P. v. Erwin CA1/3 ( 2013 )


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  • Filed 3/20/13 P. v. Erwin CA1/3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    A132396
    v.
    JOEY RAY ERWIN,                                                          (Solano County
    Super. Ct. No. FC33794)
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Defendant was committed to an indeterminate term of confinement as a sexually
    violent predator (SVP). He raises several constitutional challenges to his confinement.
    We affirm the order of commitment on the basis of existing decisions of the Supreme
    Court and Courts of Appeal in which these challenges have been resolved against him as
    a matter of law.
    Discussion1
    Following a jury trial in May 2011, defendant was found to be an SVP, and
    committed by the trial court to an indeterminate term. Defendant contends that his
    commitment for an indeterminate term is unconstitutional in that it violates the equal
    protection, due process, ex post facto, and double jeopardy provisions of the California
    and the United States Constitutions. As defendant acknowledges, the issues he raises
    have been decided against him by our Supreme Court in People v. McKee (2010) 
    47 Cal.4th 1172
     (McKee I) and by this and other appellate courts. (See People v. McKee
    1
    Because defendant raises no procedural or evidentiary errors on appeal, the details of
    the commitment proceeding are not pertinent.
    1
    (2012) 
    207 Cal.App.4th 1325
    , 1330–1331 (McKee II); People v. McCloud (2013) 
    213 Cal.App.4th 1076
    ; People v. McKnight (2012) 
    212 Cal.App.4th 860
    , 864 [agreeing with
    the Fourth Appellate District’s equal protection analysis in McKee II].)
    In McKee, the California Supreme Court found that the indeterminate term of
    commitment prescribed by the SVP statute potentially violates the equal protection
    clause. The court found that SVP’s are similarly situated with individuals found not
    guilty by reason of insanity (NGIs) and mentally disordered offenders (MDOs) for equal
    protection purposes and remanded the matter to the trial court for a hearing to determine
    whether the People could justify “the differences between SVP and NGI commitment
    statutes.” (McKee I, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1207.) Following remand, after a 21-day
    evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the People met their burden to justify the
    disparate treatment of SVP’s. (McKee II, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330.) The Fourth
    Appellate District affirmed. “[W]e conclude the People on remand met their burden to
    present substantial evidence, including medical and scientific evidence, justifying the
    amended Act’s disparate treatment of SVP’s (e.g., by imposing indeterminate terms of
    civil commitment and placing on them the burden to prove they should be released).
    [Citation.] The People have shown that, ‘notwithstanding the similarities between SVP’s
    and MDO’s [and NGI’s], the former as a class bear a substantially greater risk to society,
    and that therefore imposing on them a greater burden before they can be released from
    commitment is needed to protect society.’ [Citation.] The People have shown ‘that the
    inherent nature of the SVP’s mental disorder makes recidivism as a class significantly
    more likely[;] . . . that SVP’s pose a greater risk [and unique dangers] to a particularly
    vulnerable class of victims, such as children’[;] and that SVP’s have diagnostic and
    treatment differences from MDO’s and NGI’s, thereby supporting a reasonable
    perception by the electorate that passed Proposition 83 that the disparate treatment of
    SVP’s under the amended Act is necessary to further the state’s compelling interests in
    public safety and humanely treating the mentally disordered.” (Id. at p. 1347.) The
    Supreme Court denied review and McKee II is now final.
    2
    Defendant severely criticizes the reasoning and result in McKee II, but we concur
    with the court’s reasoning and holding. (People v. McKnight, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 864.)
    Defendant also argues that McKee II should apply only to McKee and that he
    “should not be bound by the litigation process and evidence in McKee II when he had no
    say in how the case would be presented.” The procedural history in McKee, however,
    indicates the California Supreme Court’s intention that the proceedings in McKee would
    resolve the issue as a matter of law for all SVPs, not merely for the defendant in that case.
    Specifically, on May 2010, when the Supreme Court transferred to the Courts of Appeal
    numerous cases in which review had been granted and held pending its decision in
    McKee, the court advised, “In order to avoid unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings, the
    court is additionally directed to suspend further proceedings pending finality of the
    proceedings on remand in McKee, . . . including any proceeding in the Superior Court of
    San Diego County in which McKee may be consolidated with related matters. ‘Finality of
    the proceedings’ shall include the finality of any subsequent appeal and any proceedings
    in this court.” (See, e.g., People v. Johnson, review granted Aug. 13, 2008, S164388;
    People v. Riffey, review granted Aug. 20, 2008, S164711; People v. Boyle, review
    granted Oct. 1, 2008, S166167; People v. Garcia, review granted Oct. 16, 2008,
    S166682; People v. Glenn, review granted Feb. 10, 2010, S178140.) In light of the
    Supreme Court’s denial of review in McKee II, we conclude that defendant’s
    recommitment under the SVPA does not violate his equal protection rights.
    Defendant acknowledges that his remaining constitutional arguments were
    rejected in McKee, 
    supra,
     47 Cal.4th at pages 1188-1193, 1193-1195, and that they are
    not subject to review in this court. As requested, his arguments are noted for the record.
    3
    Disposition
    Defendant’s order of commitment is affirmed.
    _________________________
    Pollak, J.
    We concur:
    _________________________
    McGuiness, P. J.
    _________________________
    Siggins, J.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A132396

Filed Date: 3/20/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021