In re Angel D. CA2/2 ( 2023 )

Filed 3/3/23 In re Angel D. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re ANGEL D., A Person B317501
Coming Under the Juvenile Court (Los Angeles County
Law. Super. Ct.
No. 21CCJP04233A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Y.C. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEALS from findings and orders of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Stacy Wiese, Judge. Affirmed.
Michelle L. Jarvis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Y.C.
Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant A.D.
Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Defendants and appellants Y.C. (mother) and A.D. (father)
each appeal from the juvenile court’s November 18, 2021,
jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders in which their
son, Angel D. (minor, born Feb. 2012), was declared a dependent
of the court and removed from parental custody. Because the
findings and orders are supported by substantial evidence, we
affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. The Family
The family consists of mother, father, and minor. When
these dependency proceedings commenced, the parents’
relationship had been over for several years. Mother began
dating Arturo V. (Arturo) in 2015. Father began dating Ruby M.
(Ruby) around 2017.
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II. Referral
On August 20, 2021, the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral
alleging general neglect of minor by mother. According to the
referral, mother dropped minor off at the paternal grandfather’s
house on August 12, 2021, and asked him to watch minor for a
few days. Father picked minor up that day and had been caring
for him since. Father found videos on minor’s phone in which
minor had writing on his arms and was throwing gang signs, and
there was a bandana and a gun on the bed.
III. DCFS’s Initial Investigation
In response to the referral, a DCFS social worker
interviewed the family.
A. Father
While waiting for father outside of his apartment complex,
the social worker heard a man and a woman screaming from the
direction of father’s apartment. The screaming stopped when the
social worker called father to announce her arrival. The
screaming resumed when the call ended. When father came
outside to greet the social worker, the social worker “observed
fresh scratch marks” on father’s neck, forearms, and forehead.
Father’s shirt was stretched out, and “he was panting as if he
[had been] exercising or yelling.”
Father stated that a 2015 family law order granted mother
full custody of minor with weekend visitation for father. Mother,
however, would refuse to let father see minor. Last year, mother
had called father to pick up minor “because she could not handle
his behavior anymore.” Father showed the social worker a
September 2020 notarized letter from mother stating that she
was giving father full custody of minor. Father reported that,
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two weeks after mother signed the letter, she picked up minor.
Father did not see minor again until his birthday and then not
again until the previous week.
Regarding the videos he found on minor’s phone, father
reported that minor appeared to be holding machine and hand
guns. Minor had told father that the guns belonged to mother’s
boyfriend, Arturo. Minor had recently disclosed that Arturo hit
him on his stomach. Minor told his mother about the abuse, but
she did not believe him.
Father reported that he had an open domestic violence case
from 2016 with a former partner, in which he was listed as the
perpetrator. He had recently completed a 52-week domestic
violence program. Father denied any domestic violence with
Ruby.
B. Minor
Minor stated that he and mother would sometimes live
with Arturo. While minor slept, Arturo would cover minor’s
mouth to prevent him from making noise and then punch him
hard in the stomach. This would leave minor with marks and in
pain for days. Minor reported this abuse to mother, but she
thought he was making it up. One night, mother caught Arturo
abusing minor. She brandished a knife and cut Arturo’s stomach.
Arturo called the police, who arrested mother.
Minor further reported that, on more than 10 occasions,
Arturo would force minor to defecate and then ingest his own
feces. According to minor, mother did not know about this form
of abuse. Minor reported recent contact with Arturo, but he was
unsure when it was. Minor stated that mother and Arturo
frequently fought, and mother sometimes drove drunk with
minor after such fights occurred.
4
Minor also reported domestic violence between father and
Ruby. They would fight every day, multiple times per day, and
the fights would become physical. Father and Ruby had been
arguing earlier that day.
C. Mother
The social worker spoke with mother the day after she
interviewed father and minor. Mother stated that she did not
want minor seeing father because he was a “gangster[.]” She
denied knowing about the videos that showed minor displaying
gang signs and with firearms.
Mother said it had been “over three years” since she was
last with Arturo. Mother accused father of “brainwashing
[minor] with information that is not true.” She denied ever
stabbing Arturo. Mother was concerned about minor’s physical
safety because he had been witnessing physical fights between
father and Ruby on a daily basis. Mother said that Ruby was
“embarrassing” her on social media by calling her names and
posting pictures of her. Mother stated that she would “‘handle it
by fighting [Ruby].’”
IV. Detention
On September 2, 2021, DCFS sought and obtained an order
authorizing the detention of minor from mother and father.
Minor was detained the next day and placed in foster care.
V. Dependency Petition
A few days after minor was detained, DCFS filed a
dependency petition seeking the juvenile court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over minor pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
5
Code section 300, subdivisions (a) (nonaccidental serious physical
harm) and (b)(1) (failure to protect).1
Counts a-1 and b-2 alleged that mother and Arturo had a
history of engaging in violent altercations in minor’s presence,
including an incident when mother brandished a knife and cut
Arturo’s stomach.
Count b-1 alleged that Arturo physically abused minor by
forcing minor to defecate and then eat his own feces. Arturo had
also hit minor’s stomach. Mother knew that Arturo had struck
minor but failed to protect him by allowing Arturo unlimited
access.
Count b-3 alleged that father and Ruby had a history of
engaging in violent altercations in minor’s presence. Father
failed to protect minor by allowing Ruby to reside in minor’s
home and have unlimited access to minor.
Finally, count b-4 alleged that mother placed minor in
detrimental and endangering situations by allowing minor to
possess rifles and handguns and driving minor while under the
influence of alcohol.
VI. Last Minute Information for the Court (Sept. 10, 2021)
Father had spoken with minor while he was in foster care.
Father was heard telling minor that he was “glad [minor] was
placed in a ‘Mexican household and not a Black one,’ and that
‘[minor] should not worry or be sad because it’s the system’s
fault.’” Father ended the conversation by saying, “‘f*** the
system.’” The report noted that father’s statements had placed
minor and other children in the home at risk, “as there are
several children in the home who identify as African American.”
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
6
Based on father’s statements and concerns about minor running
away, minor was placed in another home.
VII. Detention Hearing
The juvenile court held a preliminary detention hearing on
September 10, 2021, where it found that father was minor’s
presumed father and made temporary detention findings. At the
continued hearing on September 13, 2021, the court found that a
prima facie showing had been made that minor was a person
described by section 300 and ordered minor detained from
parental custody. Mother and father were granted visitation.
VIII. Jurisdiction/Disposition Report
A. Interviews
The DCFS dependency investigator interviewed minor,
mother, and father about the allegations in the dependency
petition.
1. Minor
Minor recalled an incident when he was six or seven years
old. Mother and Arturo were arguing, Arturo grabbed a knife,
mother grabbed a knife, and then the police came. Minor stated
that mother was no longer with Arturo.
When asked “if Arturo did anything ‘bad’ to him[,]” minor
replied that “he always did bad things to him.” When mother
was asleep, Arturo “‘threw him in a pool in the middle of the
night’” and made him take cold showers. Arturo “‘made [minor]
poo’ and then he ‘made [minor] eat it[.]’” Minor told mother the
next day; she believed him and broke up with Arturo for one day
before going back to him. Minor was afraid of Arturo, which
caused him to be afraid to sleep at night.
Minor reported that father and Ruby fought all the time,
with Ruby hitting father. Father would restrain Ruby and tell
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her to stop; sometimes, father closed the door on Ruby so that she
could calm down.
2. Mother
Mother had left Arturo because of the way he had treated
her. She denied any physical altercations and denied that she
had brandished a knife at Arturo. When minor was five years
old, mother confronted Arturo when she found him holding minor
in a cold shower in the middle of the night as a punishment. She
had been afraid to call the police due to Arturo’s threats. Minor
never told mother that Arturo forced him to eat feces. Mother
had stayed with Arturo because she thought he would change.
3. Father
Father denied the allegations regarding domestic violence
with Ruby. He also denied having verbal arguments with her.
Father said that the day the social worker came to father’s
apartment complex, his neighbors were having a loud party.
B. Police report
The police report of a 2016 domestic violence incident
between mother and Arturo was attached to the
jurisdiction/disposition report.
Mother told the police that she had informed Arturo that
she no longer wanted to be with him. While mother started
packing her belongings, Arturo told her that he was using his cell
phone to record her. He then began to yell, “‘Stop ripping my
clothes!’”; “‘Stop hitting me!’”; and “‘Drop the knife!’” Mother
responded, “‘Which clothes? What knife? I’m not hitting you.’”
When mother tried to grab Arturo’s phone, he squeezed her hand
on the phone and pushed her, causing a cut on her index finger.
She stated that visible marks on her chest had been caused by
Arturo pushing her.
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Arturo stated that he had witnessed minor suffocating
Arturo’s then three-year-old son with a pillow. Arturo became
very upset and told minor to get off of his son. Mother then
became upset, pulled Arturo’s shirt, and scratched and wounded
him. Sometime later, mother picked up a knife and brandished it
at Arturo. Arturo’s then nine-year-old son also reported that he
saw mother rip Arturo’s shirt with what appeared to be a knife in
her hand.
Mother and Arturo were both arrested for willful infliction
of corporal injury pursuant to Penal Code section 273.5,
subdivision (a).
In a subsequent interview, mother denied that she had
brandished or threatened Arturo with a knife at any time. She
stated that minor had been in the room with her and Arturo
during the altercation. Toward the end of the argument, minor
got between them and began throwing hangers at Arturo,
apparently trying to defend mother.
IX. Adjudication Hearing
The adjudication hearing was held on November 18, 2021.
Following oral argument, the juvenile court sustained
counts a-1 and b-2 regarding domestic violence between mother
and Arturo,2 count b-1 regarding Arturo’s physical abuse of
2 The sustained a-1 and b-2 counts state: “The child[’s] . . .
mother . . . [and her] male companion, Arturo V[.], have a history
of engaging in violent altercations in the child’s presence. On a
prior occasion the mother brandished a knife at the mother’s
male companion and cut the male companion’s stomach, in the
presence of the child. On other occasions, the mother and the
male companion would engage in physical altercations. Such
violent conduct on the part of the mother against mother’s male
companion endangers the child’s physical health and safety and
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minor,3 and count b-3 regarding domestic violence between father
and Ruby.4 The court dismissed count b-4. Minor was declared a
places the child at risk of serious physical harm, damage and
danger.”
3 The sustained b-1 count states: “On prior occasions, the
child[’s] . . . mother[’s] . . . male companion, Arturo V[.],
physically abused the child by forcing the child to defecate and
then eat the child’s own feces. Further, on prior occasions, the
male companion covered the child’s mouth with the male
companion’s hand and struck the child’s stomach inflicting pain
and marks to the child’s stomach. Such physical abuse was
excessive and caused the child unreasonable pain and suffering.
The mother knew of the male companion striking the child and
failed to protect the child by allowing the male companion to have
unlimited access to the child. Such physical abuse of the child by
the male companion and the mother’s failure to protect the child
endanger[] the child’s physical health and safety, creates a
detrimental home environment and places the child at risk of
serious physical harm, damage, danger, physical abuse and
failure to protect.”
4 The sustained b-3 count states: “The child[’]s . . . father . . .
[and his] female companion, Ruby M[.], have a history of
engaging in violent altercations in the child’s presence. On prior
occasions, the father and the female companion engaged in
physical altercations. On prior altercations [sic], the female
companion struck the father. The father failed to protect the
child by allowing the female companion to reside in the child’s
home and have unlimited access to the child. Such violent
conduct on the part of the father and the father’s female
companion and the father’s failure to protect the child endanger[]
the child’s physical health and safety and places the child at risk
of serious physical harm, damage, danger and failure to protect.”
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dependent of the court under section 300, subdivisions (a) and
(b)(1).
The juvenile court found the evidence “overwhelming” that
mother and Arturo “physically fought all the time.” With respect
to Arturo’s abuse of minor, the court stated, “I don’t know that
I’ve been more sad when I read something. Mother absolutely
could have taken her child out of the situation with her boyfriend,
but she didn’t. She allowed for this to happen.” As for the
domestic violence between father and Ruby, the court “believe[d]”
minor that Ruby hit father “all the time.” The court believed that
father was currently “a victim” and not “the perpetrator.”
Regarding the disposition, mother’s counsel stated: “On
behalf of mother, mother is submitting to suitable placement and
monitored visitation. I’ve reviewed the case plan with the
mother. She is in agreement with all aspects of it, and we do
believe it is narrowly tailored.” Father’s counsel asked the court
to release minor to father’s home.
The juvenile court ordered minor removed from parental
custody. The court explained, “The reason the court finds that
removal of [minor] from mother is necessary is because of
mother’s failure to protect [minor] from the physical abuse of
mother’s boyfriend. [¶] The reason the court finds that removal
of [minor] from father is necessary is because of father’s failure to
protect [minor] from the physical altercations between him and
his girlfriend.”
The juvenile court ordered family reunification services for
both mother and father and granted them monitored visitation
with minor. The parents’ case plans included developmentally
appropriate parenting classes and individual counseling to
address case issues.
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X. Appeals
Mother and father each filed a timely notice of appeal from
the November 18, 2021, findings and orders.
DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdictional Findings
Mother challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
findings concerning her domestic violence with Arturo under
section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1) (counts a-1 and b-2) and
her failure to protect minor from Arturo’s abuse under
section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (count b-1), arguing that the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Father
argues that substantial evidence does not support the
jurisdictional finding concerning his domestic violence with Ruby
under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (count b-3). We conclude
that substantial evidence supports each of the court’s findings.5
A. Applicable law
Section 300, subdivision (a), authorizes the juvenile court to
assume jurisdiction over and adjudge to be a dependent of the
court a “child [who] has suffered, or there is a substantial risk
that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted
nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent . . . .”
5 A juvenile court may properly “base jurisdiction on the
actions of one or both parents, and once established, the court
may enter orders binding both parents. [Citation.]” (In re H.R.
(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1285–1286.) Thus, “‘an appellate
court may decline to address the evidentiary support for any
remaining jurisdictional findings once a single finding has been
found to be supported by the evidence.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at
p. 1286.) For the sake of completeness, however, we address each
ground for jurisdiction.
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Under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), the juvenile court has
jurisdiction over and may adjudge to be a dependent of the court
a “child [who] has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the
child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of”—
as relevant here—the “failure or inability of the child’s parent . . .
to adequately supervise or protect the child.”
“While evidence of past conduct may be probative of current
conditions, the question under section 300 is whether
circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the child to the
defined risk of harm.” (In re Emily L. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 1, 15
(Emily L.).) Still, “section 300 does not require that a child
actually be abused or neglected before the juvenile court can
assume jurisdiction. The subdivisions at issue here require only
a ‘substantial risk’ that the child will be abused or neglected. The
legislatively declared purpose of these provisions ‘is to provide
maximum safety and protection for children who are currently
being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being
neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection,
and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk
of that harm.’ [Citation.]” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
“Exposure to domestic violence may serve as the basis for
dependency jurisdiction” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591,
602–603 (Cole L.)) under both subdivisions (a) and (b)(1) of
section 300. (In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 599
(Giovanni F.) [“Although many cases based on exposure to
domestic violence are filed under section 300, subdivision (b)
[citations], section 300, subdivision (a) may also apply”].)
B. Standard of review
Jurisdictional findings must be made by a preponderance of
the evidence. (§ 355, subd. (a); Cynthia D. v. Superior Court
13
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 248.) We review those findings for
substantial evidence—“evidence that is reasonable, credible and
of solid value. [Citations.] We do not evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or
determine the weight of the evidence. Instead, we draw all
reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record
favorably to the juvenile court’s order and affirm the order even if
there is other evidence supporting a contrary finding.” (In re R.V.
(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843.)
“Substantial evidence may include inferences, so long as
any such inferences are based on logic and reason and rest on the
evidence.” (In re Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 318.)
C. Analysis
1. Domestic violence between mother and Arturo
(counts a-1 and b-2)
Substantial evidence existed that mother had and would
again expose minor to a substantial risk of suffering serious
physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally or negligently within the
meaning of section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), based on
domestic violence.
Mother had remained with Arturo for several years even
though their relationship was marked by pervasive physical
violence and mother knew that Arturo physically abused minor.
This “[e]xposure to domestic violence” supported jurisdiction
under section 300, subdivision (b)(1). (In re L.O. (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 227, 238.) When mother brandished a knife at
Arturo during a fight in 2016 in minor’s presence, minor was not
only a bystander but became directly involved in the altercation
by throwing hangers in an attempt to protect mother. If a “child
intervenes during a fight to protect h[is] mother from . . . abuse,
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the risk of harm to the child may be properly viewed as
nonaccidental” and support a jurisdictional finding under
section 300, subdivision (a). (Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at
p. 603.)
Mother resists this conclusion by arguing that there was no
evidence of a current risk of harm to minor—the allegations were
too remote in time and there was no evidence that Arturo was a
part of mother’s or minor’s life anymore. Certainly, “section 300
requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk of harm at
the time” the jurisdictional findings are made. (Cole L., supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 601.) “While evidence of past conduct may
be probative of current conditions,” “previous acts of neglect,
standing alone, do not establish a substantial risk of future harm;
there must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe
they will reoccur. [Citation.]” (Emily L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th
at p. 15.)
Here, there were at least three nonspeculative reasons to
believe that mother’s past conduct would reoccur.
First, the juvenile court could reasonably find it more likely
than not that Arturo would reappear in mother’s and minor’s
lives. In August 2021, minor reported recent contact with Arturo.
Second, mother denied important aspects of her past
domestic violence, such as that she had brandished a knife at
Arturo. Her unwillingness to admit the extent of her role in the
domestic violence supports “[t]he inference . . . that [s]he is less
likely to change h[er] behavior in the future.” (In re V.L. (2020)
54 Cal.App.5th 147, 156.) Mother’s “denial of domestic violence
increases the risk of it recurring. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
Third, during DCFS’s investigation, mother accused Ruby
of “embarrassing” her on social media by calling her names and
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posting pictures of her. Mother intended to resolve this conflict
by “‘fighting’” Ruby. This constituted substantial evidence that
mother was still likely to engage in violence, including with
individuals who had significant contact with minor. Given
minor’s past attempt to protect his mother during a violent
confrontation, a significant risk existed that minor would become
involved in a future altercation and be exposed either
nonaccidentally or negligently to serious physical harm. This is
particularly true considering minor’s apparent access to firearms.
2. Domestic violence between father and Ruby
(count b-3)
With respect to father, substantial evidence supported the
finding that father was currently failing to protect minor by
exposing him to father’s violent relationship with Ruby,
subjecting minor to a significant risk of harm within the meaning
of section 300, subdivision (b)(1). Minor reported witnessing
daily fights between father and Ruby, with Ruby hitting father.
Father flatly denied the domestic violence, despite a DCFS social
worker hearing the screaming of a man and woman from the
direction of father’s apartment and shortly thereafter observing
father with “fresh scratch marks” on his neck, forearms, and
forehead. As with mother, father’s denial of domestic violence
“increase[d] the risk of it recurring. [Citations.]” (In re V.L.,
supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 156; see also In re Gabriel K. (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One cannot correct a problem one fails
to acknowledge”].)
Father makes much of the juvenile court’s statement that it
believed that father was currently “a victim” and not “the
perpetrator” of domestic violence. But even if only Ruby was
inflicting physical violence at the time, father still failed to
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protect minor from daily exposure to such violence by allowing
Ruby to reside in minor’s home. The risk to minor persisted
regardless of who was the perpetrator and justified the court’s
exercise of jurisdiction.
Father also notes that no harm had befallen minor while in
his care. But actual abuse or neglect is not required for the
juvenile court to exercise jurisdiction under section 300. (In re
I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) “The court need not wait for
disaster to strike before asserting jurisdiction. [Citation.] This is
why the statute uses the word ‘risk.’” (In re K.B. (2021)
59 Cal.App.5th 593, 603.)
3. Mother’s failure to protect minor from Arturo’s
abuse (count b-1)
The details of Arturo’s physical abuse of minor are
egregious. On more than 10 occasions, Arturo forced minor to
defecate and then ingest his own feces. Arturo repeatedly hit
minor. Arturo restrained minor in a cold shower in the middle of
the night. Mother knew of this abuse yet failed to protect minor
from it. Minor told mother that Arturo abused him, yet she did
not believe him and allowed Arturo unlimited access to the child,
thus allowing the abuse to continue.
Although mother was no longer in a relationship with
Arturo at the time of adjudication hearing, minor reported, in
August 2021, recent contact with Arturo. “A parent’s past
conduct is a good predictor of future behavior. [Citation.]” (In re
T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133.) The juvenile court could
reasonably infer from mother’s past conduct that she lacked the
ability to protect minor, thus placing him at substantial risk of
future harm. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).)
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II. Dispositional Order Removing Minor
Father also challenges the evidentiary basis for the
dispositional order removing minor from his custody.6
A. Applicable law
Before removing a minor from a parent’s custody, the
juvenile court is required to make one of five specified findings by
clear and convincing evidence. (§ 361, subd. (c).) One ground for
removal is that there is a substantial risk of injury to the child’s
physical health, safety, protection or emotional well-being if he or
she were returned home, and there are no reasonable means to
protect the child. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) “‘“Clear and convincing”
evidence requires a finding of high probability. The evidence
must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt. It must be
sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every
reasonable mind. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Actual harm to a child
is not necessary before a child can be removed. ‘Reasonable
apprehension stands as an accepted basis for the exercise of state
power.’” (In re V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 154.)
6 In her opening brief, mother contended that the order
removing minor from her custody should also be reversed, as it
lacked substantial evidentiary support. In her reply brief,
mother conceded DCFS’s argument that mother waived her right
to challenge the removal order because mother had submitted to
the suitable placement of minor at the adjudication hearing. We
agree with DCFS’s argument and mother’s concession. (See In re
Christopher B. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 551, 558 [“In dependency
litigation, nonjurisdictional issues must be the subject of
objection or appropriate motions in the juvenile court; otherwise
those arguments have been waived and may not be raised for the
first time on appeal”].)
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B. Standard of review
We review a dispositional order removing a minor from
parental custody for substantial evidence. (In re V.L., supra,
54 Cal.App.5th at p. 154.) The juvenile court must make its
finding that a ground for removal exists under the clear and
convincing evidence standard of proof. (§ 361, subd. (c).)
Therefore, “the question before the appellate court is whether the
record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a
reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that
the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989,
1011.)
C. Analysis
Minor’s reporting that father and Ruby engaged in daily
domestic violence, coupled with father’s denial of such violence
and minor’s access to firearms, constituted substantial evidence
from which the juvenile court could find it highly probable that
minor would be at substantial risk of injury in father’s custody,
and that no reasonable means existed to protect him short of
removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1); see also In re V.L., supra,
54 Cal.App.5th 147, 155–157.)
Urging reversal of the removal order, father asserts that
the evidence showed that father acted protectively toward minor,
as he had sought DCFS’s help concerning physical abuse of minor
in mother’s household. This argument merely goes to the
interpretation and weight of the evidence, which we may not
reevaluate. (See Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at
pp. 1008–1009.) Having identified substantial evidence
supporting the order, “it is of no consequence that the [lower]
court believing other evidence, or drawing other reasonable
19
inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.” (Bowers
v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 874, italics omitted.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s November 18, 2021, jurisdictional
findings and dispositional orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
________________________, P. J.
LUI
________________________, J.
HOFFSTADT
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