In re Cameron P. CA2/2 ( 2023 )

Filed 3/3/23 In re Cameron P. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re CAMERON P., a Person B319553
Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County Super. Ct.
Court Law. No. 19CCJP02712B)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MARTHA P.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Rudolph A. Diaz, Judge. Affirmed.
Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Bryan Mercke, Associate County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Martha P. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders
denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 3881 petition
with regard to her 14-year-old son, Cameron P. (Cameron).
Mother raises two arguments urging reversal: (1) that the
juvenile court abused its discretion by summarily denying her
petition despite mother’s demonstration that her circumstances
had changed, and (2) that reunification with mother was in
Cameron’s best interests because his caregiver had not yet
committed to providing a permanent placement for him. Finding
no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
In April 2019, Cameron’s older sister2 (sister) reported that
their mother had told the children that she “want[ed] to die.” She
also reported that Cameron had found mother collapsed on the
stairs after taking a combination of pills and alcohol. He called
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 Sister was initially included in these dependency
proceedings, but has since turned 18. Accordingly, she is not a
party to this appeal.
2
911, mother was involuntarily hospitalized, and the children
were placed in the care of foster parents.3
A referring party gave this information to the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS),
who opened an investigation into the family.
Investigating social workers found that the family home
smelled strongly of urine and was cluttered with unopened mail
and unpaid bills. When a social worker spoke to Cameron, his
hands and neck were covered in dirt. He told the social worker
that he only showered once a month and never used the
bathroom at home, because there was no soap or toilet paper in
the house. Cameron said that there was usually no food in the
house, and that he typically ate either junk food or takeout meals
that sister bought from app-based delivery services. The family’s
housekeeper confirmed that mother often forgot to give her
money, forcing the family to go without basic household items.
Cameron also told social workers that sister essentially
raised him, as mother drank often, slept excessively, and “act[ed]
weird.” He said that he worried constantly about his mother, had
trouble sleeping, and had tried to kill himself the previous year.
Social workers interviewed mother in the hospital. She
confirmed that she had been diagnosed with bipolar and
schizoaffective disorder for 30 years. She admitted that she
drank wine and overmedicated every day in an attempt to
overcome her suicidal feelings. She knew that the children
worried about her drinking, but believed that they were
“resilient” and “old enough” to “care for themselves.”
After mother was released from the hospital, social workers
interviewed her again at the family home. Slurring her speech,
3 The children’s father had passed away in 2013.
3
mother confessed to feeling unstable and suicidal. She admitted
that she had totaled the family car a month earlier, and had
subsequently been charged with driving under the influence. Yet
she did not believe that she had a substance abuse problem, and
did not think that she needed to seek treatment for her drinking.
Mother later denied that she was suicidal and that she
abused alcohol, and said that she had not been serious when she
told the children that she wanted to kill herself.
II. Procedural Background
A. Jurisdiction Petition
DCFS filed a section 300 petition alleging that mother’s
untreated substance abuse and mental health issues placed the
children at risk of serious physical harm.
In June 2019, the juvenile court sustained both the
substance abuse and mental health allegations against mother.
Mother was given family reunification services and twice-weekly
monitored visitation, and was ordered to participate in an alcohol
rehabilitation program, a 12-step program, weekly testing, and
counseling.
B. Reunification Services
Mother’s compliance with her case plan was inconsistent
from the start. She immediately enrolled in an alcohol program,
but returned both missed and diluted drug and alcohol tests. She
participated in counseling, including conjoint counseling with
Cameron, but only partially exercised her visitation rights,
visiting the children once per week.
The children stated that they did not want more visits, and
both opposed extended visitation over the 2019 holiday season.
They both wanted to stay with their foster parents if they could
not be reunited with mother.
4
In early 2020, mother briefly returned a series of clean
drug and alcohol tests, only to resume providing diluted or
missed tests from March through June.
DCFS temporarily allowed mother to have unmonitored
visits with the children, but reverted to monitored visitation after
only three visits in which mother showed up appearing lethargic
and off-balance, slurring her speech, crying, and insulting and
yelling at the children.
At one unmonitored visit in May 2020, mother struggled to
get out of her car, eventually falling and sustaining a minor head
injury. The children reported that she seemed “highly sleepy”
and potentially medicated during the visit. DCFS later learned
that, upon returning home from this visit, mother totaled her car.
Mother initially reported that the accident involved another car
and that both parties were at fault; DCFS later learned that no
other parties were involved, and that mother had crashed the car
into the wall of her parking garage.
Mother had stabilized by November 2020, with DCFS
reporting that she was consistently participating in required
mental health services. However, the children steadfastly
objected to reuniting with mother. When DCFS attempted
unmonitored visitation for a second time in February 2021, the
children quickly asked to return to monitored visitation because
mother was argumentative and made them feel uncomfortable.
Both children continued to attend once weekly monitored
visits with mother, but “adamantly opposed . . . increasing the
frequency or duration of [the] visits” as they “d[id] not want to be
alone with their mother again.” Conversely, sister said that
Cameron was flourishing with their foster family. Cameron
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agreed, telling DCFS that he wanted to be adopted by his foster
parents.
C. Termination of Reunification Services
By March 2021, mother was regularly missing up to
50 percent of her drug and alcohol tests and had stopped
providing progress updates from her drug and alcohol program.
She was no longer in conjoint counseling with Cameron because
he refused to participate.
At the status review hearing on March 22, 2021, the
juvenile court found that mother was out of compliance with her
case plan, noting her failure to test consistently and her
inappropriate behavior with the children over the past 22
months. The court concluded that the children’s “stability [would
be] jeopardized if they are returned to mother’s custody,”
terminated family reunification services, and set a section 366.26
hearing.
D. Section 366.26 Hearing Continuances
The trial court initially set a section 366.26 hearing for
August 2021, but granted multiple continuances to allow the
children’s foster mother to receive necessary paperwork, and to
determine whether adoption or legal guardianship was most
appropriate for the children.4 The hearing would ultimately take
place in March 2022.
In the year between termination of reunification services
and the section 366.26 hearing, mother’s presence in Cameron’s
life remained inconsistent. In March 2021, Cameron refused
monitored visits with mother more than once per month. Then,
4 Among other things, the children’s foster mother had yet to
receive the divorce decree from her prior marriage. There were
also difficulties obtaining the children’s father’s death certificate.
6
in May 2021, mother stopped visiting altogether when her mental
health deteriorated, subsequently informing DCFS that she was
“not yet stable” enough to arrange monitored visits with the
children.
In July 2021, mother was briefly hospitalized for
psychiatric issues. In September 2021, mother was hospitalized
again, this time for five weeks. She attempted weekly telephonic
visits with Cameron, but he was upset by her slurred speech and
apparent sedation. When mother was released from the hospital
in October 2021, Cameron would only participate in once monthly
visits, stating that he could not “handle” more. He refused to
attend visits without sister.
Although Cameron told mother that he did not want her to
contact him directly outside of visitation, Mother attempted to
call and text Cameron multiple times per week. Cameron
reported being upset by the calls, as mother was often “moody,”
repeated herself often, and seemed to forget everything that
Cameron told her from call to call.
Throughout, Cameron consistently expressed his desire to
be adopted by his foster parents.
E. Section 388 Petition
On March 10, 2022, mother filed a section 388 petition
asking for reinstatement of reunification services with Cameron.
She presented evidence that she had been actively participating
in mental health services with a local hospital since November
2021, had been in therapy since July 2019, had begun regularly
participating in AA meetings, and had allegedly maintained
sobriety since October 26, 2021. She argued that reunification
would be in Cameron’s best interest, as it would keep him
connected with mother and her extended family. Mother also
7
insisted that Cameron was unsure of whether he wanted to be
adopted by his foster parents.
At the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court heard
arguments on whether a hearing should be set for her section 388
petition. Mother’s counsel argued that she was currently
participating in mental health services and had established a
period of sobriety. DCFS and Cameron’s counsel opposed the
hearing.
The juvenile court summarily denied the section 388
petition, stating that mother had not “reached the threshold
showing” to warrant a hearing. The court explained that mother
had not demonstrated a true change of circumstances, as her
evidence only showed that she was still engaged in the
therapeutic and psychiatric services that she had been
participating in, on and off, for the last two years. The court also
concluded that reunification was not in Cameron’s best interests,
finding that mother’s “interpretation of [his] desires to be adopted
are incorrect,” as the record showed that Cameron had repeatedly
and firmly expressed a desire to be adopted by his foster parents.
F. Appeal
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion
in denying mother’s section 388 petition without a hearing.
I. Applicable Law
Under section 388, subdivision (a)(1), a parent or other
interested party may petition the juvenile court to change,
modify, or set aside a previous order in dependency proceedings.
“The petitioner has the burden of showing by a preponderance of
the evidence (1) that there is new evidence or a change of
8
circumstances and (2) that the proposed modification would be in
the best interests of the child.” (In re Mickel O. (2011)
197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615 (Mickel O.).)
To satisfy the first prong, “the change in circumstances
must be substantial.” (In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th
219, 223.) Merely changing—as opposed to changed—
circumstances will not suffice. (Mickel O., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th
at p. 615.)
For the second prong, specifically when determining
whether reinstatement of reunification services is in the best
interests of the child, the juvenile court must consider whether
“the specific factors that required placement outside the parent’s
home” have been remediated and prioritize “the goal of assuring
stability and continuity” for the child. (In re Angel B. (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 454, 463–464.) “[A]fter reunification services
have terminated, a parent’s petition for . . . reopening
reunification efforts must establish how such a change will
advance the child’s need for permanency and stability.” (In re
J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527 (J.C.).)
II. Standard of Review
We review the denial of a section 388 petition for abuse of
discretion. (In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 642
(Marcelo B.).) “An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile
court has exceeded the bounds of reason by making an arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd determination.” (Ibid.)
“It is rare that the denial of a section 388 motion merits
reversal as an abuse of discretion.” (In re Kimberly F. (1997)
56 Cal.App.4th 519, 522.)
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III. Analysis
Mother failed to show either a substantial change of
circumstances or that reunification would be in Cameron’s best
interests. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in denying her section 388 petition.
A. Change of circumstances
To support her claim of changed circumstances, mother
asserted that she had stayed sober for five months preceding the
permanency hearing and that she was currently participating in
treatment for her psychiatric and mental health issues.5
But there is nothing new about these circumstances;
mother had often undergone periods of full or partial sobriety and
treatment in the two years since the juvenile court took
jurisdiction. At two separate points, mother even stabilized
sufficiently that DCFS allowed her to have unmonitored
visitation with Cameron. Each time, mother’s mental health and
substance abuse issues quickly reasserted themselves and
derailed her reunification process.6 Given this history, it was not
unreasonable for the juvenile court to be cautious in viewing the
5 Notably, mother did not provide any independent proof of
her sobriety—such as negative drug and alcohol tests—but
instead relied on the testimony of her AA sponsor, who believed
that she had remained sober since her release from the hospital.
6 Mother argues that her alcohol abuse problems were not as
longstanding as those faced by other parents who have struggled
with years or decades of substance abuse, as in In re Ernesto R.,
supra, 230 Cal.App.4th 219, and that her relatively short period
of sobriety is thus a significant change. This assertion ignores
mother’s recent history of sporadic sobriety followed by
significant relapses.
10
extent to which mother had resolved the underlying problems
leading to Cameron’s dependency. (In re N.F. (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 112, 122 [the petitioning mother’s “brief period of
sobriety and completion of a treatment program was only the
most recent attempt in a series of unsuccessful attempts to
overcome” the issues leading to dependency, so “her recent
completion of yet another program did not constitute a material
change in circumstances”].)
The bottom line is that, at most, mother presented evidence
of changing—rather than substantially changed—circumstances
in her life, which was insufficient to meet her burden under
section 388. (Mickel O., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 615.)
Accordingly, it was not “arbitrary, capricious or patently
absurd” (Marcelo B., supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 642) for the
juvenile court to deny the petition.
B. Cameron’s best interests
While we could affirm the denial of mother’s section 388
petition based on the absence of changed circumstances alone, we
also find no abuse of the juvenile court’s discretion in concluding
that Cameron’s best interests would not be promoted by further
reunification services.
Mother’s petition was filed one year after the termination
of family reunification services. Therefore, it was her burden to
rebut the strong presumption that Cameron’s best interests were
served by remaining with his foster parents. (See Angel B.,
supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 464–465.) To do so, mother was
required to “make some factual showing that the best interests of
[Cameron] would be served by modification” (id. at p. 465) such
that it outweighed his “constitutional and statutory interest in
stability” (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 421).
11
Mother failed to make such a showing. Her assertions that
Cameron would benefit from “remain[ing] connected to mother
and [his] maternal family” do not come close to overcoming the
presumption that remaining with his foster parents—who sister
credited with allowing Cameron to thrive as never before—and
moving ahead with permanency planning were in his best
interests, especially compared to the instability and
impermanence that Cameron would likely face if reunification
services were reinstated.
On appeal, mother relies on the same faulty assertions that
underlie her section 388 petition. She insists—without
evidentiary support—that Cameron expressed uncertainty about
staying with his foster parents. In fact, Cameron vociferously
and consistently indicated his desire for permanency with his
foster family.
And, rather than demonstrate how reunification with
mother would promote Cameron’s need for stability and
permanence, mother attacks his foster parents’ cautious
approach to adoption. She argues that, because his foster
parents were still attempting to determine whether legal
guardianship or adoption was the best solution for Cameron, his
foster placement does not offer sufficient permanency to offset the
nebulous benefits of continued reunification.
Her argument is singularly unpersuasive. Uncertainty
about the legal form which permanency with his foster family
will take does not diminish the basic stability that Cameron
experiences with his foster family, or suggest that mother should
be permitted to render his future with them uncertain. “Children
need stability and permanency in their lives, not protracted legal
12
proceedings that prolong uncertainty for them.” (In re Justice P.
(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 191.)
Under the circumstances presented here, the juvenile court
properly found that granting appellant’s section 388 petition was
not in Cameron’s best interests.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
________________________, P. J.
LUI
________________________, J.
CHAVEZ
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