Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc. ( 2016 )

Filed 3/14/16
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
MIKE HERNANDEZ et al., D067091
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
FRANCESCA MULLER, (Super. Ct. No.
37-2008-00094395-CU-BT-CTL)
Plaintiff and Appellant;
v.
RESTORATION HARDWARE, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, William S.
Dato, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Law Office of Lawrence W. Schonbrun and Lawrence W. Schonbrun for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Patterson Law Group, James R. Patterson, Allison H. Goddard; Stonebarger Law
and Gene J. Stonebarger for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
In this class action, the class representatives alleged defendant Restoration
Hardware, Inc. (RHI), committed numerous violations of Civil Code section 1747.08,
also known as the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act. After a bench trial, the trial court
found RHI was liable for as many as 1,213,745 violations of that statute and set a penalty
recovery in the amount of $30 per violation, subject to RHI's right to dispute any specific
claim. Under that judgment, RHI faced a total maximum liability of $36,412,350.
In posttrial proceedings, class representatives requested the court order an award
of attorney fees of $9,103,087.50 (25 percent of the total maximum fund of $36,412,350
created by the judgment) to be payable to class counsel from the fund. RHI agreed it
would not contest that request. Francesca Muller, a class member and the person
prosecuting the present appeal, requested the court order notice of the attorney fee motion
be sent to all class members. The court denied Muller's request, granted the attorney fee
motion, and entered judgment in the action. Muller then filed a notice of appeal from the
judgment.
Muller asserts the court erred when it declined to order that notice be given to all
class members of the hearing on the attorney fee award, and that the award was
calculated in violation of applicable standards and procedures. Muller also claims the
court's award was an abuse of its discretion. Class representative Hernandez asserts
Muller does not have standing to appeal the judgment and that the appeal should
therefore be dismissed. Hernandez alternatively argues (1) no notice to the class of the
attorney fee hearing was mandated and (2) the amount awarded as fees, as well as the
2
procedure employed by the trial court for determining the amount of the attorney fees
award, was proper.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Class Action
Michael Hernandez filed this action in 2008 alleging defendant RHI violated Civil
Code section 1747.08 by requesting and recording ZIP codes from consumers who used a
credit card in purchase transactions in RHI's California retail stores. After years of
litigation, the court ultimately certified the case as a class action, appointed Michael
Hernandez and Amanda Georgino as class representatives (together Hernandez), and
appointed Patterson Law Group and Stonebarger Law as counsel for the class.
The June 2013 notice to potential class members advised them of the pending
class action and explained they had the option of (1) remaining as part of the class and
being bound by the judgment, or (2) excluding themselves from the class and not being
bound by any judgment. It also advised that, if they elected to remain in the class, they
had the option of entering an appearance through counsel. Two weeks later, attorney
Schonbrun entered an appearance in the action on behalf of Muller. However, Muller did
not move to intervene in the action, or to join as an additional class representative, or to
be substituted for Michael Hernandez and Amanda Georgino as class representative.
B. The Verdict and Common Fund Award
After a bench trial, the court issued its decision in favor of the class. The court
found RHI committed "as many as" 1,213,745 violations of section 1747.08, subdivision
3
(a)(2), for credit card transactions that occurred during the class period because RHI
requested, obtained and recorded the customer's ZIP code as part of the credit card
transaction.1 The court also concluded the appropriate penalty under section 1747.08,
subdivision (e), for each violation would be $30, for a total recovery by the class of up to
$36,412,350.
Because the court's decision ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding an
appropriate claims process, the parties met and agreed on a claims process, and a process
for distributing the total award (the claims procedures). The parties' stipulation proposed
the final judgment award of $36,412,350 be "treated as a common fund inclusive of any
attorneys' fees, costs, and class representative enhancements" subsequently ordered by
the court, and also include administrative costs associated with administering the claims
process. The parties proposed that, after deduction of attorney fees, costs, and class
representative enhancements, the net remaining fund (the Net Fund) would be distributed
to class members as (1) a prorated share of the Net Fund up to $30 per violation cash
payment to persons submitting valid claims and who elected cash payments, and (2) the
"coupon option" to persons submitting valid claims (if they did not elect the cash award)
1 However, the court's decision specified the maximum number of violations was
"subject to reduction" if information obtained during the claims process provided RHI
with evidence to show that a particular credit card transaction did not result in a violation
of section 1747.08, subdivision (a)(2), because RHI inaccurately recorded the customer's
ZIP code. The court accepted class counsel's suggestion that RHI could be given the
opportunity to challenge an individual class member's claim during the claims process if
RHI could show the ZIP code recorded by RHI for the particular customer did not match
the customer's actual ZIP code. The court ordered the parties to meet and confer "on the
scope and particulars of an appropriate claims process, including a means for RHI to
challenge the accuracy of any recorded ZIP codes."
4
for 33 percent off of an up to $10,000 purchase of nonexcluded RHI merchandise valid
for one year from issuance of the coupon. The parties' proposal also contained a
provision that, at the end of coupon period, if the payouts from the Net Fund in cash or
from coupon savings did not exhaust the Net Fund, an additional coupon would be issued
with a dollar cap sufficient to exhaust the Net Fund.
C. The Attorney Fees Determination
Hernandez subsequently moved for an attorney fees award seeking an award of
attorney fees equivalent to 25 percent of the total judgment recovered for the class.2 The
court, although acknowledging a percentage award might ultimately be the appropriate
method to calculate the fee award, also directed class counsel to supplement the motion
for fees with a filing that employed a traditional "lodestar" calculation. Hernandez
subsequently submitted the lodestar calculation and analysis, which showed class counsel
had spent over 3500 hours, totaling nearly $2.7 million in costs advanced and fees
incurred, and detailed the attorneys involved, the tasks performed, and the reasonableness
of the hourly rates for those attorneys. Hernandez's submission also articulated the
reasons that supported application of a "multiplier" to the lodestar calculation.
Muller, who was served with the attorney fee motions, did not file any objection
contesting the propriety of the amount sought by Hernandez as attorney fees. Instead,
2 Class counsel declared RHI agreed not to oppose a court award of the requested
amount as long as class counsel sought the minimum 25 percent amount and, absent that
stipulation, class counsel would have requested a higher amount. Analogous "clear
sailing" stipulations have been determined to be appropriate by other courts. (See, e.g.,
Consumer Privacy Cases (2009) 175 Cal. App. 4th 545, 552-556.)
5
Muller filed an August 29, 2014, "Request for Clarification," asking for clarification on
whether class members would receive notice of the fee application and the right to appear
and comment on the application.3 Prior to the hearing on the attorney fees, the court
issued its tentative ruling determining (1) a percentage award in a "common fund" case
was permitted by California law, (2) a 25 percent fee was a percentage courts use as a
"starting benchmark," and (3) a fee at or above that benchmark was "particularly
appropriate" considering the risks undertaken, and results obtained, by counsel in this
action.
At the hearing on the attorney fee application, Muller objected that considering the
attorney fees application without first giving class members notice of the fee application
and the right to appear and comment on the application was a violation of class action
procedures because this fee award was "a settlement as regards to the attorneys' fees . . .
[because] [class] counsel and defendants negotiated a settlement on the question of
attorneys' fees." Muller also argued, for the first time at the hearing, that a court must use
the "lodestar multiplier approach" (rather than a percentage of the fund approach) when
calculating the fee award, but did not argue the amount the court's tentative ruling
proposed to award was excessive.
3 Muller also sought clarification of whether class counsel would be required to file
"lodestar information." However, the court had already ordered class counsel to file
lodestar information and, on August 29, 2014, Hernandez did file and serve the required
lodestar information.
6
D. The Judgment
The court's final judgment, which apparently tracked the parties' proposed claims
procedures process, provided for awarding $36,412,350, to be "treated as a common fund
inclusive of any attorneys' fees, costs, and class representative incentive enhancements
ordered by the Court and any administrative costs associated with administering the
claims process . . . ." The court awarded attorney fees of $9,103,087.50, or 25 percent of
the total maximum fund of $36,412,350 created by the judgment, as well as litigation
costs and class representative incentive enhancements, and directed the remainder of the
fund (less administrative costs of administering the claims process) be distributed as
specified by the judgment. Muller filed her notice of appeal within the time specified by
law.
II
ANALYSIS
Muller raises numerous claims of alleged error in the judgment entered below.
First, she claims the court could not adjudicate the attorney fee motion without first
giving notice to the class of Hernandez's motion to set the appropriate attorney fee award,
and giving all class members an opportunity to object to the motion, and the failure to do
so in this case violated both due process protections and California's class action
procedures. Second, Muller argues the court, by calculating the award based on a
percentage of the common fund rather than by a properly rigorous lodestar multiplier
approach, transgressed controlling California precedent. Finally, Muller argues class
7
counsel breached its fiduciary duty to the class by "negotiating" with RHI over the
amount of fees to be paid by the common fund.
Hernandez contests each of Muller's claims of error. However, Hernandez raises a
jurisdictional challenge to this court's ability to entertain the appeal, arguing that because
Muller was neither a "party" nor "aggrieved" by the judgment, she does not have standing
to pursue this appeal and the appeal must therefore be dismissed. Because this claim is
jurisdictional (Life v. County of Los Angeles (1990) 218 Cal. App. 3d 1287, 1292, fn. 3
["standing to appeal is jurisdictional"]; In re Marriage of Tushinsky (1988) 203
Cal. App. 3d 136, 141-143), we begin with our analysis of whether Muller may prosecute
this appeal.
A. General Principles
Only a "party aggrieved may appeal" from a judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 902.)
As a general rule, only parties of record may appeal (County of Alameda v. Carleson
(1971) 5 Cal. 3d 730, 736), and the courts have interpreted section 902 to require the
appellant both to have been a "party" below and to have been "aggrieved" by the
judgment. (See, e.g., Marsh v. Mountain Zephyr, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal. App. 4th 289, 295
["to have standing to appeal, a person generally must be both a party of record and
sufficiently 'aggrieved' by the judgment or order"] (Marsh).)
A class action is one prosecuted by named representative plaintiffs, who have a
fiduciary responsibility to prosecute the action on behalf of the absent parties. (Earley v.
Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 1420, 1434.) The class action structure relieves
the unnamed class members of the burden of participating in the action, hiring counsel,
8
and incurring costs. (Ibid.) Indeed, "[t]he structure of the class action does not allow
absent class members to become active parties, since 'to the extent the absent class
members are compelled to participate in the trial of the lawsuit, the effectiveness of the
class action device is destroyed.' " (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Although unnamed class
members may be deemed "parties" for the limited purposes of discovery (Southern
California Edison Co. v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal. 3d 832, 840), unnamed class
members are not otherwise considered "parties" to the litigation. (Cf. National Solar
Equipment Owners' Assn. v. Grumman Corp. (1991) 235 Cal. App. 3d 1273, 1282
["unnamed class members do not 'stand on the same footing as named parties' "].)
B. Analysis
Hernandez argues that, because Muller is not a party, the appeal should be
dismissed under Eggert v. Pac. States S. & L. Co. (1942) 20 Cal. 2d 199 (Eggert).4 In
Eggert, the court addressed whether an unnamed class member could appeal from a
4 Hernandez also argues the appeal should be dismissed because Muller was not
"aggrieved" by any of the purported errors committed below, and the parties vigorously
contest whether the "aggrieved" element is satisfied here. It is unnecessary to address the
"aggrieved" element of appellate standing, and we do not examine the bulk of the cases
relied on by Muller addressing that issue, because we conclude the separate "party"
element is absent here. (See, e.g., Marsh, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 295 ["to have
standing to appeal, a person generally must be both a party of record and sufficiently
'aggrieved' by the judgment or order"]; In re Miguel E. (2004) 120 Cal. App. 4th 521, 538-
544 [although grandparents were aggrieved by order, grandparents' appeal dismissed
because they were not parties to action]; Rose v. Rose (1952) 110 Cal. App. 2d 812, 813
[child appealed from order denying mother's application for increased child support for
child; court ordered appeal dismissed because, although child's beneficial interest in such
increase was harmed by order, child "was not named as a party to the action, did not take
any appropriate steps to become a party to the record, and since the court did not order
her brought into the action, she has no right to appeal from the order"].)
9
judgment entered in the class action. There, the named plaintiff (Eggert) commenced an
action against the savings and loan company on behalf of himself and some 1,500
persons who were certificate holders. The court held the suit a proper class action, and in
its judgment for Eggert and the other certificate holders whom he represented decreed
that they recover from the defendant over $1.8 million to be apportioned pro rata among
them after deduction of expenses and fees, and reserved jurisdiction to determine the fees
to be paid plaintiff's attorneys. After appointing a receiver to facilitate the collection and
payment of the judgment, the court also issued an order, directed to plaintiff and all other
persons interested, to show cause why it should not make an order fixing reasonable
attorneys' fees. Two certificate holders appeared and objected to the amount ordered as
attorneys' fees for plaintiff's attorneys, and subsequently appealed from the order
rejecting their objections. (Eggert, supra, 20 Cal.2d at pp. 199-200.) The class
representative moved to dismiss the appeal, and our Supreme Court granted the motion to
dismiss the appeal, explaining "it is a settled rule of practice in this state that only a party
to the record can appeal. [Citations.] Appellants were not named as parties to the action
nor did they take any appropriate steps to become parties to the record. The fact that their
names and the extent of their interest in the action appeared in an exhibit attached to the
complaint and the judgment did not make them parties . . . . [Citations.] Although their
attorney appeared at the hearing on the petition for the payment of the money to
plaintiff's attorneys and objected to such payment, he did not ask that appellants be made
parties, nor did the court order them brought into the action. [Citation.] Appellants had
ample opportunity even after the court had made its orders to become parties of record by
10
moving to vacate the orders to which they objected. They could then have appealed from
the order denying the motion." (Eggert, at p. 201.) Accordingly, the Supreme Court
ordered the appeal dismissed. (Ibid.)
Eggert appears to be on "all fours" with the present action: both involved a class
action; both involved a matter litigated to judgment; both involved a challenge to the
postjudgment attorney fee award to the counsel for the named plaintiff; both involved
appellants who were members of the class, but not named parties, and who had appeared
through counsel to object to the attorney fee award; and both involved members who took
no steps to be added as named plaintiffs.5 Accordingly, under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 450, we must adhere to Eggert and dismiss the appeal.
Muller argues we may disregard Eggert and entertain this appeal, but we are
unpersuaded by her arguments. Muller argues, for example, that Eggert was decided
before the 1966 revisions to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and those
federal rules are persuasive in modern California class action jurisprudence (see, e.g.,
Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal. 4th 969, 989 [conc. opn. by Werdeger, J.]), and
because Eggert predated those rule changes it is no longer relevant to the issue of
appellate standing. However, Muller cites no authority suggesting that changes to federal
procedural rules for managing class actions at trial undermine the analysis of a state
5 On appeal, Muller asserts Hernandez has "ignore[d] the legal ramifications" of
entering an appearance and of objecting to the attorney fees award and "never . . .
provide[d] legal authority . . . for a proposition that [such actions are] insufficient to
confer appellate standing." However, we believe Eggert does explain the legal effect
such actions have on appellate standing, and is fatal to Muller's contrary argument.
11
statute that limits the standing of parties entitled to appeal, and we are aware of no
relevant authority that does so.
Muller also cites several cases in which California appellate courts stated a class
member who was not a party to the action obtains appellate standing to challenge the
judgment merely by interposing an objection to the judgment below. However, neither of
the cases cited by Muller, Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Mrs. Gooch's Natural Food Markets,
Inc. (2005) 127 Cal. App. 4th 387 and Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91
Cal. App. 4th 224, made any effort to reconcile their conclusions with Eggert, and instead
rooted their conclusions in the analysis contained in Trotsky v. Los Angeles Fed. Sav. &
Loan Assn. (1975) 48 Cal. App. 3d 134 (Trotsky). (See Wershba, at pp. 235-236 [citing
only Trotsky on issue of standing]; Consumer Cause, at pp. 395-396 [citing Trotsky and
Wershba on issue of standing].) Accordingly, we examine Trotsky.
In Trotsky, the appellants were unnamed members of the affected class who
appeared at a settlement hearing and objected to a proposed settlement of a class action
lawsuit. Trotsky, discussing the standing to appeal issue, stated:
"[A]ppellant is a party aggrieved, and has standing to appeal.
[Citing Code of Civil Procedure section 902.] This is true even
though appellant could instead have 'opted out,' I.e., requested
exclusion from the judgment. [Citation.] As stated by the court in
Ace Heating & Plumbing [Co.] v. Crane [Co.] [3d Cir. 1971] 453
F.2d 30, 33], deciding a similar question under rule 23 of the Federal
rules of Civil Procedure,' . . . It is possible that, within a class, a
group of small claimants might be unfavorably treated by the terms
of a proposed settlement. For them, the option to join is in reality no
option at all. Rule 23 recognizes the fact that many small claimants
frequently have no litigable claims unless aggregated. So, without
court approval and a subsequent right to ask for review, such
claimants would be faced with equally unpalatable alternatives—
12
accept either nothing at all or a possibly unfair settlement. We
conclude that appellants have standing to appeal . . . .' [Citations.]
Were the rule otherwise, a class member who objected in the trial
court to the terms of the settlement would be unable to secure
appellate review of the court's order approving the settlement."
(Trotsky, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d at pp. 139-140.)
Thus, Trotsky focused primarily on whether an objector to a settlement was
"aggrieved" within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 902, concluding
objectors were aggrieved because " '[i]t is possible that, within a class, a group of small
claimants might be unfavorably treated by the terms of a proposed settlement. For them,
the option to join is in reality no option at all,' " and reasoning that because those
claimants might be forced to choose between "equally unpalatable alternatives"—of
accepting either nothing or an unfair settlement—those parties were sufficiently
aggrieved for purposes of the right to appeal. (Trotsky, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d at pp. 139-
140.) However, Trotsky did not examine the distinct "party" element of Code of Civil
Procedure section 902, nor make any effort to reconcile its conclusion with Eggert's
holding that unnamed class members whose only appearance was to object to the
attorneys' fees had no standing to appeal because they were not "parties" and did not avail
themselves of the "ample opportunity . . . to become parties of record . . . ." (Eggert,
supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 201.) Because Eggert teaches the "party" requirement of Code of
Civil Procedure section 902 is not met merely because the "aggrieved" requirement of
section 902 might also be satisfied as to a nonparty class member, we conclude Trotsky's
analysis of standing is flawed and that Trotsky and its progeny (which includes both
Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Mrs. Gooch's Natural Food Markets, Inc., supra, 127
13
Cal. App. 4th 387 and Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc., supra, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224)
should not be followed.
Trotsky's analysis is also flawed because it relied primarily on federal cases,
including Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., supra, 453 F.2d 30, in which the
federal courts concluded an objecting class member had standing to appeal without
seeking to be made a party to the proceedings below. However, it appears numerous
federal courts have subsequently held that nonparty class members may not appeal a
judgment. (See Croyden Assocs. v. Alleco, Inc. (8th Cir. 1992) 969 F.2d 675, 678, 678-
680 [noting the "circuits are divided on this issue, and some have inconsistent holdings";
holding nonparty class member lacks standing to appeal]; see also Felzen v. Andreas (7th
Cir. 1998) 134 F.3d 873 [class members must intervene as parties in order to appeal from
adverse decisions]; Walker v. Mesquite (5th Cir. 1988) 858 F.2d 1071 [nonparty class
member lacks standing to appeal].)6 The rationale, as explained by the Croyden court, is
6 We acknowledge the federal decisions, even from the United States Supreme
Court (compare Marino v. Ortiz (1988) 484 U.S. 301 [nonparty class members who did
not seek to intervene may not appeal approval of settlement] with Devlin v. Scardelletti
(2002) 536 U.S. 1 [reaching opposite conclusion without disapproving Marino]), are not
uniform. For example, in Powers v. Eichen (9th Cir. 2000) 229 F.3d 1249, the court
concluded that, at least in the context of a court approval of a proposed settlement of a
class action, a nonparty class member could appeal without intervening. (Id. at p. 1256.)
However, the principal rationale for Powers's conclusion appears to have been the
conclusion that conditioning the right to appeal on a class member's motion to intervene
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 24 would "create[] a procedural hurdle that
would delay the ultimate resolution of the case and unnecessarily burden those involved."
(Powers, at p. 1256.) Powers ignored that permitting unnamed class members to appeal a
judgment without seeking to intervene would create the same delays and burdens,
because a judgment could be delayed and burdened by appellate challenges mounted by
numerous (or, as here, over 400,000) notices of appeal by disgruntled class members.
14
threefold. First, unnamed class members cannot represent the class absent the procedures
outlined in Rule 23 because the trial court has not conducted hearings to determine
whether the appellants would satisfactorily represent the interests of the other class
members. (Croyden Associates v. Alleco, Inc., supra, 969 F.2d at p. 678.) Second,
Croyden observed that unnamed class members who disagree with the class action have
other adequate procedures through which their interests can be protected, pointing out
that class members may move to intervene and, if their motion to intervene is denied,
they may appeal that decision. Croyden observed that merely objecting to the settlement
did not confer standing to appeal; rather, the unnamed class member must still move to
intervene. (Croyden, at pp. 678-679; accord, Felzen v. Andreas, supra, 134 F.3d 873
[class members must intervene as parties in order to appeal from adverse decisions].)
Alternatively, a dissatisfied class member may opt out. (Croyden, at p. 678.) Finally,
Croyden pointed out that class actions would become unmanageable and unproductive if
each class member could individually appeal. (Ibid.) The purpose of class actions is to
"render manageable litigation involving numerous class members who otherwise would
all have access to the court through individual lawsuits" (ibid.) and it would defeat the
purpose of instituting the litigation as a class action in the first place if any and all class
members could appeal from rulings and judgments. (Ibid.) Thus, because Trotsky relies
Moreover, whatever merit Powers's rationale might have in the context of a proposed
settlement of a class action, the present action involved a court judgment in which the
amount of the recovery and the amount of the attorney fees award was not made by the
parties during negotiations to which unnamed class members were not privy, but was
instead made by the court as part of adversarial proceedings, which brings this action
squarely within the holding of Eggert and also obviates one of the concerns articulated by
Powers. (See Powers, at p. 1256.)
15
on federal authority that has been at least undermined by contrary federal authority, and
disregarded Eggert's contrary (and controlling) approach, we conclude the cases on
which Muller relies should not be followed.
Even were we free to disregard Eggert, which we are not (Auto Equity Sales, Inc.
v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal. 2d 450), adhering to Eggert's approach would not leave
nonparty class members without protection or appellate recourse. Under California law,
where class members are given the option of opting out, they are not bound by the
judgment in the class action but instead may pursue their own action. (Home Sav. &
Loan Assn. v. Superior Court (1974) 42 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1010.) Even if they remain,
California law provides that a person who is a nonparty may acquire appellate standing
by intervening, and moving to vacate the judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 378; Marsh,
supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 295.) They may then appeal the order denying the motion to
vacate. (Eggert, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 201.) Based on these rationales, Muller's
argument—that merely filing a notice of appearance (and subsequently objecting to the
attorney fee award) conferred standing on her to appeal from the court's judgment—must
fail. Intervention in the instant action would have permitted Muller to oppose the
attorney fee award and preserve the objectives of the class action: orderliness, efficiency,
and fairness to other class members. Similarly, we do not see how intervention would
fail to address the "unpalatable alternatives" that animated the Trotsky court. Intervention
would have the effect of giving Muller a clear avenue from which to challenge the
attorney fee award, because as a party Muller could not be ignored by the court, the class
plaintiffs, or the class defendant; furthermore, intervention would put the class defendant
16
on notice of a possible appeal from the judgment. Moreover, we believe a bright-line
rule requiring party status to appeal a class action would be appropriate where the cost of
intervention is minimal and benefits, to both the parties and to the court system, are
substantial.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Class representatives shall recover costs on appeal.
McDONALD, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
NARES, J.
17