People v. Gutierrez CA1/5 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 10/1/21 P. v. Gutierrez CA1/5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
    ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FIVE
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  A159878, A159997
    v.                                                                     (Solano County
    JESUS GUTIERREZ, JR. et al.                                            Super. Ct. Nos. FCR332353,
    FCR332354)
    Defendants and Appellants.
    A shootout in Fairfield left a man dead, and a jury convicted Jesus
    Gutierrez, Jr. and Christopher Vanning Johnson (collectively, defendants) of
    second degree murder and found that Johnson personally and intentionally
    discharged a firearm causing death during the offense. The trial court
    sentenced defendants to state prison.
    Defendants appeal, raising several claims of error. We affirm.1
    BACKGROUND
    In August 2017, Gary Cromwell, Jr. was shot and killed. The
    prosecution charged defendants with first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a))
    and alleged Johnson personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
    causing death in the commission of the murder (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).
    By separate order this date, we deny defendants’ respective petitions
    1
    for writ of habeas corpus (case Nos. A168038 and A168039) alleging
    ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
    1
    A.
    Prosecution Evidence
    Jordan Hendricks and Cromwell were close friends.2 They sold and
    used drugs together. At noon on the day of the shooting, Hendricks went to
    Cromwell’s house. The two men took Xanax. That evening, they went to
    Fairfield to sell marijuana. Cromwell drove the car, a silver Acura with
    windows so tinted one could not see through them. Hendricks rode in the
    passenger seat. Both men carried firearms.
    Cromwell parked the Acura near an apartment complex. The two men
    got out of the car and walked around looking for a buyer. But a buyer “never
    came,” so the two men walked through an alley back to the Acura. Hendricks
    put his gun under the passenger seat. Cromwell drove away.
    When they reached a nearby intersection, a dark car pulled up next to
    the Acura. The passenger in the dark car had his upper body “hanging out
    the window.” He had a “gun pointed” at the Acura. Hendricks grabbed his
    gun “for self-defense.” Hendricks could not remember who fired first, but he
    heard enough shots being fired that he decided to “shoot back.” Cromwell did
    not fire his gun. Seconds later, Cromwell “got shot” in the head. The Acura
    accelerated, then crashed.
    Hendricks got out of the Acura, threw his gun under a parked car, and
    ran to a nearby house to ask for help. The police arrived and arrested him.
    Hendricks lied to the police about the incident: he claimed a man named
    Leon shot the gun from the Acura. But when confronted by the police with
    surveillance video, Hendricks admitted Leon was not in the car and that he—
    not Leon—shot the gun. Hendricks told the police that “somebody pulled up
    hanging out the window shooting at [him] so [he] shot back.”
    2   Hendricks testified under a grant of immunity.
    2
    On cross-examination, Hendricks acknowledged that both he and
    Cromwell knew of Johnson. But Hendricks denied knowing Johnson was in
    the dark car. Cromwell’s phone contained YouTube videos with comments
    about where to find a man with one leg who was “hiding.” Johnson had a
    prosthetic leg.
    A.    Neighbor’s Testimony
    On the night of the shooting, a woman who lived in the neighborhood
    saw a “handful” of people—including a man named “Chris”—hanging out by
    the white picket fence surrounding her front yard. As Johnson spoke with a
    woman in the group, two men came out of an alley across the street. Johnson
    appeared to recognize the men. Johnson said, “ ‘Look. There they are.’ ” He
    “pulled a gun out of his pants” and held it “by his side.” Johnson seemed
    “adrenaline excited” but not nervous or scared. When the men walked in the
    other direction, Johnson put the gun away and resumed his conversation.
    Minutes later, a black Chevy Impala pulled up by the fence. A woman
    got out of the car and went inside a nearby house. Then an Acura drove up,
    stopped at the intersection, and turned left. Johnson seemed to recognize the
    people in the Acura. He was excited, even more so than when he saw the
    men coming out of the alley. He “did not appear . . . scared.” Johnson quickly
    got into the passenger seat of the Impala and yelled in a loud voice at the
    driver to “ ‘follow the car.’ ” Johnson commanded: “ ‘Go get them. Follow
    them. Follow that car.’ ”
    As the Impala sped away, Johnson hoisted his body onto the passenger
    side windowsill. The top half of Johnson’s body hung out of the passenger
    window. Johnson held a gun in his hands. Seconds later, the neighbor heard
    gunshots and car tires “screeching.” Then the Impala returned. Johnson
    3
    “stumbled” out of the car and yelled at the people by the fence to get inside a
    nearby house. He was frantic. At that point, the neighbor called 911.
    B.    Police Investigation
    Police officers found Cromwell in the driver’s seat of the Acura,
    dead. In Cromwell’s jacket pocket was a gun with a magazine filled to
    capacity. Officers found shell casings in the seat, floorboard, and backseat of
    the Acura. There were bullet holes in the driver’s side of the car. Nearby,
    police officers located the Impala. Gutierrez was in the driver’s seat. The
    driver’s side window was shattered. Police found “expended shell casings on
    top of the driver’s side doorframe.” The front passenger window was down.
    Surveillance video footage from a nearby building showed Hendricks
    and Cromwell walking through the alley. Another video showed the Impala
    quickly overtake the Acura, pause for a few seconds, and drive away. After
    watching the video, a police officer testified there were “six to eight flashes”
    that appeared “to be a discharge of firearms” from inside the Acura. The
    video did not show the passenger side of the Impala, so the officer could not
    “tell if someone [was] hanging out” of the Impala or firing shots from the
    passenger side of that car.
    In a police interview, Johnson claimed he was the victim of two
    shootings. The first shooting occurred when Johnson was on the sidewalk
    near the white picket fence: a car “pulled up,” “started shooting,” then sped
    “away.” After the shooting, Johnson decided to leave because he thought the
    car “was going to come back.” He and Gutierrez got into Gutierrez’s Impala.
    Gutierrez drove in the same direction as the car that had shot at them. The
    Impala happened to go this way, according to Johnson, because it was the
    route to his house. Earlier in the interview, Johnson told police he was
    homeless.
    4
    Johnson described the second shooting: he said the car pulled up next
    to the Impala and “said stuff.” Johnson could not see inside the car because
    the darkly-tinted windows were up. Then Johnson felt a bullet “hit the
    window, hit the car.” The Impala drove away. Johnson denied having—or
    shooting—a gun. But he acknowledged he would have “gunshot residue on
    [his] hands” from visiting “the shooting range.”
    B.
    Defense Evidence
    Gutierrez testified he drove the Impala to the neighborhood where the
    shooting occurred and parked outside a house with a white picket fence.
    Gutierrez had a gun that he hid in the Impala. A car with “very tinted”
    windows drove by, slowed down, then “sped off.” As soon as the car left,
    Johnson “hopped in” the Impala and said, “ ‘Did you see that? Did you see
    that car?’ ” Gutierrez responded, “Yes.”
    Johnson wanted to see “who was in the car,” so he told Gutierrez to
    follow it. Gutierrez followed Johnson’s directions despite knowing that he
    would be unable to “see anybody” in the car because the windows were “so
    tinted.” Gutierrez did not see a gun in Johnson’s hands. The two men did
    not speak while they followed the car.
    Gutierrez drove fast and “pulled up beside” the car. Someone from the
    car “started shooting” and bullets “were flying” at the Impala. Gutierrez
    froze and tried to “take cover.” Johnson said, “ ‘Go. Go. Go. Drive off. Drive
    off.’ ” Before he did so, Gutierrez heard two or three gunshots that “sounded
    very close to [him].” At that point, Gutierrez knew Johnson had a gun.
    Gutierrez did not fire his gun. He drove away and threw his gun in the
    bushes. Gutierrez lied to the police about the incident because “a lot of things
    5
    were going through [his] mind and [he] didn’t really know what to say and
    what not to say.”
    Johnson’s girlfriend, Victoria C., was with Johnson and Gutierrez in
    front of the white picket fence on the day of the shooting. Victoria watched
    Johnson get into the Impala. She did not see whether he had anything in his
    hands. She did not see him hanging out of passenger window.3 Soon after
    Johnson and Gutierrez drove away, Victoria heard gunshots. Then the
    Impala returned. Johnson got out of the car and said, “ ‘It just went down.’ ”
    Johnson told Victoria to “ ‘run into the house.’ ” She ran into the
    backyard, where she, Johnson, and Gutierrez hid. Johnson told Victoria that
    an Acura had shot at the Impala. He did not ask Victoria to call 911; he did
    not tell her he acted in self-defense. Victoria acknowledged repeatedly lying
    to police and to a defense investigator.
    A forensic scientist testified that a person hanging his torso out of the
    front passenger side window of the Impala would have “a high probability of
    getting shot.”
    C.
    Verdict and Sentence
    A jury convicted defendants of second degree murder and found the
    firearm enhancement true as to Johnson (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (b),
    12022.53, subd. (d)). In 2020, the trial court denied Johnson’s motion to
    strike the firearm enhancement and sentenced him to 40 years to life in state
    prison. It imposed a $10,000 restitution fine (§ 1202.4) on Johnson. The
    court sentenced Gutierrez to 15 years to life in state prison and ordered him
    A friend of Johnson’s testified Johnson was not hanging out of the
    3
    window of the Impala and did not have a gun in his hands.
    6
    to pay a $4,500 restitution fine. Defense counsel did not object to the amount
    of the fines.
    DISCUSSION
    I.
    Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Implied Finding that
    Johnson Did Not Act in Self-Defense
    “When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for a jury
    finding, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the
    judgment of the trial court. We evaluate whether substantial evidence,
    defined as reasonable and credible evidence of solid value, has been disclosed,
    permitting the trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
    [Citation.] ‘ “The standard of review is the same in cases in which the
    prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Vargas
    (2020) 
    9 Cal.5th 793
    , 820.) Under this standard of review, reversal is not
    warranted “unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
    sufficient substantial evidence to support’ ” the conviction. (People v. Bolin
    (1998) 
    18 Cal.4th 297
    , 331.)
    When self-defense is at issue, the prosecution bears the burden of
    proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted without
    justification. (People v. Rios (2000) 
    23 Cal.4th 450
    , 462; People v. Lloyd
    (2015) 
    236 Cal.App.4th 49
    , 63.) Perfect self-defense—a complete defense to
    murder—requires the defendant to have an actual and objectively reasonable
    belief that bodily injury is about to be inflicted on the defendant. (People v.
    Humphrey (1996) 
    13 Cal.4th 1073
    , 1082.) “The threat of bodily injury must
    be imminent.” (People v. Minifie (1996) 
    13 Cal.4th 1055
    , 1064.) “ ‘Fear of
    future harm-no matter how great the fear and no matter how great the
    likelihood of the harm-will not suffice.” (Humphrey, at p. 1082.)
    7
    Moreover, it “is well established that the ordinary self-defense
    doctrine—applicable when a defendant reasonably believes that his safety is
    endangered—may not be invoked by a defendant who, through his own
    wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a physical assault or the commission
    of a felony), has created circumstances under which his adversary’s attack . . .
    is legally justified.” (In re Christian S. (1994) 
    7 Cal.4th 768
    , 773, fn. 1.)
    Defendants contend the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable
    doubt that Johnson did not act in self-defense. But in finding defendants
    guilty of second degree murder, the jury impliedly found otherwise and
    substantial evidence supports that finding. A neighbor testified Johnson
    seemed “adrenaline excited” when he saw Hendricks and Cromwell emerge
    from the alley. When Johnson saw the two men, he retrieved a gun and held
    it by his side. Later, when Hendricks and Cromwell drove by, Johnson got
    “more excited.” At no point did Johnson seem afraid. Johnson yelled at
    Gutierrez to “ ‘get’ ” the men and to “ ‘follow’ ” their car. He quickly got into
    the Impala. As the Impala sped away, Johnson hung out of the window,
    holding a gun in his hand.
    Hendricks testified a dark car pulled alongside the Acura. A man—
    Johnson—was hanging out of the car’s window “shooting at [him].”
    Hendricks heard enough shots being fired that he decided to “shoot back.”
    Surveillance video footage showed the Impala aggressively overtaking the
    Acura, pausing briefly during the gunfight, and driving away. When
    interviewed by police, Johnson gave no indication he feared imminent harm
    “that could be met only through the use of deadly force.” (People v. Steskal
    (2021) 
    11 Cal.5th 332
    , *15.)
    Considered together, this evidence easily supports a conclusion that
    defendants sought out Hendricks and Cromwell and initiated the
    8
    confrontation that ended in Cromwell’s death. (People v. Steskal, supra, 11
    Cal.5th at *15 [circumstances of the crime indicated the defendant was the
    aggressor, “not the other way around”]; People v. Salazar (2016) 
    63 Cal.4th 214
    , 244 [ample evidence established the defendant initiated the assault and
    supported jury’s rejection of his self-defense claim].) This evidence also
    supports a reasonable inference that Johnson did not fear imminent harm
    when he directed Gutierrez to go “ ‘get’ ” the two men. (People v. Brady
    (2018) 
    22 Cal.App.5th 1008
    , 1018 [“there was sufficient evidence for the jury
    to reject [the defendant’s] claim of self-defense based on a lack of objective
    reasonableness”]; People v. Nguyen (2015) 
    61 Cal.4th 1015
    , 1044 [jury could
    reasonably conclude the defendant “did not act on the basis of fear alone but
    also on a desire to kill his rival”].)
    Defendants’ argument to the contrary is premised on a recitation of the
    evidence favoring them. This strategy—an improper request to reweigh the
    evidence and reevaluate the credibility of witnesses—is unavailing. It “ ‘is
    the jury, not the appellate court, which must be convinced of the defendant’s
    guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] Where the circumstances
    reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, a reviewing court’s conclusion
    the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary
    finding does not warrant the judgment’s reversal.” (People v. Zamudio (2008)
    
    43 Cal.4th 327
    , 357–358, italics added.) Here, the evidence supports the
    jury’s rejection of Johnson’s self-defense claim.4
    II.
    4 Having reached this result, we need not address Gutierrez’s argument
    that he is not liable for murder as an aider and abettor because Johnson
    acted in self-defense.
    9
    Substantial Evidence Establishes Gutierrez Aided
    and Abetted the Murder
    Gutierrez claims he was unaware Johnson intended to kill Cromwell
    and, as a result, insufficient evidence establishes he aided and abetted the
    murder.
    “Second degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
    malice aforethought but without the additional elements, such as willfulness,
    premeditation, and deliberation, that would support a conviction of first
    degree murder.” (People v. Knoller (2007) 
    41 Cal.4th 139
    , 151.) Malice “ ‘may
    be either express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a
    deliberate intention to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied,
    when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances
    attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.’ ” (Id. at
    p. 151.)
    “[A] person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he . . . ,
    acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2)
    the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the
    commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or
    instigates, the commission of the crime.” (People v. Beeman (1984) 
    35 Cal.3d 547
    , 561.) In a murder prosecution, this means “the aider and abettor must
    know and share the murderous intent of the actual perpetrator.” (People v.
    McCoy (2001) 
    25 Cal.4th 1111
    , 1118.) But “the aider and abettor need not
    have advance knowledge of the crime or the perpetrator’s intent. ‘Aiding and
    abetting may be committed “on the spur of the moment,” that is, as
    instantaneously as the criminal act itself.’ ” (People v. Frandsen (2019) 
    33 Cal.App.5th 1126
    , 1148.)
    Here, substantial evidence supports a reasonable inference that
    Gutierrez—with knowledge of Johnson’s murderous intent—offered support
    10
    and encouragement to Johnson, thereby aiding and abetting the murder.
    When Johnson saw the Acura, he got into Gutierrez’s car. Armed with a gun,
    Johnson yelled at Gutierrez to “ ‘follow’ ” the car and to “ ‘get’ ” Hendricks and
    Cromwell. Gutierrez followed Johnson’s directions: he chased after the
    Acura and pulled up alongside it. Before driving away, Gutierrez waited
    while Johnson shot at the Acura. Nothing suggests Gutierrez was surprised
    by, or afraid to interfere with, Johnson’s actions. (People v. Campbell (1994)
    
    25 Cal.App.4th 402
    , 409.) After the shootout, Gutierrez discarded his own
    weapon and hid. (People v. Hoang (2006) 
    145 Cal.App.4th 264
    , 270 [the
    defendant’s actions after the crime were consistent with aiding and
    abetting].) Together, this evidence adequately demonstrates Gutierrez’s
    “awareness and complicity in [the] killing.” (People v. Quiroz (2013) 
    215 Cal.App.4th 65
    , 76.)
    III.
    Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective for Failing to Object
    to the Prosecutor’s Closing Argument
    Defendants contend the prosecutor erroneously argued she had proven
    defendants’ guilt because her theory of the case was “reasonable” and that
    trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object.
    A.     Background
    During closing argument, the prosecutor urged the jury to evaluate the
    circumstantial evidence through the prism of reasonableness and predicted
    “when you do that, you are going to find that the only reasonable conclusion,
    based off what was presented in this courtroom . . . is that Mr. Johnson
    committed first-degree murder and Mr. Gutierrez aided and abetted him in
    that . . . murder.”
    The prosecutor described Johnson’s response upon seeing the Acura:
    he “pulls out the gun . . . gets into Mr. Gutierrez’s car, saying ‘Go get them.’
    11
    Mr. Gutierrez then drives in a very aggressive fashion in order to catch up,
    . . . , high rate of speed, wrong side of the road. What’s the reasonable
    inference? That they were having a conversation in that vehicle about what
    was happening and what they needed to do and what was going to happen
    and what was going on. [¶] Mr. Gutierrez just all of a sudden decided that
    he was going to drive down the wrong side of the road at a high rate of speed,
    go find out—or who’s in the Acura with dark-tinted windows that you can’t
    see in. The Acura windows never came down. You could not see who was in
    that car. That’s not reasonable. You don’t do that just to see who was in a
    car.” (Italics added.)
    During his closing, Johnson’s counsel acknowledged the prosecutor was
    “right. You can use circumstantial evidence, and you can make inferences.
    But you have to have some evidence upon which to base it, and you have
    none. You have to decide based on what evidence you have heard and
    through common sense.” Counsel argued “within a second or two . . . is when
    . . . Johnson starts to fire in self-defense. . . . And the reasonable
    circumstantial evidence was that he fired more shots in the air because
    nothing was damaged as he traveled along” the street. (Italics added.)
    Referring to the circumstantial evidence jury instruction, Johnson’s
    counsel argued: “If you can draw two reasonable conclusions from the
    circumstantial evidence and one which points to innocence and one of them
    points to guilt, you . . . are required to conclude that the required intent was
    not proven. . . . [I]f you think this could have happened and if it did, he was
    guilty; this could have happened and if it did he was innocent, you have to
    [choose] the one that points toward innocence. Unless you say that story is
    just not reasonable. And I think it does all match up. All of the testimony
    that you heard from the witnesses that I presented to you matches up with
    12
    the video evidence and common sense.” (Italics added.)
    Gutierrez’s attorney made a similar argument: she claimed the
    prosecution evidence was “all circumstantial. . . . And this jury instruction
    tells you that if there are two different theories, two reasonable theories and
    one points to innocence, you need to find Mr. Gutierrez not guilty. And there
    is.” (Italics added.)
    On rebuttal, the prosecutor characterized defendants’ version of the
    incident as “not reasonable.” (Italics added.) She read the circumstantial
    evidence instruction to the jury and said defense counsel had failed to tell the
    jury that “ ‘when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only
    reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable.’ ” (Italics
    added.) The prosecutor continued, “They forgot to tell you that part because
    their version is unreasonable.” Then the prosecutor asserted she had proven
    her case beyond a reasonable doubt. (Italics added.) Defense counsel did not
    object during the prosecutor’s closing argument.
    The court instructed the jury on the prosecution’s burden to prove the
    elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. (CALCRIM No.
    220.) It also instructed the jury on the use of circumstantial evidence to
    establish intent. (CALCRIM No. 225.)
    B.     No Prosecutorial Error
    A prosecutor commits prosecutorial error “insofar as her statements
    could reasonably be interpreted as suggesting to the jury [the prosecution]
    did not have the burden of proving every element of the crimes charged
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Hill (1998) 
    17 Cal.4th 800
    , 831,
    overruled on another ground in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 
    25 Cal.4th 1046
    , 1069, fn. 13.) It “is error for the prosecutor to suggest that a
    13
    ‘reasonable’ account of the evidence satisfies the prosecutor’s burden of proof.”
    (People v. Centeno (2014) 
    60 Cal.4th 659
    , 672 (Centeno).)
    But it “is permissible” for a prosecutor “to argue that the jury may
    reject impossible or unreasonable interpretations of the evidence and to so
    characterize a defense theory.” (Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 672.) It is
    also “permissible to urge that a jury may be convinced beyond a reasonable
    doubt even in the face of conflicting, incomplete, or partially inaccurate
    accounts. [Citations.] It is certainly proper to urge that the jury consider all
    the evidence before it.” (Ibid.)
    To determine whether a prosecutor has committed reversible error “in
    this context, we examine (1) whether it was reasonably likely that the
    prosecutor’s statements misled the jury on reasonable doubt and (2) whether
    there is ‘a reasonable probability that the prosecutor’s argument caused one
    or more jurors to convict defendant based on a lesser standard than proof
    beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Johnsen (2021) 
    10 Cal.5th 1116
    ,
    1165–1166 (Johnsen).) “ ‘In conducting this inquiry, we “do not lightly infer”
    that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging
    meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.’ ” (Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at
    p. 667.)
    Here, the prosecutor argued circumstantial evidence—and the
    reasonable inferences therefrom—established defendants’ guilt. She argued
    the relative reasonableness of the parties’ competing versions of the incident
    and characterized defendants’ version as “not reasonable.” (Italics added.)
    Then, after reading the circumstantial evidence instruction, the prosecutor
    reminded the jury that it “must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject
    any that are unreasonable.’ ” (Italics added.) The prosecutor did not,
    however, link the reasonableness of the prosecution theory to the reasonable
    14
    doubt standard. Nothing in the prosecutor’s closing argument “lessened the
    prosecution’s burden of proof.” (People v. Romero (2008) 
    44 Cal.4th 386
    , 416.)
    Defendants’ reliance on Centeno, supra, 
    60 Cal.4th 659
    , is unavailing.
    There, prosecutor told the jury: “ ‘[Y]our decision has . . . to be a reasonable
    account. . . . [Y]ou need to look at the entire picture, not one piece of
    evidence, not one witness . . . to determine if the case has been proven beyond
    a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Id. at p. 666.) Then the prosecutor compared the
    prosecution and defense evidence and asked the jury, “ ‘Is it reasonable to
    believe that the defendant is being set-up . . . or [that] he[’s] good for it? That
    is what is reasonable. He’s good for it.’ ” (Ibid., italics omitted.) Our high
    court held this argument conflated reasonable inferences from the evidence
    with the prosecution’s obligation to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
    impermissibly leaving the jury “with the impression that so long as her
    interpretation of the evidence was reasonable,” the prosecution had met its
    burden. (Id. at pp. 671–672.)
    Here—and unlike Centeno—the prosecutor did not suggest the jury
    could find defendant guilty based on a “reasonable” account of the evidence.
    (Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 673.) Consistent with CALCRIM No. 225,
    the prosecutor urged the jury to “ ‘accept the reasonable and reject the
    unreasonable’ ” in evaluating the circumstantial evidence before it. (Centeno,
    at p. 673.) A reasonable juror under the circumstances, having been
    instructed by the court that defendants must be acquitted unless the
    prosecutor proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, would have
    understood that the prosecutor was arguing that the prosecution inferences
    from the evidence were correct, but that it remained the jury’s task to decide
    whether that evidence established each element of the crime beyond a
    reasonable doubt.
    15
    In their reply brief, defendants cite Johnsen, supra, 
    10 Cal.5th 1116
    and People v. Cowan (2017) 
    8 Cal.App.5th 1152
     (Cowan), but those cases do
    not assist them. In Johnsen, the prosecutor erroneously told the jury “the
    reasonable doubt standard requires jurors ‘to point to something in the
    evidence that makes them have that doubt’ ” and “misstated the law by
    advising the jury that in evaluating whether a perceived doubt is reasonable,
    a ‘juror should be able to convince his or her fellow jurors that the doubt is
    reasonable.’ ” (Johnsen, at p. 1166.) In Cowan, the prosecutor misinformed
    the jury that the “presumption of innocence is ‘gone’ prior to the jury’s
    deliberation” (Cowan, at p. 1159) and erroneously defined the reasonable
    doubt standard as requiring the jury to be “firmly convince[d] that guilt is the
    only reasonable interpretation of the evidence.” (Id. at p. 1161.)
    This case bears no resemblance to Johnsen and Cowan. Here, the
    prosecutor did not mischaracterize the reasonable doubt standard or misstate
    the law. Instead, the prosecutor permissibly urged the jury to reject
    unreasonable conclusions when considering circumstantial evidence.
    (Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 672; CALCRIM No. 225.)
    In sum, the prosecutor did not err and, as a result, there was no reason
    for defense counsel to object. (People v. Lucero (2000) 
    23 Cal.4th 692
    , 732.)
    Defendants’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.
    C.    No Prejudice
    Assuming the prosecutor erred, and that defense counsel was
    ineffective for failing to object, defendants’ claim fails because they cannot
    show prejudice, e.g., “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
    unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
    different.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 694.) “The
    likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.”
    16
    (Harrington v. Richter (2011) 
    562 U.S. 86
    , 112.) “ ‘Surmounting Strickland’s
    high bar is never an easy task.’ ” (Id. at p. 105.) Defendants have not
    satisfied their burden.
    The court instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence,
    reasonable doubt, and the prosecution’s burden of proof. It also directed the
    jury to follow these instructions in the event of conflicting statements. Jurors
    are presumed to follow the court’s instructions. (People v. Holt (1997) 
    15 Cal.4th 619
    , 662.) As recited above, the evidence of defendants’ guilt was
    strong and the evidence supporting the defense theories was comparatively
    weak. Accordingly, it is not reasonably probable the result would have been
    different had defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s closing argument.
    (Johnsen, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1167 [no prejudice from defense counsel’s
    failure to object to prosecutor’s alleged error in stating reasonable doubt
    standard].)
    IV.
    Defendants’ Challenge to the Restitution Fines Has No Merit
    The court imposed a $10,000 restitution fine on Johnson pursuant to
    section 1202.4. It imposed a $4,500 restitution fine on Gutierrez. Defendants
    argue the court erred by imposing these fines without considering their
    ability to pay, and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
    amount of the fines.
    Under section 1202.4, a trial court must impose a restitution fine for
    each felony conviction unless there are compelling and extraordinary reasons
    for not imposing the fine and the court states those reasons on the record.
    (§ 1202.4, subd. (b).) The amount of the fine—$300 to $10,000—is within the
    court’s discretion and should be commensurate with the seriousness of the
    offense. (Id., subd. (b)(1).) In setting the fine, the court may multiply the
    17
    minimum fine “by the number of years of imprisonment the defendant is
    ordered to serve, multiplied by the number of [the defendant’s] felony”
    convictions. (Id., subd. (b)(2).) Inability to pay is one factor a court may
    consider when setting the restitution fine. (Id., subds. (c), (d).) Other factors
    include the seriousness and gravity of the offense and the circumstances of its
    commission. (Id., subd. (d).) A defendant has the burden to demonstrate
    inability to pay; express findings on the factors bearing on the amount of the
    fine are not required.5 (Ibid.)
    Here, defendants were “obligated to object to the amount of the fine[s]
    and demonstrate [their] inability to pay anything more than the $300
    minimum.” (People v. Frandsen, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1154.) Trial
    counsel did not object to the amount of the restitution fines, nor raise the
    issue of defendants’ purported inability to pay. Thus, defendants forfeited
    their challenge to the amount of the fines. (Id. at p. 1153; People v. Smith
    (2020) 
    46 Cal.App.5th 375
    , 395–396.)
    Assuming for the sake of argument the failure to object was ineffective,
    defendants’ claim fails because they cannot show prejudice. (Strickland v.
    Washington, 
    supra,
     466 U.S. at p. 694.) Defendants have not established a
    likelihood the court would have imposed lower restitution fines had trial
    counsel objected. When it imposed the restitution fines, the court was aware
    of defendants’ physical limitations and their educational and work history.
    The court was also aware of the seriousness and gravity of the offense and
    the circumstances surrounding its commission. Additionally, the record
    5The California Supreme Court is considering whether a trial court
    must consider a defendant’s ability to pay before imposing or executing fines,
    fees and assessments, and if so, which party bears the burden of proof
    regarding inability to pay. (People v. Kopp (2019) 
    38 Cal.App.5th 47
     review
    granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844.)
    18
    supports a reasonable inference that defendants have the ability to pay the
    restitution fines from probable prison wages. (People v. Aviles (2019) 
    39 Cal.App.5th 1055
    , 1076.) Under the circumstances, it is not reasonably
    probable the court would have imposed lower restitution fines had trial
    counsel objected. Defendants’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.
    The Attorney General argues the judgment needs to be corrected to
    reflect that defendants’ section 1202.45 parole revocation restitution fines are
    imposed and suspended. At the sentencing hearing, the court orally imposed
    on each defendant a parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45
    but failed to suspend the fines. (See § 1202.45, subd. (c) [fine “shall be
    suspended” unless parole or supervision “is revoked”].) The sentencing
    minute orders state the parole revocation restitution fines are imposed and
    stayed, and the abstracts of judgment indicate the fines are imposed and
    suspended. “Under the circumstances, we will deem the . . . abstract[s] of
    judgment to prevail over the reporter’s transcript. [Citations.] The erroneous
    statement in the reporter’s transcript is of no effect.” (People v. Cleveland
    (2004) 
    32 Cal.4th 704
    , 768; People v. Smith (1983) 
    33 Cal.3d 596
    , 599.)
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    19
    _________________________
    Rodriguez, J.*
    WE CONCUR:
    _________________________
    Simons, Acting P. J.
    _________________________
    Needham, J.
    A159878, A159997
    * Judge of the Superior Court of Alameda County, assigned by the Chief
    Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
    20