Davis v. Davis CA3 ( 2014 )


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  • Filed 6/17/14 Davis v. Davis CA3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
    (El Dorado)
    ----
    MELONIE DAVIS,                                                                               C073446
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Super. Ct. No. PFL20130066)
    v.
    MARY ALLISON DAVIS,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Melonie Davis obtained a domestic violence restraining order against her sister-in-
    law, Mary Allison Davis. (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.) In this pro se appeal from the
    restraining order, Mary1 claims the trial court erred by issuing the order outside her
    presence. We ordered supplemental briefing regarding whether we should dismiss the
    1   Because the parties share a surname, we refer to them by their first names.
    1
    appeal as moot, and received no response to our query. We now dismiss the appeal as
    moot.
    BACKGROUND
    We first note that because Melonie has not filed a respondent’s brief, we may
    accept as true the facts stated in Mary’s opening brief. (Smith v. Smith (2012)
    
    208 Cal.App.4th 1074
    , 1077; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2).) However, Mary still
    bears the “affirmative burden to show error whether or not the respondent’s brief has
    been filed,” and we “examine the record and reverse only if prejudicial error is found.”
    (Smith, at p. 1078.)
    In January 2013,2 Melonie filed a petition for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
    and injunction to prevent Mary from harassing her or her two teenagers, contacting them
    by telephone, or coming within 300 yards of her home, vehicle, and workplace. In
    support of the petition, Melonie averred that Mary, who lives in Oklahoma, had been
    harassing her by sending dozens of hostile text messages from multiple cell phones. On
    January 29, the court issued a TRO and set the matter for hearing.
    In her response, Mary did not deny engaging in the harassing conduct. She
    attached 15 pages of transcribed text messages exchanged between her and Melonie from
    January 24 to 29. She disagreed with the issuance of an injunction, however, claiming
    Melonie was motivated by revenge in seeking the order because Mary reported to other
    family members that Melonie’s husband had persuaded their father to change his trust to
    favor of Melonie’s family.
    The minute order of the March 5 hearing on Melonie’s injunction request indicates
    that Mary was not present, but she had “contacted the court and indicates that she wants a
    continuance so that she can appear by court call.” The court granted Mary’s request and
    2   Further date references are to 2013.
    2
    continued the hearing to March 26. However, the reporter’s transcript of the March 26
    hearing confirms that Mary did not appear, and the clerk indicated that Mary had not
    requested to appear by Court Call for that particular hearing. The court then made the
    decision to proceed without her.
    After hearing evidence, the trial court granted Melonie’s petition and issued a one-
    year restraining order against Mary.
    DISCUSSION
    Mary admits in her briefing that she engaged in the exchange of text messages
    alleged by Melonie, and she does not contend that the trial court erred in its implicit
    conclusion that the messages constituted harassment and, absent a restraining order, Mary
    would continue to send them. She claims only that the trial court erred in issuing its
    order when she was “not present and unable to defend herself.”
    As we noted in our order regarding supplemental briefing, the restraining order at
    issue expired during the pendency of this appeal. We directed the parties to answer the
    question of whether this appeal is now moot, pointing them to the authority of City of
    Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 
    215 Cal.App.4th 1068
    , 1078-1079 [challenge to
    issuance of permanent injunction moot because injunction had expired while appeal
    pending] and Covina U. H. School v. California Interscholastic Fed. (1934) 
    136 Cal.App. 588
    , 589-590 [challenge to issuance of permanent injunction issued for specified school
    year was moot because school year had ended while appeal was pending]. Neither party
    followed our direction.
    For the reasons discussed in those cases, because the challenged order has expired,
    we shall dismiss the appeal as moot.
    3
    DISPOSITION
    The appeal is dismissed as moot.
    DUARTE   , J.
    We concur:
    BUTZ                , Acting P. J.
    HOCH                , J.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: C073446

Filed Date: 6/17/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021