People v. Dolphin CA4/1 ( 2016 )

Filed 3/11/16 P. v. Dolphin CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D068245
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD258105)
KAYMI ELIZABETH DOLPHIN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Howard H.
Shore, Judge. Affirmed.
Steven J. Carroll, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Scott C.
Taylor, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found Kaymi Dolphin guilty of possessing methamphetamine for sale. The
court suspended imposition of the sentence for a three-year period and imposed local
custody for 120 days. Custody was stayed pending Dolphin's completing a residential
treatment program.
Dolphin contends the trial court erred in questioning a defense witness and later
briefly ordering the witness into custody for refusing to answer a question about the
identity of the witness's drug supplier. Dolphin maintains these actions violated her right
to a fair trial and the court erred in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on the reasons
the witness was taken into custody. We reject these contentions and affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Wal-Mart loss prevention officer Gilberto Meraz began his shift at about 8:00
a.m. on August 18, 2014. At the time, he was told a woman (Dolphin) had been at the
store looking for her purse since about 2:00 a.m. After checking the security tapes and
the store offices, Meraz found the purse. When Meraz looked inside the purse, he saw
a large sum of cash and two baggies containing a powdery substance that appeared to
be methamphetamine.
Meraz called the police. The responding police officer told Meraz to ask
Dolphin to identify the purse, and if she did so, return the purse and its contents to her.
The officer said he would be waiting outside the store. After Dolphin identified the
purse and it was returned to her, Dolphin asked a store manager to walk her to her car.
As Dolphin walked outside the store, a police officer told her she was being
detained for a narcotics investigation. When asked what kind of drugs were in her
purse, Dolphin responded, " 'possibly meth.' " The police officer opened the purse and
saw two plastic baggies commonly used to store illegal drugs and $1,623 in cash,
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mostly $20 bills. The baggies were later found to contain 4.67 grams and 4.17 grams of
methamphetamine. Dolphin did not appear to be under the influence of
methamphetamine and did not have the appearance of a chronic methamphetamine user.
Dolphin had no methamphetamine paraphernalia in her possession.
Police officers also found a cell phone inside Dolphin's purse and later searched
the phone's text messages. At trial, the prosecutor presented evidence of these messages
in a 14-page exhibit. The exhibit shows numerous incoming texts from individuals
seeking small amounts of methamphetamine and outgoing texts from Dolphin agreeing
to satisfy these requests in exchange for a money payment.
At trial, the prosecution also called a law enforcement expert who had extensive
narcotics training and experience. The expert opined that the 8.84 grams of
methamphetamine found in Dolphin's purse were possessed for sale, rather than
personal use. He based this conclusion on numerous factors, including: (1) the amount
of cash ($1,623) found in the purse and the fact the cash was primarily in $20 bills; (2)
the amount of the drugs, given that an average user consumes about .4 grams per day
and that users (who are not also sellers) do not usually buy methamphetamine in bulk
amounts; (3) the fact that Dolphin had no drug paraphernalia and did not appear to be a
chronic user; (4) the street value of the drugs, which was between about $480 and $800;
and (5) the nature of the text messages that the expert opined reflected
methamphetamine purchases and sales.
Dolphin's defense theory was that the methamphetamine found in her purse was
for her personal use and not for sale. In support, her counsel cross-examined the
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prosecution's expert on the grounds for his opinions that the drugs were possessed for
sale, eliciting his agreement that other conclusions were possible (although not likely).
Dolphin did not testify, but presented two witnesses primarily to explain why she had
the large sum of cash in her purse at the time she was arrested.
First, she called David Roe, a bail agent for a bail bonding company. Roe
testified that Dolphin called him on the evening of August 17, 2014 (one day before her
arrest) regarding bail for a person named Jesse Hoover. Roe testified that Hoover's case
had a "1275 hold," which he said means that generally cash is not an acceptable form of
payment for a bail.
The second witness was Tracey Bojorquez, Dolphin's friend. Bojorquez admitted
she was a methamphetamine user, had pled guilty to a methamphetamine possession
charge, and frequently used methamphetamine with Dolphin during August 2014.
Bojorquez said Dolphin was a methamphetamine addict at the time.
Bojorquez testified that on August 5 (about two weeks before Dolphin's arrest),
Bojorquez and Hoover were arrested for methamphetamine possession. Bojorquez said
she and Dolphin then attempted to obtain money to bail Hoover out of jail by having
Dolphin collect cash from their friends. Bojorquez said she gave $300 to Dolphin in
this effort. Once Dolphin collected the cash, the two women learned they could not use
the money for the bail because Hoover had a "hold" requiring "a credit card or someone
to co-sign." Bojorquez and her mother then paid the full bail amount on a credit card.
Bojorquez identified text messages on her cell phone that she said supported this
sequence of events.
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During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Bojorquez whether Dolphin was
the person who supplied her with methamphetamine in August 2014. After substantial
reluctance to respond to the question, Bojorquez denied that she obtained
methamphetamine from Dolphin, but refused to identify the person who did provide her
with the drugs. As detailed below, after determining the information was relevant and
there was no applicable privilege, the court ordered Bojorquez to answer the question
regarding the identity of the person providing the drugs to her. When Bojorquez
refused to abide by this order, the court held her in contempt of court and had the bailiff
take her into custody while the jury was present. A short time later, Bojorquez came
back to the witness stand and identified two people (not Dolphin) who had supplied her
with the methamphetamine.
During redirect, defense counsel elicited testimony that Bojorquez did not want to
identify her methamphetamine suppliers because she was afraid to do so and they were
her friends.
After deliberating for about 90 minutes, the jury found Dolphin guilty of
possessing the methamphetamine for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.)
DISCUSSION
Dolphin's sole appellate challenge concerns the court's handling of witness
Bojorquez's initial refusal to identify the person who provided her with
methamphetamine. Dolphin contends the court denied her a fair trial by (1) questioning
this witness directly; and (2) ordering Bojorquez handcuffed and taken into custody for
failing to respond to the prosecutor's question. Dolphin additionally contends the court
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erred in refusing to sua sponte provide the jury with an explanation for Bojorquez's
custody status.
A. Relevant Background Facts
At the outset of her cross-examination of Bojorquez, the prosecutor noted
Bojorquez's testimony that she used methamphetamine with Dolphin, and asked: "Who
did you get your methamphetamine from [in August 2014]?" Defense counsel objected
based on relevance. The court overruled the objection, and told Bojorquez to answer
the question. Defense counsel asked whether counsel could approach the sidebar, but
the court said "After she answers the question." The court said to Bojorquez, "You're
under oath. You have to answer the question." Bojorquez responded that she would
"like to talk to my lawyer."
After a sidebar discussion, the trial judge said he was going to ask the witness "a
couple of questions myself." During this brief questioning (while the jury was present),
the court elicited certain foundational information, including that Bojorquez obtained
the drugs from someone both she and Dolphin knew, and that Bojorquez obtained the
drugs from a "few" people. The court then said it would recess for the day, and it was
going to conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury "and then I'll make a
determination as to what to do with the remainder of [Bojorquez's] testimony."
After the jury was excused, the court said it would ask Bojorquez a few questions
to determine whether she needed to speak with an attorney. In response to these
questions, Bojorquez said the drugs were given to her and she did not purchase them,
but she did not want to identify the person who gave them to her. The court stated that
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Bojorquez did not have a privilege to remain silent and the answer would not
incriminate her. The court then stated it would take a brief recess to give defense
counsel time to speak with the witness. The court stated: "I'm pursuing this because I
believe it's within the proper scope of examination to assess the credibility of the
witness when she says the defendant was not her supplier."
After the recess, the court indicated it would provide Bojorquez the opportunity to
speak with her attorney. The court stated: "I'm going to order you back tomorrow
morning. And this is an extremely important issue because—I'll just explain a couple of
different possibilities: If there is some basis, some privilege, for example, for not
answering one or more questions, I would then have to consider striking all of your
testimony, which, of course, would not be beneficial to the defense case. [¶] Also
because part of the testimony involved you . . . admitting that [you are or] were a
[methamphetamine] user and admitting that the defendant was a [methamphetamine]
user, by refusing to answer the question about where you got your [methamphetamine],
even though you denied getting it from the defendant, you could leave the jury with the
impression that she was your supplier. So there are some . . . very important issues
involved in dealing with your testimony, and I want to make sure that you understand
that when you talk to [your attorney]."
The next morning, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel informed the
court she had spoken with Bojorquez's attorney, and the attorney is available to come to
court to assist Bojorquez if requested to do so. Defense counsel said that Bojorquez's
attorney indicated Bojorquez may be "fear[ful] of potential street retaliation" and that if
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"the court would be inclined to seal a portion of the transcript that might help alleviate
some of the concerns."
The trial court then stated that based on its legal research, it had confirmed
Bojorquez had no privilege to refuse to answer the drug-supplier question and the court
had the authority to find her in contempt and place her in custody if she did not answer
the question. The court told Bojorquez it would exercise this authority if she did not
answer the question. The court also said it was willing to seal the record pertaining to
Bojorquez's testimony on this issue.
At that point, defense counsel reasserted a relevance objection, stating Bojorquez
has now confirmed it was not Dolphin who provided the drugs, and therefore the
identity of the person who provided the drugs was not relevant. The court overruled the
objection, stating "the jury has the right to decide whether she's telling the truth or lying
with regard to" whether Dolphin supplied her with the drugs. The court then reiterated
that Bojorquez would be asked the question before the jury and her answer would be
sealed. The court said to Bojorquez that if she refused to answer, the court "will order
that you be imprisoned until you do," and this would occur in the jury's presence,
"mean[ing] a bailiff is going to take you out of the courtroom in handcuffs . . . ."
Bojorquez said she understood.
When the jury returned, the prosecutor asked Bojorquez "who did you get the
drugs from?" After Bojorquez remained silent, the court stated: "Ms. Bojorquez you
need to answer the question. I indicated, for the benefit of the jury, that I would seal
any names so that they would not be made public." When Bojorquez continued to
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remain silent, the court ordered her remanded to custody until she answered the
question. As this was being done, the court stated: "I'm going to give the witness a few
moments to think about her future, and I apologize to the jury for the inconvenience.
We're going to take a short recess, and we will let you know—I'm going to give it about
15 minutes. . . ."
After the recess, the bailiff brought Bojorquez back to the witness stand, and the
court asked him to remove her handcuffs. The prosecutor then asked again: "Ms.
Bojorquez, who did you get your methamphetamine from?" Bojorquez responded by
identifying two individuals (not Dolphin). Bojorquez also testified that her
methamphetamine use was "a social thing" and that she would sometimes use the same
methamphetamine pipe as did Dolphin. The prosecutor also elicited Bojorquez's
testimony that she never saw other people giving Dolphin cash for Hoover's bail bond.
During redirect examination, defense counsel asked questions about Bojorquez's
reluctance to identify her supplier:
"[Defense Counsel:] You weren't really happy about coming back
here today, were you?"
"[Bojorquez:] No."
"[Defense Counsel:] And it was hard for you to answer some of the
district attorney's questions, wasn't it?"
"[Bojorquez:] Yes."
"[Defense Counsel:] Yesterday you were asked a question, and I
just [want] to make sure I get it correctly, but you were asked by the
judge, 'Did Ms. Dolphin ever sell you methamphetamine?' And I
just want to confirm, what's the answer to that question?"
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"[Bojorquez:] No."
"[Defense Counsel:] You were asked, though, who did provide you
with methamphetamine."
"[Bojorquez:] Yes."
"[Defense Counsel:] And it was hard to answer those questions; is
that right?"
"[Bojorquez:] Yes."
"[Defense Counsel:] And is that because those people are friends of
yours?"
"[Bojorquez:] One is and one because I was scared."
During closing arguments, defense counsel discussed Bojorquez's reluctance to
identify her supplier: "We heard from Tracey Bojorquez. It was pretty painful. She had
a really hard time testifying. It's a friend, of course. She cares about her. Of course she
doesn't want anything bad to happen to her. She didn't want to name names. She was
specific: She never got drugs from [Dolphin]. Took almost going into jail for her to say
who she does get her drugs from. She told you, she acknowledged to you that Ms.
Dolphin's a user. You can't judge [Dolphin] because she's a user. You have to judge
[Dolphin] because of what's being charged. And you judge the facts of this case, and you
hold the government to its burden."
In her reply argument, the prosecutor also briefly addressed Bojorquez's
testimony: "[Y]ou have to question yourself about the credibility of [Bojorquez]. You
saw—we all watched painfully—she refused to answer questions. She didn't want to
answer questions. And, ladies and gentlemen, you get to consider a witness's testimony,
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the way that she acted, the way that she testified, et cetera, in considering whether to
find her testimony credible or not."
B. Analysis
Dolphin contends she was deprived of a fair trial based on the court's involvement
in asking Bojorquez questions and ordering Bojorquez taken into custody once she
violated its direct order.
Dolphin forfeited these issues because her counsel failed to object to, or seek a
jury admonition regarding, the court's challenged conduct. (See People v. Snow (2003)
30 Cal. 4th 43, 78; People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 1075, 1108.)
Additionally, the contentions lack merit. With respect to the court's direct
questions to Bojorquez, a trial judge has " ' " 'the power, discretion and affirmative
duty . . . [to] participate in the examination of witnesses whenever [the court] believes
[the questioning] may fairly aid in eliciting the truth, in preventing misunderstanding, in
clarifying the testimony or covering omissions, in allowing a witness his right of
explanation, and in eliciting facts material to a just determination of the cause.' " ' "
(People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal. 4th 310, 350; accord, People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal. 4th
566, 597.) "The court's questioning must be ' "temperate, nonargumentative, and
scrupulously fair" ' [citation], and it must not convey to the jury the court's opinion of
the witness's credibility." (Cook, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 597.)
Under these standards, the court's questions to Bojorquez were appropriate. After
Bojorquez refused to answer the prosecutor's question regarding her drug supplier,
Bojorquez said she wanted to speak with her attorney. At that point, the parties held a
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brief sidebar, and the court then stated it would ask Bojorquez "a couple of questions."
The court then proceeded to ask foundational questions regarding the existence of a
supplier, i.e., whether a third party or parties supplied the drugs to Bojorquez or whether
Bojorquez manufactured the methamphetamine herself. Once the court confirmed that
Bojorquez had a supplier and knew the identity of her supplier, the court then repeated
the prosecutor's question regarding the identity of the supplier. When Bojorquez again
refused to answer, the court excused the jury.
These limited inquiries by the court did not show bias toward the prosecution, and
did not reflect the court becoming an advocate for either party. The court's questions
were proper as they sought to clarify the grounds for Bojorquez's refusal to respond to
the prosecutor's questions and to assess Bojorquez's request to speak with her lawyer.
Once the court was satisfied there were no proper grounds for an objection, the court did
not err in repeating the prosecutor's question.
On the court's later actions in declaring the witness was in contempt of court and
ordering the bailiff to take her into custody, this action was within the court's broad
discretion to control the conduct of the trial. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1211, subd. (a),
1219, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 1044; In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal. 4th 1217, 1230; see
also In re Willon (1996) 47 Cal. App. 4th 1080, 1089.) The court has the authority to
require a witness to answer a question that does not seek privileged information and is
not otherwise legally objectionable. (See Evid. Code, §§ 765, subd. (a), 766; see also
People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal. 4th 291, 304.) If a witness refuses a court's direct order
that he or she answer a valid question, the court may find the witness in contempt of
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court in the presence of the jury. (See People v. Lopez (1999) 71 Cal. App. 4th 1550,
1553, 1555-1556.) Moreover, if a defense witness has no constitutional or statutory
right to refuse to answer a prosecutor's question, the "[j]urors are entitled to draw a
negative inference when such a witness refuses to provide relevant testimony." (Id. at p.
1554.)
Dolphin contends it would have been "better" for the court to allow Bojorquez to
refuse to answer the question and then permit the prosecutor to argue negative
credibility inferences from this refusal, i.e., that Dolphin was in fact Bojorquez's
supplier. Although this may have been one available option, the court did not abuse its
discretion in deciding to require an answer, particularly because this approach
potentially benefited Dolphin's defense. Bojorquez's identification of the third-party
suppliers supported Dolphin's defense that she did not sell methamphetamine. And it
allowed defense counsel to explain Bojorquez's initial reluctance to respond to the
question, e.g., she was scared to name her supplier. If Bojorquez did not answer the
question, a strong inference to draw was that Dolphin sold her the drugs. By working to
make Bojorquez understand she needed to answer the question, the court was seeking to
promote the "effective ascertainment of the truth" and to ensure a fair trial for all
parties. (See Pen. Code, § 1044.)
Contrary to Dolphin's contentions, the fact that Bojorquez was placed in
handcuffs before the jury did not constitute undue prejudice to Dolphin's case. In the
jury's presence, the court told Bojorquez in clear and plain language that she had no
privilege to refuse to answer the prosecution's questions and explained the consequences
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for her failure to answer. When Bojorquez continued to defy the court, the court
followed through with its admonishments and ordered her placed in custody. On this
record, the jurors would have reasonably understood that the court took these actions as
a necessary step to enforcing its orders, and not as a reflection of its views on
Bojorquez's credibility or the merits of the defense case. Bojorquez's own actions, and
not the court's rulings, were responsible for undermining her credibility. Bojorquez's
refusal to follow the court's order to answer the prosecutor's question was a valid factor
for the jury to consider in evaluating whether she was telling the truth that Dolphin was
not her drug supplier. Dolphin's counsel had the opportunity to argue to the jury that
Bojorquez's actions reflected her own discomfort with the question, and should not
reflect on Dolphin's guilt. On the record before us, the fact the jury saw Bojorquez
placed in handcuffs for violating a direct court order did not deny Dolphin a fair trial.
We also reject Dolphin's suggestion that the trial court should have sua sponte
instructed the jury on a witness in custody using CALCRIM No. 337, which tells the
jury not to speculate regarding the physical restraint or custody. In this case, the jury
was fully aware of the reason Bojorquez was briefly taken into custody. Thus, an
additional instruction was unnecessary.
Finally, the court's actions regarding witness Bojorquez were not prejudicial. The
evidence presented at trial unequivocally demonstrated that Dolphin was selling drugs.
The undisputed evidence shows that at the time of her arrest, Dolphin's purse contained
almost nine grams of methamphetamine together with $1,623 in cash (mostly $20 bills),
and her text messages showed that she was involved in providing small amounts of the
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drug to others in exchange for money. Dolphin presented Bojorquez's testimony to
support her defense that Dolphin held the $1,623 to use for a bail bond. But
Bojorquez's testimony on this issue had little or no probative value given that Bojorquez
could identify the source for only $300 of these funds, and this testimony did not relate
to Dolphin's possession of the large quantity of drugs or the text messages reflecting
methamphetamine sales.
We additionally note that at the outset of the trial, the court instructed the jury:
"As a judge, my sole responsibility is to ensure that both sides receive a fair trial. I have
absolutely no interest in the outcome of this case. [¶] . . . [P]lease don't infer from
anything I say or do that I care what your verdict is. That's completely up to you. My
only job is to make sure that both sides receive a fair trial. [¶] And there may be times
when I may ask questions of witnesses myself. If I do that, it's not because I'm trying to
help or hurt one side or the other. That would be improper. It's only because I believe
something needs to be clarified for your benefit to help you decide the case." At the
conclusion of trial, the court reiterated that the jury should not "take anything I said or did
during the trial as an indication of what I think about the facts, the witnesses, or what
your verdict should be. . . ."
These instructions informed the jury that the trial court's role was limited to an
impartial presiding officer, and that the jury should not interpret the court's actions or
rulings as intending to favor either side. (People v. Cook, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 598.)
We are required to presume the jury understood and followed these instructions. (See
People v. Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 350.)
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DISPOSITION
Judgment affirmed.
HALLER, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MCDONALD, J.
IRION, J.
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