P. v. Baulknight CA4/1 ( 2013 )

Filed 4/17/13 P. v. Baulknight CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D061905
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD234645)
ERIC BAULKNIGHT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Eugenia A.
Eyherabide, Judge. Affirmed.
Defendant Eric Baulknight pled guilty to committing crimes on June 5, 2011. He
also admitted he had a prior serious felony conviction and a prior strike conviction. The
court imposed a 13-year stipulated sentence.
Baulknight's sole appellate contention is that the court erred in calculating his
presentence conduct credits. (Pen. Code,1 § 4019.) Specifically, he argues the trial court
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
erred in failing to award him enhanced presentence conduct credits under the current
version of section 4019. The contention is without merit and we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMMARY
The following factual summary is based on the probation report. On June 5, 2011,
Baulknight punched his elderly mother after she refused to give him money for
marijuana, resulting in substantial injury to his mother's face. Later that evening,
Baulknight was transported to a mental health facility, where he attacked one of the
nurses, punching her in the jaw and throat.
On February 15, 2012, Baulknight pled guilty to committing willful cruelty to an
elder adult resulting in great bodily injury and an assault by force likely to inflict great
bodily injury. (§§ 368, subd. (b)(1), 243, subd. (d).) On April 19, 2012, the court
sentenced Baulknight to 13 years, and awarded him 320 actual days and 160 conduct
credits. Baulknight was in continuous local custody from the date he committed the
crimes until he was sentenced.
DISCUSSION
Baulknight contends the court erred in calculating his custody credits based on the
prior version of section 4019, rather than on the newer version of the statute that became
operative on October 1, 2011, while he was awaiting sentencing.
Under section 4019, defendants are entitled to earn credit towards their sentences
by performing additional labor (§ 4019, subd. (b)) and for good behavior (§ 4019, subd.
(c)). These credits are referred to as conduct credits. (People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal. 4th
787, 793.)
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The Legislature has repeatedly amended section 4019 regarding the proper
calculation of conduct credits. When Baulknight committed his offense in June 2011,
individuals who had been convicted of a serious or violent felony were entitled to two
days of conduct credits for every four days actually served. (See Former § 4019, subd.
(f); Stats. 2010, ch. 426, § 2; former § 2933, subd. (e)(1); see People v. Rajanayagam
(2012) 211 Cal. App. 4th 42, 48-49 (Rajanayagam).) However, when Baulknight was in
local custody awaiting sentencing, the Legislature amended section 4019 as part of the
Realignment Act and amended former section 2933. The amendments, which became
operative on October 1, 2011, eliminated the prior felony strike disqualification and
increased the amount of conduct credits earned by prisoners in local custody to one day
of conduct credit for each day spent in actual custody. (§ 4019, subds. (b), (c), (f); Stats.
2011, ch. 39, § 53; see also Stats. 2011-2012, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 12, § 35 (Assem. Bill No.
17 (2011-2012 Ex. Sess.).)
In awarding 160 conduct credits to Baulknight, the court applied the former
version of section 4019 in effect at the time Baulknight committed his crime. Baulknight
contends the applicable conduct credits he accrued after the amendment's operative date
(October 1, 2011) should have been calculated using the more generous amended rate.
He argues the reduced conduct credit award for his time served after October 1, 2011
violates section 4019 and his equal protection rights.
Baulknight forfeited this argument by failing to raise the issue in the proceedings
below. By not objecting to the conduct credit calculation, Baulknight waived his right to
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challenge any error in the court's award amount. (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal. App. 4th
305, 312.)
We also conclude the argument fails on its merits. With respect to the October 1,
2011 amendment, section 4019, subdivision (h) states: "The changes to this section
enacted by the act that added this subdivision shall apply prospectively and shall apply to
prisoners who are confined to a county jail, city jail, industrial farm, or road camp for a
crime committed on or after October 1, 2011. Any days earned by a prisoner prior to
October 1, 2011, shall be calculated at the rate required by the prior law." (Italics added.)
Baulknight was confined for crimes committed in June 2011, which is before
October 1, 2011. Thus, the amended statute's new credit calculation rate is expressly
inapplicable to Baulknight.
Although recognizing that the first sentence of section 4019, subdivision (h) states
that the amendment "shall apply prospectively" and "shall apply to prisoners who are
confined . . . for a crime committed on or after October 1, 2011," Baulknight nonetheless
contends he is entitled to take advantage of the amendment for local time served after
October 1, 2011, because the second sentence of section 4019, subdivision (h) refers to
days earned by a prisoner before the October 1 date. Baulknight argues that to give
meaning to this second sentence, the statute must be interpreted as providing that days
earned by a prisoner after October 1, 2011 must be calculated at the rate established by
the new law, even if the crime was committed before the October 1 date.
Several courts have rejected the identical argument. (See, e.g., Rajanayagam,
supra, 211 Cal. App. 4th 42; People v. Ellis (2012) 207 Cal. App. 4th 1546 (Ellis).) The
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Rajanayagam court explained: "[S]ubdivision (h)'s first sentence reflects the Legislature
intended the enhanced conduct credit provision to apply only to those defendants who
committed their crimes on or after October 1, 2011. Subdivision (h)'s second sentence
does not extend the enhanced conduct credit provision to any other group, namely those
defendants who committed offenses before October 1, 2011, but are in local custody on
or after October 1, 2011. Instead, subdivision (h)'s second sentence attempts to clarify
that those defendants who committed an offense before October 1, 2011, are to earn
credit under the prior law. However inartful the language of subdivision (h), we read the
second sentence as reaffirming that defendants who committed their crimes before
October 1, 2011, still have the opportunity to earn conduct credits, just under prior
law. . . . To imply the enhanced conduct credit provision applies to defendants who
committed their crimes before the effective date but served time in local custody after the
effective date reads too much into the statute and ignores the Legislature's clear intent in
subdivision (h)'s first sentence. [fn. omitted.] [¶] We recognize the Legislature in
drafting subdivision (h)'s second sentence used the word 'earned.' And it is impossible to
earn presentence credits for an offense that has not yet been committed. But reading the
first and second sentences together, the implication is the enhanced conduct credit
provision applies to defendants who committed crimes before October 1, 2011, but who
served time in local custody after that date. To isolate the verbiage of the second
sentence would defy the Legislature's clear intent in subdivision (h)'s first sentence and
contradict well-settled principles of statutory construction. . . . [W]e find the enhanced
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conduct credit provision applies only to those defendants who committed their crimes on
or after October 1, 2011." (Rajanayagam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.)
The Ellis court similarly concluded: "In our view, the Legislature's clear intent
was to have the enhanced rate apply only to those defendants who committed their crimes
on or after October 1, 2011. [Citation.] The second sentence does not extend the
enhanced rate to any other group, but merely specifies the rate at which all others are to
earn conduct credits. So read, the sentence is not meaningless, especially in light of the
fact the October 1, 2011, amendment to section 4019, although part of the so-called
realignment legislation, applies based on the date a defendant's crime is committed,
whereas section 1170, subdivision (h), which sets out the basic sentencing scheme under
realignment, applies based on the date a defendant is sentenced." (Ellis, supra, 207
Cal.App.4th at p. 1553.)
We agree with the reasoning of the Rajanayagam and Ellis courts and reach the
same conclusion. The plain language of section 4019, subdivision (h) makes clear the
amendment's new credit calculation rate applies only to individuals who are confined for
a crime committed on or after October 1, 2011. Reasonably read, the second sentence
does not permit a court to ignore this plain language. We thus reject Baulknight's
contention he is statutorily entitled to conduct credits at the increased rate provided in the
amended version of section 4019.
We also reject Baulknight's argument that this interpretation of section 4019
violates his constitutional equal protection rights.
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To succeed on an equal protection claim, Baulknight must first show the state has
adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal
manner. (See People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal. 4th 1185, 1199; People v. Wilkinson
(2004) 33 Cal. 4th 821, 836-837; Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal. 4th 537,
571.) Second, Baulknight must show there is no rational basis for the different treatment
of similarly situated groups. (See People v. Kennedy (2012) 209 Cal. App. 4th 385, 397
[proper test for issues concerning conduct credits is rational basis review].) Under this
highly deferential test, a statutory classification is constitutionally sound if there are any
reasonably conceivable facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.
(Ibid.; see People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal. 4th 62, 74-75.)
For purposes of Baulknight's appellate contention, there are two classes of
incarcerated inmates: (1) those in jail on or after October 1, 2011, having committed a
crime on or after October 1, 2011; and (2) those in jail on or after October 1, having
committed the same offense before October 1, 2011. Even assuming these groups are
similarly situated, the classifications bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose.
One of the objectives of the Realignment Act and the amendment to section 4019
was to more cost-effectively manage prison populations. (See Rajanayagam, supra, 211
Cal.App.4th at pp. 54-55.) This goal is achieved by the section 4019 amendment, as the
fiscal crisis is ameliorated to a degree by awarding additional conduct credits to those
prisoners who committed their crimes on or after October 1, 2011. Although awarding
enhanced credits retroactively would have produced greater cost savings, the Legislature
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did not choose this approach. Nonetheless, the approach the Legislature did choose bears
a rational relationship to cost savings.
Under the rational relationship test, the Legislature is permitted to "experiment
individually with various therapeutic programs related to criminal charges or
convictions" (In re Huffman (1986) 42 Cal. 3d 552, 561), so as "to control the risk of new
legislation by limiting its application" (People v. Lynch (2012) 209 Cal. App. 4th 353,
361), and determine what works and what does not. (See Warden v. State Bar (1999) 21
Cal. 4th 628, 649 [reform measures can be implemented one step at a time].) Because the
deferential nature of the rational basis test does not permit us to second guess the
Legislature and determine the most effective manner to achieve the legitimate state
interest, the classifications established in section 4019 bear a rational relationship to a
legitimate state interest.
Baulknight contends the date of October 1, 2011 is arbitrary and thus has no
legitimate or rational public purpose. However, all changes, additions or deletions to the
code must have a beginning date. Equal protection of the law "does not forbid statutes
and statutory changes to have a beginning and thus to discriminate between rights of an
earlier and later time." (Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Rhodes (1911) 220 U.S. 502, 505;
see People v. Floyd (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 179, 188 ["[d]efendant has not cited a single case,
in this state or any other, that recognizes an equal protection violation arising from the
timing of the [operative] date of a statute lessening the punishment for a particular
offense"].)
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Additionally, the Legislature could have rationally believed that by making the
2011 amendment to section 4019 apply based on the offense date, it was "preserving the
deterrent effect of the criminal law as to those crimes committed before that date. To
reward appellant with the enhanced credits of the 2011 amendment to section 4019, even
for time he spent in custody after October 1, 2011, weakens the deterrent effect of the law
as it stood when appellant committed his crimes. We see nothing irrational or
implausible in a legislative conclusion that individuals should be punished in accordance
with the sanctions and given the rewards (conduct credits) in effect at the time an offense
was committed." (People v. Kennedy, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 399.)
DISPOSITION
Judgment affirmed.
HALLER, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
MCDONALD, J.
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