarly, the EIR noted overall total shadows
    cast on the children’s play area would be 0.17 percent, and would not adversely affect use
    of the space due to the time and duration of the increased shadows (a short period during
    the winter months, after 3:30 p.m.).
    Plaintiffs also complain the EIR did not consider mitigation measures or
    alternatives that would have reduced the shade and shadow impact, but fail to cite record
    evidence in support of their contention. In fact, the DEIR analyzed wind and shadow
    impacts for each of the four feasible project alternatives, and noted that for two of them
    (the Unified Zoning and No Project alternatives), the alternative would reduce the 5M
    Project’s less-than-significant impacts or have no adverse shadow impact on open spaces
    in the vicinity of the site. Further, because the EIR did not identify impacts from new
    shadow or shade as a significant environmental effect, the City was not required to
    consider mitigation measures as cursorily argued by plaintiffs. (See San Franciscans for
    Reasonable Growth v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at
    p. 1517.)
    7. Inconsistency with Area Plans and Policies
    Plaintiffs contend the EIR failed to adequately account for inconsistencies between
    the 5M Project and applicable area plans and policies and thus failed to serve as the
    32
    required informational document under CEQA.19 An EIR must “discuss any
    inconsistencies between the proposed project and applicable general plans, specific plans
    and regional plans.” (Guidelines, § 15125, subd. (d).) Here, the DEIR contained 36
    pages of analysis comparing the 5M Project to area plans and policies, including, among
    many others, the San Francisco General Plan, the South of Market Redevelopment Plan,
    the Draft Central South of Market (Central Corridor) Plan, and the San Francisco
    Planning Code. The DEIR also analyzed a “Code Compliant” alternative based on the
    level of development that would be allowed without amending any existing zoning or
    planning controls.
    In their opening brief, plaintiffs contend the 5M Project is inconsistent with
    various policies and objectives of the East SoMa portion of the general plan and Draft
    Central SoMa Plan. As Forest City notes, however, the 5M Project is not located in the
    East SoMa area, nor is it subject to the Draft Central SoMa Plan.20 Plaintiffs also argue
    the H1 Building is inconsistent with height requirements for the SoMa Youth and Family
    SUD, but the proposed project would be rezoned out of that area. (See Sierra Club v.
    City of Orange, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at pp. 543–544 [EIR was not required to discuss
    inconsistencies with county general plan where proposed project would be subject to city
    general plan if approved].) On reply, plaintiffs do not dispute these facts or explain why
    the City would be required to evaluate the alleged inconsistencies.
    19
    Plaintiffs also make a cursory claim that “The City’s findings that the Project is
    consistent with area plans and policies is not supported by substantial evidence” (italics
    added), but they do not discuss that contention substantively or provide any record
    citations to support it. Accordingly, we will not address it. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
    8.204(a)(1)(B), (C).)
    20
    Plaintiffs argue the 5M Project is inconsistent with “East SoMa Area Plan
    Policy 7.1,” which they contend requires height and building intensity limits for new
    developments which would preserve the existing scale. Forest City assumes this is a
    reference to the Draft Central SoMa Plan because there is no “Policy 7.1” in the East
    SoMa Area Plan. For reasons discussed above, the East SoMa Area Plan does not apply
    to the 5M Project, and plaintiffs do not address this issue further on reply.
    33
    Plaintiffs further argue the 5M Project exceeds the height and intensity limits for
    the SoMa Youth and Family Special Use District (SUD), Residential/Service Mixed Use
    (RSD), and Downtown Support (C-3-S) zoning districts, and complain the project is
    “made to appear to be consistent with surrounding zoning” even though it is not. The
    record reflects, however, that the EIR disclosed that the 5M Project would require
    amendments to the general plan, the rezoning of portions of the site, and modification of
    existing development standards. The DEIR described the existing land use, bulk and
    height requirements on the project site, and compared existing planning controls to those
    proposed as part of the project. Plaintiffs have not shown how this discussion was
    misleading or inhibited informed decisionmaking or public participation.
    Nor are we convinced by plaintiffs’ argument the DEIR does not contain any
    meaningful discussion of the project’s consistency with the Draft Central SoMa Plan. As
    its “draft” designation suggests, the Draft Central SoMa Plan had not been approved at
    the time of the EIR, and thus the EIR was not required to consider it. (See Chaparral
    Greens v. City of Chula Vista (1996) 
    50 Cal.App.4th 1134
    , 1145, fn. 7 (Chaparral)
    [“applicable” plan within meaning of Guidelines, § 15125, subd. (d) is plan that has
    already been adopted and thus legally applies to project; draft plans need not be
    evaluated].) Regardless, the DEIR compared the 5M Project with the Draft Central
    SoMa Plan and concluded it “generally implements the vision of the Central SoMa Plan”
    and “would not be expected to conflict with [it],” while noting the 5M Project would not
    be subject to the Central SoMa Plan. Moreover, though plaintiffs complain about the
    EIR’s failure to divulge the Project’s inconsistencies with the Draft Central SoMa Plan,
    plaintiffs themselves do not identify any.
    We also find unpersuasive plaintiffs’ general complaint that the inconsistencies
    with area plans and policies are so extensive as to amount to “spot zoning.” “The essence
    of spot zoning is irrational discrimination. [Citation.] . . . ‘ “Spot zoning occurs where a
    small parcel is restricted and given lesser rights than the surrounding property, as where a
    lot in the center of a business or commercial district is limited to uses for residential
    purposes thereby creating an ‘island’ in the middle of a larger area devoted to other
    34
    uses. . . .” ’ ” (Avenida San Juan Partnership v. City of San Clemente (2011)
    
    201 Cal.App.4th 1256
    , 1268–1269.) On reply, plaintiffs concede the term “spot zoning”
    was not meant in a “strict legal sense,” but as a “colloquial term” for the project’s
    inconsistency with surrounding land uses.
    Finally, plaintiffs raise a number of purported inconsistencies with the current
    zoning regulations, the City’s “Transit-First Policy,” the San Francisco Planning Code,
    and shadow limits on Boeddeker Park. Plaintiffs’ contentions that (1) the provision of
    parking spaces was inconsistent with the Transit-First Policy, and (2) the wind impacts
    are inconsistent with criterion established in the Planning Code, were not raised during
    the administrative process or in the trial court, and are therefore waived.21 As to the
    remainder of the issues listed in bullet-point fashion, plaintiffs fail to provide reasoned
    argument to support their points (and in some cases citations to the record), and
    accordingly, we summarily reject them.22
    “ ‘CEQA requires an EIR to reflect a good faith effort at full disclosure; it does not
    mandate perfection, nor does it require an analysis to be exhaustive.’ ” (Chaparral,
    supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1145.) The administrative record here reflects the City made
    a good faith effort to discuss inconsistencies with the applicable general plans. Plaintiffs
    have not met their burden to demonstrate otherwise.
    8. Statement of Overriding Considerations
    Plaintiffs argue the statement of overriding considerations adopted by the City
    when approving the project is not supported by substantial evidence because the City
    improperly considered the benefits before considering feasible mitigation measures or
    alternatives. They also assert Forest City had the ability to configure the 5M Project so
    21
    Plaintiffs contend the issue of inconsistency with the City’s Transit-First Policy
    was raised by the Sierra Club in connection with the need to consider a zero-parking
    alternative, but plaintiffs did not assert the EIR was inadequate because it failed to
    disclose or analyze any inconsistency with the Transit-First Policy.
    22
    As to the changes in floor area ratio (FAR) requirements for the Downtown
    Support (C-3-S) zoning district, however, we note the DEIR discussed the changes that
    would be required if the project were approved.
    35
    as to avoid impacts to Boeddeker Park and Yerba Buena Gardens but the EIR failed to
    consider such an alternative.
    For several reasons, these arguments lack merit. First, the EIR did consider a no
    project alternative, which would have resulted in no new shadow impacts to Boeddeker
    Park and Yerba Buena Gardens, but rejected it because that alternative would not meet
    any of the project objectives except retention of the Chronicle Building and Dempster
    Printing Building. Second, as Forest City notes, the 5M Project was modified to
    substantially conform to the identified environmentally superior alternative. If there were
    no consideration of mitigation measures or alternatives, the revised project would not
    have been adopted. Finally, the statements plaintiffs cite in support of their argument
    regarding the “benefits” of the project were made by Commissioners Low and Levitan
    and Planning Director Rahaim during the hearing at which CEQA findings and the
    statement of overriding considerations were adopted—the precise point at which they
    were supposed to be weighing the benefits against the environmental impacts.
    (Guidelines, § 15093, subd. (a) [“CEQA requires the decision-making agency to balance,
    as applicable, the economic, legal, social, technological, or other benefits . . . of a
    proposed project against its unavoidable environmental risks when determining whether
    to approve the project.”].) Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the statement of
    overriding considerations was not supported by substantial evidence.
    III. DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are to recover their costs on appeal.
    36
    ____________________________
    Margulies, J.
    We concur:
    _____________________________
    Humes, P. J.
    _________________________
    Kelly, J.*
    A151521
    SOMCAN v. City and County of San Francisco
    *
    Judge of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, assigned
    by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
    37
    Filed 3/25/19
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    SOUTH OF MARKET COMMUNITY
    ACTION NETWORK et al.,
    Plaintiffs and Appellants,                 A151521
    v.                                                  (San Francisco City & County
    CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN                              Super. Ct. No. CPF-15-514691)
    FRANCISCO,
    ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION
    Defendant and Respondent;                  FOR PUBLICATION
    FOREST CITY CALIFORNIA
    RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT, INC.,                      [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
    et al.,
    Real Parties in Interest and
    Respondents.
    THE COURT:
    The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on February 22, 2019, was
    not certified for publication in the Official Reports. After the court’s review of a request
    under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120, and good cause established under
    rule 8.1105, it is hereby ordered that the opinion should be published in the Official
    Reports.
    There is no change in the judgment.
    Dated:
    ___________________________
    Margulies, Acting P.J.
    Trial Court: San Francisco City and County Superior Court
    Trial Judge: Hon. Garrett L. Wong
    Counsel:
    Provencher & Flatt, Rachel Mansfield-Howlett for Plaintiff and Appellants.
    Dennis Herrera, City Attorney and Audrey Pearson, Deputy City Attorney for
    Defendant and Respondent.
    Coblentz Patch Duffy & Bass, Jonathan R. Bass, Charmain G. Yu and Skye D. Langs for
    Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A151521

Filed Date: 3/25/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/26/2019