Green v. Logan CA2/8 ( 2014 )


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  • Filed 6/2/14 Green v. Logan CA2/8
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION EIGHT
    HARLAN GREEN,                                                        B248773
    Plaintiff and Appellant,                 (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BS138340)
    v.
    DEAN LOGAN, as Registrar-
    Recorder/County Clerk, etc.,
    Defendant and Respondent;
    ___________________________________
    COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,
    Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.
    APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Ann I.
    Jones, Judge. Affirmed.
    Huskinson, Brown & Heidenreich, David W.T. Brown, and Paul E. Heidenreich
    for Plaintiff and Appellant.
    Nossaman, Lloyd W. Pellman, Winfield D. Wilson, and Stephen P. Wiman for
    Defendant and Respondent, and Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.
    **********
    Plaintiff and appellant Harlan Green, a resident and voter in the County of Los
    Angeles (County), filed this action seeking to set aside the election results for two county
    measures, Measure H and Measure L, placed on the ballot by real party in interest and
    respondent County in the June 5, 2012 general election. The trial court sustained,
    without leave to amend, the demurrer to plaintiff’s first amended pleading and entered a
    judgment of dismissal from which plaintiff now appeals. Plaintiff primarily contends the
    trial court erred in dismissing the action as the first amended pleading stated facts
    showing Measure H and Measure L were unconstitutional, the ballot and election
    materials for the two measures were misleading and resulted in the effective
    disenfranchisement of voters, and sufficient grounds were pled to support writ relief and
    declaratory relief related to the two measures. We conclude there are no grounds for
    reversing the judgment of dismissal, and therefore affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    We summarize the material facts alleged in the operative pleading, as well as the
    incorporated exhibits which consisted of the challenged ballot and election materials.
    On the June 5, 2012 ballot, Measure H was titled “Los Angeles County Hotel
    Occupancy Tax Continuation Measure” and sought a vote on the following proposition:
    “Shall the existing unincorporated county hotel room tax be readopted to ratify, continue,
    and update the existing ordinance at the current rate of 12 percent to fund essential
    County general fund services, such as parks, libraries, senior services, and law
    enforcement; to continue exempting hotel stays longer than 30 days, to add exemptions
    for emergency shelter referrals, and for individuals on official government business
    pursuant to federal law?” Measure H is referred to by the parties as the “Hotel Tax.”
    Measure L was titled “Los Angeles County Landfill Tax Continuation Measure”
    and sought a vote on the following proposition: “Shall Los Angeles County’s existing
    tax on landfills be readopted to ratify and continue the existing 10 percent tax on landfill
    operators’ gross receipts from waste disposal in landfills in the unincorporated county, to
    fund essential general fund services, such as parks, libraries, senior services, and law
    enforcement; and to update the administrative appeal process, and clarify definitions to
    2
    ensure the tax is properly calculated?” Measure L is referred to by the parties as the
    “Landfill Tax.”
    The Hotel Tax was originally enacted in 1964 as ordinance No. 8607. (L.A.
    County Mun. Code, § 4.72.010.) In 1990, the Board of Supervisors for the County
    (Board) authorized an increase of the Hotel Tax to 12 percent, from its previous rate of
    10 percent. (§ 4.72.430.) The increase became effective in 1991 and assessments and
    collections of the tax at the new rate began thereafter. The Hotel Tax is also commonly
    referred to as a transient occupancy tax, and is a general tax imposed on occupants of
    hotels and motels in the unincorporated areas of the County, subject to certain
    exemptions.
    The Landfill Tax was originally enacted by the Board in December 1990. (L.A.
    County Mun. Code, § 4.63.010.) The Landfill Tax is a general tax imposed on operators
    of landfills in the unincorporated areas of the County at the rate of 10 percent of gross
    receipts.
    Defendant and respondent Dean Logan was appointed as the County’s Registrar-
    Recorder and County Clerk in July 2008. Real party in interest and respondent John
    Krattli was acting County Counsel in 2012 with the responsibility for drafting and
    analyzing the propriety of ballot and election materials for the County. Real party in
    interest and respondent Board authorized both County measures for placement on the
    June 5, 2012 ballot.
    The “Impartial Analysis of Measure H” provided, in relevant part, as follows:
    “Approval of Measure H would amend and readopt an existing County ordinance
    to authorize continued, and ratify past, collection of a Transient Occupancy Tax (‘Hotel
    Tax’), at a rate of 12%, on occupants of hotels and motels within the unincorporated area
    of the County of Los Angeles.
    “The Hotel Tax is a general tax which provides funding for essential government
    services including parks, libraries, senior services, law enforcement, and other general
    fund services. The Hotel Tax would continue to be imposed on every temporary, or
    transient, occupant of a hotel, motel or other place of lodging within the unincorporated
    3
    area of the County, and would be imposed at the current rate of 12%, which rate was
    adopted by ordinance by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors on December 18,
    1990.
    “This measure clarifies the definition of ‘transient’ to exempt any person
    occupying space in a hotel or motel for a period of longer than 30 days upon written
    agreement[;] emergency shelter referrals[;] and employees of federally-related agencies
    who are travelling on official government business.
    “The current Hotel Tax rate of 12% has been in effect since January 1991. From
    August 1983 until January 1991, the Hotel Tax rate was 10%. The present Hotel Tax rate
    is the subject of existing litigation. An adverse decision in that litigation may result in
    reverting the Hotel Tax to its pre-1991 rate of 10%, which would reflect a reduction of
    approximately $2.1 million per year in general funds, and may also result in refunds of
    2% of the tax paid to those persons who occupied hotel or motel rooms in the
    unincorporated area during certain periods of time.
    “Approval of this measure ratifies the current rate and approves the past collection
    of the Hotel Tax from transients who occupied hotels and motels in the unincorporated
    area of the County of Los Angeles.
    “This measure requires a majority vote of the qualified voters in the County of Los
    Angeles who cast votes in the election.”
    An argument in favor of the measure was submitted by various County officials,
    including the then-Chairman of the Board, stating that a change in state law “requires
    County voters to ratify this tax in order to maintain it at its current rate.” The ballot
    materials indicated that no argument against the measure was submitted. The full text of
    the proposed amended ordinance was included in the election materials.
    The “Impartial Analysis of Measure L” provided, in relevant part, as follows:
    “Approval of Measure L would amend and readopt an existing County ordinance
    to authorize continued collection of the Business License Tax on Disposal Facilities
    (‘Landfill Tax’). The measure would additionally ratify past collections. The existing
    4
    Landfill Tax rate is 10% of gross receipts, imposed on operators of landfills in the
    unincorporated area of the County of Los Angeles.
    “The Landfill Tax is a general tax which provides funding for essential
    government services such as parks, libraries, senior services, law enforcement, and other
    general fund services. The Landfill Tax would continue to be imposed on operators and
    proprietors of waste disposal facilities within the unincorporated area of the County, and
    would be imposed at the current rate of 10% of the gross receipts collected, which rate
    was adopted by ordinance and approved by the Los Angeles County Board of
    Supervisors on January 22, 1991. [¶] . . . [¶]
    “The Landfill Tax has been in effect since January 1991 at the current rate of 10%
    of gross receipts. Subsequent state court decisions have found that voter approval may be
    required for certain taxes imposed after 1990. Should the County be sued, an adverse
    decision could place the Landfill Tax revenues at risk, resulting in a reduction in general
    funds.
    “Approval of this measure ratifies the current rate and approves the past collection
    of the Landfill Tax from operators of landfills and waste disposal facilities in the
    unincorporated area of the County of Los Angeles.
    “This measure requires a majority vote of the qualified voters in the County of Los
    Angeles who cast votes in the election.”
    An argument in favor of the measure was submitted by various County officials,
    including the then-Chairman of the Board, stating that a change in state law “requires
    County voters to ratify this tax in order to maintain it at its current rate.” It further stated
    that if the measure was not approved “the tax could be completely eliminated, and the
    County would have to cut those services on which County residents depend.” The ballot
    materials indicated that no argument against the measure was submitted. The full text of
    the proposed amended ordinance was included in the election materials.
    Both county measures were passed by over 60 percent of the voting electorate in
    the June 5, 2012 election.
    5
    Plaintiff, a resident and voter in the County, filed this postelection contest seeking
    to set aside the election results for both the Hotel Tax and the Landfill Tax. The
    operative first amended “Statement of Election Contest and Petition for Writ of Mandate”
    contained six causes of action: (1) the first cause of action for “Malconduct” in violation
    of Election Code section 9160; (2) the second cause of action for “Constitutional
    Violations,” including denial of due process and free speech; (3) the third cause of action
    for a writ of mandate directing the setting aside of the election results for both measures
    on the grounds they violated both Proposition 62 and Proposition 218; (4) the fourth
    cause of action for a writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085
    striking the election results for Measure L, and/or striking the ratification clause set forth
    in the ordinance at County Municipal Code section 4.63.180; (5) the fifth cause of action
    for a writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 striking the
    election results for Measure H, and/or striking the ratification clause set forth in the
    ordinance at County Municipal Code section 4.72.430; and (6) the sixth cause of action
    for declaratory relief seeking a declaration of plaintiff’s “rights and the Defendants’
    duties regarding all legal issues raised in this Contest,” including the County’s
    constitutional and statutory duties relative to both measures.
    All six causes of action incorporated by reference the same core allegations of
    wrongdoing by the County and its officials, namely the violation of state initiatives
    Proposition 62 (passed in 1986) and Proposition 218 (passed in 1996). We summarize
    plaintiff’s allegations in the following paragraphs of this background summary.
    Plaintiff alleged that in 1995, the California Supreme Court held in Santa Clara
    County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 
    11 Cal.4th 220
     (Guardino),
    that the voter approval requirements for local tax measures mandated by Proposition 62
    are constitutional. After issuance of the decision in Guardino, the real parties in interest
    knew the Hotel Tax and Landfill Tax were illegal because they were enacted without
    voter approval in violation of Proposition 62.
    Up until 1990, the Hotel Tax was a valid, “grandfathered” local taxing measure,
    despite the lack of voter approval, due to its original adoption before the passage of
    6
    Proposition 62. However, the County, in 1990, “unilaterally, without voter approval and
    in direct violation of Proposition 62” increased the Hotel Tax by 2 percent to the rate of
    12 percent. The Landfill Tax was originally enacted in 1990, without voter approval, in
    direct violation of Proposition 62.
    Despite its knowledge of the limits on its taxing authority, the County through the
    Board and its officials, continued to collect the illegally increased Hotel Tax and the
    illegally enacted Landfill Tax for another 16 years. The County was aware that
    Propositions 62 and 218 provided a limited window period in which local governments
    could seek to validate an illegally enacted tax, but the County failed to act within the
    window period.
    Finally, in 2012, the County belatedly acted to place the Hotel Tax and the
    Landfill Tax on the ballot to be approved by County voters. However, the ballot and
    election materials for both measures were “drafted, reviewed and published” with the
    intent to mislead voters, failed to conform to the requirements of Elections Code section
    9160, and constituted improper election advocacy in violation of Government Code
    section 54964. The County wrongfully included “unconstitutional” ratification clauses in
    both measures (L.A. County Mun. Code, §§ 4.72.43, 4.63.180), and failed to explain, in a
    statutorily required neutral fashion, the purpose and scope of the measures, specifically
    the County’s desire to retroactively validate over 20 years of illegal collection of taxes.
    The ballot materials were materially false, deceptive and incomplete, and included
    wrongful election advocacy to emotionally sway voters into believing the tax revenues
    were needed to fund specific essential services. The conduct by the County and its
    officials effectively disenfranchised voters and prevented an informed choice at the polls.
    There are no allegations in the first amended pleading alleging plaintiff ever made
    any preelection challenge to either ballot measure, nor any allegations plaintiff was ever
    assessed or paid either tax, or is seeking a refund for the payment of any illegally
    collected taxes.
    7
    The County, Logan, Krattli and the Board filed a demurrer to the operative
    pleading. After briefing and oral argument, the trial court sustained the demurrer without
    leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal.
    This appeal followed.
    DISCUSSION
    “In reviewing a judgment of dismissal after a demurrer is sustained without leave
    to amend, we must assume the truth of all facts properly pleaded by the plaintiffs, as well
    as those that are judicially noticeable.” (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. City of
    La Habra (2001) 
    25 Cal.4th 809
    , 814.) Properly pleaded facts do not include
    contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 
    39 Cal.3d 311
    , 318.) Moreover, specific allegations prevail over general, and pleaded facts will not
    be accepted as true where contradicted by facts which may be judicially noticed or which
    are contained in exhibits attached to the pleading. (See Financial Corporation of
    America v. Wilburn (1987) 
    189 Cal.App.3d 764
    , 768-769; see also Dodd v. Citizens Bank
    of Costa Mesa (1990) 
    222 Cal.App.3d 1624
    , 1627 (Dodd) [“facts appearing in exhibits
    attached to the complaint will also be accepted as true and, if contrary to the allegations
    in the pleading, will be given precedence”] & Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials
    Co. (1981) 
    123 Cal.App.3d 593
    , 604.)
    The crux of plaintiff’s argument is that the Hotel Tax and the Landfill Tax both
    sought to ratify the past collection of taxes illegally imposed in violation of both
    statutorily and constitutionally mandated voter-approval requirements, and that the ballot
    and election materials crafted by the County were deceptive and meant to mislead the
    voters into affirming the County’s misconduct. This lawsuit is unequivocally a
    postelection challenge seeking to set aside the results of the June 5, 2012 election.
    Recently, in Owens v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 
    220 Cal.App.4th 107
     (Owens), this
    court decided a similar challenge brought by the same law firm that represents plaintiff in
    this case; Owens rejected the same arguments asserted here. We are not persuaded by
    plaintiff’s argument that the applicable law and standard of review for postelection
    challenges discussed in detail in Owens should not govern this appeal. Not only do we
    8
    find no reason to depart from Owens, we also are not persuaded by plaintiff’s due process
    argument which rests on authority applicable to administrative proceedings as discussed
    in cases such as Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education
    (2013) 
    57 Cal.4th 197
    , and does not apply to an election contest. We now turn to an
    analysis of the challenged ballot measures.
    “The purpose of an election contest is ‘to ascertain the will of the people at the
    polls, fairly, honestly and legally expressed.’ [Citation.] ‘Strict rules embodied in the
    Elections Code govern a court’s review of a properly contested election. “ ‘It is a
    primary principle of law as applied to election contests that it is the duty of the court to
    validate the election if possible. That is to say, the election must be held valid unless
    plainly illegal. [Citations.]’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Friends of Sierra Madre v. City
    of Sierra Madre (2001) 
    25 Cal.4th 165
    , 192, italics added (Friends of Sierra Madre).)
    An election contest is statutory in nature and the grounds for a postelection
    challenge are set forth in Elections Code section 16100.1 These enumerated statutory
    grounds are exclusive. (Friends of Sierra Madre, 
    supra,
     25 Cal.4th at pp. 192-194;
    accord, People ex rel. Kerr v. County of Orange (2003) 
    106 Cal.App.4th 914
    , 932
    (Kerr).) This postelection contest does not fall within any of the enumerated statutory
    grounds.
    1       Elections Code section 16100 provides: “Any elector of a county, city, or of any
    political subdivision of either may contest any election held therein, for any of the
    following causes: [¶] (a) That the precinct board or any member thereof was guilty of
    malconduct. [¶] (b) That the person who has been declared elected to an office was not,
    at the time of the election, eligible to that office. [¶] (c) That the defendant has given to
    any elector or member of a precinct board any bribe or reward, or has offered any bribe
    or reward for the purpose of procuring his election, or has committed any other offense
    against the elective franchise defined in Division 18 (commencing with Section 18000).
    [¶] (d) That illegal votes were cast. [¶] (e) That eligible voters who attempted to vote
    in accordance with the laws of the state were denied their right to vote. [¶] (f) That the
    precinct board in conducting the election or in canvassing the returns, made errors
    sufficient to change the result of the election as to any person who has been declared
    elected. [¶] (g) That there was an error in the vote-counting programs or summation of
    ballot counts.”
    9
    While plaintiff labeled his statutory claim as arising from “malconduct” of County
    officials, a review of the pleading, attached exhibits and judicially noticeable facts reveals
    the claim is in fact an attack on the alleged sufficiency and propriety of the ballot
    materials—a ground which may only be raised preelection. (Friends of Sierra Madre,
    
    supra,
     25 Cal.4th at pp. 192-194; accord, Kerr, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at pp. 932-934, &
    Owens, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 123 [“Generally, a challenge to ballot materials
    must be made before an election. Indeed, a postelection challenge to ballot materials is
    not permitted by the Elections Code.”].) Plaintiff’s statutory claim therefore fails as a
    matter of law.
    Nevertheless, like the plaintiffs in Owens and Kerr, plaintiff argues the election
    here was so fundamentally flawed as to raise the specter of constitutional deprivations of
    due process and free speech. “The power of the court to invalidate a ballot measure on
    constitutional grounds is an exception to this limitation on election contest proceedings.
    [Citation.] Assertedly invalid statutes or ordinances may be challenged on constitutional
    grounds in an election contest, which leads to an order setting aside the result of the
    election, or on constitutional or other grounds by an action for declaratory relief or, where
    authorized, by a petition for writ of mandamus, each of which results in a judicial
    determination that the measure is invalid.” (Friends of Sierra Madre, supra, 25 Cal.4th
    at p. 192, fn. 17.)
    Kerr aptly explained that given the fact “the Legislature has determined in the
    Election Code that an election cannot be undone on the basis of alleged deficiencies in an
    impartial analysis, trying to achieve the same result under the rubric of constitutional due
    process . . . requires a showing that the impartial analysis profoundly misled the
    electorate, not that it just didn’t educate the electorate as to all the legal nuances of the
    measure.” (Kerr, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 934.) Owens elaborated: “Although the
    California appellate courts have recognized the ‘possibility’ that an impartial analysis of a
    county measure or other ballot materials can be so misleading and inaccurate ‘that
    constitutional due process requires invalidation of the election’ [citation], no California
    10
    appellate court, to our knowledge, has invalidated an election on this basis.” (Owens,
    supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 123.) Our research has also failed to disclose any such case.
    We conclude plaintiff’s due process claims fare no better than the similar
    constitutional claim his lawyers raised in Owens. Resolving whether allegedly deceptive
    ballot materials rise to the level of a deprivation of due process ordinarily “ ‘will depend
    on whether the materials, in light of other circumstances of the election, were so
    inaccurate or misleading as to prevent the voters from making informed choices. In
    conducting this inquiry courts should examine the extent of preelection publicity,
    canvassing and other informational activities, as well as the substance or content of such
    efforts. The ready availability of the text of the ordinance, or the official dissemination
    and content of other related materials, such as arguments for or against the measure, will
    also bear on whether the statutory noncompliance rendered the election unfair. Finally,
    courts should take into account the materiality of the omission or other informational
    deficiency. Flaws striking at the very nature and purpose of the legislation are more
    serious than other, more ancillary matters.’ [Citation.]” (Owens, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th
    at p. 124.)
    Plaintiff claims the ballot materials contained material omissions because they did
    not inform the public that both ballot measures violated Proposition 218. We are not
    persuaded either ballot measure violated Proposition 218, which was enacted in 1996.
    The 2 percent increase in the Hotel Tax and the Landfill Tax were enacted years earlier,
    in 1990. “Structurally, Proposition 218 sets up a dual system of voting on taxes. It
    contains two parallel subdivisions, now set forth respectively in article XIII C, section 2,
    subdivision (b) and article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (d), of the state Constitution.
    They govern two different kinds of taxes. The language in each subdivision is almost
    identical. A vote is required before a tax may be imposed, extended or increased. But
    the required quantum of support for the tax varies with the kind of tax being imposed,
    extended or increased. If, as provided for in subdivision (b), a tax is a ‘general’ one, the
    quantum is a simple majority. But if the tax is ‘special’, a supermajority of two-thirds is
    11
    required.” (Citizens Association of Sunset Beach v. Orange County Local Agency
    Formation Commission (2012) 
    209 Cal.App.4th 1182
    , 1189, italics added.)
    Plaintiff is correct that since the passage of Proposition 218, the County, like other
    local entities in the state, is constitutionally required to present any proposed tax measure
    to the electorate for a vote before that tax can be lawfully imposed. However, it is
    undisputed the Hotel Tax was first enacted in 1964 and increased to the rate of 12 percent
    in 1991. The Hotel Tax therefore did not violate the voter approval requirements of
    Proposition 218 which was not passed until 1996. (Owens, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p.
    130 [city’s utility user tax enacted in 1991 without voter approval did not violate voter
    approval requirements of Proposition 218]; accord, Batt v. City and County of San
    Francisco (2010) 
    184 Cal.App.4th 163
    , 176 [city’s transient occupant hotel tax,
    originally enacted in 1961, was in place when Proposition 218 was passed and therefore
    was not invalid for having not been submitted to the electorate], and Burbank-Glendale-
    Pasadena Airport Authority v. City of Burbank (1998) 
    64 Cal.App.4th 1217
    , 1226-1227
    [charter city’s transient parking tax enacted in 1995 and first assessed in January 1996
    was valid on its effective date and did not violate Proposition 218]; see also Strauss v.
    Horton (2009) 
    46 Cal.4th 364
    , 470 [absent express retroactivity provision or plain
    evidence the Legislature or the voters intended a retroactive application, statutes and
    constitutional amendments are presumed to apply prospectively], and Brooktrails
    Township Community Services District v. Board of Supervisors of Mendocino County
    (2013) 
    218 Cal.App.4th 195
    , 205 [same].)
    The same holds true for the Landfill Tax, first enacted in 1991, some five years
    before the passage of Proposition 218. (Owens, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 130.)2 It
    2      Because neither measure violates Proposition 218, plaintiff’s contention the
    County violated the “window period” for validation actions on tax measures, and failed to
    explain this violation in the ballot materials, is equally without merit. “ ‘[T]he window
    period provision was intended to discourage local taxing authorities from rushing to
    impose taxes after the ballot measure became public knowledge but before its
    enactment.’ [Citation.]” (Owens, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 129.) The window period
    12
    follows then that the fact the ballot materials did not discuss Proposition 218 does not
    provide any support for plaintiff’s contention the electorate was profoundly misled as to
    the effect of either ballot measure or was effectively disenfranchised.
    As for the County’s failure to discuss Proposition 62 in the ballot materials,
    plaintiff’s argument is also unavailing. Proposition 62 was enacted in 1986. It was a
    statutory initiative, not an amendment to the state Constitution. As relevant here, it
    enacted Government Code section 53723 which provides: “No local government, or
    district, whether or not authorized to levy a property tax, may impose any general tax
    unless and until such general tax is submitted to the electorate of the local government, or
    district and approved by a majority vote of the voters voting in an election on the issue.”
    The Hotel Tax was first imposed more than 20 years before the passage of
    Proposition 62. The tax was increased, without voter approval, in 1990 after
    Proposition 62 was in effect. The Landfill Tax was first enacted during this same time
    period. At that time, at least two appellate courts had held the voter approval
    requirements of Proposition 62 were unconstitutional. (See, e.g., City of Woodlake v.
    Logan (1991) 
    230 Cal.App.3d 1058
     and City of Westminster v. County of Orange (1988)
    
    204 Cal.App.3d 623
    .) It was not until 1995 that the Supreme Court declared the voter
    approval requirements of Proposition 62 were constitutional in Guardino, 
    supra,
     
    11 Cal.4th 220
    .
    Contrary to plaintiff’s contentions, the ballot and election materials for both the
    Hotel Tax and the Landfill Tax, while not expressly identifying Proposition 62, do state
    that changes in state law have made the ratification by voters necessary to continue the
    12 percent Hotel Tax and the 10 percent Landfill Tax.
    The impartial analysis for Measure H acknowledged the purpose of the measure
    was to “authorize” the continuation of the Hotel Tax and to “ratify” and approve the past
    collection of the tax. The impartial analysis also acknowledged the tax was the subject of
    is not relevant to measures in existence before the operation of Proposition 218 like both
    the Hotel Tax and the Landfill Tax.
    13
    pending litigation. The argument submitted in favor of the Hotel Tax pointed out that a
    change in state law “requires County voters to ratify this tax in order to maintain it at its
    current rate.”
    The impartial analysis for Measure L explained: “The Landfill Tax has been in
    effect since January 1991 at the current rate of 10% of gross receipts. Subsequent state
    court decisions have found that voter approval may be required for certain taxes imposed
    after 1990. Should the County be sued, an adverse decision could place the Landfill Tax
    revenues at risk, resulting in a reduction in general funds. [¶] Approval of this measure
    ratifies the current rate and approves the past collection of the Landfill Tax from
    operators of landfills and waste disposal facilities in the unincorporated area of the
    County of Los Angeles.” And, the argument in favor of the measure reiterated that a
    change in state law “requires County voters to ratify this tax in order to maintain it at its
    current rate.” It further stated that if the measure was not approved “the tax could be
    completely eliminated, and the County would have to cut those services on which County
    residents depend.”
    Plaintiff has not shown the voters were profoundly misled as to the nature or
    purpose of either ballot measure because of any failure to further explain the nuances of
    Proposition 62 in greater detail.
    Further, plaintiff’s allegations as to the deficiencies or factual misrepresentations
    in the ballot materials, including the title and the impartial analysis for each measure, are
    contradicted by the plain language of the ballot materials attached as exhibits to the
    pleading. (Dodd, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1627.) The references in the title and in
    the impartial analysis to each ballot measure being a “continuation” of an existing tax or
    providing for the “readopt[ion]” of an existing tax are not misleading or false. It was
    objectively correct that both the Hotel Tax and the Landfill Tax had been “imposed
    without interruption” and that the passage of each measure would result in the
    continuation and readoption of both county ordinances, albeit as modified, if the voters
    approved of them. (Owens, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at pp. 124-125.)
    14
    “The County, through its counsel, was required to provide an impartial title and
    summary of the purpose of the measure (Elec. Code, § 9105, subd. (a)), as well as a
    separate impartial analysis showing the effect of the measure (Elec. Code, § 9160, subd.
    (b)). It was not required to inform the voters of all of the arguments against the measure.
    That task fell to the opponents of the measure.” (Owens, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p.
    125.) Simply because no opposition statement was submitted to either measure, did not
    require the County to take on the task of articulating any and all possible arguments
    against the measures. Indeed, the County was statutorily proscribed from including an
    impartial analysis and summary that exceeded 500 words. (§§ 9105, subd. (a), 9160,
    subd. (b); see also Kerr, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 936.)
    Moreover, the full text of the proposed amended ordinances were attached to the
    election materials. Where “the voters are provided the whole text of a proposed law or
    ordinance, we ordinarily assume the voters voted intelligently on the matter.” (Owens,
    supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 126.)
    Plaintiff’s free speech claims are also without merit. Plaintiff, as did the Owens
    plaintiff, primarily relies on Vargas v. City of Salinas (2009) 
    46 Cal.4th 1
     and Stanson v.
    Mott (1976) 
    17 Cal.3d 206
    , to support his free speech claim. But, the danger to the
    electoral process discussed by the Supreme Court in Vargas and Stanson concerned a
    public entity or official devoting “ ‘funds from the public treasury, or the publicly
    financed services of public employees to campaign activities favoring or opposing’ ” a
    particular measure. (Owens, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 128, citing Vargas, at pp. 36-
    37.) Plaintiff has not alleged any facts or made any argument that public funds or public
    employees were improperly used to “campaign” for either ballot measure.
    And, as already explained above, nothing in the wording or structure of the ballot
    materials reflects improper campaign advocacy. “The constitutional guarantees of equal
    protection and freedom of speech as applied to public elections ‘mean, in practical effect,
    that the wording on a ballot or the structure of the ballot cannot favor a particular partisan
    position.’ [Citations.] The ballot title, for example, ‘must not be false, misleading, or
    partial to one side. . . . [¶] . . . We understand “partial” to mean [that] the council’s
    15
    language signals to voters the council’s view of how they should vote, or casts a
    favorable light on one side of the [issue] while disparaging the opposing view.’
    [Citations.]” (McDonough v. Superior Court (2012) 
    204 Cal.App.4th 1169
    , 1174.)
    We do not believe the County engaged in improper advocacy by including
    statements in the ballot materials that revenue generated by both taxes would provide
    funding for various general fund services, including parks, libraries, senior services, and
    law enforcement. Nothing in the record shows this to be inaccurate or a mere ploy to
    appeal to voters’ emotions and support for certain County services. Plaintiff has failed to
    persuade us the ballot and elections materials were partial or improperly signaled to
    voters that they should or must vote in favor of either measure.
    Finally, it must be noted the record establishes it is undisputed plaintiff did not
    avail himself of any of the statutory preelection bases for opposing either measure or
    otherwise seek to clarify any allegedly misleading aspect of the ballot materials.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on
    appeal.
    GRIMES, J.
    We concur:
    BIGELOW, P. J.
    FLIER, J.
    16