People v. Luquin CA4/1 ( 2013 )

Filed 12/20/13 P. v. Luquin CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D062832
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCS232939)
JAVIER ANGEL LUQUIN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Stephanie
Sontag, Judge. Affirmed.
Tracy A. Rogers, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland,
Kathryn Kirschbaum and Kimberly Donohue, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The People charged Javier Angel Luquin with three counts of committing a lewd
act upon a child (Pen. Code, § 288)1 (counts 1-3),2 one count of making a criminal threat
(§ 422) (count 4), and one count of attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a
crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)) (count 5).3 A jury found Luquin guilty of counts 1, 4 and 5.
The jury found Luquin not guilty of count 2, and was unable to reach a verdict on count
3. The trial court sentenced Luquin to an aggregate term of six years in prison,
comprised of the middle term of six years on count 1, the middle term of two years on
count 4 to run concurrently with the term imposed on count 1, and the middle term of two
years on count 5, stayed pursuant to section 654.
On appeal, Luquin claims that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's
verdict finding him guilty of making a criminal threat (§ 422) (count 4). Specifically,
Luquin claims that there is insufficient evidence that the victim suffered "sustained fear,"
as is required to support a finding of guilt for a violation of section 422. We affirm the
judgment.
1 Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 The People alleged that A.Q. was the victim of the offense charged in count 1 and
that M.L. was the victim in the offenses charged in counts 2 and 3.
3 Counts 1, 4, and 5 are all alleged to have taken place in early June 2009.
2
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND4
On June 2, 2009, Luquin molested his cousin's eight-year-old daughter, A.Q.,
during a family gathering at Luquin's mother's house. At the time of the incident, A.Q.
and her mother, Y.B., were living with Luquin's mother. The incident occurred after
A.Q. and Luquin went to an upstairs bedroom to retrieve some playing cards. While
standing in the doorway of the room, Luquin touched A.Q. over her clothing in her
vaginal area. Luquin told A.Q. that if she would stay quiet, he would give her money.
A.Q. ran from the room and immediately disclosed the molestation to Y.B.
Within approximately 15 minutes of A.Q.'s disclosure, Y.B. called the police.
Later that evening, Luquin called Y.B.'s cell phone and left a profanity-laden voicemail
message. Y.B. listened to the message the following morning. When asked by the
prosecutor what Luquin said on the voicemail message, Y.B. testified that Luquin was
"calling me names, calling me a bitch," and that he said that "when he sees me and my
daughter he was going to bury us alive where we stood." Y.B. described Luquin's tone of
voice in the voicemail as "ranting and raging." The following colloquy then occurred:
"[The prosecutor]: And how did listening to that message make you
feel?
"[Y.B.]: He is supposed to be my cousin. He is supposed to be my
family, not—
"[The prosecutor]: Did you take his threats seriously?
4 We need not discuss the evidence pertaining to counts 2 and 3, since that evidence
is not relevant to the issue on appeal.
3
"[Y.B.]: I did.
"[The prosecutor]: Why?
"[Y.B.]: Cause I did. I know how [Luquin] can get when he gets
mad.[5]
"[The prosecutor]: Were you scared by his threat?
"[Y.B.]: I was."
After this exchange, the prosecutor played a recording of the voicemail message
for the jury.6 The transcription of the voicemail message that was provided to the jury
reads as follows:
"[F]irst saved message from phone number . . . , received June 2 at
10:16 p.m. Hey bitch (unin[telligible]) Hey mother fucker. You
better pack your shit mother fucker. Get your fucking ass out of the
house. You are out on the street. (unin[telligible]). I don't give a
fuck (unin[telligible]) bitch, you ain't fucking with me [and] you
ain't fucking with my house, bitch. You're not fucking with my
family. And your shit is out on the street. Do you hear me?! You
don't fuckin' fuck with me bitch. That's right bitch fuck that shit,
fuck you and your and your [sic] fucking daughter go fuck
(unin[telligible]) so he can give you a fuckin roll of on the street
bitch you know you're gonna fuck'n (unin[telligible]) you fuck'n call
the cops and call everybody you fucking know because
5 Elsewhere during her testimony, Y.B. stated that she had known Luquin all of her
life.
6 We directed the trial court to send the exhibit containing the recording to this
court. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.224(d) ["At any time the reviewing court may
direct the superior court . . . to send it an exhibit"].)
4
(unin[telligible]) don't fuck with me, do not fuck with me you
fucking cunt, (unin[telligible]) fuck'n whore."7
After the prosecutor played the recording of the voicemail message for the jury,
the following colloquy occurred:
"[The prosecutor]: Now, prior to playing that recording, you testified
that on that voicemail message [Luquin] said something to the effect
of bury you alive. Did you hear that in there? I know it's hard to
hear, because it's a recording.
"[Y.B.]: I think I heard I will bury you where you stand."
On the morning after the incident, Luquin telephoned Y.B. again and attempted to
apologize. Y.B. hung up on Luquin and then went to the police station. Y.B. has not had
any interaction with Luquin since this telephone call.8
7 The trial court instructed the jury, "The transcript is not the evidence. The audio
tape is the evidence. So you have to rely on what you hear as the evidence in this matter.
It is difficult to hear."
8 After the close of evidence, defense counsel made an oral motion for judgment of
acquittal with respect to count 4 (making a criminal threat) and count 5 (dissuading a
witness). Defense counsel argued in part, "There is a lot of cussing going on, but there is
no direct threat of great bodily injury . . . or to kill somebody." The prosecutor responded
that the sound quality of the recorded voicemail message was poor, and that the jury
should have the opportunity to listen to the recording and consider Y.B.'s testimony
regarding the content of the message.
The trial court denied the motion, noting that the People had played the voicemail
message for the jury at trial, and that "there is some suggestion of a threat and certainly
the victim heard the threat." The court stated, "I think it is a factual question for the jury
to decide and not for me to decide as a matter of law."
5
III.
DISCUSSION
There is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict
finding Luquin guilty of making a criminal threat
Luquin claims that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict
finding him guilty of making a criminal threat (§ 422) (count 4).9 Specifically, Luquin
contends that there is insufficient evidence that Y.B. suffered "sustained fear," which is
required to support a finding of guilt with respect to this crime.
A. Standard of review
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, "the relevant question is whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
(Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319.) "[T]he court must review the whole
record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)
B. Governing law
In People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227-228, the Supreme Court
summarized the elements of making a criminal threat (§ 422) as follows:
9 Luquin does not raise any challenge to the jury's finding of guilt on count 5 for
dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)). Count 5 was also based on the voicemail
message described in part II., ante.
6
"In order to prove a violation of section 422, the prosecution must
establish all of the following: (1) that the defendant 'willfully
threaten[ed] to commit a crime which will result in death or great
bodily injury to another person,' (2) that the defendant made the
threat 'with the specific intent that the statement . . . is to be taken as
a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out,' (3) that
the threat—which may be 'made verbally, in writing, or by means of
an electronic communication device'—was 'on its face and under the
circumstances in which it [was] made, . . . so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person
threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of
execution of the threat,'[10] (4) that the threat actually caused the
person threatened 'to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety
or for his or her immediate family's safety,' and (5) that the
threatened person's fear was 'reasonabl[e]' under the circumstances.
[Citation]." (Italics added.)11
10 On appeal, Luquin does not claim that there is insufficient evidence as to this
element.
11 Section 422 provides in relevant part:
"Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will
result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the
specific intent that the statement, made verbally, in writing, or by
means of an electronic communication device, is to be taken as a
threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on
its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so
unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to
the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate
prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person
reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his
or her immediate family's safety, shall be punished by imprisonment
in the county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the
state prison.
"For the purposes of this section, 'immediate family' means any
spouse, whether by marriage or not, parent, child, any person related
by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree, or any other
person who regularly resides in the household, or who, within the
prior six months, regularly resided in the household.
7
The word "sustained" for purposes of section 422 "means a period of time that
extends beyond what is momentary, fleeting, or transitory." (People v. Allen (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156 (Allen).)
"[A]ll of the circumstances can and should be considered in determining whether a
terrorist threat [pursuant to section 422] has been made." (People v. Solis (2001) 90
Cal.App.4th 1002, 1014 (Solis) [stating that "it is clear a jury can properly consider a
later action taken by a defendant in evaluating whether the crime of making a terrorist
threat has been committed"].) For example, a "victim's knowledge of defendant's prior
conduct is relevant in establishing that the victim was in a state of sustained fear." (Allen,
supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1156.) In addition, evidence of a defendant's emotional state
is relevant to the determination of whether the victim suffered sustained fear. (See
People v. Culbert (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 184, 191, fn. 3 (Culbert) [concluding that there
was substantial evidence that victim suffered sustained fear from incident in which
"angry stepparent" put firearm to victim's head]; cf. People v. Martinez (1997) 53
Cal.App.4th 1212, 1221 ["Defendant was extremely angry, was cursing at Iorio and was
in very close proximity to Iorio when he made the threats. This type of situation can be
very intimidating and can carry an aura of serious danger"].) Likewise, the seriousness of
the threat is relevant in determining whether there is substantial evidence that the victim
suffered sustained fear. (See People v. Fierro (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1348
" 'Electronic communication device' includes, but is not limited to,
telephones . . . ."
8
(Fierro) ["Facing what he thought was a gun and hearing words to the effect that he and
his son were about to be killed, [the victim] was in sustained fear for his and his son's
life"].)
C. Application
In order to determine whether there is substantial evidence that Y.B. suffered
sustained fear from a threat made by Luquin, we must first examine the evidence in the
record that pertains to the nature of that threat. (Solis, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1014
[a reviewing court must consider all surrounding circumstances in determining the
existence of a criminal threat].) As noted above, Y.B. testified that Luquin left a
voicemail message in which he stated that, "when he sees me and my daughter he was
going to bury us alive where we stood." Luquin contends in his reply brief that "those
words do not appear in the recorded message that contains the threat," and that Y.B.'s
testimony "to that effect is a mistake, an exaggeration, or a fabrication."12
We have reviewed Y.B.'s testimony and have listened to the recorded message that
the prosecutor played for the jury at trial. In light of the poor quality of the recording, it
is not possible to determine precisely what Luquin is saying. However, it is clear that
that the voicemail message contains numerous profanities, and that Luquin refers to both
12 Luquin's counsel did not raise a direct challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
as to the content of his threat in the opening brief and failed to designate the exhibit
containing the recorded message for transmittal to this court, as is required. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.224(a).) Despite counsel's failure to properly preserve this claim,
we exercise our discretion to consider the claim on the merits. (See People v. Williams
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [appellate court has discretion to consider claims that
are not properly preserved for review].)
9
the molestation of Y.B.'s daughter and to Y.B. contacting the police. After listening to
the recording, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have found that Luquin stated
during a portion of the message, "I'll go fucking psycho fucking [sic] get out of jail,
bitch." In addition, Luquin appears to state several times that he will be coming to his
mother house where the molestation incident occurred and where Y.B. and A.Q. lived,
stating, "I will be down there tomorrow," "[t]omorrow, I be there," and "I will be there
motherfucking bitch." Further, it is clear that the transcription provided to the jury is far
from a full transcription of the words contained on the voicemail message. Accordingly,
we conclude that the jury could have reasonably credited Y.B.'s testimony that Luquin
stated that when he saw Y.B. and her daughter, he would " bury [them] alive where [they]
stood."
There is thus substantial evidence in the record that Luquin threatened to kill Y.B.
and her daughter the next time he encountered them. The jury could also have reasonably
found that Luquin issued this threat while in an extremely emotional and angry state (see
Culbert, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 191, fn. 3 [noting that the defendant was "angry"
when issuing implied criminal threat]), after having committed a serious criminal offense
against Y.B.'s daughter. Moreover, the jury could have reasonably found that Luquin
made the threat while implying that Y.B. would suffer repercussions if she were to
contact the police. In addition, Luquin and Y.B. are related, and Y.B. knew Luquin well.
Thus, the jury could have reasonably found that Y.B. would reasonably believe that
Luquin would know how to find her in order to carry out his threat. In addition, as noted
above, the jury could have reasonably found that Luquin repeatedly stated on the message
10
that he was going to come the following day to the residence where Y.B. and her
daughter were staying. Further, Y.B. testified both that she took Luquin's threats
seriously because of her knowledge of his temper (see Allen, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p.
1156), and that she was scared by the threat.
While the prosecution presented essentially no direct evidence that Y.B. suffered
sustained fear as a result of Luquin's threat (compare with e.g, Fierro, supra, 180
Cal.App.4th at p. 1348 ["Mr. Ibarra testified clearly and more than once that he was
horribly scared, and his fright was not fleeting"]; Solis, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th 1002[prosecutor presented evidence that when victim heard threatening voice message she
"became hysterical and started to cry" (id. at p. 1016, fn. 6), and that victim later told
investigator that she was "very upset and afraid" (id. at p. 1009)]), we conclude, in light
of all of the circumstances described above, that a jury could reasonably have inferred
that Luquin made a threat that actually caused Y.B. to be in sustained fear for her and her
daughter's safety.
Accordingly, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's
verdict finding Luquin guilty of making a criminal threat.
11
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
AARON, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.
12