Golden Hill Neighborhood Assn. v. City of San Diego CA4/1 ( 2013 )

Filed 11/25/13 Golden Hill Neighborhood Assn. v. City of San Diego CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
GOLDEN HILL NEIGHBORHOOD D062203
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
(Super. Ct. Nos. 37-2007-00074201-
v. CU-WM-CTL, 37-2008-00088429-
CU-MC-CTL)
CITY OF SAN DIEGO,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Richard S.
Whitney, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Law Offices of Charles R. Khoury Jr. and Charles R. Khoury, Jr.; Haskins &
Associates and Steven W. Haskins, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Jan I. Goldsmith, City Attorney, Carmen A. Brock, Deputy City Attorney for
Defendant and Respondent.
The Golden Hill Neighborhood Association and property owner John McNab
(collectively Association) prevailed in a prior appeal in which this court ordered the trial
court to vacate the judgment and issue a new judgment granting the Association's
requested relief against the City of San Diego (City). (Golden Hill Neighborhood Assn.,
Inc. v. City of San Diego (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 416 (Golden Hill).) After the remittitur
was issued and the trial court entered the new judgment, the Association sought attorney
fees under the private attorney general doctrine. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1021.5
(§ 1021.5).) The trial court denied the motion, finding it was untimely under California
Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(c)(1).1
We determine the trial court erred in ruling that the Association's attorney fees
motion was governed by rule 3.1702(c)(1). Under settled law, rule 3.1702(b)(1) is the
applicable rule and the Association's motion was timely under this rule. We reject the
City's alternate contention that the Association waived its right to seek attorney fees by
failing to seek the fees after the initial trial or during the prior appeal. We reverse and
remand for the court to consider the Association's attorney fees motion on its merits.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In 2007, the Association sued the City challenging the legality of a City resolution
establishing a Golden Hill maintenance district (District) and challenging the City's initial
2007 assessments to fund services in the maintenance district. (Golden Hill, supra, 199
Cal.App.4th at pp. 426-428.) In its complaint and petition for writ of mandate, the
Association claimed the City's formation of the District and the 2007 assessments
violated article XIII D of the California Constitution (article XIIID), which limits a local
1 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
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government's ability to levy special assessments against real property. (Golden Hill,
supra, at pp. 426-428.)
The next year the Association filed a second lawsuit against the City challenging
the District's 2008 tax assessments. (Golden Hill, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 428.) The
lawsuits were consolidated. (Id. at p. 421.)
After a bench trial on the consolidated action, the trial court issued a judgment
favoring the Association in part and the City in part, but the judgment was not entirely
clear as to the grounds for the decision or the scope of the relief provided on the
Association's claims. (Golden Hill, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 428.) No party sought
attorney fees.
All parties appealed, and on September 22, 2011 this court issued a lengthy
published opinion holding that the City's resolution establishing the District was
unconstitutional. (Golden Hill, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th 416.) In the Disposition section,
we ordered the trial court to: (1) vacate its judgment; and (2) enter a new judgment (i)
granting the Association's petition for writ of mandate filed in the 2007 lawsuit and (ii)
ordering the issuance of a writ vacating the City's resolution forming the District and
invalidating all of the District's assessments. (Id. at p. 440.) This was an unqualified
"win" for the Association.
The remittitur was issued on November 22, 2011. Less than one month later, the
Association filed a proposed amended judgment with the relief ordered by the Golden
Hill court. The proposed judgment included a space for costs and attorney fees to be
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awarded. Shortly after, the City filed an opposition to the proposed judgment, raising
various issues with the judgment and asserting that the Association was not entitled to
any attorney fees because it did not seek the fees after the first trial or in their appellate
briefs filed in the first appeal.
On January 9, 2012, the Association filed a response to the City's objections, and
also requested a hearing date on the costs and attorney fees issues. The Association
argued it was entitled to raise the issue of attorney fees under section 1021.5 and had not
waived the issue.
On January 20, 2012, the Association filed a motion seeking a hearing on the
proposed new judgment and requesting attorney fees incurred in the action. In its
supporting memorandum, the Association set forth legal and factual grounds for its
entitlement to attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine.
On February 9, 2012, the court signed the new judgment that had been proposed
by the Association. The judgment states:
"1. The previous judgments in each of the consolidated cases are
VACATED;
"2. The Petition for WRIT of MANDATE filed by Association in
2007 is GRANTED;
"3. The City's Resolution No. R-302887 forming the Maintenance
Assessment District of Golden Hill is vacated;
"4. The assessments imposed by that Maintenance Assessment
District are invalidated;
"5. A Writ shall issue to carry out the above orders."
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In the final line, the judgment states the issue of costs and fees will be decided by "filed
motions."
About one month later, on March 21, the Association filed a formal motion for
attorney fees under section 1021.5, supported by extensive documentation regarding the
nature of the attorney services and the amount of the claimed fees. On April 2, the City
filed an opposition to the attorney fees motion. The sole basis of its opposition was that
the court had no jurisdiction to consider the fees because the Association had not
requested the fees after the first trial or as part of the prior appeal. In reply, the
Association denied it had waived its rights, asserting that it was not until the Court of
Appeal issued the Golden Hill decision that it had succeeded in obtaining the primary
benefit sought—a writ invalidating the resolution forming the District and invalidating all
(including the post-2007) assessments.
After a hearing, the trial court denied the Association's attorney fees motion on a
different ground than had been briefed by the parties. On its own motion, the court
concluded the Association's motion was not timely because it was governed by rule
3.1702(c)(1), which requires an attorney fees motion to be filed within 40 days after a
remittitur is issued. The court stated the Association "did not file [its] motion for
attorneys' fees until March 21, 2012, beyond the 40-day limit."
Within several weeks, the Association moved for a new trial, requesting the court
to reconsider its ruling because it was legally incorrect. The Association explained that
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rule 3.1702(b)(1), rather than rule 3.1702(c)(1), governs the timeliness issue, citing
several supporting authorities, including Yuba Cypress Housing Partners, LTD v. Area
Developers (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1077 (Yuba). The Association argued that under rule
3.1702(b)(1), the Association's attorney fees motion was required to be filed within 60
days of the new judgment, and the Association filed its motion within this 60-day period.
The Association alternatively argued that it substantially complied with the rule because
it put the City on notice of its intent to seek attorney fees within several weeks of the
remittitur and before the new judgment was even filed.
The court denied the new trial motion.
DISCUSSION
I. Timeliness of Motion Under the California Rules of Court
The Association contends the court erred in concluding rule 3.1702(c)(1) applied
instead of rule 3.1702(b)(1).
A. Review Principles
The Association's contention requires that we interpret the Rules of Court. In
doing so, we apply well-settled statutory interpretation principles. (The Termo Co. v.
Luther (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 394, 403 [traditional statutory construction principles
applicable to interpretation of California Rules of Court].) In this analysis, we focus on
the language used in the applicable rules. (Centex Homes v. Superior Court (2013) 214
Cal.App.4th 1090, 1099.) If the words are not ambiguous, " 'the plain meaning of the
language governs.' " (Taxpayers for Accountable School Bond Spending v. San Diego
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Unified School District (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1025.) We presume the
Legislature meant what it said, and the statute's plain meaning governs. (Centex Homes,
supra, at p. 1099.)
We apply a de novo review standard in considering whether the trial court
properly interpreted the Rules of Court. (In re M.C. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 784, 804-
805.)
B. Analysis
Rule 3.1702 sets forth deadlines for attorney fees motions after trial or after an
appeal. The rule contains two separate deadlines: one applicable to fees incurred at trial
or on appeal (rule 3.1702(b)); and one applicable only to fees incurred on appeal (rule
3.1702(c)).
The first deadline, contained in rule 3.1702(b)(1) states in relevant part:
"(b) Attorney's fees before trial court judgment
"(1) Time for motion
"A notice of motion to claim attorney's fees for services up to and including
the rendition of judgment in the trial court—including attorney's fees on an
appeal before the rendition of judgment in the trial court—must be served
and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal under rules 8.104 and
8.108 in an unlimited civil case or under rules 8.822 and 8.823 in a limited
civil case." (Italics added.)
Under this rule, the Association had 60 days from the time the new judgment was filed to
file its motion. It is undisputed the Association met this deadline.
The second deadline, contained in rule 3.1702(c)(1) states in relevant part:
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"(c) Attorney's fees on appeal
"(1) Time for motion
"A notice of motion to claim attorney's fees on appeal—other than the
attorney's fees on appeal claimed under (b)—under a statute or contract
requiring the court to determine entitlement to the fees, the amount of the
fees, or both, must be served and filed within the time for serving and filing
the memorandum of costs under rule 8.278(c)(1) in an unlimited civil case
or under rule 8.891(c)(1) in a limited civil case." (Italics added.)
If this rule applies, the Association had 40 days from the time the remittitur was issued to
file its motion. (Rule 8.278(c)(1).) It is undisputed the Association did not meet this
deadline.
The trial court's conclusion that rule 3.1702(c)(1) applied to the Association's
motion is not supported by the plain language of this rule. First, rule 3.1702(c)(1)
expressly applies only to motions seeking attorneys fees "on appeal." Here, the
Association was seeking fees incurred at trial as well as on appeal. Second, rule
3.1702(c)(1) applies only to attorney fee requests "other than the attorney's fees on
appeal claimed under (b)." (Italics added.) Rule 3.1702(b) applies to attorney fees for
services "up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court—including
attorney fees on an appeal before the rendition of judgment in the trial court." (Rule
3.1702(b)(1).) When the Association filed its attorney fees motion in March 2012, it
sought fees incurred during trial and on appeal, all of which were incurred before the
existing February 9, 2012 judgment. Because the Association sought fees for services
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during trial and appeal and these fees were incurred before the February 9, 2012
judgment, rule 3.1702(b)(1) applies.
More than 10 years ago, a Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion under
similar facts. (Yuba, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th 1077.) The Yuba plaintiff was unsuccessful
at trial but prevailed on appeal and the appellate court remanded the case with orders for
the trial court to enter a new judgment in the plaintiff's favor. (Id. at pp. 1080, 1087.) On
remand, the plaintiff moved for attorney fees, but the trial court found the portion of the
motion seeking appellate attorney fees was untimely under former rule 870.2(c)(1), the
predecessor rule to rule 3.1702(c)(1).2 (Yuba, at p. 1084.) On appeal, the Yuba court
held the trial court erred in concluding subsection (c) contained the governing rule.
(Yuba, at pp. 1084-1086.) The court reasoned that subsection (c) excludes fee motions
falling under subsection (b), and the subsection (b) language encompasses attorney fees
on appeal " 'before the rendition of judgment,' " which necessarily refers to appellate
attorney fees sought after "the appellate court reverse[d] a judgment following trial and
direct[ed] the entry of a new judgment." (Id. at p. 1085, italics added.) "In contrast,
[subdivision (c) applies where] appellate attorney fees are incurred after rendition of [the
trial court] judgment when the appellate court simply affirms the judgment without
remanding the matter for further proceedings entailing the entry of a new judgment."
(Ibid.)
2 The two rules are essentially identical with respect to the issues raised here.
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Accordingly, when a party moves for attorney fees after an appeal, the time
deadlines depend on whether the appellate disposition was a simple affirmance of an
existing judgment (in which case rule 3.1702(c)(1) applies) or whether the disposition
was a reversal and/or a reversal with directions to enter a new judgment (in which case
rule 3.1702(b)(1) applies). (Yuba, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1084-1086.) This
interpretation has been endorsed by the commentators. (See Eisenberg et al., Cal.
Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2013) ¶¶ 14:122.11,
14:122.5 ["The subdivision (b)(1) timing rule for claiming fees incurred on an interim
appeal applies (not the subdivision (c)(1) deadline) when the appellate court reverses and
remands for further proceedings entailing the entry of a new judgment"]; 2 Pearl, Cal.
Attorney Fee Awards (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed. 2013) §§ 11.43, 12.21.)
Applying these principles here, the Association's motion was timely. As in Yuba,
this court reversed a judgment and directed the entry of a new judgment. (Golden Hill,
supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 440.) After the remittitur was issued, the trial court entered a
new judgment consistent with the opinions expressed in the Golden Hill opinion.
Thereafter, the Association moved for attorney fees that were incurred before the new
judgment. At that point, the prior judgment was no longer in existence and had no effect.
(See Saller v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1237-1238
["effect of an unqualified reversal is to vacate the judgment . . . as if . . . no judgment had
been entered"].) Accordingly, by definition, the fees sought by the Association were fees
"for services up to and including the rendition of [the only existing] judgment in the trial
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court—including attorney's fees on an appeal before the rendition of judgment in the trial
court." (Rule 3.1702(b)(1).) Thus, rule 3.1702(b) applied.
The City argues Yuba is inapplicable because in that case the plaintiffs "lost" in
the trial court whereas in this case each party prevailed in part. However, with respect to
the rule 3.1702 issue, this difference is not material. The critical point is that the rule
3.1702(b)(1) deadline applies when the party is seeking appellate fees incurred before the
"new" judgment. In Yuba, as here, the court ordered the trial court to reverse the prior
judgment and enter a new judgment in the plaintiff's favor. Under those circumstances,
the plaintiff seeking prevailing party attorney fees for attorney services incurred before
the new judgment is governed by the deadline set forth in rule 3.1702(b)(1). (See Yuba,
supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1084-1086.)
Similarly, the fact that Yuba involved an attorney fees motion under Civil Code
section 1717, rather than under section 1021.5, is a distinction without a difference. Rule
3.1702 expressly applies to "statutory attorney's fees and claims for attorney's fees
provided for in a contract." (Rule 3.1702(a).)
Finally, we disagree with the City's contention that the prior judgment was not
"reversed." In the Disposition section, the Golden Hill court stated: "The trial court is
directed to vacate the judgment and enter a new judgment granting the Association's
petition for writ of mandate filed in 2007 and ordering the issuance of a writ vacating the
city's resolution . . . forming the District and invalidating the assessments imposed by the
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District." (Golden Hill, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 440.) That disposition constitutes a
reversal of the prior judgment.
II. Association Did Not Waive Right To Seek Attorney Fees
The City alternatively urges this court to affirm the court's order on the ground that
the Association did not file an attorney fees motion after the first trial and/or during the
first appeal. The City argues that by failing to previously move for attorney fees, the
Association waived its right to seek the fees following this court's unqualified reversal of
the judgment. Although the trial court did not reach this issue, both parties briefed the
issue in the proceedings below and in this appeal, and request that we decide the issue.
For purposes of judicial economy, we agree it is appropriate to address the issue on this
appeal.
Under section 1021.5, " 'the court may award attorney fees to a "successful party"
in any action that "has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the
public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been
conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial
burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such
fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.". . .' "
(Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 565.)
The City contends that even assuming the Association could satisfy section
1021.5's statutory elements with respect to the results achieved from the Golden Hill
decision, the Association is precluded from seeking the fees for services incurred to
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obtain these results because the Association had already obtained this same successful
outcome after the initial trial court judgment. Essentially, the City argues that there was
no need for the first appeal because the Association had already obtained its primary
requested relief after the trial, even if its attorneys did not recognize this.
This argument is unsupported. After the initial trial, the trial court entered a
judgment in favor of the Association on its cause of action alleging that the City's special
assessments were invalid because they were not imposed for "special benefits," as is
required under article XIIID. (Golden Hill, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 429.) But the
trial court found in the City's favor with respect to the Association's requests for
declaratory and injunctive relief pertaining to future assessments and other requested
relief. (Id. at p. 429.)
Our court stated that the "effect" of this judgment was "unclear" and "it is
uncertain whether the trial court intended to invalidate the formation of the District or
simply invalidate the 2007 assessments levied by the District as being unauthorized by
article XIII D." (Golden Hill, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 428.) In a footnote, the
Golden Hill court additionally observed that "[c]ase law is unclear as to whether a
judicial determination invalidating an initial assessment imposed in a newly formed
assessment district necessarily invalidates the formation of the assessment district
established to levy the assessment." (Id. at p. 428, fn. 9.) In this same footnote, the court
specifically rejected the City's argument that the judgment necessarily invalidated the
formation of the District. (Ibid.) Later in the opinion, the Golden Hill court noted that
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the judgment "appears to uphold the 2008 assessment," which would be inconsistent with
a conclusion that the trial court intended to invalidate the District. (Id. at p. 429.)
After determining the trial court's judgment was unclear and uncertain, our court
engaged in a lengthy analysis of the Association's and the City's appellate arguments
regarding whether the City's formation of the District and the imposition of the
assessments satisfied constitutional requirements. (Golden Hill, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 429-439.) The court ultimately concluded the formation of the District violated the
state Constitution (article XIIID) because there was insufficient evidence to support the
assigned values of City-owned parcels within the District in determining whether there
was a proper affirmative vote from the property owners. (Golden Hill, supra, 199
Cal.App.4th at pp. 429-435.) Our court also concluded that all assessments were
improper and unconstitutional because the City did not separately quantify the general
and special benefits to be provided by the assessments. (Id. at pp. 436-439.) Based on
these conclusions, the Golden Hill court ordered the prior judgment "vacate[d]" and
ordered the trial court to enter a new and different judgment and a writ of mandate
vacating the City's resolution forming the District and invalidating the assessments
imposed by the District. (Id. at p. 440.)
The Association asserts it did not seek section 1021.5 attorney fees after the initial
trial because "the benefit of the lawsuit to the residents of Golden Hill was not at all clear
until the ambiguities in the trial court's rulings were resolved by this Court of Appeal and
the prior judgment vacated, a new judgment filed and a writ issued . . . pursuant to this
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Court of Appeal's [decision]." The Association explains that it appealed the trial court
judgment "because their partial victory did not gain them what they sought, the
dissolution of the assessment district. That result was gained in the reversal and public
opinion of Golden Hill . . . ."
The Association's position is supported by the Golden Hill decision. Based on the
statements, conclusions, and disposition set forth in the Golden Hill opinion, the
Association obtained new, qualitatively different, and substantially greater relief in the
new judgment than was initially mandated by the original trial court judgment. Thus, the
Association was entitled to seek private attorney general fees incurred for obtaining this
relief in a timely motion filed for the first time after the new judgment was entered. To
the extent the City believes that the Association did not need to file the appeal to achieve
this result, or that its earlier partial victory was no different from its later appellate
victory, those arguments can be presented to the trial court when the court determines
whether the Association met its burden to show the statutory criteria for obtaining a
section 1021.5 attorney fees award and/or when the court examines the reasonableness of
the incurred fees during trial and on appeal.
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DISPOSITION
Order reversed. The court is ordered to vacate its April 19 order finding plaintiffs'
attorney fees motion untimely under rule 3.1702(c)(1). The court is ordered to consider
the Association's attorney fees motion consistent with the conclusions reached in this
opinion. The City is ordered to bear appellants' costs on appeal.
HALLER, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
MCDONALD, J.
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