P. v. Hood CA4/1 ( 2013 )

Filed 4/17/13 P. v. Hood CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D061078
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD215929)
COURTNEY JEAN HOOD,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Roger W.
Krauel, Frederick Maguire and Howard H. Shore, Judges. Affirmed.
INTRODUCTION
Courtney Jean Hood1 pleaded no contest to three counts of using personal
identifying information of another (Pen. Code,2 § 530.5, subd. (a)) and one count each of
burglary (§ 459), grand theft (§ 484g, subd. (a)), acquiring access cards of four or more
1 Although official court documents list appellant's last name as "Hoop," the trial
court determined her true last name was "Hood."
2 Further statutory references are also to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
people (§ 484e, subd. (b)), possessing forged items (§ 475, subd. (a)), possessing
completed paper (§ 475, subd. (c)), and receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)). The
trial court suspended imposition of sentence and granted Hood probation, conditioned
upon her serving 365 days in custody.
Hood appeals, contending we must reverse her conviction and allow her to
withdraw her guilty plea because the trial court erroneously denied her pretrial motion to
suppress the evidence against her. She additionally requests we independently review the
the transcript of an in camera proceeding conducted by the trial court under Pitchess v.
Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 531 (Pitchess)3 to determine whether the trial court
erred in finding certain police officers' personnel records contained no discoverable
information.
We conclude the trial court did not err in denying Hood's suppression motion. In
addition, we have reviewed the transcript of the Pitchess proceeding and conclude the
trial court did not err in finding the officers' personnel records contained no discoverable
information. We, therefore, affirm the judgment.
3 The Legislature essentially codified Pitchess in Penal Code sections 832.5, 832.7,
832.8 and Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1047. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26
Cal. 4th 1216, 1225, fn. 3, 1226.)
2
BACKGROUND4
Prosecution Evidence
On September 3, 2008, San Diego Police Sergeant Paul Salas and police officers
Carlos Navarro and Melinda McArthur went to a hotel to investigate a disturbance of the
peace incident. They met with the hotel manager who told them several people in a room
registered to "Kerri Miller" had caused a disturbance regarding their unpaid restaurant
bill. The manager also told them he had seen narcotics paraphernalia in the room and
wanted the people staying there to leave. He asked the people in the room to leave the
premises, but not all of them complied with his demand.
Accompanied by the manager, the officers went to the room. The manager
knocked on the door. When no one responded, Navarro knocked on it. Hood opened a
sliding glass door on the second floor of the room. Salas asked her to come to the front
door. About half a minute to a minute later, she opened the front door.
The manager told Hood she had to leave the premises and she agreed to do so.
Navarro asked Hood if her name was Kerri Miller. She told him her name was Courtney
Hood. Navarro asked to see her identification. As she turned to retrieve her
identification, he asked, "May we come inside?" She said, "Yes, you may[,]" and
Navarro, McArthur, and the hotel manager entered the room.5
4 We derive our summary of facts from the evidence presented at the hearing on the
motion to suppress.
5 Navarro testified he asked Hood if he could enter the room. McArthur testified
Navarro asked Hood if they all could enter the room.
3
The officers saw numerous items of clothing hanging in the open closet. The price
tags were still attached to the items. The officers also saw several duffel bags, purses,
and notebook bags throughout the room.
Hood gave Navarro a student identification card identifying her as Courtney Hood.
While waiting for the results of a records check, Navarro talked with Hood for about 15
minutes.6 She told him she arrived at the hotel the night before. After obtaining the
records check results, Navarro asked Hood if he could search the room, including the
bed, the couch, the closet, and the furniture. He followed his usual pattern of questioning
in such circumstances: Is there anything illegal in this room I should know about.
What's your property? Do you know who the other items belong to? Do you have a
problem with me searching the room? She hesitated at first and then consented to the
search.
Navarro had Hood sit on the couch while he conducted the search. The officers
did not handcuff her or use any threats, display any weapons, or otherwise coerce her to
consent to the search.
McArthur initially watched and spoke with Hood while Navarro conducted the
search. McArthur noticed Hood waved her hands around a lot, spoke extremely rapidly,
and jumped from one topic to another. Based on her training and experience, McArthur
believed Hood was under the influence of a controlled substance.
6 Navarro testified it took awhile to receive the results of the records check.
McArthur testified it took 30 seconds.
4
While searching the room, Navarro found a clear plastic baggie containing a white
residue in the bathroom next to the toilet.7 It was visible from where McArthur stood in
the main part of the room.8 She also went into the bathroom and observed it. The
officers did not inform Hood of their discovery of the baggie. In addition, the
prosecution never charged Hood with any narcotics related offenses in this case.
After Navarro found the baggie and a check belonging to a crime victim,
McArthur joined the search. The officers found three bags from a clothing retailer with
the store price tags still on them, credit cards, several identifications belonging to
different people along with their personal information and pictures, checks, checkbooks,
blank check paper, software to create checks, passports, and a stolen gun.
McArthur conducted a records check on the identifications and discovered four of them
belonged to people who reported being victims of property crimes. The officers then
arrested Hood. The entire encounter from the time the officers entered the hotel room
until they arrested Hood was around 30 to 40 minutes.
7 McArthur's testimony occurred over the course of two days, approximately six
weeks apart. On her first day of testimony, she indicated the sequence of events was that
Navarro obtained consent to search and found the baggie and a stolen check. On her
second day of testimony, she indicated the sequence of events was that Navarro walked
around the room while waiting for the records check on Hood's identification, found the
baggie almost immediately and within two minutes of their entrance into the hotel room
obtained consent to search specific areas where stolen items were found.
8 McArthur gave conflicting testimony on this point as well. She initially testified
she could see the plastic baggie from where she stood. She later testified she could not
see it from where she stood and had to go into the bathroom to see it.
5
Defense Evidence
Hood testified she arrived at the hotel a day earlier and was a guest of the people
who rented the room. She was invited by her wealthy friend, "Jason." Although she had
known him for years, she could not recall his last name, address, or current phone
number. She also did not know the last names of anyone else staying in the room.
She testified she had been taking a shower when she heard the knock on the hotel
room door. She put on a robe, peeked out the sliding glass balcony door, saw Salas and
cracked opened the balcony door. Salas ordered her to open the room door. She shut the
balcony door, put on some clothes, opened the room door, and saw Navarro and
McArthur. The officers asked her if she was Kerri Miller. She told them she was not and
told them her name. They asked for her identification and she told them she would get it
for them. When she went to retrieve her identification, they followed her into the room.
They did not ask for her consent to enter and she did not give them permission to come
inside the room.
She gave the officers her identification and answered some questions about her
business. While she was doing this, her phone rang. Navarro told McArthur to answer
the phone and pretend to be Hood. When McArthur signaled to Navarro that it was Jason
on the phone, Navarro left the room to look for him.
While Navarro was out, McArthur and Hood began taking items out of the room
and into the hallway. After Navarro returned and indicated he could not find Jason, he
told Hood he was going to search everything. Hood did not consent to the search.
6
Hood testified she did not see Navarro find the plastic baggie and no one told her
about it or asked her about it at the time. She also denied being under the influence of
anything that night. She admitted that, after her arrest in this case, she pleaded guilty to
an "under the influence" misdemeanor. She also admitted she had previously been
arrested while on a boat where cocaine and methamphetamine were found and that she
had some marijuana in her purse at the time.
DISCUSSION
I
Motion to Suppress
Before trial, Hood moved under section 1538.5 to suppress the evidence against
her. The trial court denied the motion, finding the police officers entered Hood's hotel
room after she gave her free and voluntary consent for them to do so.
Hood contends her initial consent to the entry of police officers into her hotel
room did not extend to her bathroom where an officer found a plastic baggie containing
white residue. Consequently, her second consent to police officers searching her hotel
room was invalid and the trial court should have granted her motion to suppress. We
conclude there is no merit to this contention.
"The standard of review on a motion to suppress is well established. The appellate
court views the record in the light most favorable to the ruling and defers to the trial
court's factual findings, express or implied, when supported by substantial evidence. But
in determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, the appellate court exercises its independent judgment.
7
[Citations.] Appellate review is confined to the correctness or incorrectness of the trial
court's ruling, not the reasons for its ruling." (People v. Superior Court (Chapman)
(2012) 204 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1011.)
"The Fourth Amendment prohibits only those searches and seizures that are
unreasonable. (Chapman, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1011, citing Florida v. Jimeno
(1991) 500 U.S. 248, 250, and Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 403.)
Generally, "a search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment." (Chapman, at p. 1011.) However, one of the established exceptions to the
warrant requirement is "when consent is given by one authorized to give it." (Id. at
pp. 1011-1012, citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 219; People v.
Leib (1976) 16 Cal. 3d 869, 873.) "By consenting to a warrantless search, one waives the
right protected by the Fourth Amendment." (Chapman, at p. 1012.)
In this case, substantial evidence in the record shows Hood consented to Navarro
and McArthur's entry into the hotel room. Substantial evidence in the record also shows
Hood consented to the officers' search of the areas of the hotel room where the officers
found the unlawful items. Whether Navarro requested Hood's consent to search before or
after he spotted the baggie in the bathroom does not affect the validity of Hood's consent
because, according to Hood, she did not know about the baggie and the officers never
told her of its discovery. Accordingly, Hood has not established the officers obtained her
consent to search the hotel room by exploiting unlawful conduct or, concomitantly, that
the trial court improperly denied her suppression motion. (See People v. Mayfield (1997)
8
14 Cal. 4th 668, 760; People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 1268, 1300, abrogated on
another point as recognized in People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal. 4th 472, 518-519 & fn. 10.)
II
Review of Pitchess Proceeding Transcript
Before trial, Hood moved under Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal. 3d 531, and Evidence
Code sections 1043 and 1045 for discovery of information in the personnel records of the
officers involved in the search of her hotel room. The trial court granted the motion,
agreeing to review the personnel records to determine whether they contained
discoverable information related to acts of dishonesty or excessive force. After
reviewing the records in camera, the trial court determined they contained no
discoverable information.
At Hood's request, and with no objection by the People, we have independently
reviewed the sealed transcript of the trial court's in camera review. (See, e.g., People v.
Hughes (2002) 27 Cal. 4th 287, 330.) We conclude the trial court did not err in finding
there was no discoverable information in the officers' personnel records.
9
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, J.
NARES, J.
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