Talega Village Center Community Assoc. v. Superior Court CA4/3 ( 2016 )


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  • Filed 5/18/16 Talega Village Center Community Assoc. v. Superior Court CA4/3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    TALEGA VILLAGE CENTER
    COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION,
    Petitioner,
    G051950
    v.
    (Super. Ct. No. 30-2013-00671155)
    THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE
    COUNTY,                                                                OPINION
    Respondent;
    STANDARD PACIFIC CORPORATION
    et al.,
    Real Parties in Interest.
    Original proceedings; petition for a writ of mandate/prohibition to
    challenge an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Gail Andrea Andler, Judge.
    Petition granted.
    Peters & Freedman, David M. Peters, Kennan A. Parker, Kyle E. Lakin and
    Zachary R. Smith for Petitioner.
    No appearance for Respondent.
    Green & Hall, Brian C. Plante, Nicole E. Bartz and Robert L. Green for
    Real Parties in Interest.
    Gemmill, Baldridge & Yguico and Carlos V. Yguico for Professional
    Warranty Service Corporation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest.
    *         *           *
    In this writ proceeding the petitioner challenges the enforcement of an
    arbitration provision contained in the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)
    of a residential development. The arbitration provision is contained in an exhibit to the
    CC&Rs entitled “Home Builder’s Limited Warranty,” which, according to the CC&Rs,
    becomes enforceable when “issued.” There is no evidence in the record that it ever
    issued. Accordingly, the trial court erred by enforcing the arbitration provision.
    FACTS
    Talega Village Center is a residential development consisting of 302
    residential units, together with association property and common areas, located in San
    Clemente. Petitioner Talega Village Center Community Association (the HOA) is the
    governing body for the development. Real Party in Interest Standard Pacific Corporation
    (Standard Pacific) was the developer and declarant of the CC&Rs. Real Party in Interest
    Talega Associates, LLC, is an entity related to Standard Pacific that was involved in the
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    1
    development. Talega Village Center was built and sold in the 2003-2005 time frame.
    Standard Pacific recorded the CC&Rs in 2003 at a time when it controlled the
    homeowner’s association entirely.
    2
    In September 2013 the HOA filed its first amended complaint against
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    defendants, alleging four causes of action: violation of SB800 construction standards,
    strict liability (developer), negligence, strict liability (product). “Class
    Action/Construction Defect” is stated on the face page of the complaint. The HOA
    brought the action on its own behalf and on behalf of “all persons having an ownership
    interest in a condominium unit at the Project.” The complaint alleges a litany of defects
    in the construction of the development.
    In response, defendants filed a petition to compel arbitration, seeking to
    enforce the arbitration provisions of the CC&Rs, and in particular the “Home Builder’s
    Limited Warranty, which is administered by the Professional Warranty Service
    Corporation . . . .”
    The arbitration provisions in the CC&Rs are set forth in various sections
    and exhibits. Section 12.4.1 of the CC&Rs states, “Any Dispute, as defined in Exhibit G,
    entitled ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution Provisions’ . . . , shall be governed by and
    resolved in accordance with the ADR Provisions.” Exhibit G to the CC&Rs, entitled
    “Alternative Dispute Resolution Provisions,” provides in part, “WITH RESPECT TO
    ALL DISPUTES, DECLARANT, OWNERS, AND THE ASSOCIATION SHALL
    COMPLY WITH THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND ARBITRATION
    1
    For ease of reading, real parties in interest are hereafter referred to as
    defendants, their lower court designation.
    2
    The original complaint is not in the record.
    3
    SB800 refers to the legislation that enacted Civil Code sections 895 through
    945.5, popularly known as the Right to Repair Act. (Civil Code, § 895 et seq.: Sen. Bill
    No. 800 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.).)
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    PROCEDURES AND PROVISIONS SPECIFIED IN THE HOME WARRANTY OR
    THE ASSOCIATION PROPERTY WARRANTY, WHICHEVER IS
    APPLICABLE . . . . [Citation.] The Association acknowledges and agrees that the
    Home Warranty and the Association Property Warranty forms to be issued have been
    made available to the Association for review, that the Association has made such review
    of the Home Warranty and the Association Property Warranty and the dispute resolution
    procedures specified therein as the Association deems necessary and appropriate, and that
    the Association consents to participation in such procedures for resolution of Disputes.”
    (Italics added.)
    Under exhibit G, the alternative dispute resolution provisions, arbitration
    vis-à-vis the home warranty is the primary method of resolving disputes. It is not,
    however, the only method. Exhibit G contains “SECONDARY ALTERNATIVE
    DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES,” which apply “TO THE EXTENT ANY OF
    THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION OR ARBITRATION PROCEDURES AND
    PROVISIONS SPECIFIED IN THE HOME WARRANTY OR THE ASSOCIATION
    PROPERTY WARRANTY . . . ARE DETERMINED TO BE UNENFORCEABLE IN
    WHOLE OR IN MATERIAL PART . . . , OR TO THE EXTENT A DISPUTE ARISES
    WITH AN OWNER WHO DID NOT RECEIVE A HOME WARRANTY. . . .” The
    secondary procedure is simply arbitration by Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services
    (JAMS), “or any other entity offering judicial reference dispute resolution procedures as
    may be mutually acceptable to the parties to the Dispute, pursuant to its standard
    arbitration procedures for construction matters.” There is yet a third method of
    resolution, should the foregoing be deemed unenforceable, which is “a general judicial
    reference pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 638(a) and 640-
    645.2 . . . .” Defendants’ petition to compel arbitration, however, specifically requested
    enforcement of the arbitration provisions “pursuant to the Home Builder’s Limited
    Warranty, which is administered by the Professional Warranty Service Corporation . . . .”
    4
    The reader must return to the CC&Rs for the definition of the home
    warranty and association property warranty. Section 12.5 of the CC&Rs states, “The
    form Home Builder’s Limited Warranty attached to this Declaration as Exhibit H
    contains provisions which apply to both Condominiums and Association Property in the
    Properties. Those provisions of the Home Builder’s Limited Warranty that pertain to
    Condominiums shall be referred to as a ‘Home Warranty.’ Persons who receive from
    Declarant a Home Warranty shall be bound by and shall be a beneficiary of the Home
    Warranty and the ADR Provisions in the form attached to the Declaration as Exhibit G.
    Nothing in the Home Warranty or any other document provided by Declarant in
    conjunction with the sale of a Condominium diminishes any rights or obligations Owner
    or Declarant may have under California Civil Code Sections 895 through 945.5 . . . .
    THE HOME WARRANTY, WHEN ISSUED, SHALL BE THE ONLY WARRANTY,
    EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, MADE BY DECLARANT WITH REGARD TO THE
    RESIDENCE AND THE CONDOMINIUM, AND DECLARANT DISCLAIMS ALL
    OTHER WARRANTIES AS MORE FULLY SET FORTH IN THE DISCLAIMER
    ATTACHED AS EXHIBIT I TO THIS DECLARATION. This section applies to a
    particular Dispute only to the extent a Home Warranty is actually issued and in effect at
    the time of that particular Dispute with respect to the particular Condominiums at issue.”
    (Italics added.) The Association Property Warranty is defined in the same way, except
    that it includes only “[t]hose provisions of the Home Builder’s Limited Warranty that
    pertain to Association Property.” In other words, both the Home Warranty and
    Association Property Warranty are set forth in Exhibit H to the CC&Rs, entitled “Home
    Builder’s Limited Warranty.”
    Exhibit H, the home builder’s limited warranty, is a 13-page document, and
    at the top of each page appears the word “SAMPLE.” Page 1 states, “Enclosed with this
    LIMITED WARRANTY is a Limited Warranty Validation Form. The Limited Warranty
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    Validation Form provides the dates on which the warranty coverage period begins and
    expires.” The record does not contain an executed validation form.
    The home builder’s limited warranty contains a section entitled “Binding
    Arbitration Procedure.” It provides that all disputes will be resolved through binding
    arbitration. “The arbitration shall be conducted by Construction Arbitration Services,
    Inc., or such other reputable arbitration service that PWC shall select, at its sole
    discretion, at the time the request for arbitration is submitted.” PWC refers to
    Professional Warranty Services Corporation, who Standard Pacific hired to administer
    the warranty (and who filed an amicus curiae brief in this writ proceeding). “The rules
    and procedures of the designated arbitration organization, that are in effect at the time the
    request for arbitration is submitted, will be followed. A copy of the applicable rules and
    procedures will be delivered to YOU upon request.” “[I]f the arbitrator finds US
    responsible for a CONSTRUCTION DEFECT, the arbitrator will determine the scope of
    any repair or replacement, OUR cost of any such repair or replacement, and the
    diminution in fair market value, if any, caused by such CONSTRUCTION DEFECT.
    Based upon the arbitrator’s decision, WE shall choose whether WE shall (1) repair,
    replace the CONSTRUCTION DEFECT, (2) pay to YOU the actual amount it would cost
    US to repair or replace the CONSTRUCTION DEFECT or (3) PAY to YOU an amount
    equal to the diminution in fair market value caused by the CONSTRUCTION DEFECT.
    The decision to repair, replace, or make payment to YOU is at OUR or OUR authorized
    representative’s sole option.”
    The HOA opposed the petition to compel arbitration, arguing, among other
    things, that, “Defendants offer no evidence that the ‘SAMPLE HOME BUILDER’S
    LIMITED WARRANTY’ attached to the CC&Rs . . . was ‘actually issued’ . . . .” The
    HOA also argued the arbitration provisions are unconscionable. In its reply to HOA’s
    opposition, defendants ignored the HOA’s argument that the warranty never issued. The
    only statement in the reply that might have been in response to this point was the
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    following passing comment: “Moreover, the homeowners were given a copy of the
    CC&Rs prior to closing escrow and the purchase documents also contain identical
    provisions requiring construction defect disputes to be resolved through binding
    arbitration with [PWC].” To support this proposition, defendants cited the declaration of
    Karen Spargo, Pacific Standard’s vice-president of sales and marketing for the Orange
    County division during the relevant time frame. Spargo declared, “As part of the Sales
    and Marketing team, I was also required to familiarize myself with the purchase
    agreements and Alternative Dispute Resolution (‘ADR’) agreements for the various SPC
    communities. The ADR provisions in the purchase agreements generally mirror the ADR
    provisions in the CC&Rs. For Talega Village Center, both the purchase documents and
    the CC&Rs require all construction defect disputes to be resolved by binding arbitration
    and to be administered by Professional Warranty Service Corporation.” Spargo also
    declared that a copy of the CC&Rs is given to each homeowner before closing escrow.
    The HOA objected to the latter testimony based on lack of foundation/personal
    knowledge. The trial court apparently never ruled on the objection.
    The court granted the petition to compel arbitration, stating only, “The
    court orders the litigation stayed and orders the parties to comply with the arbitration
    provisions in Talega Village Center Community Association’s CC&Rs.” The HOA
    subsequently filed a motion for “reconsideration and clarification” of the court’s order.
    In denying the motion for reconsideration, the court stated, “The court declines to further
    clarify its ruling beyond reiterating that the court granted the arbitration as requested by
    moving party.” Thus, the arbitration provision enforced by the court was the provision
    requested by defendants — namely, an arbitration under the procedures specified in the
    home builder’s limited warranty.
    The court’s order was stayed for nearly one year while the parties went to
    mediation. Mediation apparently failed, and shortly after the stay was lifted, the HOA
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    filed the present writ petition. We issued an order to show cause and stayed the trial
    court order.
    DISCUSSION
    The HOA contends the court erred by enforcing the home warranty. At the
    same time, the HOA states, “It should be stressed that petitioner consents to a fair and
    reasonable construction defect arbitration process using a neutral forum (i.e. JAMS).”
    This concession is consistent with our high court’s decision in Pinnacle Museum Tower
    Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 
    55 Cal. 4th 223
    , where the court
    held arbitration provisions in CC&Rs are generally enforceable despite that no actual
    homeowners existed at the time the CC&Rs were drafted and recorded (id. at pp. 232,
    240). The issue, therefore, is not whether the arbitration provisions in the CC&Rs are
    generally enforceable, but only whether the primary method of arbitration is — i.e., the
    home warranty. We conclude it is not.
    We interpret the CC&Rs as we would a contract. (Nahrstedt v. Lakeside
    Village Condominium Assn. (1994) 
    8 Cal. 4th 361
    , 380-381 [“As noted earlier, equitable
    servitudes permit courts to enforce promises restricting land use when there is no privity
    of contract between the party seeking to enforce the promise and the party resisting
    enforcement. Like any promise given in exchange for consideration, an agreement to
    refrain from a particular use of land is subject to contract principles, under which courts
    try ‘to effectuate the legitimate desires of the covenanting parties’”].) “In contract law, a
    ‘condition precedent’ is ‘either an act of a party that must be performed or an uncertain
    event that must happen before the contractual right accrues or the contractual duty
    arises.’” (Wm. R. Clarke Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co. (1997) 
    15 Cal. 4th 882
    , 885, fn. 1.)
    “The existence of a condition precedent normally depends upon the intent of the parties
    as determined from the words they have employed in the contract.” (Realmuto v.
    Gagnard (2003) 
    110 Cal. App. 4th 193
    , 199.) “The rule is that provisions of a contract
    8
    will not be construed as conditions precedent in the absence of language plainly requiring
    such construction.” (Rubin v. Fuchs (1969) 
    1 Cal. 3d 50
    , 53.)
    We conclude the home warranty is not enforceable because a condition
    precedent — issuance — has not occurred. The CC&Rs are quite clear on their face that
    the home warranty does not apply unless it has issued: “This section applies to a
    particular Dispute only to the extent a home warranty is actually issued and in effect at
    the time of that particular Dispute with respect to the particular Condominiums at issue.”
    In the same section, the CC&Rs provide that the home warranty is the only applicable
    warranty “WHEN ISSUED.” Likewise, exhibit G, the alternative dispute resolution
    provisions, states that the home warranty is “to be issued.”
    The HOA argued both in the trial court and again in this writ proceeding
    that the home warranty never issued, and in both cases, defendants completely ignored
    the argument. Defendants’ decision to not address the issue leaves us in the difficult
    position of having no guidance as to what it even means for the home warranty to issue.
    The CC&Rs provide no definition for the term. Does the home warranty issue generally,
    or does it issue to each homeowner specifically? Does it issue by simply handing a
    homeowner a copy? Or, does issuance require the sort of validation form mentioned in
    the home warranty? Does issuance require an additional recordation? Defendants
    provided no evidence of what the parties intended, much less evidence that whatever was
    intended actually occurred.
    We perceive only two pieces of evidence that might bear on the issue. The
    first is that in exhibit G, the alternative dispute resolution provisions, the HOA agreed to
    the terms of the home warranty: “The Association acknowledges and agrees that the
    Home Warranty and the Association Property Warranty forms to be issued have been
    made available to the Association for review, that the Association has made such review
    of the Home Warranty and the Association Property Warranty and the dispute resolution
    procedures specified therein as the Association deems necessary and appropriate, and that
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    the Association consents to participation in such procedures for resolution of Disputes.”
    (Italics added.) The problem, of course, is that this provision specifically contemplates
    that the home warranty is “to be issued,” and read in conjunction with the CC&Rs, the
    home warranty is not binding until it is issued. Without evidence of issuance, this
    provision is of no help to defendants.
    The second piece of evidence is a declaration by Karen Spargo to the effect
    that each homeowner is given a copy of the CC&Rs prior to purchasing the home, and
    that the home purchase documents contain alternative dispute resolution provisions that
    “generally mirror” the provisions in the CC&Rs. Setting aside the problem that it is not
    clear that merely handing a copy of the CC&Rs to a homeowner qualifies as issuance, for
    any given homeowner, Spargo cannot testify to what was or was not given to them prior
    to the purchase. The HOA’s objection based on lack of personal knowledge is well
    taken. Moreover, to the extent the purchase documents, which are not in the record,
    “generally mirror” the CC&Rs, presumably they also require a home warranty to be
    issued. Finally, defendants’ petition was to compel arbitration pursuant to the CC&Rs,
    not pursuant to any purchase documents.
    Because we conclude there is no evidence in the record that the home
    warranty issued, we need not address the HOA’s argument that the arbitration provisions
    in the home warranty are unconscionable. Nor need we address the HOA’s arguments
    concerning whether DeMars & Associates, Ltd., the originally chosen but subsequently
    withdrawn arbitration provider, is biased. And since the HOA has consented to
    arbitration through the secondary method of using JAMS, we need not address its
    contention that defendants failed to comply with the Right to Repair Act (Civil Code,
    4
    § 895 et seq.) prior to petitioning to compel arbitration.
    4
    Our conclusion that the home warranty did not issue applies only to the
    present petition to compel arbitration. In addition to the arbitration provisions, the home
    warranty contains limitations on liability that defendants may wish to enforce in a future
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    DISPOSITION
    The petition for a writ of mandate is granted. Let a peremptory writ of
    mandate issue directing the trial court to vacate its March 5, 2014 order granting
    defendants’ petition to compel arbitration. Having served its purpose, the order to show
    cause is discharged. The stay imposed by this court is dissolved upon the finality of this
    opinion. The HOA shall recover costs incurred in this writ proceeding.
    The HOA’s motion for judicial notice is denied, as it contains material not
    presented to the trial court and unnecessary to resolve the writ petition.
    The defendants’ motion to strike the declarations of David M. Peters and
    Kyle E. Larkin is granted, as the objectionable material was not presented to the trial
    court and is unnecessary to resolve the writ petition.
    Amicus Curiae PWC’s requests for judicial notice are denied, as they
    contain material not presented to the trial court and unnecessary to resolve the writ
    petition.
    IKOLA, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    O’LEARY, P. J.
    ARONSON, J.
    arbitration in this case. For purposes of enforcing those limitations on liability, nothing
    about our opinion would preclude defendants from presenting evidence that the home
    warranty, in fact, did issue. In other words, our conclusion is only that there is no
    evidence in the record before us that the home warranty issued. That said, we offer no
    opinion on whether those limitations on liability are ultimately enforceable.
    11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: G051950

Filed Date: 5/18/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021