In re C.M. CA4/1 ( 2015 )

Filed 1/9/15 In re C.M. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re: C.M., et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEATH AND D066081
HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J518518)
v.
A.F. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Elizabeth A.
Riggs, Judge. Affirmed.
Clare M. Lemon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant, A.F.
Patti L. Dikes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant, C.M., Sr.
Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips and Lisa Maldonado,
Deputies County Counsel for the Plaintiff and Respondent.
A.F. (mother) and C.M., Sr. (father) appeal from an order terminating their
parental rights to their child C.M. and choosing adoption as the appropriate permanent
plan under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26. Asserting she maintained
frequent and consistent visitation with C.M. and thereby preserved her parent-child bond,
mother contends the juvenile court erred by declining to find C.M. would benefit from
continuing his relationship with her under the beneficial-relationship exception to
adoption preference. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Father joins in her contentions. We
conclude the juvenile court did not err by finding the beneficial relationship exception did
not apply. Accordingly, we affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Agency's Section 300 Petition and Amended Petition for C.M.
In September 2012, the San Diego Health and Human Services Agency (Agency)
filed a section 300 petition on behalf of then two-month-old C.M., alleging under section
300, subdivision (a) that father inflicted serious nonaccidental physical harm by
swaddling him and tying a blanket around his eyes so tight as to cause bruising to his
upper and lower eyelids, forehead, right cheek and tongue; a puncture wound to his left
foot; and a subconjunctival hemorrhage. Agency alleged that mother, who was then 16
years old, believed the child was not safe in father's care but did not protect him. Agency
1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise
specified.
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subsequently recommended C.M. be detained outside of his home, and the parents be
offered reunification services with supervised visits. The juvenile court ordered C.M.
detained with the Polinsky Child Center or an approved foster home, and gave the social
worker discretion to detain the child with a relative or nonrelative extended family
member. Mother and father visited C.M. consistently at Polinsky in September and early
October, and staff observed that mother nursed and fed him, was focused on him, and
was "very good" with him when he was crying and screaming. After C.M. was placed in
foster care, his foster mother observed during a scheduled visit that mother was loving
and attentive to C.M. and his needs.
In October 2012, Agency amended its petition to add allegations under section
300, subdivision (e) that C.M. suffered severe physical abuse from father, including
fractures to his ribs and upper arms, multiple bruises and tears to his upper and lower
frenula (the connection from upper and lower lips to gums) and under section 300,
subdivision (i) that he suffered from father's acts of cruelty. C.M. was detained in a
licensed foster home. In a report for an October 16, 2012 jurisdiction/disposition hearing,
Agency stated that father admitted causing C.M.'s injuries due to his frustration and lack
of patience, and mother was aware C.M. was being bound and blindfolded but denied
knowledge of the extent of his injuries and was unable to stop father from abusing the
child or leave to protect him. It reported that father was arrested on October 4, 2012, and
charged with 10 counts of felony child cruelty, and it recommended that due to the
severity of the physical abuse, mother and father not be offered reunification services but
mother have supervised visits and father be subject to a no-contact order. On October 16,
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2012, the juvenile court ordered C.M. detained in a licensed foster home, and Agency to
provide mother voluntary reunification services.
Mother's Reunification Efforts and Compliance with Case Plan
In early November 2012, Agency recommended mother be offered reunification
services with continued supervised visitation. C.M. was placed with a paternal great
uncle and aunt. Mother had been attending weekly parenting classes with her own
mother and had twice-a-week visits with C.M. since mid-October that were loving and
positive, with mother attentive to C.M. and his needs: soothing, rocking and playing with
him appropriately. She was referred to individual therapy. Father was incarcerated.
Agency noted that mother was only 15 years old when she gave birth to C.M., and her
judgment was affected by her life inexperience, immaturity and undeveloped thinking. It
also observed mother had a long history of significant exposure to domestic violence
between her own mother and father as recently as 2010 and 2011, and she exhibited many
of the abnormal conditions associated with such trauma, which included posttraumatic
stress, physiological problems and negative brain development in young children; and in
teenagers, a tendency to enter into violent relationships, mental health issues and
substance abuse problems.2 Agency stated her judgment was impaired as a result.
Agency expressed concern that mother did not have the knowledge and experience to
connect C.M.'s nonaccidental bruising as an action of severe physical abuse, she may not
2 Throughout the reunification process, mother told Agency that she did not wish to
reunify in her own mother's home; that it was an inappropriate place for C.M. to live. As
of February 2014, neither mother's mother nor sister was approved to supervise visits.
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be able to assess physical abuse behaviors in future relationships, and such relationships
could place C.M. at risk for future harm. However, it observed mother had previously
engaged in some protective actions, and because she had positive interactions with C.M.,
consistent visitation and was able to participate in services, it planned to offer her
structured and intensive parent education and individual therapy, and recommended
family reunification services.
Mother's case plan was updated in April 2013. Mother's therapist had reported to
Agency that mother was "stuck" and making choices that did not keep herself safe and
did not demonstrate her ability to keep C.M. safe. Mother was ambivalent about her
ongoing relationship with father, and told her therapist she knew if he was released she
would go back to him right away. The therapist recommended discontinuing individual
therapy and that mother attend a 52-week child physical abuse psychotherapy group.
Agency recommended that mother undergo a psychiatric medication evaluation as she
had reported having visual hallucinations for several months. Mother was presently on
Zoloft, which was prescribed by a physician. She was referred to a psychiatrist but
missed the appointment.
In a May 2013 six-month review hearing status report, Agency recommended
mother's reunification services be terminated and that C.M. remain in out-of-home care
with his paternal aunt. It reported that then 9-month-old C.M. was healthy, happy, well-
adjusted, and very comfortable in the care of his paternal aunt and her family. He was
also very comfortable with mother, responding positively when he saw her by smiling
and moving animatedly. However, though mother had completed a parent education
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class, participated in individual therapy and engaged in supervised visits with C.M. with
safe, positive and loving interactions, she had not made the necessary substantial progress
in therapy to address the protective risks to C.M. Specifically, mother was in contact
with father and his sister, sharing pictures and updates about C.M., and though she knew
father was subject to a criminal protective order barring contact with her, she was
planning a birthday party with father's mother around the time of father's release from
jail, and exhibited a "cavalier, carefree demeanor" about her plans, expressing confidence
in father's remorse. Mother became angry when the therapist sought to address the issue,
and told her she would not return. Mother had intimated to an Agency worker and her
therapist that she planned to have a relationship with father, made assumptions he was
safe around C.M., and she put her own unmet emotional needs ahead of her and C.M.'s
safety. Mother then denied having those feelings about father after his release from
prison. Mother also reported to her therapist that she had been forcibly raped in her own
home by a 18- or 19-year-old man she met on the trolley to whom she gave her contact
information, but was unwilling to pursue charges. Mother declined to return to individual
therapy and had stopped her medication for a period of time, which resulted in her
exhibiting erratic behavior.
Agency reported that when asked to process the connection between C.M.'s
trauma and her recent assault, mother "shut down," and was unwilling to address how her
behavior impacts her or C.M. She had a pattern of rejecting people who challenged her
to improve her decisionmaking, and did not follow through with her therapist's
recommendation for a medication evaluation and monitoring by a psychiatrist. Based in
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part on mother's dangerous judgment, Agency concluded mother had not demonstrated
any ability to protect herself from harm, and, in turn, could not protect C.M. She had not
increased her protective capacities with regard to assessing physically abusive behaviors
in her future relationships that could potentially place C.M. at risk for future harm, she
lacked motivation to address those issues, and she had not made the necessary behavioral
changes and thinking conducive to increased safety for C.M. over time. Agency
recommended a section 366.26 hearing be set to determine a permanent plan for C.M.
Mother began seeing a new therapist in April 2013.
In August 2013, Agency reported in an addendum report that mother's new
therapist told Agency that mother's progress in meeting her parenting, protection, safety
and independence goals was still very slow; mother having met only two of seven goals.
Mother's visits with C.M. remained supervised as she had not been able to demonstrate
over time that she would be able to protect him from unsafe associations or actions from
others. Agency acknowledged mother's slow progress in addressing the risk factors
affecting C.M.'s safety, but pointed out she positively engaged in individual therapy and
she consistently attended her child abuse treatment class, as well as her medication
management appointments. Mother reported being compliant with her psychotropic
medication. Given that progress, Agency recommended that mother continue to receive
services until the 12-month review date. The court vacated the 6-month review hearing
and set the matter for a 12-month review hearing; ordered that mother continue
reunification services; and ordered Agency to assist her in becoming independent, assess
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an appropriate living situation, and explore emancipation. In September 2013, the court
appointed a special advocate (CASA) for C.M.
As of early October, mother's new individual therapist reported to Agency that
mother, who was then 17 years old, was "not capable of taking care of herself leave alone
a toddler." Mother had stopped going to school and gave her therapist differing stories
about her future plans for school or independence. Mother also admitted throwing
temper tantrums and destroying things when she did not get her way; the therapist
observed that some of her behaviors were normal but some mimicked the domestic
violence relationship she witnessed with her own parents, and she felt mother had a lot of
unresolved issues with the trauma she was subjected to, combined with typical teenage
behavior.
In November 2013, C.M.'s CASA reported that 1-year-old C.M. was thriving and
flourishing in his placement with the relative caregiver, who had a good relationship with
mother and coached her in caregiving skills. Mother had missed two therapy sessions
with her therapist, who would terminate her if she missed one more session. Mother was
not contributing information during her child abuse prevention class, only drawing or
doodling throughout. She was still living in her mother's home, which Agency
determined was not safe for C.M. Mother's visits with C.M. were positive, and she
engaged in the full range of caregiving activities, and played with C.M. in a warm and
engaging manner, but the CASA recommended her visits remain supervised until mother
had a transportation plan and took greater initiative in independent living. The CASA
described mother's progress as slow, and the fact she was a nondependent,
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nonemancipated youth had prevented her from receiving the community-based services
referred to in her case plan. The CASA recommended that mother receive reunification
services to the 18-month review hearing, with increased visits as deemed appropriate.
Agency, however, in status review and addendum reports for the 12-month review
hearing, recommended that mother's reunification services be terminated and a section
366.26 hearing be set, with continued supervised visits. It observed that while mother's
one-on-one interactions with C.M. were very positive, engaging and safe, she had not
been able to demonstrate that her past trauma would no longer negatively impact her
decisionmaking, that she had developed new thinking, that she could take action to
protect herself and C.M. from physical harm, or that she had a plan for C.M.'s future
safety and well-being. Mother was not fully participating in services, she displayed very
dangerous judgment in inviting the man who assaulted her into her home, and she was
planning to move in with a man who she identified as a family friend but did not know a
lot about, which was naïve and risky behavior. Mother lacked the ability to follow
through on appointments (having several unapproved absences from her child abuse
group sessions, and missing seven therapy sessions), and made excuses and placed blame
on others. She had not seen her psychiatrist since July 2013, though the doctor required
minors to see her monthly. She demonstrated no ability to care for herself much less a
vulnerable young child.
In February 2014, Agency reported that in January 2014, police found mother and
father together reclining in a car watching a movie, and father was arrested for violating a
protective order requiring him to stay away from mother. When confronted with the
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situation, mother "shrugged her shoulders." She had no explanation other than father
wanted to talk to her and she did not feel anything was wrong with that, and she denied
knowing about a restraining order. Agency observed that in December, Mother had
cancelled an individual therapy appointment and was not attending all of her child abuse
group sessions. Mother lacked progress in her plan for independent living. Mother
started seeing a new therapist. Agency did not change its prior recommendation to
terminate reunification services. In an addendum report, Agency observed that mother
had been participating in services for approximately 16 months but had not demonstrated
she was mature enough or capable of achieving independence or caring for herself, did
not consistently attend school, and was on her third therapist as a result of continued
absences. Mother continued to place blame on others for her absences or missed visits
and appointments. It concluded that mother had been given a significant amount of time
to make substantial progress but did not, and that C.M. deserved permanency. Agency
again recommended that the court terminate reunification services and set a section
366.26 hearing.
That same month, C.M.'s CASA likewise recommended that mother's
reunification services be terminated and a section 366.26 hearing be set. In addition to
mother's January 2014 meeting with father, the CASA noted that mother had missed over
three weeks of school in late December 2013 and early January 2014 then stopped going
altogether, and she had been unable to find employment. C.M. continued to thrive in the
caregiver's home, and mother visited with him twice a week, playing with him in an
engaging and appropriate way. C.M. had a "healthy attachment with his caregiver and
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with [mother]," and the CASA recommended that he remain placed there with supervised
visits between him and mother. The CASA expressed "greatest concern" in mother's
"ability to stand firm in her resolve to not meet with [father]," observing that while
mother realized it was a mistake and did not want father to have contact with C.M., she
nevertheless voluntarily met with him in disregard of the restraining order.
Contested 12-Month Review Hearing
At the February 11, 2014 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court ordered
C.M.'s continued placement in the caregiver's home. It found mother had not made
substantive progress with her case plan, and it terminated mother's reunification services,
ordered Agency to prepare an assessment, and set a section 366.26 hearing for June 2014.
Social worker Ernesto Escobar prepared Agency's June 2014 section 366.26
assessment report. He recommended that the court terminate parental rights and establish
a permanent plan of adoption. He reported visiting C.M. on a monthly basis and
observed C.M. was happy and well attached to his caregiver, and sought her out for
comfort and soothing. Escobar recounted the history of mother's contacts with C.M., and
his observations after supervising two one-hour visits between mother and C.M. on April
22, 2014, and May 8, 2014. At the first visit, C.M. greeted mother cordially, and they
played together throughout the visit; mother was attentive and C.M. laughed out loud
while they jumped in a trampoline and smiled during their play. While mother and C.M.
watched cartoons, the caregiver informed Escobar that mother visited consistently once
or twice a week, staying three or four hours at a time, and sometimes accompanied the
caregiver and C.M. to run errands. When mother left, C.M. waved goodbye and was
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picked up by the caregiver. C.M. showed no distress or anxiety at being separated from
mother.
At the second visit, mother arrived on time and sat on the floor to play with C.M.
They played, watched cartoons, and she read children's books to him. When Escobar and
mother left, C.M. waved goodbye from the caregiver's arms, and likewise did not show
anxiety or distress from his separation from mother.
Escobar assessed C.M. as highly adoptable given his age and good health, and his
caregiver relatives were very interested in adopting him. He reported a high likelihood
they would be approved for his adoption, but that there were 126 families with approved
home studies willing to adopt a child like him. Though mother engaged in consistent
supervised visits with C.M., engaging actively with him by reading, playing and singing,
and C.M. apparently enjoyed playing with her, it was Escobar's opinion that their
relationship was more consistent with a playmate relationship than a parent-child
relationship. C.M. still related to his caregiver as his primary maternal figure,
without asking for his mother or crying when she left. He stated if parental rights
were terminated, C.M. would suffer "very minimal detriment from the permanent
separation . . . .", which he observed might only be a technicality considering the good
relationship between the caregiver and mother, and the caregivers' willingness to allow
her to be involved in C.M.'s life. Escobar described C.M. as being in a good position, in
a safe placement with caregivers who had been giving him love and nurturing him since
his November 2012 placement with them. According to Escobar, permanency was
preserved in C.M.'s current placement and adoption would ensure it; the possible
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detriment caused by the termination of parental rights was outweighed by the need for
permanency in C.M.'s life. Thus, Escobar stated it was in C.M.'s best interest that the
court terminate parental rights and establish a permanent plan of adoption for C.M.
C.M.'s CASA also recommended that parental rights be terminated and adoption
be selected as the permanent plan. She found C.M. to be socially engaged, with a big
smile and a love for play. She observed he called his caregivers "mama" and "dada" and
appeared to have a strong emotional connection with them. He liked his caregiver's
attention and would speak to her or bring her a toy to engage, and willingly went to her
husband to be picked up and fed. C.M. routinely interacted with the older boys and they
treated him like a brother. The CASA stated the caregivers had provided a safe,
nurturing home for C.M., were willing to adopt C.M., planned on completing adoption
classes, and were willing to do whatever necessary to facilitate the adoption process. She
observed mother and C.M.'s interactions to be warm and engaging with positive physical
interactions, but mother admitted to the CASA that adoption was best for C.M., though it
was hard for her to accept. Because C.M. was thriving physically, emotionally, and
developmentally in his placement, the CASA felt a placement change would cause
significant trauma, and she recommended he remain placed with his caregivers, who had
strong family connections and offered C.M. nuclear and extended family relationships.
The CASA pointed out that father was never offered reunification services, he was
currently incarcerated, and protective orders precluded him from having visitation with
C.M. Though the CASA acknowledged C.M. had a good relationship with mother, the
CASA pointed out her reunification services were terminated in February 2014, that C.M.
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deserved a permanent family who could provide a loving and a stable home, and that
adoption was in his best interest.
Section 366.26 Hearing
At the section 366.26 hearing, the trial court read and considered social worker
Escobar's section 366.26 assessment report, the CASA's report, and father's stipulated
testimony that he loved C.M., wanted to do whatever it took to change and be the father
C.M. needed, and did not want his son adopted. Mother's counsel argued the parent-child
bond exception should apply based on the quality and quantity of mother's visits with
C.M. Agency's counsel argued that even assuming a significant relationship existed
between mother and C.M., the detriment of severing the relationship had to be weighed
against the plan of adoption because of the benefit C.M. would receive from adoption.
The court found by clear and convincing evidence there would be no detriment to
severing the parent-child relationship, that C.M. was likely to be adopted, that adoption
was in C.M.'s best interest, and it was the appropriate plan for him. Adopting the June
2014 recommendations by Agency and the CASA, it terminated all parental rights of
mother and father.
Mother and father filed these appeals from the order terminating their parental
rights.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
At a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court determines a
permanent plan of care for a dependent child, which may include adoption. (In re S.B.
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(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 296; In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 50.) "If the
dependent child is adoptable, there is strong preference for adoption over alternative
permanency plans." (In re S.B., at p. 297; In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580,
588.) Under section 366.26, if parents have failed to reunify with a child, and the
juvenile court determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is likely the child will
be adopted, the court "shall terminate parental rights and order the child be placed for
adoption." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)
In order to avoid termination of parental rights and adoption, a parent must show
that one or more of the statutory exceptions to termination of parental rights set forth in
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) or (B) apply. (In re Scott B. (2010) 188
Cal.App.4th 452, 469.) The exceptions permit the court, "in exceptional circumstances,"
"to choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption." (In re Celine R.
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53; see also In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350
["Because a section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the court has repeatedly found the
parent unable to meet the child's needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that
preservation of the parent's rights will prevail over the Legislature's preference for
adoptive placement."].) The so-called parental benefit exception applies when there is "a
compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would be
detrimental to the child due to . . . the following circumstances: [¶] . . . The parents
have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i), italics added.) This
court construes the "benefit" necessary to trigger this exception to mean that "the
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relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the
well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In
other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child
relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new
family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the
child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly
harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not
terminated." (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575; see also In re C.F.
(2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555.)
The parent asserting the exception has the burden of proving it by a preponderance
of the evidence. (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 529.) The parent will not meet
his or her burden by showing the existence of a "friendly and loving relationship," an
emotional bond with the parent, or pleasant, even frequent, visits. (Ibid.; In re C.F.,
supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 555; In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-
1419.) There must be a parental role in the child's life, resulting in a significant, positive
emotional attachment from the child to parent that if severed would result in harm to the
child. (In re C.F., at p. 555; In re Elizabeth M. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 318, 324; see also
In re J.C., at p. 529 [observing that interaction between a natural parent and child will
always confer some incidental benefit to the child and for the exception to apply, " 'a
parental relationship is necessary[.]' "].)
We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issue of the
existence of a beneficial parental relationship, and the abuse of discretion standard to the
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determination of whether there is a compelling reason for finding that termination would
be detrimental to the child. (In re J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 530-531; In re K.P.
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622; In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308,
1314-1315.) The latter determination "calls for the juvenile court to determine the
importance of the relationship in terms of the detrimental impact that its severance can be
expected to have on the child and to weigh that against the benefit to the child of
adoption . . . ." (In re J.C., at p. 531.)
II. Mother Did Not Meet Her Burden to Establish the Beneficial Relationship Exception
We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by concluding
termination of the parent-child relationship would not be detrimental to C.M., and that the
benefit of C.M.'s adoption by his caregivers outweighed the potential harm caused by the
termination of parental rights. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
There is no dispute that the record shows mother had consistent twice weekly
visits with C.M., and that her visits were appropriate and positive. Mother was loving
and attentive to C.M.'s needs and cooked, fed, changed, bathed and played with him;
soothing and comforting him appropriately. She participated in child massage sessions
and C.M.'s swimming lessons at the caregiver's invitation. However, as stated, regular,
loving visits, without a more significant positive attachment between parent and child, are
not enough. (In re C.F., supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 555; In re Beatrice M., supra, 29
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1418-1419; see also In re L.S., Jr. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1199;
In re I.R. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 201, 213; In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th
635, 642-643.)
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Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's conclusion that despite her
emotional bond to C.M., mother did not establish that their relationship " 'promotes [his]
well-being . . . to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being [C.M.] would gain in a
permanent home with new, adoptive parents.' " (In re K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p.
621, quoting In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) The record does not
establish mother's bond with C.M. constituted a substantial positive emotional
attachment, or the requisite parental bond, such that severing the natural parent-child
relationship would greatly harm C.M. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p.
575.) Mother cites no evidence that the termination of her relationship with C.M. would
be detrimental to C.M. or that their relationship conferred benefits to C.M. more
significant than the permanency and stability offered by adoption. C.M. easily separated
from mother at the conclusion of visits, and there is no bonding study or other evidence
to counter Agency's conclusion that C.M. would experience "very minimal detriment"
from permanent separation and termination of parental rights, and that any possible
detriment was outweighed by C.M.'s need for permanency. (Accord, In re J.C., supra,
226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 533-534; In re C.F., supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 557.)
Here, C.M., who had been removed from mother and father's care when he was
only two months old, was thriving in his placement, looked to his caregivers for primary
comfort and care, referred to them as "mama" and "dada," and was observed to have a
strong emotional connection with them. Even if we were to assume there was evidence
that mother and C.M. had a parent-child relationship, mother did not establish further that
C.M. would be greatly harmed (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575) by
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terminating her parental rights. Mother ignores the evidence that despite reunification
services provided to her, she could not fulfill her parenting and other individual goals
including schooling, compliance with psychotropic medication and other care, and
becoming independent from her living situation with her own mother, which was
inappropriate for C.M. Mother made a decision to invite a man into her home who
assaulted her, and she contacted father after his release from jail, which showed poor
choices and judgment as well as an inability to stay away from unsafe associations and
situations. Importantly, as a result, mother's visits with C.M. never progressed beyond
the need for supervision. (Accord, In re K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 622; In re
G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1166.)
Ultimately, Agency and C.M.'s CASA concluded that C.M. was doing well in the
home of his caregivers, who were committed to adopting him and who were meeting all
of his emotional, medical and developmental needs. Agency's social workers believed
C.M. needed a safe, stable and permanent home with parents who could meet his needs,
and he should not have to wait for permanency. The juvenile court was entitled to credit
the assessments and conclusions of the social workers and the CASA. (In re Casey D.,
supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 53.) In view of this and the evidence recited above, we
uphold the juvenile court's conclusion that no beneficial relationship existed such that
termination of mother's parental rights would be detrimental to C.M.
Father's sole position is that if we reverse the order terminating parental rights as
to mother, we must likewise reverse the order as to him and remand the matter to conduct
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a new section 366.26 hearing to select a different permanent plan. As we have upheld the
order as to mother, father has shown no basis to reverse the order as to his parental rights.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
O'ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, Acting P. J.
AARON, J.
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