People v. Mitchell CA5 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 10/20/21 P. v. Mitchell CA5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    THE PEOPLE,
    F081153
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    (Super. Ct. No. SC052002A)
    v.
    RICKY MARSDEN MITCHELL,                                                               OPINION
    Defendant and Appellant.
    THE COURT*
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Michael G.
    Bush, Judge.
    Mark Alan Hart, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
    General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel B. Bernstein and Eric L.
    Christoffersen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    -ooOoo-
    *        Before Hill, P. J., Poochigian, J. and Detjen, J.
    INTRODUCTION
    In 1993, petitioner Ricky Marsden Mitchell entered a plea of no contest to the
    murder of Verlin Mitchell1 (Pen. Code,2 § 187, subd. (a)), and admitted the special
    circumstance of murder during the commission or attempted commission of a burglary
    (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(VII)).3 For this offense, he was sentenced to a term of life
    without the possibility of parole.
    In 2019, petitioner filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95.
    The court summarily denied the petition without stating its reasons.
    On appeal, petitioner asserts he established a prima facie claim for resentencing
    relief, and the court therefore erred in denying the petition without issuing an order to
    show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing. We conclude the court did not err in
    summarily denying the petition without issuing an order to show cause or holding an
    evidentiary hearing because the record establishes petitioner is ineligible for resentencing
    as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    The facts underlying the offenses are not relevant to our determination, and we
    therefore summarize them only briefly.4
    1       Although petitioner and the decedent share the same last name, they do not appear
    to be related. To avoid confusion, we refer to Verlin by his first name. No disrespect is
    intended.
    2      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    3      Petitioner was originally charged with additional offenses, as described below.
    4       We deny petitioner’s November 18, 2020 request for judicial notice of the record
    in his prior appeal, People v. Mitchell, F020913. (See People v. Sanders (2003) 
    31 Cal.4th 318
    , 323, fn. 1 [declining to take judicial notice of documents that were not
    before the trial court]; see also People v. Young (2005) 
    34 Cal.4th 1149
    , 1171, fn. 3
    [judicial notice cannot be taken of any matter that is irrelevant].)
    Our factual summary is derived from records contained in the record on appeal in
    the instant case, specifically a summary of police reports contained in the probation
    2.
    On October 5, 1992, Verlin was found lying face down, bound, and dead on his
    bed from multiple gunshot wounds to the head and a broken neck caused by either a blow
    to the head with an object or by being “stomped on.” The residence appeared to have
    been ransacked and both his vehicles were missing. Petitioner, Mike G., Charles O., and
    Larry F.5 were stopped that afternoon in New Mexico in one of Verlin’s vehicles and
    arrested. Two firearms were found in the vehicle. Each of the individuals made
    incriminating statements. Relevant here, petitioner told police that Mike planned the
    burglary and murder, hit Verlin on the head and neck with an ax, and then shot Verlin.
    Charles told police that petitioner and Mike were both armed, and Mike shot Verlin twice
    after being urged to do so by petitioner. Mike told police that petitioner was armed,
    directed the others to restrain Verlin, and told Mike he had to shoot Verlin or petitioner
    would kill Mike’s parents. Larry’s statements were generally consistent with the others,
    although he was unsure who killed the victim.
    On November 13, 1992, the Kern County District Attorney charged petitioner with
    premeditated murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), with the special circumstance that the
    murder was committed during the commission or attempted commission of a burglary
    (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(VII)); two counts of residential burglary (former § 460.1;
    counts 2 & 5); and two counts of vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); counts 3
    & 4). As to count 1, the People also alleged petitioner personally used a firearm
    (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and a principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
    On September 29, 1993, petitioner entered a plea of no contest to count 1, and
    admitted the burglary special circumstance. The parties stipulated that petitioner was not
    the shooter in the murder. The remaining counts and allegations were dismissed.
    officer’s report. The parties previously stipulated that the police reports provided part of
    the factual basis for the plea.
    5      Mike, Charles, and Larry were minors at the time of the offense. Charles and
    Larry are brothers.
    3.
    On November 29, 1993, the court sentenced petitioner on count 1 to a term of life
    without the possibility of parole.
    On February 7, 2019, petitioner, in propria persona, filed a petition for
    resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. In the form petition, petitioner stated that a
    complaint, information, or indictment was filed against him that allowed him to be
    prosecuted under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
    consequences doctrine; he pled guilty or no contest to first or second degree murder; and
    he could not now be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes made
    to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019. He further averred that he was not the
    actual killer, did not act with an intent to kill, and was not a major participant in the
    underlying felony or did not act with reckless indifference to human life in the course of
    the crime.
    The court appointed counsel to represent petitioner.
    On March 5, 2019, the People filed an opposition to the petition and a motion to
    dismiss the petition, both arguing section 1170.95 is unconstitutional.6 On March 29,
    2019, the People filed an opposition on the merits to petitioner’s petition, arguing that the
    facts, as testified to at the preliminary hearing, demonstrated petitioner was a major
    participant in the crime and acted with reckless indifference to human life.
    On May 15, 2019, petitioner’s counsel was relieved due to a conflict of interest
    and new counsel was appointed.
    On September 19, 2019, the People filed a motion to dismiss the petition arguing
    that the facts, as testified to at the preliminary hearing, demonstrated petitioner was a
    major participant in the crime and acted with reckless indifference to human life, and
    additionally aided and abetted in the murder with the intent to kill. The People also
    6      The motion was fully briefed and eventually denied by the court.
    4.
    argued petitioner’s admission of the burglary-murder special circumstance constituted an
    admission that his conviction did not fall within the provisions of section 1170.95.
    On April 14, 2020, petitioner filed a reply, arguing that the record did not rebut his
    assertion that he is entitled to relief and the court could not resolve whether petitioner
    was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life without
    resolving factual questions at an evidentiary hearing.
    On April 17, 2020, the People filed a reply to petitioner’s reply, arguing once
    again that the special circumstance admission rendered petitioner ineligible for relief.
    On May 11, 2020, the court denied the petition in a minute order without
    providing a statement of reasons.
    This timely appeal followed.
    DISCUSSION
    I.     Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) and Section 1170.95
    Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018
    Reg. Sess.) “to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences
    doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person
    who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
    participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
    (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The bill accomplished this task by adding three
    separate provisions to the Penal Code. (People v. Gentile (2020) 
    10 Cal.5th 830
    , 842
    (Gentile).) First, to amend the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the bill added
    section 188, subdivision (a)(3), which requires a principal to act with malice aforethought
    before he or she may be convicted of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); accord, Gentile, at
    pp. 842-843.) Second, to amend the felony-murder rule, the bill added section 189,
    subdivision (e):
    “A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of [qualifying
    felonies] in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the
    5.
    following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The
    person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
    counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual
    killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person
    was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
    indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section
    190.2.”7 (§ 189, subd. (e); accord, Gentile, at p. 842.)
    Finally, the bill “added section 1170.95 to provide a procedure for those convicted of
    felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek
    relief under the two ameliorative provisions above.”8 (Gentile, at p. 843.)
    “Section 1170.95 lays out a process for a person convicted of felony murder or
    murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to seek vacatur of his or her
    conviction and resentencing.” (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 853.) First, “an offender
    must file a petition in the sentencing court averring that: ‘(1) A complaint, information,
    or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed
    under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
    doctrine[;] [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder
    following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be
    convicted for first degree or second degree murder[;] [¶] [and] (3) The petitioner could
    not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or
    189 made effective January 1, 2019.’ (§ 1170.95, subd[]. (a)(1)-(3); see also § 1170.95,
    subd. (b)(1)(A).) Additionally, the petition shall state ‘[w]hether the petitioner requests
    the appointment of counsel.’ (§ 1170.95, subd. (b)(1)(C).) If a petition fails to comply
    with subdivision (b)(1), ‘the court may deny the petition without prejudice to the filing of
    7      Additionally, section 189 was amended to allow for felony-murder liability where
    the victim is a peace officer. (§ 189, subd. (f); accord, People v. Daniel (2020) 
    57 Cal.App.5th 666
    , 672, review granted Feb. 24, 2021, S266336.)
    8      The Legislature recently passed, and the Governor signed, a bill amending section
    1170.95. (Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.).) The amendments are not yet
    effective (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c)(1)) and, in any event, would not alter our
    analysis. We quote from the version of section 1170.95 presently in effect.
    6.
    another petition.’ (§ 1170.95, subd. (b)(2).)” (People v. Lewis (2021) 
    11 Cal.5th 952
    ,
    959-960 (Lewis).)
    Where the petition complies with the requirements of section 1170.95, subdivision
    (b)(1), counsel must be appointed, if requested. The prosecutor must file a response and
    the petitioner may file a reply. The trial court must then review the petition to determine
    if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief.
    (§ 1170.95, subd. (c); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 961-963, 967.) In making this
    determination, the court may rely on the record of conviction. (Lewis, at pp. 970-971.)
    However, the prima facie inquiry is limited and, at this stage of the proceedings, the court
    “should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
    discretion.’ ” (Id. at pp. 971-972.)
    If the court determines the petitioner has met his or her prima facie burden, “the
    trial court must issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing to determine whether to
    vacate the murder conviction and to resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts.
    (§ 1170.95, subds. (c), (d)(1).) At the hearing, the prosecution must ‘prove, beyond a
    reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.’ (§ 1170.95,
    subd. (d)(3).) ‘The prosecutor and the petitioner may rely on the record of conviction or
    offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.’ (Ibid.)” (Gentile,
    supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 853.)
    To demonstrate prejudice from the denial of a section 1170.95 petition before the
    issuance of an order to show cause, the petitioner must show it is reasonably probable
    that, absent error, his or her petition would not have been summarily denied without an
    evidentiary hearing. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 972-974; see People v. Watson
    (1956) 
    46 Cal.2d 818
    , 836.)
    II.    The Petition was Properly Denied
    Petitioner contends he set forth a prima facie claim for relief and the trial court
    erred in denying his petition without issuing an order to show cause. We conclude the
    7.
    petition was properly denied at the prima facie stage because petitioner’s admission of
    the special circumstance establishes petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of
    law.
    To be eligible for relief pursuant to section 1170.95, petitioner must not have been
    the actual killer, must not have acted with the intent to kill, and must not have been a
    major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
    life. (§§ 189, subd. (e), 1170.95, subd. (a)(3); see Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 842.)
    Here, petitioner admitted a burglary-murder special circumstance pursuant to section
    190.2, subdivision (a)(17). In so doing, petitioner admitted he acted “with reckless
    indifference to human life and as a major participant” in aiding or abetting the
    commission of the underlying felony. (§ 190.2, subd. (d); People v. Gutierrez-Salazar
    (2019) 
    38 Cal.App.5th 411
    , 419.) In other words, “[t]he language of the special
    circumstance tracks the language of Senate Bill [No.] 1437 and the new felony-murder
    statutes.” (Gutierrez-Salazar, at p. 419.) By admitting this special circumstance,
    petitioner admitted the facts necessary to sustain a felony-murder conviction under the
    amended law. Petitioner’s admission on the burglary-murder special circumstance
    establishes that he is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.
    Nonetheless, petitioner argues the special circumstance admission, standing alone,
    is insufficient to render him ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. In support, he
    relies on People v. Banks (2015) 
    61 Cal.4th 788
     (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 
    63 Cal.4th 522
     (Clark), both decided after his conviction was final. “Banks and Clark
    ‘clarified “what it means for an aiding and abetting defendant to be a ‘major participant’
    in a crime who acted with a ‘reckless indifference to human life.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Banks
    identified certain factors to consider in determining whether a defendant was a major
    participant; Clark identified factors to guide the determination of whether the defendant
    acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (People v. Gomez (2020) 
    52 Cal.App.5th 1
    , 13, fn. 5, review granted Oct. 14, 2020, S264033 (Gomez).) Courts of Appeal are split
    8.
    on the question of whether a special circumstance finding entered prior to Banks and
    Clark renders a petitioner ineligible for section 1170.95 resentencing relief as a matter of
    law (see People v. Jones (2020) 
    56 Cal.App.5th 474
    , 478-479 [collecting cases], review
    granted Jan. 27, 2021, S265854 (Jones)), and our Supreme Court has granted review to
    decide the issue (People v. Strong (Dec. 18, 2020, C091162) [nonpub. opn.], review
    granted Mar. 10, 2021, S266606).
    Courts which have held that a pre-Banks and Clark felony-murder special-
    circumstance finding bars section 1170.95 resentencing relief have reasoned that Banks
    and Clark merely clarified the law as it always was. (Jones, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at
    pp. 482, 484, review granted; accord, People v. Nunez (2020) 
    57 Cal.App.5th 78
    , 92,
    review granted Jan. 13, 2021, S265918; People v. Allison (2020) 
    55 Cal.App.5th 449
    ,
    458.) These courts further note that our Supreme Court does not require juries to be
    instructed on the Banks and Clark clarifications. “Rather, while CALCRIM No. 703 now
    includes optional language drawn from Banks and Clark regarding the factors a jury may
    consider, ‘[t]he bench notes to the instruction state that Banks “stopped short of holding
    that the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on those factors,” and Clark “did not hold
    that the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on those factors.” ’ ” (Nunez, at pp. 92-93;
    accord, Jones, at p. 484; Allison, at pp. 458-459.) Thus, these courts found “no basis to
    conclude as a general matter that a pre-Banks and Clark jury was instructed differently
    than a post-Banks and Clark jury, or resolved different factual issues, answered different
    questions, or applied different standards.” (Nunez, at p. 94.)
    These courts have also held that an attack on a special circumstance finding in a
    section 1170.95 proceeding effectively constitutes a collateral attack on the judgment.
    (People v. Galvan (2020) 
    52 Cal.App.5th 1134
    , 1142, review granted Oct. 14, 2020,
    S264284; Gomez, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 16, review granted.) According to these
    courts, a petitioner who wishes to argue the special circumstance finding is invalid under
    current law must first seek to invalidate that finding through a petition for writ of habeas
    9.
    corpus before seeking resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. (Galvan, at p. 1142;
    Gomez, at p. 17; Jones, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 485, review granted.) These courts
    reason that a contrary interpretation “would read into section 1170.95 a new procedure
    allowing petitioners to ignore a special circumstance finding—no matter how well
    supported in the record—as well as the recognized method of challenging it. Such
    petitioners would be allowed to relitigate a prior jury finding at an evidentiary hearing
    where the prosecution bears the burden of proving the truth of the finding, beyond a
    reasonable doubt, a second time.” (Jones, at p. 485.)
    On the other hand, courts that have found a special circumstance finding
    insufficient to render a petitioner ineligible for relief have reasoned that Banks and Clark
    “construed section 190.2, subdivision (d) in a significantly different, and narrower
    manner than courts had previously construed the statute.” (People v. Torres (2020) 
    46 Cal.App.5th 1168
    , 1179, review granted June 24, 2020, S262011, abrogated on another
    ground by Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 962-963; accord, People v. Harris (2021) 
    60 Cal.App.5th 939
    , 958, review granted Apr. 28, 2021, S267802.) Thus, these courts
    surmised that a petitioner with a pre-Banks and Clark special circumstance finding may
    have been convicted based on “conduct that is not prohibited by section 190.2 as
    currently understood.” (Torres, at p. 1180; accord, Harris, at p. 958; People v. York
    (2020) 
    54 Cal.App.5th 250
    , 258, review granted Nov. 18, 2020, S264954; People v.
    Smith (2020) 
    49 Cal.App.5th 85
    , 93, review granted July 22, 2020, S262835.) To the
    extent the jury’s finding on a felony-murder special circumstance is legally insufficient
    under Banks and Clark, it cannot refute a prima facie showing of entitlement to
    resentencing relief. (People v. Secrease (2021) 
    63 Cal.App.5th 231
    , 256.) Accordingly,
    in considering whether a petitioner is entitled to relief pursuant to section 1170.95, the
    trial court must first determine whether “the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
    support the felony-murder special-circumstance finding under Banks and Clark.”
    (Secrease, at p. 264.)
    10.
    A panel of this court has recently resolved to follow the line of authority holding
    that a special circumstance finding precludes relief as a matter of law. (People v.
    Simmons (2021) 
    65 Cal.App.5th 739
    , 748-749, review granted Sept. 1, 2021, S270048.)
    We agree. Banks and Clark did not state a new rule of law. Rather, they relied on the
    United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Enmund v. Florida (1982) 
    458 U.S. 782
     and
    Tison v. Arizona (1987) 
    481 U.S. 137
     to clarify principles that had long been in existence
    at the time petitioner was convicted. (See In re Miller (2017) 
    14 Cal.App.5th 960
    , 978;
    accord, People v. Allison, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 458; Gomez, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th
    at p. 13, fn. 5, review granted.) Enmund prohibited felony-murder liability for a
    defendant that “did not commit the homicide, was not present when the killing took
    place, and did not participate in a plot or scheme to murder,” and explained that, to be
    liable for felony murder, the aider and abettor must himself “kill, attempt to kill, or intend
    that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed.” (Enmund, at pp. 795,
    797.) Tison held that, “major participation in the felony committed, combined with
    reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability
    requirement.” (Tison, at pp. 151, 158.) As Banks noted, this language from Tison was
    later codified by the California electorate in section 190.2, subdivision (d). (Banks,
    supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 800.) To the extent Banks and Clark illuminated factors a fact
    finder might consider in determining whether a defendant was a major contributor who
    acted with reckless indifference to human life, they drew those factors from Edmund and
    Tison. (See Banks, at pp. 801, 803; see also Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 615, 618-
    623.) These principles existed when petitioner was convicted. There is no basis to
    conclude petitioner’s admission involved different standards than those described in
    Banks and Clark.
    Petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law, and the court was not
    required to issue an order to show cause or hold an evidentiary hearing. The petition was
    properly denied. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970-971.)
    11.
    DISPOSITION
    The order is affirmed.
    12.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: F081153

Filed Date: 10/20/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/20/2021