P. v. Ward CA4/2 ( 2013 )

Filed 4/10/13 P. v. Ward CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E054822
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIC298511)
RONALD WILLIAM WARD, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Thomas Kelly, Judge.
(Retired judge of the Santa Cruz Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art.
VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and William M. Wood and
Bradley A. Weinreb, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Ronald William Ward appeals from his indeterminate commitment as a
sexually violent predator (SVP) under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 6600 et
seq. He contends his indeterminate commitment term violates his constitutional rights to
due process and equal protection, as well as the ex post facto clause. We find no error,
and we affirm.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant does not challenge the evidence to support his civil commitment, so we
set forth the underlying facts summarily: Defendant has prior convictions for five counts
of lewd conduct with a child in 1985 and one prior conviction of forcible lewd conduct
with a child in 1981. Defendant was also convicted of forcible rape in 1978. In 1997,
defendant was committed under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) (§ 6600 et
seq.) and was subsequently recommitted several times.
In April 2005 and March 2007, the People filed petitions to recommit defendant
under the SVPA. Defendant was evaluated in 2010 and 2011, and in the evaluators‟
opinions, defendant had a history of depression and substance abuse, as well as a mental
disorder of paraphilia and an antisocial personality disorder, among other conditions.
Risk assessment tests showed defendant to be at a high or moderately high risk of
reoffending.
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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Following trial on the petitions in August 2011, the jury found the petitions true.
However, the trial court suspended proceedings because the question whether the SVPA
violated equal protection was pending in the appellate court on remand from the
California Supreme Court. (See People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1211
(McKee I). Meanwhile, the trial court ordered defendant detained at Coalinga State
Hospital, and defendant filed a notice of appeal. This court stayed the appeal pending
final disposition of the petitions in the trial court.
In July 2012, the Court of Appeal issued its decision in People v. McKee (2012)
207 Cal.App.4th 1325 (McKee II), and thereafter, proceedings were resumed in the trial
court. On August 12, the trial court imposed a civil commitment on defendant under
section 6600 et seq. In September 2012, this court lifted the stay of the appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
The SVPA provides for civil commitment of a person “who has been convicted of
a sexually violent offense against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental
disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is
likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior. (§ 6600, subd.
(a).) In 2006, the SVPA was amended by Proposition 83. As relevant to this appeal, the
commitment to a state mental hospital was changed from a renewable two-year
commitment to an indeterminate term. (§ 6604; see also generally Bourquez v. Superior
Court (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1280-1282.)
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A. Due Process Challenge
Defendant asserts that his involuntary commitment under the amended SVPA
violates his constitutional right to due process. In McKee I, the California Supreme Court
rejected the defendant‟s due process challenge to the application of Proposition 83 to
persons whose original commitment petition preceded the enactment of the amendment.
(McKee I, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1188-1193.) Defendant acknowledges that we are
bound by the court‟s holding. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57
Cal.2d 450, 455.)
B. Ex Post Facto Challenge
Defendant asserts that his involuntary commitment under the amended SVPA
violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. In McKee I, the court
rejected an ex post facto challenge to the amended SVPA. (McKee I, supra, 47 Cal.4th at
pp. 1193-1195.) Defendant acknowledges that we are bound by the court‟s holding.
(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 455.)
C. Equal Protection Challenge
Defendant asserts that his involuntary commitment under the SVPA violates his
federal constitutional right to equal protection of the laws because the amended SVPA
treats SVP‟s less favorably than individuals civilly committed under other statutory
schemes such as those applicable to mentally disordered offenders (MDO‟s)and persons
not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI‟s). In McKee I, the defendant raised a similar
challenge, and the California Supreme Court remanded the matter for an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether, under a strict scrutiny standard, the People could establish
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that disparate treatment was necessary to further a compelling state interest. On remand,
the trial court conducted a 21-day evidentiary hearing and concluded the People had met
their burden. In McKee II, the appellate court affirmed the trial court‟s conclusion.
Defendant argues, however, that the McKee II court‟s holding applied only to
McKee himself, because the court conducted a sufficiency of the evidence review, and
equal protection challenges against the SVPA must be adjudicated on a “case specific, „as
applied‟ basis.” We disagree. The McKee II court held that SVP‟s, as a class, are
differently situated than MDO‟s and NGI‟s, and differing treatment of those groups is
necessary to further compelling state interests. (McKee II, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1347-1348.) Specifically, the court concluded that “the People on remand met their
burden to present substantial evidence, including medical and scientific evidence,
justifying the amended Act‟s disparate treatment of SVP‟s (e.g., by imposing
indeterminate terms of civil commitment and placing on them the burden to prove they
should be released). [Citation.] The People have shown that, „notwithstanding the
similarities between SVP‟s and MDO‟s [and NGI‟s], the former as a class bear a
substantially greater risk to society, and that therefore imposing on them a greater burden
before they can be released from commitment is needed to protect society.‟ [Citation.]
The People have shown „that the inherent nature of the SVP‟s mental disorder makes
recidivism as a class significantly more likely[;] . . . that SVP‟s pose a greater risk [and
unique dangers] to a particularly vulnerable class of victims, such as children‟; and that
SVP‟s have diagnostic and treatment differences from MDO‟s and NGI‟s, thereby
supporting a reasonable perception by the electorate that passed Proposition 83 that the
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disparate treatment of SVP‟s under the amended [SVPA] is necessary to further the
state‟s compelling interests in public safety and humanely treating the mentally
disordered. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1347; italics added.) The court‟s language made plain
that its holding applied not only to the defendant in that case, but also to the entire class
of SVP‟s. (See also People v. McKnight (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 860, 863-864 [agreeing
with McKee II‟s equal protection analysis].)
We agree with and adopt the McKee II court‟s analysis and holding. We therefore
conclude that defendant‟s recommitment under the SVPA did not violate his equal
protection rights.
IV. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
HOLLENHORST
Acting P. J.
We concur:
RICHLI
J.
CODRINGTON
J.
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