People v. Dawkins ( 2018 )


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  • Filed 6/18/18
    CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION *
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    A150774
    v.
    JEROME DION DAWKINS,                               (San Mateo County
    Super. Ct. Nos. SC084122A,
    Defendant and Appellant.                   16-NF-002698-A)
    A jury convicted defendant Jerome Dion Dawkins of stalking, false imprisonment,
    criminal threats, lewd acts upon a child, and indecent exposure based on two incidents
    during which he harassed passengers on Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) trains. After
    finding true various prior-conviction allegations, the trial court sentenced Dawkins to
    25 years in prison.
    On appeal, Dawkins claims that (1) venue for the indecent-exposure offense was
    not proper in San Mateo County because he committed the offense while the train was in
    Contra Costa County; (2) his constitutional rights were violated when the jury was
    inadvertently provided with a printout of his criminal history (rap sheet); and (3) the trial
    court abused its discretion by striking only three of the four prior convictions that were
    the subject of his motion under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 
    13 Cal. 4th 497
    (Romero). In the published part of this opinion, we hold that venue was proper under the
    plain terms of Penal Code section 783, which pertains to offenses committed on various
    modes of transportation. We also reject Dawkins’s remaining contentions and affirm.
    *
    Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is
    certified for publication with the exception of parts II.B. and II.C.
    I.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
    BACKGROUND
    A.     The May 5, 2015 Incident.
    Around 6:00 a.m. on May 5, 2015, a 15-year-old girl, whom we shall refer to as
    E., boarded a BART train at the San Bruno station to go to school. She intended to
    disembark at the Civic Center station in San Francisco, but got on the wrong train and
    ended up going in the opposite direction, toward San Francisco International Airport
    (SFO).
    At the SFO station, E. stayed on the BART train as it reversed and began traveling
    toward San Francisco. She noticed a man in his 40’s or 50’s, whom she perceived to be
    homeless, lying on the seats across the aisle from her. They were the only people in the
    train car. The man, whom E. identified at trial as Dawkins, told her to look at him, but
    she did not comply. Then, reflected in the window, she saw Dawkins’s hand moving up
    and down inside his pants. He repeatedly called at her, trying to get her attention, and she
    began crying.
    Eventually, Dawkins tried to sit next to E., but her legs were blocking the area. He
    pushed her knee aside, sat down next to her, and said, “ ‘Look over here and stop
    crying.’ ” After he continued to move his hand inside his pants, E. switched seats, and
    Dawkins followed her and sat down in front of her. He then stuck out his leg to block her
    from moving again and said to her, “ ‘Shut up and stop crying like a little bitch.’ ”
    As they approached the Daly City station, E. got up to exit the train, and Dawkins
    followed her. As she was standing near the doors, waiting for the train to pull into the
    station, he gripped her shoulder and said “to come with him” because “he was going to
    make [her] pregnant.” E. then got off and boarded a more crowded train car, but
    Dawkins followed her. Raising his voice, he continued to tell her to “stop crying” and
    “acting like a little bitch.”
    2
    Dawkins got off the train at the Glen Park station. As he exited, he told E. “he
    was going to mess [her] up and make [her] pregnant.” She left the train at the 24th Street
    station, went to a relative’s home, and reported the incident to the police.
    A few days later, the police showed E. an array of six photographs, including one
    of Dawkins. She was not certain if the photograph of Dawkins was of the same person
    who had harassed her on the train, but she said that the man in the photograph had
    “sleepy” eyes similar to those of her harasser. She also said that a man in a different
    photograph had similar skin color and facial hair to that of her harasser, but she could not
    make a definitive identification.
    At trial, however, E. testified that Dawkins, not the other man whose photograph
    she had also noticed in the array, was the man who had harassed her on the BART train.
    She indicated she now knew that Dawkins was the perpetrator because of his teeth. On
    the train, she had observed that the man’s top row of teeth “was more likely missing” and
    his bottom teeth were yellow and rotten.
    B.     The May 6, 2015 Incident.
    Around 6:30 a.m. on May 6, 2015, the day after E. was victimized, a woman,
    whom we shall refer to as A., was with her one-year-old daughter. They boarded a
    BART train traveling toward Pittsburg-Bay Point at the Walnut Creek station, which is in
    Contra Costa County. The train car was “pretty empty,” and a man whom A. identified
    as Dawkins was seated near her. Dawkins switched seats but then moved back to his
    original seat, reclining so that his feet were facing toward A. After the train left the
    Pleasant Hill station, A. noticed Dawkins was making “a vertical motion” near his
    stomach, and she realized that “he had his entire penis out of the fly of . . . [his] jeans”
    and was staring at her while he masturbated.
    A. felt “stunned” and “immobilized,” but after about a minute, she stood up and
    called out to other passengers, “ ‘He has his penis out. He’s masturbating. He’s looking
    at me and my baby.’ ” She then asked Dawkins what he was doing, and he got up and
    moved into another car.
    3
    A different passenger called the station agent through the onboard call box. When
    the train stopped at the Concord station, which is also in Contra Costa County, a BART
    police officer boarded and spoke to A. She described the man who had been
    masturbating. The officer then located Dawkins, whose fly was unbuttoned, and pulled
    him off the train.
    C.       The Trial Court Proceedings.
    The San Mateo District Attorney charged Dawkins with multiple crimes as a result
    of these incidents. Based on the incident involving E., Dawkins was charged with a
    felony count of stalking, a felony count of making criminal threats, two felony counts of
    lewd or lascivious acts upon a child, and one misdemeanor count of false imprisonment. 1
    Based on the incident involving A., Dawkins was charged with a felony count of indecent
    exposure. 2 Dawkins was also alleged to have four prior strike convictions—one in 1987
    for burglary, one in 1991 for robbery, and two in 1995 for rape—and to have served four
    prior prison terms, three for the strike convictions and one for an October 2013 indecent-
    exposure conviction. 3 At trial, the parties stipulated that, in addition to the October 2013
    conviction, Dawkins had also been convicted of indecent exposure around April 2008
    and around December 2008.
    The jury found Dawkins guilty on all counts, and the trial court found true the
    prior-conviction allegations. The court then granted Dawkins’s Romero motion in part,
    striking the burglary and robbery convictions and one of the rape convictions. Dawkins
    was sentenced as a second-strike offender to a total term of 25 years in prison, composed
    of a six-year term for the count of making criminal threats, three consecutive 16-month
    terms for the two counts of lewd acts and the count of indecent exposure, and three
    1
    These charges were brought under Penal Code sections 646.9, subdivision (a)
    (stalking), 422, subdivision (a) (criminal threats), 288, subdivision (c)(1) (lewd acts), and
    236 (false imprisonment). All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    2
    This charge was brought under section 314, subdivision (1).
    3
    The strike allegations were made under sections 667 and 1170.12, and the prior-
    prison-term allegations were made under section 667.5, subdivision (b).
    4
    consecutive five-year terms for the prior strikes. Terms for the remaining counts and
    enhancements were imposed and stayed, except that the prior-prison-term findings were
    also stricken.
    II.
    DISCUSSION
    A.        San Mateo County Was a Proper Venue in Which to Try the Indecent-
    exposure Charge.
    Dawkins claims that he could not be prosecuted in San Mateo County for the
    offense involving A. because it clearly occurred in Contra Costa County. We are not
    persuaded.
    1.    Additional facts.
    Dawkins brought a motion to dismiss the indecent-exposure count on the basis that
    venue was not proper in San Mateo County. At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate
    “reluctantly” denied the motion, stating that she did not “understand San Mateo County’s
    interest in reaching into Contra Costa County and taking an offense that occurred entirely
    within their jurisdictional territory and prosecuting it here.” She concluded, however,
    that venue was proper in San Mateo County under section 783 because the BART train
    had passed through the county on its route.
    Dawkins later filed a motion under section 995 to dismiss the indecent-exposure
    count on the same ground, that venue was lacking, and the trial court denied it. He
    petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition, which we denied. Our state Supreme Court
    then denied his petition for review.
    2.    Discussion.
    Generally, under section 777, “the proper venue for the prosecution of a criminal
    offense is in the superior court of the county where the crime was committed.” (People v.
    Thomas (2012) 
    53 Cal. 4th 1276
    , 1281 (Thomas).) Venue “ ‘establishes the proper place
    for trial,’ ” but it does not affect a trial court’s personal or subject matter jurisdiction over
    a criminal action. (Id. at p. 1282.)
    5
    “There are statutory exceptions to the general rule that a crime should be
    prosecuted in the county where it is committed” 
    (Thomas, supra
    , 53 Cal.4th at p. 1283),
    including section 783, which is at issue here. Under that statute, when a crime is
    committed “on board . . . a railroad train or car . . . [or] common carrier transporting
    passengers,” venue lies “in any competent court, through, on, or over the jurisdictional
    territory of which the . . . train . . . [or] common carrier . . . passes in the course of its
    voyage or trip, or in the jurisdictional territory of which the voyage or trip terminates.”
    (§ 783; see also Thomas, at pp. 1281-1282.) “The words ‘jurisdictional territory’ . . . in
    [the] case of a superior court mean the county in which the court sits.” (§ 691, subd. (b).)
    In reviewing a ruling on a section 995 motion, we “ ‘ “in effect disregard[] the
    ruling of the superior court and directly review[] the determination of the magistrate
    holding the defendant to answer.” ’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Bell) (2002)
    
    99 Cal. App. 4th 1334
    , 1339.) “Venue is a question of law that is governed by statute.”
    
    (Thomas, supra
    , 53 Cal.4th at p. 1282.) “ ‘ “As in any case involving statutory
    interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to
    effectuate the law’s purpose.” ’ ” (People v. Scott (2014) 
    58 Cal. 4th 1415
    , 1421.) We
    first consider the statutory language, “ ‘ “giving [it] a plain and commonsense
    meaning.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “ ‘When [that] language . . . is clear, we need go no further.’
    [Citation.] But where a statute’s terms are unclear or ambiguous, we may ‘look to a
    variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be
    remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative
    construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) To the
    extent that Dawkins challenges the factual findings underlying the venue ruling, we
    uphold the ruling so long as there is “ ‘ “some evidence” ’ ” to support it. (Thomas, at
    p. 1283.)
    Here, the plain language of section 783 provides for venue in San Mateo County.
    At the preliminary hearing, two BART police officers testified that trains on the
    Pittsburg-Bay Point line generally originate in San Mateo County. Although the officers
    acknowledged the possibility that a train could be replaced somewhere along the line due
    6
    to a mechanical issue or some other problem, their testimony about the normal origin
    point of Pittsburg-Bay Point trains constituted sufficient evidence that the train on which
    Dawkins committed indecent exposure “passe[d]” “through, on, or over” San Mateo
    County “in the course of its voyage or trip.” 4 (§ 783.) Thus, contrary to Dawkins’s
    suggestion otherwise, there is no need to construe the statute’s reference to trips
    “terminat[ing]” in a superior court’s jurisdiction to include trips originating there. (Ibid.)
    Dawkins claims that despite its unambiguous language, section 783 was intended
    to apply only when the particular location of a crime is unknown. He relies on People v.
    Bradford (1976) 
    17 Cal. 3d 8
    (Bradford), in which the defendant robbed a bank in
    Ventura County and a highway patrol officer stopped him in the same county for
    speeding. (Id. at p. 13.) The defendant shot at the officer and another person, and a
    chase ensued, ending in a traffic accident in neighboring Los Angeles County. (Ibid.)
    The defendant’s accomplice then shot at two other officers. (Ibid.) After being convicted
    in separate trials in the two counties, the defendant appealed, claiming the proceedings
    had violated section 654’s prohibition of multiple prosecutions. (Bradford, at p. 13.) The
    determinative issue was whether joinder of the charges was prohibited, and thus multiple
    prosecutions were permitted, because Los Angeles County was not an appropriate
    alternate venue for the Ventura County offenses. (Id. at p. 14.)
    Framing the question as whether the Ventura County offenses could “be said to
    have occurred ‘on a . . . motor vehicle’ within the meaning of section 783,” the Supreme
    Court agreed with the People that venue did not lie in Los Angeles County because “the
    offenses were committed outside the vehicle at an identifiable spot along the highway.”
    
    (Bradford, supra
    , 17 Cal.3d at p. 15, italics added.) Construing section 783 “[i]n light of
    4
    It is unclear from the record where Dawkins boarded the train. The BART police
    officer who interviewed him after his arrest testified that Dawkins “said he got on the
    BART train at the Millbrae BART station,” took the train to the Pittsburg station, and
    “off-boarded the train because [Pittsburg is] the final destination, walked across the
    platform[,] and got on the [SFO]-bound train.” But Dawkins exposed himself to A. on a
    train that was traveling toward Pittsburg, not San Francisco, so this explanation of how he
    traveled to the Concord station that day is inconsistent or at least incomplete.
    7
    the federal constitutional right to a trial by a jury drawn from the vicinage in which the
    crime occurred,” 5 the Court determined that “section 783 must be held inapplicable
    where, as here, the location of the crime is readily identifiable.” (Bradford, at p. 17.)
    Dawkins seizes on this broadly worded holding, contending that under Bradford
    section 783 does not apply because it is clear he committed indecent exposure
    somewhere in Contra Costa County. But in Bradford the offenses occurred outside the
    car, and thus section 783 did not apply by its terms. 
    (Bradford, supra
    , 17 Cal.3d at
    p. 15.) In contrast, the offense here took place on a train that passed through San Mateo
    County on its trip. Although in Bradford the fact that the offenses occurred in a “readily
    identifiable” location also supported the result, the holding was consistent with
    section 783’s language. (Bradford, at pp. 15, 17.) In other words, the Supreme Court did
    not have to interpret section 783 in a manner that contradicted its plain meaning, as
    Dawkins would have us do here.
    We also disagree with Dawkins that interpreting section 783 to provide for venue
    in San Mateo County would violate his constitutional right to vicinage. As he
    acknowledges, subsequent cases cast doubt on Bradford’s reliance on the Sixth
    Amendment right to vicinage, which does not apply to the states through the Fourteenth
    Amendment. (See 
    Thomas, supra
    , 53 Cal.4th at p. 1288; Price v. Superior 
    Court, supra
    ,
    25 Cal.4th at p. 1065.) And while there is an implied right to vicinage under the state
    Constitution, it “ ‘constitutes simply the right of an accused to a trial by an impartial jury
    drawn from a place bearing some reasonable relationship to the crime in question.’ ”
    (People v. Clark (2016) 
    63 Cal. 4th 522
    , 555.) Dawkins contends that the BART train’s
    supposed departure from San Mateo County “sometime prior to the offense which was
    complete in Contra Costa” does not establish such a reasonable relationship, but he
    provides no authority for the contention. In light of section 783’s express provision for
    venue in any county through which a train passes on its trip, there was a sufficient
    5
    “ ‘[V]enue and vicinage are logically distinct concepts. Venue refers to the
    location where the trial is held, whereas vicinage refers to the area from which the jury
    pool is drawn.’ ” (Price v. Superior Court (2001) 
    25 Cal. 4th 1046
    , 1054.)
    8
    relationship between San Mateo County and the indecent-exposure offense such that
    Dawkins’s right to vicinage was not violated. (See People v. Chavarria (2013)
    
    213 Cal. App. 4th 1364
    , 1369 [state constitutional right to vicinage “is effectively
    vindicated upon a showing of proper venue”].)
    Dawkins claims that his position also finds support in the policy reasons for
    limiting venue that were articulated in People v. Simon (2001) 
    25 Cal. 4th 1082
    (Simon).
    Even if we could otherwise rely on policy justifications to interpret section 783 in a
    manner inconsistent with its text, those justifications do not support his claim.
    “First, ‘[v]enue in the place where the crime was committed promotes the
    convenience of both parties in obtaining evidence and securing the presence of
    witnesses.’ ” 
    (Simon, supra
    , 25 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) But Dawkins does not suggest how
    his ability to prepare his defense against the indecent-exposure charge was negatively
    affected by his being prosecuted in San Mateo County.
    Second, venue in the place where the crime occurred “ ‘vindicate[s] the
    community’s right to sit in judgment on crimes committed within its territory.’ ” 
    (Simon, supra
    , 25 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) But Dawkins’s only explanation for why this factor favors
    him is that “Contra Costa County declined to prosecute [the indecent-exposure] charge.”
    There is no indication this is true except for Dawkins’s counsel’s assertion to that effect
    in the section 995 motion. And even if it is true, Contra Costa County’s lack of interest
    in prosecuting the offense does not weigh against allowing San Mateo County to
    prosecute it.
    Finally, venue in the place where the crime happened limits the prosecution’s
    ability “to choose a setting that, for whatever reason, the prosecution views as favorable
    to its position or hostile or burdensome to the defendant’s.” 
    (Simon, supra
    , 25 Cal.4th at
    p. 1095.) Again, Dawkins does not show how this factor supports his position. It may be
    that the San Mateo County District Attorney had an interest in prosecuting the indecent-
    exposure offense, for which Dawkins was immediately apprehended, in the same
    proceeding with the other offenses, as to which his identity as the perpetrator was at
    issue. But the policy reason for restricting the prosecution’s ability to forum shop
    9
    involves the venue’s favorability or hostility (see ibid.), and Dawkins does not identify
    anything about San Mateo County itself (such as the characteristics of its jury pool) that
    could or did negatively impact his defense. Moreover, though he opposed the People’s
    motion to consolidate the indecent-exposure charge with the charges involving E.,
    claiming that “the People [were] trying to bolster their weaker . . . case . . . with a
    stronger . . . case,” on appeal he does not challenge the trial court’s ruling that joinder
    was proper.
    In short, neither the text of section 783, the right to vicinage, nor the policy
    reasons for limiting venue lead us to conclude that San Mateo County was an improper
    venue for bringing the indecent-exposure charge. As a result, Dawkins’s claim fails.
    B.     Dawkins Fails to Demonstrate any Prejudice Arising from the Jury’s
    Inadvertent Access to a Copy of His Rap Sheet.
    Dawkins also contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new
    trial after the jury was accidentally given his 20-page rap sheet. Although we recognize
    that it could easily be prejudicial for a jury to have improper access to a defendant’s rap
    sheet during deliberations, Dawkins has failed to demonstrate any prejudice here.
    1.      Additional facts.
    After the jury returned its verdict, the prosecutor discovered that Dawkins’s rap
    sheet, which was used as an exhibit for the People’s pretrial motion to admit Dawkins’s
    prior convictions, had accidentally been provided to the jury with the other trial exhibits.
    The rap sheet revealed that Dawkins was a registered sex offender and had arrests and
    convictions dating back to the early 1980’s for numerous crimes, including rape, sodomy,
    and other sexual offenses. His trial counsel conceded that there had been “no misconduct
    on the part of anybody in this matter” but argued that the rap sheet was “prejudicial on its
    face” and orally moved for a new trial. The trial court agreed with the prosecutor that it
    was appropriate to first question the jurors “to find out to what extent [they] reviewed
    [the rap sheet] and to what extent that affected their decision.”
    Upon being individually questioned, most of the jurors either denied reviewing
    the rap sheet or could not remember seeing it. Most of the jurors also agreed that the
    10
    topic of Dawkins’s criminal history had been discussed, but none of them recalled that
    topic being discussed in reference to the rap sheet or any evidence other than that
    presented at trial (namely, the stipulation that Dawkins had three previous convictions for
    indecent exposure).
    A hearing on the motion for a new trial was held several weeks later. The trial
    court denied the motion, explaining, “[I]t’s pretty clear that the jurors did not consider the
    evidence that was sent back there inadvertently” and the few who had looked at it “didn’t
    recognize what it was or realize it. It was never discussed among the jurors.” As a result,
    the court found that Dawkins had failed to demonstrate the required prejudice.
    2.      Discussion.
    A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by impartial and unbiased
    jurors. (U.S. Const., 6th and 14th Amends.; Cal Const., art. I, § 16; In re Hitchings
    (1993) 
    6 Cal. 4th 97
    , 110.) A juror’s “receipt of information about a party or the case that
    was not part of the evidence received at trial” undermines “ ‘the fundamental integrity of
    all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury’ ” and is grounds for
    granting a new trial. (People v. Nesler (1997) 
    16 Cal. 4th 561
    , 578-579; § 1181,
    subd. (2).)
    When, as here, “extrinsic evidence . . . finds its way into the jury room through
    party or court error,” we treat the problem as “ordinary trial error,” not juror misconduct.
    (People v. Gamache (2010) 
    48 Cal. 4th 347
    , 397-398.) Thus, the defendant has the
    burden of demonstrating prejudice. (Id. at p. 397.) We independently review the trial
    court’s denial of a new trial motion based on the jury’s receipt of outside information, but
    we “ ‘ “accept the . . . court’s credibility determinations and findings on questions of
    historical fact if supported by substantial evidence.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 396.)
    Although Dawkins recognizes his burden to demonstrate prejudice, he contends
    that prejudice should be assessed under Chapman v. California (1967) 
    386 U.S. 18
    , 24,
    because his claim implicates his federal constitutional rights to due process and an
    impartial jury. Our state Supreme Court has explained, however, that when “a jury
    innocently considers evidence it was inadvertently given, . . . [t]he situation is the same
    11
    as any in which the [trial] court erroneously admits evidence. . . . Such error is reversible
    only if it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have
    been reached in the absence of the error” under People v. Watson (1956) 
    46 Cal. 2d 818
    ,
    836. (People v. Cooper (1991) 
    53 Cal. 3d 771
    , 836; see also People v. 
    Gamache, supra
    ,
    48 Cal.4th at p. 399.)
    The trial court denied the motion for a new trial because it concluded that the
    jurors, most of whom had not even looked at the rap sheet, had not relied on it to reach
    the verdict. There was undoubtedly substantial evidence to support the court’s
    determination. All of the jurors claimed either not to have reviewed the rap sheet or not
    to have looked at it closely, and they all denied that the exhibit had played a role in any
    discussion of Dawkins’s criminal record. Based on its questioning of the jury, the court
    properly determined that a new trial was not warranted because the rap sheet had not
    affected the jury’s deliberations.
    In arguing otherwise, Dawkins contends that the testimony of Juror No. 11, who
    admitted to “ ‘thumb[ing] through’ ” the rap sheet but claimed not to have understood it,
    “is improbable and unworthy of belief.” Dawkins points to the facts that (1) when shown
    the rap sheet, another juror quickly recognized that it involved Dawkins’s criminal
    history, which Dawkins claims casts doubt on Juror No. 11’s claim not to have
    understood the document; and (2) Juror No. 11 was the only one to deny that the jury had
    discussed Dawkins’s criminal history, which Dawkins claims further undermines this
    juror’s credibility. We agree with the Attorney General, however, that these
    inconsistencies do not provide a basis for disregarding Juror No. 11’s testimony, much
    less “finding that the testimony affirmatively establishes something that [Juror No. 11]
    denied.” Given the jurors’ unanimous agreement that the rap sheet did not affect their
    deliberations, we cannot disturb the trial court’s ruling that Dawkins failed to
    demonstrate prejudice.
    Moreover, even if we were to assume that Juror No. 11 both reviewed and
    understood the rap sheet, we would conclude that it is not reasonably probable that
    Dawkins would have received a more favorable verdict in the absence of the extraneous
    12
    evidence. The jury was aware that Dawkins had three prior convictions for indecent
    exposure, and there was no real doubt that he committed the offense involving A. While
    E.’s initial identification was somewhat uncertain, by the time of trial she was sure that
    Dawkins was the perpetrator and specifically remembered his distinctive teeth. It was
    also suggestive that the offenses against her were committed the day before the offense
    involving A. Dawkins was not entitled to a new trial based on the jury’s accidental
    receipt of his rap sheet.
    C.     The Trial Court Did Not Err by Partially Denying Dawkins’s Romero
    Motion.
    Finally, Dawkins claims that the trial court abused its discretion by striking only
    three of the four prior convictions that his Romero motion covered. There was no error.
    1.      Additional facts.
    After the trial court found true that Dawkins had four prior strike convictions—in
    1987 for burglary, in 1991 for robbery, and in 1995 for two counts of rape, Dawkins
    asked the court to strike these convictions under Romero. Emphasizing that he otherwise
    faced life in prison, he urged the court “to strike at least one of his prior strikes.” He
    argued that the convictions were remote and, although he had “exhibited a ‘post-strike’
    record of drugs, indecent exposure, and other crimes, . . . nothing in the past 20 years
    involved physical assault or injury to another person.” He also noted his difficult life
    circumstances, including his homelessness and “lifelong” addition to crack cocaine.
    At the sentencing hearing, the trial court observed that “the bottom line issue,
    obviously, in this case, is whether the defendant should be sentenced as a three strikes
    case, which is an indeterminate sentence[,] or a two strikes case. [¶] The Court never
    really considered striking all the strikes and sentencing the defendant to a probationary
    sentence. I don’t think that this case or his record warrants that in any way, shape, or
    form.” Although “the recent offenses . . . [were] certainly extremely troubling,” they
    were “at least not as serious as the previous convictions.” Therefore, the court found it
    appropriate to strike the 1987 and 1991 convictions “due to [their] remoteness,” as well
    13
    as one of the 1995 convictions, resulting in Dawkins’s being sentenced as a second-strike
    offender.
    A trial court may, “in furtherance of justice” (§ 1385, subd. (a)), dismiss a finding
    that a defendant has a previous strike conviction. (People v. Carmony (2004) 
    33 Cal. 4th 367
    , 373; 
    Romero, supra
    , 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529-530.) We review the denial of a Romero
    motion for an abuse of discretion. (Carmony, at p. 374.) The “Three Strikes” law, which
    is “ ‘intended to restrict courts’ discretion in sentencing repeat offenders’ . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
    . . . creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to [its] sentencing
    norms is both rational and proper.” (Id. at pp. 377-378.) As a result, “a trial court will
    only abuse its discretion in failing to strike a prior felony conviction . . . in limited
    circumstances,” such as where it did not realize it had discretion to do so, where it
    “considered impermissible factors in declining to dismiss” the conviction, or where “ ‘the
    sentencing norms [of the Three Strikes law] . . . produce[] an “arbitrary, capricious[,] or
    patently absurd” result’ under the specific facts of a particular case.” (Id. at p. 378.)
    Dawkins claims that “the trial court’s reasons for striking one of the . . . rape
    convictions applied equally to the other rape charged in the same case, and . . . there was
    no rational reason to strike the one and not the other.” He points to his description of the
    facts underlying the two convictions in his sentencing brief, in which he claimed he was
    convicted of raping a single victim, a friend who was also a “hopeless crack addict[]. She
    had promised him sex in exchange for drugs, but . . . once the drugs were used up, she
    declined to follow through.” The trial court rejected this story as “very suspect and self-
    serving,” however, and observed that in light of the lack of official information about the
    offenses it simply did not know “what the facts were.” Dawkins identifies no authority
    suggesting that, to avoid an arbitrary result, a court must strike all similar convictions
    arising from an incident about which it has little information, and we decline to so hold.
    Dawkins also argues that his life circumstances establish he is “outside the spirit
    of the Three Strikes law.” It is hard to see what he has to complain about, however, since
    the trial court accepted the main point of his Romero motion and sentenced him as a two-
    strikes offender, allowing him to avoid a life term. In any event, his long criminal history
    14
    brought him well within the spirit of the statutory scheme (see People v. 
    Carmony, supra
    ,
    33 Cal.4th at p. 378), and we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by
    striking some but not all of his prior convictions.
    III.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    15
    ____________________________
    Humes, P.J.
    We concur:
    _____________________________
    Margulies, J.
    _____________________________
    Dondero, J.
    A150774
    People v. Dawkins
    16
    Trial Court:
    Superior Court of the County of San Mateo (Redwood City)
    Trial Judge:
    Hon. Barbara J. Mallach
    Counsel for Defendant and Appellant:
    Kathy R. Moreno; by appointment under the First District Appellate Project
    Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent:
    Xavier Becerra, Attorney General
    Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General
    Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General
    Catherine A. Rivlin, Supervising Deputy Attorney General
    Allan Yannow, Deputy Attorney General
    People v. Dawkins A150774
    17