People v. McGehee CA2/8 ( 2014 )


Menu:
  • Filed 7/17/14 P. v. McGehee CA2/8
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
    ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION EIGHT
    THE PEOPLE,                                                          B250781
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. PA073511)
    v.
    MARCEL MCGEHEE,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Daniel B.
    Feldstern, Judge. Affirmed.
    Law Office of Alan Goldberg and Alan M. Goldberg for Defendant and Appellant.
    Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
    General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., and
    Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    ******
    Appellant Marcel McGehee appeals a judgment following his conviction for
    possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon, arguing (1) the trial court abused its
    discretion in refusing a day-of-trial request to discharge his retained counsel and continue
    trial so he could retain a new attorney; (2) he did not voluntarily admit his prior convictions;
    and (3) his counsel was ineffective in various respects. We affirm.
    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Appellant was charged with four counts: (1) transportation of marijuana (Health &
    Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a)), (2) possession of concentrated cannabis (Health & Saf.
    Code, § 11357, subd. (a)), (3) possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd.
    (a)(1)),1 and (4) possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)). Prior to trial,
    the court dismissed the drug counts on the prosecution’s request, and appellant waived his
    right to a jury trial on his prior convictions and the parties stipulated he had two. A jury
    convicted him of the remaining felon-in-possession counts. The court sentenced him to the
    midterm of two years on the firearm count and a concurrent midterm of two years on the
    ammunition count. He timely appealed.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    On April 13, 2012, around 1:30 p.m., Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy James
    Peterson monitored traffic from a marked patrol vehicle parked on the southbound side of
    the Interstate 5 freeway just north of the City of Castaic. At the time it was raining. Deputy
    Peterson saw appellant drive by in a brown Chevrolet sedan (which he would later
    determine was a rental car) with a female passenger. Appellant was driving without his
    headlights and changed lanes without signaling, which were violations of the Vehicle Code,
    so Deputy Peterson initiated a traffic stop. Deputy Brian Rooney arrived as backup and the
    officers searched the vehicle.2 They discovered a size “4XL” hooded sweatshirt in the back
    seat with a Glock pistol in the front pocket loaded with 13 rounds of live ammunition.
    1      All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
    2     At the preliminary hearing and during a pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress,
    Deputy Peterson testified he smelled unburned marijuana in the car, which prompted
    2
    Deputy Peterson arrested appellant, who was a “fairly large gentleman” at six feet
    four inches tall, weighing approximately “320, 330 pounds.” In contrast, the female
    passenger was approximately five feet four or five inches tall, weighing around “130, 140
    pounds.” Deputy Peterson ran the serial number on the gun in a Department of Justice
    database, but uncovered no record of a dealer sale.
    The parties stipulated appellant had suffered a prior felony conviction. Appellant
    presented no evidence.
    DISCUSSION
    1. Request to Discharge Retained Counsel; Waiver of Jury Trial on Priors
    Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his day-of-trial request to discharge
    his retained counsel and continue trial so he could retain a new attorney. In a related
    argument, he claims his waiver of his jury trial right for his prior convictions was not
    knowing and voluntary, which occurred within the discussion of his request to discharge his
    retained counsel. We reject both contentions.
    A. Proceedings
    At the preliminary hearing, appellant was represented by counsel retained only for
    that hearing. On February 21, 2013, appellant appeared in propria persona for his
    arraignment and requested a continuance to hire a private attorney. A week later, appellant
    appeared in court represented by a private attorney.
    On Friday, July 12, 2013, appellant appeared before the court with his attorney to
    discuss any final possibilities for settlement. The court noted trial was set for the following
    Tuesday, July 16, 2013, and if the case did not settle, the trial would proceed on that date.
    Appellant rejected the prosecution’s settlement offer and acknowledged trial would go
    forward on the date set. The court ordered a jury panel and anticipated jury selection would
    begin on that date.
    officers to conduct the search. Officers found a mason jar of marijuana, a pill bottle
    containing cannabis (or hash), and an unburned marijuana cigarette in the passenger area.
    After the prosecution dismissed the drug counts, none of that evidence was introduced at
    trial.
    3
    The morning of July 16, 2013, however, defense counsel informed the court
    appellant had informed her the prior day that he wanted to retain a new attorney. Appellant
    confirmed he wanted to hire new counsel. The court responded, “So you were in my court
    on July 12th, knowing that there was a trial date today, and you waited until yesterday to
    tell . . . .” Appellant interrupted, “No, I came -- It was just Friday. I didn’t know all this
    legal matter and how everything, the actual stuff. Once I found out, I made it over the
    weekend. So the quickest I was able to contact an attorney was Monday, and I have an
    appointment actually today as soon as I get out of here go talk with one person.” The court
    asked if he had retained anyone yet, and appellant responded, “As of today as soon as I go
    meet him, I can.” When asked again, he conceded he had not retained anyone.
    The court suggested if appellant had another attorney ready to start trial that day,
    “[t]here would not be any further delay in the proceedings,” but “[t]here is no record in this
    file that you’ve made this request previously, that this is just really just a last-minute
    request.” Even though appellant had his current counsel for months, the court noted
    appellant was “raising this issue on the actual trial date.” When the court asked what new
    information he had obtained, appellant said, “[T]his is the actual trial date, that we’re
    proceeding to trial.” The court reminded him that it had said on the previous Friday that the
    trial was proceeding on July 16, 2013, “[s]o I can’t account for you not listening, but you
    were paying attention. I was clear on that. I don’t believe what you’re saying right now,
    I’m sorry to say. I believe you knew that today was the trial date. And to say anything
    otherwise would be that you closed your ears during the entire proceeding on July 12th. [¶]
    So, again, any attorney that you would hire today would be requesting additional time to
    prepare for trial. And that’s what makes this untimely, your asking for this. I first learned
    about it just now, and we have a trial set for today and it’s not timely. And so I’m not going
    to relieve your attorney today who is prepared for your trial because on the very last minute
    you decide that you want someone else.” In response, appellant denied his counsel was
    prepared for trial “because I haven’t retained her for trial.” The court noted she was the
    attorney of record for him. The court ultimately denied appellant’s request, finding no
    “good cause to continue, if that’s [appellant’s] request, for the purpose of hiring a new
    4
    lawyer. The court believes that his request here made today, first time on the record, is
    untimely and there has been no previous request for change of counsel since [his counsel]
    has been representing him.”
    When the parties returned from the lunch break, the issue arose again when the court
    broached the subject of appellant’s prior convictions with counsel, suggesting appellant
    could stipulate to them to avoid the prosecution having to prove them to the jury, which
    would otherwise allow the jury to learn the basis of the prior convictions. Because appellant
    had not yet discussed the issue with his attorney, the court gave him time to do so. The
    court explained in some detail the benefit of stipulating to a prior conviction, that is,
    avoiding “some prejudice” if the jury learned the basis of the prior convictions. The court
    also explained, however, that by stipulating that they exist, appellant would be giving up his
    right to a jury trial on that issue.
    Appellant affirmed several times he understood, and he conferred with his attorney,
    but he “wanted the record to reflect” his Sixth Amendment right to “proper counsel” was
    being violated. The court said, “You hired this lawyer. She’s privately retained by you.”
    Appellant responded, “Yes.” Because appellant was making a “very generalized allegation
    about her,” the court asked what she was “not doing that she’s supposed to do?” Appellant
    said, “I don’t feel she’s representing me in the way that I need to be represented properly for
    trial . . . .” The court asked appellant’s counsel if she was ready to proceed with trial, and
    she responded she was.
    The court returned to the topic of stipulating to the prior convictions, and appellant
    reiterated that he could not stipulate without being able to speak with his new counsel and
    he felt his Sixth Amendment right was being violated. Appellant and his counsel conferred,
    and the court overheard their discussion. It explained, “You’re objecting to this attorney
    being the one to represent you. I’ve already overruled your objection. So I think you need
    to be realistic. You can cooperate with her and help her defend you, or you can resist and
    keep telling me that you object on Sixth Amendment grounds. I’ve already overruled that.
    She is your lawyer, she’s prepared, and she’s going forward.” The court asked again about
    a stipulation, and appellant wanted the prosecutor to prove the priors, which his counsel
    5
    indicated was against her advice. When the court pressed appellant to state his decision on
    the record, appellant responded, “Once again, without being able to have proper counsel to
    know like what’s going on, I wouldn’t know how to answer that.” The court reiterated, “I
    believe you do have proper counsel. I believe that she can advise you.”
    Appellant still refused to stipulate, so the court asked his counsel what she
    recommended to him. Counsel explained she advised him to stipulate, but he did not want
    to take that advice. The court observed appellant “at this point . . . is in a very
    uncooperative mood right now, not only with me as the court, but with his counsel. [¶] And
    I’m just going to make this as clear as I can. Your trial is starting in moments. This is not
    the first case I’ve ever handled, this is not the first criminal defendant who has resisted
    various aspects of a criminal trial. What I can tell you is that in every case it hurts the
    defendant. It does not help. So I’m trying to emphasize this because it’s not too late for you
    to make good decisions about how this case is going to proceed, in light of the fact that we
    are going forward over your objection about your representation. [¶] You strike me as
    intelligent enough. Okay? So if you want—but intelligence is only as useful as the mind
    that’s working with it; and if you are of a mind not to cooperate and just not respond to my
    questions, that’s your business. I won’t force you to. But I do not have a stipulation at this
    point, and therefore the jury will hear what your prior convictions were for, unless there is a
    stipulation. So you can keep the same response if you wish, but we’re not really—I don’t
    have a stipulation.”
    Appellant again conferred with his counsel and indicated he wanted to consult his
    family for advice. The court denied the request because there was no time and the jury was
    ready to enter. The court asked if appellant had enough time to consult his attorney, and he
    said he did. He then agreed to admit the prior convictions. The court advised appellant at
    length about the rights he would be waiving, including his right to a jury trial. Appellant
    stated he understood his rights, waived them, and admitted two prior convictions. His
    counsel joined. The court found appellant had “expressly, knowingly, understandingly, and
    intelligently waived his right to a jury trial” on his prior convictions and the parties
    stipulated to them.
    6
    B. Request to Discharge Retained Counsel and Continue Trial
    We review the trial court’s denial of appellant’s request to discharge his retained
    counsel and continue the trial to retain new counsel for abuse of discretion. (People v.
    Maciel (2013) 
    57 Cal.4th 482
    , 512 (Maciel) [discharge retained counsel]; People v. Pigage
    (2003) 
    112 Cal.App.4th 1359
    , 1367 [continuance].)
    “‘The right to retained counsel of choice is—subject to certain limitations—
    guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution.’” (Maciel, supra, 57
    Cal.4th at p. 512.) “‘The right to discharge a retained attorney is, however, not absolute.
    [Citation.] The trial court has discretion to “deny such a motion if discharge will result in
    ‘significant prejudice’ to the defendant [citation], or if it is not timely, i.e., if it will result in
    ‘disruption of the orderly processes of justice . . . .’”’” (Ibid.) Similarly, a continuance for
    the purpose of retaining counsel “may be denied if the accused is ‘unjustifiably dilatory’ in
    obtaining counsel, or ‘if he arbitrarily chooses to substitute counsel at the time of trial.’
    [Citation.] [¶] However, ‘a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a
    justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality.’
    [Citation.] For this reason, trial courts should accommodate such requests—when they are
    linked to an assertion of the right to retained counsel—‘to the fullest extent consistent with
    effective judicial administration.’” (People v. Courts (1985) 
    37 Cal.3d 784
    , 790-791.)
    Nevertheless, “[w]here a continuance is requested on the day of trial, the lateness of the
    request may be a significant factor justifying denial absent compelling circumstances to the
    contrary.” (People v. Jeffers (1987) 
    188 Cal.App.3d 840
    , 850 (Jeffers).)
    Given that appellant sought to discharge his retained attorney on the morning of jury
    selection and had not yet retained a new attorney prepared to move forward with trial, the
    trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding his request untimely. (People v. Keshishian
    (2008) 
    162 Cal.App.4th 425
    , 429 (Keshishian) [affirming denial of day-of-trial discharge
    request when defendant explained he “‘lost confidence’” in his retained attorney because the
    case had been pending for two and a half years, an indefinite delay was necessary, and
    defendant had not identified or retained new counsel]; People v. Hernandez (2006) 
    139 Cal.App.4th 101
    , 109 [suggesting denial of a request to discharge retained counsel “almost
    7
    immediately before jury selection was to begin” would have been proper because it was
    “almost inconceivable that the public defender (or alternate counsel) would be able and
    willing to defend the case without a material postponement of the trial date”]; Jeffers, supra,
    188 Cal.App.3d at pp. 850-851 [affirming denial of day-of-trial continuance because
    defendant’s current attorney was ready, defendant had five months to retain new counsel if
    he desired, and witnesses would have been inconvenienced].)
    While appellant claims to have notified the court about his desire to discharge his
    counsel as soon as was practicable because a “rift” occurred with his attorney over the
    weekend between July 12, 2013, and the start of jury selection on July 16, 2013, the record
    belies that assertion. When asked what new information he had obtained over the weekend,
    appellant said only, “[T]his is the actual trial date, that we’re proceeding to trial.” And
    when pressed, appellant asserted the “very generalized allegation” that she was not
    representing him “properly” for trial. Counsel herself affirmed she was ready to proceed to
    trial, suggesting appellant’s request was a delaying tactic in the face of an imminent trial,
    not a legitimate complaint about his counsel’s representation. (See People v. Turner (1992)
    
    7 Cal.App.4th 913
    , 919 [finding “the vagueness of [the defendant’s] complaints supported
    the [trial] court’s apparent finding that the motion was motivated not by any genuine
    dissatisfaction with counsel but by a desire to delay the trial”].) The trial court did not
    believe appellant’s last-minute complaints, a credibility finding we will not disturb on
    appeal.
    Appellant’s request could have also significantly delayed trial. Appellant claimed he
    had an appointment with a new attorney that afternoon, but he had not retained that attorney
    and there was no assurance after the meeting he would have. Even if he had, this new
    attorney surely would have required some time to prepare for trial. While appellant now
    suggests that a new attorney would have only needed two weeks, that is at odds with his
    contention that his retained attorney was ineffective for, inter alia, failing to retain and call
    expert witnesses (discussed below). If, as appellant suggests, his new attorney would have
    been required to explore expert witnesses and other avenues of evidence, a significant delay
    would have ensued.
    8
    Appellant argues the trial court inadequately explored the reasons for his request, but
    further inquiry was unnecessary. In discharging retained counsel, a defendant is “not
    required to demonstrate ‘inadequate representation by his retained attorney, or to identify an
    irreconcilable conflict between them.’” (Maciel, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 512.) In fact, a
    hearing “at which the court determines whether counsel is providing adequate representation
    or is tangled in irreconcilable differences with the defendant is ‘“[an] inappropriate vehicle
    in which to consider [the defendant’s] complaints against his retained counsel.”’”
    (Keshishian, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 429.)
    Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s request to
    discharge his retained counsel and continue the trial for him to retain new counsel.
    C. Waiver of Jury Trial on Priors
    Appellant challenges his waiver of his right to a jury trial on his prior convictions,
    which occurred in the midst of his request to discharge his retained counsel. He advances
    several arguments, but we are not persuaded. First, any issue with his waiver is beside the
    point because the trial court could have accepted the stipulation to his status as a felon for
    the purpose of the felon-in-possession charges without advising him of his right to a jury
    trial and taking a waiver. (See People v. Newman (1999) 
    21 Cal.4th 413
    , 422-423.)
    Second, appellant contends he did not have sufficient time to discuss the matter with his
    attorney, but the stipulation was a tactical decision, so his attorney could have entered it on
    his behalf, even if he had been fully advised and disagreed. (People v. Harris (1993) 
    14 Cal.App.4th 984
    , 990 [“It is well established that trial counsel has the right to control the
    proceedings and make tactical decisions which are contrary to the expressed wishes of his or
    her client.”]; see People v. Adams (1993) 
    6 Cal.4th 570
    , 578 [“Evidentiary stipulations have
    long been recognized as tactical trial decisions which counsel has discretion to make
    without the express authority of the client.”].) Finally, appellant contends the trial court
    coerced him into admitting his priors, but we have reviewed the record and find no coercion.
    2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    “‘In assessing claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we consider whether
    counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
    9
    professional norms and whether the defendant suffered prejudice to a reasonable probability,
    that is, a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. [Citations.] A
    reviewing court will indulge in a presumption that counsel’s performance fell within the
    wide range of professional competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be
    explained as a matter of sound trial strategy. Defendant thus bears the burden of
    establishing constitutionally inadequate assistance of counsel. [Citations.] If the record on
    appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, an
    appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected unless counsel was
    asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or there simply could be no satisfactory
    explanation. [Citation.] Otherwise, the claim is more appropriately raised in a petition for
    writ of habeas corpus.’” (People v. Carter (2005) 
    36 Cal.4th 1114
    , 1189 (Carter).)
    Appellant asserts a miasma of claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, none of
    which are meritorious. We assume the parties are familiar with the record and we only
    briefly address each claim below.
    A. Overall Performance
    Appellant claims his counsel failed to use “ancillary services” for his defense, most
    particularly the subpoena power to call an expert witness on when the headlights in his
    rental car illuminate. The record does not disclose why counsel chose not to use any
    “ancillary services” and there could have been tactical reasons not to, so we reject this
    claim. Further, appellant has not shown any prejudice because he failed to point to any
    exculpatory evidence that would have been uncovered if counsel had used “ancillary
    services.” (People v. Williams (2013) 
    56 Cal.4th 630
    , 692-693 [failure to hire experts to
    analyze physical evidence was not prejudicial because defendant did not identify evidence
    that would have been uncovered]; People v. Szadziewicz (2008) 
    161 Cal.App.4th 823
    , 839
    (Szadziewicz) [failure to subpoena witness not ineffective or prejudicial because record did
    not reveal witness’s expected testimony].)
    Relatedly, appellant claims his counsel failed to present a defense case-in-chief.
    Again, the record does not disclose why counsel chose to rely on attacking the prosecution’s
    case, rather than presenting a defense case-in-chief, so we must reject this claim on direct
    10
    appeal. There are certainly tactical reasons for vigorously attacking the prosecution’s case
    in lieu of presenting a case-in-chief and appellant has proffered no reason why it constituted
    ineffective assistance to do so in this case. (Carter, 
    supra,
     36 Cal.4th at pp. 1189-1190.)
    B. Pretrial Performance
    In a single sentence, appellant claims his counsel failed to file a motion pursuant to
    Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 
    11 Cal.3d 531
    , in order to obtain discovery related to
    officer complaints. The record does not disclose that any such complaints plausibly existed
    or, if they did, why counsel would have chosen (or forgone) the filing of a Pitchess motion
    to obtain them, so we reject this claim.
    Appellant claims his attorney filed an “incompetent” pretrial motion to suppress
    pursuant to section 1538.5.3 However, the motion adequately set forth a prima facie case
    that the police acted without a warrant, triggering the prosecution’s burden to demonstrate a
    justification. (People v. Williams (1999) 
    20 Cal.4th 119
    , 136.) But even if the motion was
    inadequate, the issue was thoroughly addressed both at the preliminary hearing and in a
    pretrial hearing.
    Also in conjunction with his motions to suppress, appellant contends his counsel
    (presumably both his preliminary hearing attorney and his trial attorney, although not
    entirely clear) failed to question Deputy Peterson about the level of visibility at the time of
    the traffic stop and failed to call an expert witness to testify to visibility and how the rental
    car’s headlamps worked. As to the visibility issue, appellant has not identified what
    favorable testimony Officer Peterson or an expert would have given. (People v. Datt (2010)
    
    185 Cal.App.4th 942
    , 952-953 (Datt) [failure to call expert witness not ineffective without
    showing trial counsel failed to consult expert, and if counsel did, whether expert would have
    given favorable testimony]; Szadziewicz, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 839.) Indeed, the
    3       Apparently, both appellant’s preliminary hearing attorney and trial attorney filed
    motions to suppress, but only the motion filed by his trial counsel was included in the record
    on appeal. This was probably because appellant’s preliminary hearing attorney withdrew
    the first motion at the end of the preliminary hearing and the court allowed appellant to
    renew it “in the next court if that’s what you think is okay to do.”
    11
    visibility issue appears to have been irrelevant. Deputy Peterson testified he pulled
    appellant over for driving without his headlights on while it was raining, which violated
    Vehicle Code section 24400, subdivision (b). That provision requires headlamps to be
    illuminated “during darkness, or inclement weather, or both,” and “inclement weather” is
    defined as either “(1) A condition that prevents a driver of a motor vehicle from clearly
    discerning a person or another motor vehicle on the highway from a distance of 1,000 feet”
    or “(2) A condition requiring the windshield wipers to be in continuous use due to rain,
    mist, snow, fog, or other precipitation or atmospheric moisture.” (Veh. Code, § 24400,
    subd. (c)(1)-(2).) Deputy Peterson testified at the preliminary hearing that it was raining
    heavy enough that day to have windshield wipers on, and he had his vehicle’s windshield
    wipers on, as did most or all of the cars passing on the freeway. Because that satisfied
    Vehicle Code section 24400, subdivision (b) without regard to visibility, any additional
    evidence on visibility would not have changed the outcome of the suppression proceedings.
    As for calling an expert on the way in which his rental car’s headlamps illuminate, appellant
    failed to demonstrate whether his counsel consulted an expert, and if so, whether the expert
    would have given favorable testimony. (Datt, supra, at pp. 952-953.) In any case, the
    record does not disclose the reasons for these tactical decisions, so we must reject these
    claims.
    Appellant claims his counsel failed to further question appellant and Officer Peterson
    about appellant’s lane change in violation of Vehicle Code section 22107. Appellant
    suffered no conceivable prejudice because his lack of headlights justified the stop,
    regardless of his lane change. But even if appellant’s lane change was the basis for
    conducting the traffic stop, his claim still fails. Vehicle Code section 22107 provides, “No
    person shall turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway until
    such movement can be made with reasonable safety and then only after the giving of an
    appropriate signal in the manner provided in this chapter in the event any other vehicle may
    be affected by the movement.” (Veh. Code, § 22107.) At the pretrial suppression hearing,
    the court asked appellant, “How close was the closest car to you at that time you made that
    lane change?” Appellant responded, “I don’t know exactly what lane change he’s talking
    12
    about, but it was traffic. I was by semis. I was in the slow lane.” The court asked, “So
    right before the officer stopped you, pulled you over, how would you describe the traffic
    around you? Heavy, moderate, low?” Appellant responded, “Moderate.” This testimony
    supported finding a violation of Vehicle Code section 22107, so appellant’s trial counsel
    may have decided not to risk soliciting more unfavorable testimony from him or Deputy
    Peterson. Because there could have been tactical reasons for this decision, we must reject
    this claim.
    Appellant also contends his trial counsel incorrectly argued at the suppression
    hearing that appellant did not violate Vehicle Code section 22107 with his lane change
    because no other vehicles were affected, which prompted the court to correct her that the
    statute required only that other vehicles “may” be affected. Appellant cannot possibly show
    prejudice because there was no evidence anyone, including the trial court, misunderstood
    the requirements of the statute.
    Appellant contends his counsel should have called an expert witness on the issue of
    whether Deputy Peterson could have smelled marijuana outside appellant’s rental car based
    on the unburned marijuana found in the passenger area. But this claim fails because, as with
    his claim regarding a visibility and headlamps experts, appellant has not established his
    counsel failed to consult any experts, or if counsel did, whether those experts would have
    provided favorable testimony. (Datt, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 952-953.)
    Appellant argues his trial counsel failed to adequately explain to him the difference
    between plea offers made before and after a preliminary hearing. The record indicates the
    court asked whether counsel did, in fact, explain the difference to him, and he responded,
    “Yes, briefly.” Still, the court explained the difference on the record and asked if appellant
    understood, to which he responded, “Yes.” We find neither deficient performance nor
    prejudice.
    Appellant contends his trial counsel improperly “brought up” the death certificate of
    appellant’s grandfather in pretrial proceedings because it was irrelevant that appellant was
    traveling to his grandfather’s funeral the day he was stopped. Appellant never brought up
    13
    the death certificate during trial or offered it into evidence, so there was no possible
    deficient performance or prejudice.
    C. Jury Selection
    In another exceedingly brief contention, appellant claims counsel failed to challenge
    the panel of prospective jurors because it did not contain any African-Americans. Near the
    conclusion of jury selection, appellant’s trial counsel objected to the composition of the jury
    because there were no African-American jurors on it. The court noted the jury as currently
    composed included male and female Hispanics and Asians, and that no African-American
    prospective jurors were apparently part of the panel of prospective jurors. The list of jurors
    was drawn from the wide geographic area of the district and the current panel “looks very
    much like the dozens and dozens of jury panels that I see here in this particular part of the
    county.” The court overruled the objection because the “composition of this jury in its
    totality is a fair representation, notwithstanding the fact that there . . . do not appear to be
    any African-Americans.”
    In order to show a violation of the right to a jury selected from a “‘fair cross section
    of the community,’” a defendant must show “‘(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a
    “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires
    from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such
    persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic
    exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.’” (People v. Ramirez (2006) 
    39 Cal.4th 398
    , 444.) Appellant has identified no facts to support the second and third requirements or,
    if he had, that any objection to the panel of prospective jurors would have been sustained.
    (In re Seaton (2004) 
    34 Cal.4th 193
    , 207 [rejecting ineffective assistance claim for failure to
    object to jury panel because defendant did not show an objection would have been sustained
    and failed to allege facts satisfying third prong].) Thus, appellant has shown neither
    ineffective assistance nor prejudice.
    Appellant also contends his attorney failed to strike a juror who stated he or she had
    “a little issue” without elaborating. The juror ultimately stayed on the panel, stating, “I’ll
    see how I make it.” The court asked if either side wanted to question the juror, and neither
    14
    did. Appellant now speculates this juror may have “wanted off the panel because he was
    racist and knew it,” but nothing in the record suggests at any point this or any other juror
    was biased. As a result, appellant has shown neither deficient performance nor prejudice.4
    D. Trial Performance
    Appellant argues his counsel should have presented a defense that he may have
    possessed the firearm for his protection or the protection of others. This claim is meritless.
    Self-defense may defeat a felon-in-possession charge only when there is evidence the
    defendant was “in imminent peril of great bodily harm or reasonably believes himself or
    others to be in such danger” (People v. King (1978) 
    22 Cal.3d 12
    , 24), and there was no
    such evidence in this case. Counsel was not deficient for failing to raise an inapplicable
    defense. (People v. Pepper (1996) 
    41 Cal.App.4th 1029
    , 1038.) For this reason, we also
    reject appellant’s claim the lack of self-defense impacted his sentence.
    Appellant contends his counsel improperly solicited testimony from Deputy Peterson
    on cross-examination that appellant’s headlamps were not illuminated and failed to establish
    it was dark outside at the time of the stop. But counsel could not have been ineffective
    because by the time of trial these points were irrelevant to the felon-in-possession charges.
    These facts were pertinent to the motion to suppress, but the motion had already been
    denied. The only issue at trial was whether appellant was a felon in possession of a firearm
    or ammunition, which required proof that (1) appellant possessed a firearm or ammunition;
    (2) appellant knew he possessed the firearm or ammunition; and (3) appellant had
    previously been convicted of a felony. (§§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), 30305, subd. (a)(1).)
    Whether it was dark and whether appellant’s headlamps were illuminated were at best
    background facts that could not have had an impact on the jury’s verdict. We find neither
    ineffective assistance nor prejudice.
    Appellant argues his counsel improperly asked Deputy Peterson on cross-
    examination who owned the sweatshirt containing the gun. We find no possible prejudice
    4      Appellant also claims his attorney did not question jurors on bias, but that contention
    is purely speculative because the voir dire was not transcribed.
    15
    because, while counsel asked this question, Deputy Peterson never answered it. Instead,
    when asked whether he asked appellant who owned the sweatshirt, he responded, “No.”
    The line of questioning stopped there. Thus, no damaging testimony was elicited in front of
    the jury.
    Appellant also claims his counsel should have asked Deputy Peterson if Deputy
    Rooney asked appellant or his passenger who owned the sweatshirt. But appellant has not
    suggested what favorable testimony that question would have elicited, and in any event,
    during cross-examination, Deputy Rooney testified that no one told him the sweatshirt
    belonged to appellant. Again, appellant can show no prejudice.
    Appellant claims his counsel made a deficient motion to dismiss pursuant to section
    1118.1.5 At the close of evidence, his counsel briefly argued that the evidence was
    insufficient, but the trial court disagreed. And rightly so, because there was substantial
    evidence to support a conviction: the firearm and ammunition were found in the car
    appellant was driving within his reach wrapped in a sweatshirt sufficiently large to fit him,
    which supported a reasonable inference that the sweatshirt belonged to him and he
    possessed the gun found inside it. (Maciel, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 522 [§ 1118.1 motion is
    properly denied when there is “‘“‘substantial evidence of the existence of each element of
    the offense charged’”’”].) Appellant has not shown what additional information his counsel
    should have presented or whether it would have supported granting the motion. Hence, we
    find no deficient performance or prejudice.6
    5       Section 1118.1 states, “In a case tried before a jury, the court on motion of the
    defendant or on its own motion, at the close of the evidence on either side and before the
    case is submitted to the jury for decision, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of
    one or more of the offenses charged in the accusatory pleading if the evidence then before
    the court is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses on appeal. If such
    a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence offered by the prosecution is
    not granted, the defendant may offer evidence without first having reserved the right.”
    6      In his reply brief, appellant for the first time claims his counsel should have filed a
    new trial motion. We find this contention forfeited. (People v. Clayburg (2012) 
    211 Cal.App.4th 86
    , 93 [arguments raised for the first time in reply brief are forfeited].)
    16
    E. Sentencing
    Finally, appellant claims counsel’s sentencing brief was deficient because it did not
    expressly analyze mitigating factors. To the contrary, his counsel argued for the low or
    midterm for count three and for a concurrent term on count four, pointing out appellant had
    prior convictions but none for similar charges, he had never been in prison before, and the
    instant case arose from a “single period of aberrant behavior.” The court partially agreed by
    imposing a concurrent midterm sentence on count four. The court explained it imposed the
    midterm sentence on count three because appellant had possessed a fully loaded gun and
    had a history of felony convictions. Appellant has not identified what arguments counsel
    failed to make or whether those arguments would have resulted in a more favorable
    sentence. Thus, we find no deficient performance or prejudice.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    FLIER, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    BIGELOW, P. J.
    RUBIN, J.
    17
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B250781

Filed Date: 7/17/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014