Hernandez v. K.B. Ins. Co. CA1/1 ( 2021 )


Menu:
  • Filed 10/6/21 Hernandez v. K.B. Ins. Co. CA1/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
    ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    ROBERTO HERNANDEZ,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     A158709
    v.
    K.B. INSURANCE CO., LTD.,                                               (Solano County
    Intervenor and Appellant.                                     Super. Ct. No. FCS046123)
    A jury awarded respondent Roberto Hernandez $962,077 in damages
    against appellant K.B. Insurance Co., Ltd. (KBIC) in this slip-and-fall case.
    On appeal, KBIC argues that it is entitled to a new trial because the trial
    court (1) abused its discretion in limiting KBIC’s cross-examination of
    Hernandez and recross-examination of his orthopedic surgery expert; and
    (2) erred in declining to instruct the jury using the CACI No. 105 insurance
    instruction. In the alternative, KBIC argues that the jury verdict was
    excessive and should have been reduced by $386,000 because insufficient
    evidence supports the award for future lost wages. We affirm.
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Hernandez sued Golden Dragon Buffet after sustaining injuries to his
    right knee from a fall at the restaurant in 2014. After intervening as the
    responsible insurer, KBIC stipulated to liability, and the parties proceeded to
    trial in 2019 on the issue of damages.
    1
    A. Opening Statements
    During her opening statement, Hernandez’s counsel described the issue
    before the jury as the “harms and losses” caused by a quadriceps tendon tear
    Hernandez suffered from his fall and a subsequent surgery that was only
    partially successful. She claimed that the 2014 injury “continues to the
    present day” and “will continue into the future.” Counsel noted that since his
    2014 injury, Hernandez also tore his meniscus and had surgery on it, but
    these were “unrelated” to the fall and Hernandez was not seeking medical
    expenses for that surgery.
    In his opening statement, KBIC’s attorney told the jury that it would be
    hearing from its expert that Hernandez had “recuperated” from his 2014
    quadriceps tendon tear and that his subsequent medical treatment was
    “unrelated” to that injury.
    B. Trial Testimony
    1. Hernandez
    Hernandez testified that he was currently employed as a letter carrier
    for the U.S. Postal Service. After his fall, he had surgery to reattach his
    quadriceps tendon. He was off work for five months, but he returned to work
    because he had “[n]o money” and “no leave left.” He testified that the pain in
    his right knee had continued since the incident in 2014. He had a follow-up
    MRI in 2017, and he was told that he still had swelling in his knee because
    the tendon was not completely attached. Hernandez had planned to work
    until he reached “social security age” in 2023, and his supervisor had allowed
    him extra time to run routes due to his injury. But he felt he could not
    physically work for those additional years due to the injury. He stated he
    had “developed too many problems over the years since this happened” and
    was “tired” of treating the pain in his knee.
    2
    During cross-examination, counsel for KBIC asked Hernandez about
    when he first started having pain in either knee. Hernandez responded that
    he had surgery on his left knee around 2010. When asked how that injury
    occurred, Hernandez’s counsel objected to the question as beyond the scope of
    direct. The trial court sustained the objection and noted it was “not relevant
    either.” Counsel for KBIC continued his questioning, and asked: “And then
    in August of 2018, you had a meniscus cartilage issue that required surgery,
    right?” Hernandez’s counsel objected to the question as beyond the scope of
    direct, and the trial court sustained the objection.
    2. Hernandez’s Grandson
    Hernandez’s grandson testified that, since the 2014 incident,
    Hernandez had stopped doing various household chores and other physical
    activities. On cross-examination, counsel for KBIC asked if the grandson
    understood that Hernandez had a meniscus repair surgery after the 2014
    incident. The grandson responded that he did.
    3. Dr. Kofoed
    Excerpts of videotaped deposition testimony from Dr. John Kofoed were
    played for the jury. Dr. Kofoed performed Hernandez’s quadriceps tendon
    surgery in 2014. Dr. Kofoed also reviewed the follow-up MRI in 2017, which
    indicated there was a tendon tear that suggested “incomplete healing” or
    separation of the tendon from the knee bone. When asked if Hernandez
    would need to retire early, Dr. Kofoed responded: “Well, potentially from
    pain issues that he is currently experiencing. One from the meniscus tear,
    one from the quadriceps tendon tear. At the time, this may accelerate his
    need to retire.”
    3
    4. Dr. Barry
    Dr. Piers Barry testified as an orthopedic surgery expert who treated
    Hernandez from 2017 to 2019. In 2017, Dr. Barry found that Hernandez had
    “ongoing pain at the site of his quadriceps tendon repair” and ordered an
    MRI. The MRI showed “either partial re-tear or nonhealing of part of his
    quadriceps tendon.” The MRI also included images of other areas of the
    knee, which showed “good articular cartilage in a normal meniscus.” Dr.
    Barry testified that when Hernandez is “in the more active part of his work,
    it seems to really trigger pain symptoms in his knee” and that if Hernandez
    weren’t doing that, he would have less pain.
    During redirect, Dr. Barry testified that the swelling in Hernandez’s
    knee seems to be “directly related” to his quadriceps tendon tear. On recross,
    counsel for KBIC asked Dr. Barry whether a torn meniscus can cause
    swelling. Dr. Barry responded: “If you have a currently torn meniscus, that
    could certainly cause swelling.” Counsel for KBIC then asked: “And after it’s
    been repaired, a result of ongoing issues regarding the meniscus can be
    swelling too, can it not?” Dr. Barry responded: “I don’t believe there was a
    meniscal repair.” As KBIC’s counsel began to repeat that answer,
    Hernandez’s counsel objected as beyond the scope of redirect. The trial court
    sustained the objection.
    5. Dr. Peatman
    KBIC’s orthopedic surgery expert Dr. Thomas Peatman testified that
    he personally examined Hernandez in 2018, two months before Hernandez
    had surgery to repair a medial meniscus tear. The tear did not appear on the
    MRI from 2017. Dr. Peatman concluded that the 2018 meniscus surgery was
    unrelated to the 2014 fall, and that the “most likely cause” of Hernandez’s
    4
    current pain and swelling in the knee was “the medial compartment arthritis
    that had a meniscus tear.”
    6. Economic Consultant Ines
    Economic consultant Laura Ines testified regarding the calculation of
    damages for Hernandez, including future wage losses if Hernandez was
    unable to continue working due to the 2014 injury. She calculated those
    future wage losses to range from $127,000 (if Hernandez retired one year
    early) to $519,000 (if Hernandez retired four years early). Ines used
    Hernandez’s current $65,766 annual salary, the average overtime he had
    worked since his injury, and other factors like inflationary growth in making
    these calculations.
    C. Jury Instructions
    At a hearing to discuss preliminary jury instructions, counsel for KBIC
    argued that the standard CACI No. 105 instruction1 should be provided to the
    jury because KBIC would be identified as “KB Insurance Company” during
    the trial. The trial court denied the request, reasoning that the instruction
    was inappropriate because it related to liability insurance, but invited KBIC
    to draft a special instruction to address its concerns. At a hearing to discuss
    closing jury instructions, KBIC’s counsel stated that it had declined to draft a
    special instruction, but now requested CACI No. 5001 be provided.
    Hernandez’s counsel proposed the following modified instruction: “You must
    not consider whether the Defendant has liability insurance, or whether the
    Plaintiff has health insurance. The presence or absence of insurance is
    totally irrelevant. You must decide this case based only on the law and the
    1The standard CACI No. 105 instruction reads: “You must not
    consider whether any of the parties in this case has insurance. The presence
    or absence of insurance is totally irrelevant. You must decide this case based
    only on the law and the evidence.”
    5
    evidence.” KBIC’s counsel responded: “I think it’s an excellent suggestion.”
    The trial court noted the stipulation of the parties, and subsequently
    provided the modified instruction to the jury.
    D. Verdict, Judgment, and Post-Trial Motions
    The jury awarded Hernandez $962,077 in total damages, including
    $386,000 in future lost earnings and $212,440 in future medical care.
    Judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict.
    KBIC subsequently filed a motion for a new trial on several grounds,
    including that (1) the trial court improperly sustained objections to cross-
    examination questions about Hernandez’s meniscus repair surgery as beyond
    the scope of direct; (2) the trial court erroneously refused to instruct the jury
    using the standard CACI No. 105 instruction; and (3) the jury’s verdict was
    excessive and must be reduced by $598,440 because there was an inadequate
    foundation for the damages awarded for future lost wages and future medical
    care. KBIC also filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
    (JNOV), arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the future lost
    wages and future medical care awards. The trial court denied both motions.
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. The Trial Court Did Not Prejudicially Abuse Its Direction in
    Sustaining the Evidentiary Objections
    KBIC argues that it is entitled to a new trial because the court abused
    its discretion in sustaining objections to its cross-examination of Hernandez
    and recross-examination of Dr. Barry regarding the 2018 meniscus surgery,
    unduly restricting KBIC’s right to confrontation.
    Cross-examination is generally limited to the scope of direct
    examination, and recross-examination is similarly limited to the scope of
    redirect. (Evid. Code §§ 762, 773, subd. (a); People v. ConAgra Grocery
    Products Co. (2017) 
    17 Cal.App.5th 51
    , 146.) “The extent of cross-
    6
    examination is a matter over which the trial court is given wide discretion,
    and the only grounds for error are an abuse of that discretion.” (People By
    and Through Department of Public Works v. Murray (1959) 
    172 Cal.App.2d 219
    , 232.)
    Here, KBIC’s counsel attempted to ask Hernandez on cross-
    examination whether he had meniscus surgery in 2018. Hernandez had
    testified on direct regarding his 2014 injury, subsequent quadriceps tendon
    surgery, and continuing knee pain, but not about the meniscus surgery.
    Similarly, KBIC’s counsel attempted to question Dr. Barry about the
    meniscus surgery during recross-examination. Dr. Barry had testified on
    redirect regarding Hernandez’s quadriceps tendon and the relationship
    between his 2014 injury and current symptoms, but not about the meniscus
    surgery.
    Given the clear relevancy of the meniscus surgery to Hernandez’s
    claims of injury, we question whether it was proper for the trial court to
    disallow KBIC’s efforts to inquire into it during these cross- and recross-
    examinations. But even if the court abused its discretion in disallowing the
    testimony, no prejudice resulted from the rulings. (People v. Sully (1991)
    
    53 Cal.3d 1195
    , 1220 [abuse of discretion in refusing cross-examination is
    subject to harmless error analysis, based on factors such as the importance of
    witness’ testimony, presence or absence of other evidence corroborating or
    contradicting testimony, and overall strength of case].) KBIC argues that it
    was unduly prejudiced because Dr. Barry’s testified that he did not “believe
    there was a meniscal repair,” and this left the jury with “the entirely false
    impression that there was doubt as to whether a medial meniscus tear
    surgery had ever taken place at all.” But plenty of comments and evidence
    were presented about the meniscus surgery, and its occurrence could not
    7
    seriously have been in doubt. Hernandez’s counsel mentioned during opening
    statements that Hernandez had meniscus repair surgery after his 2014
    injury. And witnesses testified about the meniscus surgery, including
    Hernandez’s grandson and Dr. Peatman. Indeed, Dr. Peatman testified
    about the surgery at length, and his conclusion that the meniscus was the
    “most likely cause” of Hernandez’s current knee pain. In short, KBIC had
    ample opportunity to present evidence establishing Hernandez’s meniscus
    surgery and did so.
    The trial court did not prejudicially abuse its discretion in sustaining
    the objections.
    B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Declining to Provide the CACI No.
    105 Instruction
    KBIC also argues that it is entitled to a new trial because, while it
    agreed to a modified version of CACI No. 5001 in the closing jury
    instructions, the jury was “tainted” from the outset when the trial court
    refused to give CACI No. 105 in the preliminary instructions. We are again
    not persuaded.
    We review claims of instructional error de novo. (Ted Jacob
    Engineering Group, Inc. v. Ratcliff Architects (2010) 
    187 Cal.App.4th 945
    ,
    961.) “It is well established in California that the correctness of jury
    instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from
    a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.”
    (People v. Burgener (1986) 
    41 Cal.3d 505
    , 538.)
    The modified instruction provided here included all three elements of
    the standard CACI No. 105 instruction: (1) the jury must not consider
    whether the parties had insurance; (2) the presence or absence of insurance
    was totally irrelevant; and (3) the jury must decide the case based only on the
    law and the evidence. KBIC offers no authority for its position that timing of
    8
    the instruction “forever tainted” the case, and we must presume the jury
    followed their instruction in the absence of contrary evidence. (People v.
    Harris (2005) 
    37 Cal.4th 310
    , 350.) We conclude there was no instructional
    error.
    C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Verdict on Future Lost Wages
    While KBIC maintains that it is entitled to a new trial, it argues in the
    alternative that the jury verdict was excessive and should have been reduced
    by $386,000 because there was insufficient evidence supporting the award for
    future lost wages. Specifically, KBIC contends that the evidence regarding
    Hernandez’s need to retire due to his knee pain was “speculative.” Once
    again, we are not persuaded.
    “We review the jury’s damages award for substantial evidence, giving
    due deference to the jury’s verdict.” (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017)
    
    7 Cal.App.5th 276
    , 300.) The amount of damages is a fact question “first
    committed to the discretion of the jury.” (Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines
    (1961) 
    56 Cal.2d 498
    , 506 (Seffert).) “They see and hear the witnesses and
    frequently, as in this case, see the injury and the impairment that has
    resulted therefrom.” (Id. at pp. 506–507.) Accordingly, the appellate court
    “can interfere on the ground that the judgment is excessive only on the
    ground that the verdict is so large that, at first blush, it shocks the conscience
    and suggests passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the jury.” (Id. at
    p. 507.)
    “Whatever its measure in a given case, it is fundamental that ‘damages
    which are speculative, remote, imaginary, contingent, or merely possible
    cannot serve as a legal basis for recovery.’ ” (Piscitelli v. Friedenberg (2001)
    
    87 Cal.App.4th 953
    , 989.) “However, recovery is allowed if claimed benefits
    9
    are reasonably certain to have been realized but for the wrongful act of the
    opposing party.” (Ibid.)
    The evidence presented here was not too speculative to support the lost
    wages award. Hernandez testified that the pain in his knee had continued
    since the incident in 2014. While he had planned to work until 2023 when he
    reached “social security age,” he testified that he could not physically work
    for those additional years due to the injury. That testimony, in turn, was
    supported by Dr. Kofoed’s testimony that Hernandez’s knee pain “may
    accelerate his need to retire.”
    Moreover, Ines calculated Hernandez’s future wage losses based on his
    annual salary at the time of trial and average overtime he had worked since
    his injury. She presented a range of losses from $127,000 to $519,000, based
    on whether Hernandez would retire one to four years earlier than he
    expected. The jury’s $386,000 award fell in the middle of that range. For
    these reasons, we cannot say that the award of future lost wages shocked the
    conscience. (Seffert, supra, 56 Cal.2d at pp. 506–507.)
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment and order denying the motions for new trial and JNOV
    are affirmed. Respondent shall recover his costs on appeal.
    10
    _________________________
    Humes, P.J.
    WE CONCUR:
    _________________________
    Banke, J.
    _________________________
    Sanchez, J.
    Hernandez v. K.B. Insurance Co., LTD. A158709
    11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A158709

Filed Date: 10/6/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/6/2021