Lock v. Cunnyngham CA4/1 ( 2013 )

Filed 9/23/13 Lock v. Cunnyngham CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
HELEN LOCK, as Administrator, etc., D062716
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No.
37-2010-00151262-PR-LS-CTL)
DAVID CUNNYNGHAM et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Jeffrey S.
Bostwick, Judge. Affirmed.
Roy M. Doppelt and Associates and Scott C. Soady for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Dicks & Workman, Joseph G. Dicks and Linda Workman for Defendants and
Respondents.
Helen Lock, administrator with will annexed of the estate of decedent Robert
Clifford Reed, appeals an order granting the petition for partial distribution of the estate
filed by claimants David Cunnyngham, Kristy Fyffe, Amy Austin, and Mirna
Cunnyngham (together Claimants). That petition, in effect, sought enforcement against
the estate of a judgment enforcing a settlement agreement, the subject of a prior appeal
we decided in Lock v. Cunnyngham (Apr. 25, 2013, D062047 [nonpub. opn.]) (Lock I).
In Lock I, we affirmed, as modified, the trial court's March 22, 2012, judgment ordering
Lock to pay Claimants $91,500 out of property in the estate in the course of
administration. Claimants subsequently filed, and the probate court granted, a petition
for partial distribution from the estate based on that judgment. On appeal, Lock contends
the probate court erred by issuing the order granting Claimants' petition for partial
distribution.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
On April 4, 2010, Reed died testate. Lock was appointed as administrator of his
estate. After Lock rejected their claims against the estate, Claimants filed a wrongful
death action against the estate based on Reed's murder of Mitch and Diane Cunnyngham.
In December 2010, the parties entered into a pretrial settlement agreement in the
wrongful death action that required Lock to convey to Claimants all estate assets after
payment of court-approved administrative expenses. On March 2, 2011, a judgment was
entered reflecting the terms of that settlement agreement.
On June 2, 2011, Lock filed her first and final account and report of administrator
and petition for settlement, final distribution of insolvent estate and reserve, and statutory
compensation to attorney and administrator (Final Account). She alleged the estate
1 For a more complete discussion of the factual and procedural background in this
case, please refer to our opinion in Lock I. We hereby incorporate that discussion into
this opinion.
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currently had assets with a total value of $1,126,352.37. She requested the probate court
order that the estate be closed, approve the Final Account, and authorize her to distribute
the estate's real property (valued at $365,000) to Claimants and distribute its cash on hand
(approximately $757,852.37) to her for statutory administrator's fees ($25,197.89), her
probate counsel ($25,197.89 for statutory attorney fees and $8,527.50 for extraordinary
attorney fees), her litigation counsel ($68,441.68), Arlette Reed ($1,585.00 for funeral
expenses), and Claimants' counsel for his client trust account ($623,902.41).
Claimants objected to the Final Account. In general, they asserted that the
proposed payments to Lock, her probate counsel, and her litigation counsel, as well as to
certain other individuals, were excessive and should be reduced. Claimants asked the
probate court to order the immediate distribution of all estate assets, except for the
amounts they contested.
On July 22, 2011, the probate court issued an order approving the Final Account
for the most part, ordering distribution of real property to Claimants, cash to Claimants'
counsel, and $25,197.89 as statutory attorney fees for Lock's probate counsel, except for
a $155,000 reserve to be held until the remaining issues were resolved. The probate court
also ordered Lock, Claimants, and their counsel to participate in a mandatory settlement
conference with San Diego County Superior Court Judge Jay M. Bloom.
On August 12, 2011, following settlement negotiations, the parties signed a
settlement agreement and Judge Bloom read into the record the terms of that settlement
agreement. Judge Bloom stated:
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"I'll indicate I've met with the parties, and we've reached a
settlement. . . . [¶] It is as follows: $63,500 is to be released from
the estate reserve of [$]155,000 for all attorney and administrative
fees. The balance of the reserve, which is [$]91,500, is to go to
[C]laimants. Claimants hereby agree to waive all objections. And
Judge Bloom is to keep jurisdiction to enforce the settlement."
However, because of the parties' disagreement regarding the terms of the settlement
agreement, the probate court did not sign a written order enforcing the agreement.
Claimants thereafter filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. They argued the settlement agreement required
Reed's estate to pay them $91,500. Lock opposed the motion, arguing that because the
parties did not know at the time of the settlement that the estate had substantial income
tax liabilities, the settlement should be interpreted as allowing her to pay all
administrative costs, expenses and income taxes before any amounts would be paid to
Claimants.
On March 2, 2012, after hearing counsel's arguments, Judge Bloom granted
Claimants' motion to enforce the settlement agreement. On March 22, he entered a
judgment after settlement (Judgment) in Claimants' favor. Lock timely filed a notice of
appeal challenging the Judgment. In Lock I, we affirmed the Judgment as modified.
(Lock I, supra, D062047, at p. 17.)
On April 19, 2012, Claimants filed the instant petition for partial distribution of
the estate and for an order compelling Lock to act. Based on the Judgment, Claimants
requested the probate court order Lock to pay them $91,500. On May 23, the court heard
arguments of counsel and granted the petition. On June 20, the court issued a written
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order (Order) after hearing granting the petition for partial distribution of the estate and
compelling Lock to act. The Order stated:
"[Lock and her attorney] shall pay Claimants $91,500 within 24
hours of this Court's ruling on this Petition. Payment is to be in the
form of a check made payable to [the client trust account of
Claimants' attorneys]. [Claimants' attorneys] shall deposit said
check into its client trust account and shall hold said funds therein
until further order of this Court. Until such further order of this
Court, [Claimants' attorney] shall not disburse any of said funds to
any party, attorney, client, Claimant, itself or any other person or
entity."
Lock timely filed the instant notice of appeal challenging the Order.
DISCUSSION
I
Lock's Contentions on Appeal
Lock contends the probate court erred by granting Claimants' petition for partial
distribution after the Judgment was entered. Her entire argument in her opening
appellant's brief is as follows:
"The papers filed in support of the appeal in [Lock I] explain in
detail that the Judgment erroneously ordered Lock to pay $91,500 to
Claimants immediately, rather than directing distribution of the
$155,000 residual in the course of administration and only after
payment of all other higher priority debts, including the agreed-upon
$63,500 in administrative expenses, and any and all state and federal
income taxes. [Citation.] The erroneous language was the sole basis
for the [Order], which directed Lock to pay $91,500 to Claimants'
attorneys within 24 hours of the trial court's ruling. As a result,
Lock was deprived of access to the estate funds needed to pay
substantial tax liabilities." (Fn. omitted.)
By so arguing, Lock, in effect, incorporates her appellate briefs in Lock I and relies solely
on those briefs and their arguments in contending the probate court erred by issuing the
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Order involved in this appeal. Because in our Lock I opinion we rejected the substantive
arguments Lock raised in that appeal and affirmed the Judgment as modified, we likewise
must reject those same arguments raised in the context of this appeal.2 Because the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and/or collateral estoppel (or issue preclusion)
apply to the questions of law we decided in Lock I, we must follow our prior decisions in
this matter and cannot reach contrary conclusions on the same issues raised in this appeal.
(See, e.g., Morohoshi v. Pacific Home (2004) 34 Cal.4th 482, 491; Water Replenishment
Dist. of Southern California v. City of Cerritos (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1071;
Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles
(2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 149, 156; Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 425,
434; Daar & Newman v. VRL International (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 482, 489; Nathanson
v. Hecker (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1162; Risam v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 99
Cal.App.4th 412, 420.) Accordingly, Lock has not carried her burden on appeal to show
the probate court erred by issuing the Order.
As we concluded in Lock I, to the extent Lock repeats her argument that the
probate court cannot order her to distribute estate assets (e.g., $91,500) to Claimants
before the estate's income taxes are paid, she has not carried her burden on appeal. In any
2 We decide this appeal based on these grounds and reject Claimants' argument that
Lock's appeal of the Order is "moot." The appeal is not technically moot because there
has been no subsequent event that would preclude us from addressing the issues in this
appeal and/or rendering effective relief. (See, e.g., Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v.
City of Redondo Beach (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 852, 864-865; Eye Dog Foundation v.
State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541.)
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event, at the time of the Order, there had not yet been any final account and report and/or
petition for final distribution approved by the probate court. Accordingly, it appears the
probate court has yet to decide the issue of income tax liabilities of the estate and any
statutory prohibitions against distributions of estate assets until those income taxes are
paid. As we concluded in Lock I, "[i]n the event the probate court determines there are
insufficient estate assets to pay both the estate's tax liabilities and Claimants' $91,500, the
appropriate remedy for the deficiency will be a matter for the probate court to determine
in the first instance. It is not a matter for us to decide in this appeal." (Lock I, supra,
D026047, at p. 16, fn. 6.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Claimants are entitled to costs on appeal.
McDONALD, J.
WE CONCUR:
HALLER, Acting P. J.
O'ROURKE, J.
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