P. v. Huysman CA2/4 ( 2013 )


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  • Filed 6/24/13 P. v. Huysman CA2/4
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FOUR
    THE PEOPLE,                                                          B240206
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. MA051461)
    v.
    KENNETH LYNN HUYSMAN,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court for Los Angeles County,
    Hayden A. Zacky, Judge. Affirmed.
    Robert Booher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
    and Appellant.
    Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant
    Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle
    and Stacy S. Schwartz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    Defendant Kenneth Lynn Huysman appeals from a judgment of conviction
    after the trial court found him in violation of his probation. He contends the trial
    court violated his due process and confrontation rights at his probation violation
    hearing by allowing a probation officer to testify regarding a probation officer‟s
    report prepared by a different probation officer. We affirm the judgment.
    BACKGROUND
    In a felony complaint filed in January 2011, defendant was charged with
    possession of methamphetamine, a violation of Health and Safety Code section
    11377, subdivision (a); the complaint also alleged that defendant had suffered two
    prior convictions within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).
    He pled guilty and admitted the prior conviction in exchange for probation under
    Proposition 36. Imposition of sentence was suspended, and he was placed on
    probation for one year with certain terms and conditions, including mandatory drug
    abuse counseling.
    A detailed discussion of subsequent proceedings in which probation was
    revoked and reinstated with modifications is not required here. Suffice to say that
    defendant did not perform well on probation. Finally, in September 2011, the trial
    court revoked defendant‟s Proposition 36 probation, and on October 12, 2011, the
    court sentenced defendant to five years in prison. The court suspended execution
    of the sentence, however, and placed defendant on probation for three years on the
    condition that he serve 180 days in jail, the last 120 days of which he would serve
    in a live-in rehabilitation center. At the time sentence was imposed, the court
    ordered defendant to report to probation within 48 hours of his release from
    custody.
    A month later, the trial court modified defendant‟s probation. The court
    vacated the order that defendant spend 120 days in a live-in drug treatment
    2
    program, and instead ordered that defendant spend 365 days in county jail and do a
    drug treatment program through the probation department. At the end of the
    hearing, after determining defendant‟s credits, the court told defendant, “Make sure
    that you report to probation within 48 hours of your release from custody, all
    right?” Defendant then asked a question about the computation of his credit time.
    The court answered his question, then said, “Make sure you report. You‟ve got
    that five years hanging over your head. Okay?” Defendant replied, “All right.”
    In January 2012, the trial court received notice that defendant had failed to
    report to the probation department. The court preliminarily revoked probation and
    issued a bench warrant for defendant.
    Defendant appeared before the court on February 9, 2012 for a probation
    violation hearing. The court began the hearing by marking, as Court Exhibit No. 1,
    the probation officer‟s desertion report. The court stated that it would rely upon
    the contents of the report, citing People v. Gomez (2010) 
    181 Cal.App.4th 1028
    .1
    The prosecutor called as a witness Deputy Probation Officer Robin Garton.
    Relying upon the desertion report found in the probation file for defendant, Officer
    Garton testified that defendant has never reported to the probation department.
    Officer Garton also testified that a probation letter was mailed to defendant on
    December 16, 2011, telling him to report on January 5, 2012, that the author of the
    desertion report contacted certain recovery centers and determined that defendant
    was not in a treatment program, and that defendant had not made any payments to
    satisfy his financial obligations. On cross examination, Officer Garton admitted
    that the desertion report was written by a different probation officer, and that he
    had no personal knowledge, apart from reading the report, about what was said in
    1
    In light of the trial court‟s statement, any objection by defendant to the admission
    of the report would have been futile. Therefore, we reject the Attorney General‟s
    assertion that defendant forfeited any issue regarding the admission of the report by
    failing to object. (People v. Sandoval (2001) 
    87 Cal.App.4th 1425
    , 1433, fn. 1.)
    3
    the report. The trial court then questioned Officer Garton, confirming that the
    records the officer relied upon were kept in the normal course of business in the
    probation department, and the entries were made at or near the time of the
    occurrence. The court also took judicial notice of the court file, particularly the
    court‟s admonition to defendant on October 12, 2011, that he was ordered to report
    to probation within 48 hours of his release from custody.
    Defendant also testified at the probation violation hearing. On direct
    examination, he testified that he never received a letter from the probation
    department, nor did he receive anything telling him where to report or what
    amounts he was required to pay. On cross examination, defendant admitted that he
    was present in court when he was sentenced and put on probation, although he did
    not remember if he agreed to the terms of probation and did not recall if he was
    ordered to report to probation. He admitted that he never reported to probation and
    never paid any fine, but he asserted that he had been reporting to his parole officer
    once a week.
    Based upon the testimony at the hearing and the desertion report, the trial
    court found by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant violated probation
    by failing to report, and lifted the stay on the previously imposed five-year
    sentence. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal from the judgment.
    DISCUSSION
    Defendant contends the trial court‟s reliance on the probation desertion
    report and the testimony of a probation officer who had no personal knowledge
    about the facts set forth in the report violated his Sixth Amendment right to
    confront the witnesses against him (citing Crawford v. Washington (2004) 
    541 U.S. 36
    , 68; Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 
    557 U.S. 305
    , 311), as well as
    4
    his right to due process (citing U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; People v. Arreola (1994)
    
    7 Cal.4th 1144
    , 1152-1153). We disagree.
    To the extent defendant asserts the trial court‟s reliance on the probation
    desertion report violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment confrontation
    clause, he is incorrect. “Probation revocation proceedings are not „criminal
    prosecutions‟ to which the Sixth Amendment applies.” (People v. Johnson (2004)
    
    121 Cal.App.4th 1409
    , 1411, citing U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Morrissey v. Brewer
    (1972) 
    408 U.S. 471
    , 480; Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 
    411 U.S. 778
    , 781.)
    To the extent defendant asserts his right to due process was violated by the
    trial court‟s consideration of the report and the testimony of a probation officer
    who had no personal knowledge of the facts stated in the report, variations of this
    same argument have been rejected by several appellate courts. (See, e.g., People v.
    Gomez, supra, 
    181 Cal.App.4th 1028
     [no due process violation in admitting a
    probation report prepared by one probation officer based upon electronic records
    and records prepared by another probation officer, detailing the defendant‟s failure
    to report as instructed to his probation officer]; People v. Abrams (2007) 
    158 Cal.App.4th 396
     [trial court properly admitted testimony by one probation officer
    regarding another probation officer‟s report that defendant had been directed to
    report to probation but had failed to do so]; People v. O’Connell (2003) 
    107 Cal.App.4th 1062
     [admission of probation officer‟s report attaching report by
    manager of drug counseling program stating that defendant failed to attend the
    program did not violate due process].)
    As the court in People v. Abrams, supra, 
    158 Cal.App.4th 396
    , noted, where
    the probation officer‟s report was “„prepared contemporaneously to, and
    specifically for, the hearing where [defendant‟s] lack of compliance‟ was at issue
    . . . the evidence from the probation reports had sufficient „indicia of reliability‟” to
    be admissible as a general rule. (Id. at p. 404.) The court explained that, although
    5
    some portions of a probation officer‟s report may not be admissible (such as
    reports of statements made by victims or witnesses), statements in the report
    involving “routine matters such as the making and keeping of probation
    appointments, restitution and other payments, and similar records of events of
    which the probation officer is not likely to have personal recollection and as to
    which the officer „would rely instead on the record of his or her own action‟” are
    admissible without the testimony of the author of the report. (Id. at p. 405, quoting
    People v. Arreola, 
    supra,
     7 Cal.4th at p. 1157.)
    In the present case, the report consisted entirely of the kind of evidence
    found to be admissible in Abrams and Gomez. As in those cases, we find the
    admission of the report in this case did not violate defendant‟s right to due process.
    In any event, we conclude that even if there could have been error in admitting the
    report without the author‟s testimony, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable
    doubt. (People v. Arreola, 
    supra,
     7 Cal.4th at p. 1161 [applying harmless beyond a
    reasonable doubt standard].) Defendant testified at the revocation hearing that he
    had never reported to probation and had never paid any fine. Although defendant
    testified that he did not receive the probation orientation appointment letter, which
    the report states was sent to him, the trial court noted that at both the October 12,
    2011 and the November 14, 2011 hearings, it ordered defendant to report to
    probation within 48 hours of his release from custody. Thus, defendant‟s
    testimony that he never reported constituted an admission of the probation
    violation.
    6
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    WILLHITE, Acting P. J.
    We concur:
    MANELLA, J.
    SUZUKAWA, J.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B240206

Filed Date: 6/24/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021