Otay Land Co. v. UE Limited CA4/1 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 10/20/21 Otay Land Co. v. UE Limited CA4/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    OTAY LAND COMPANY, LLC et al.,                                       D076415
    Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants, and
    Respondents,
    (Super. Ct. No. 37-2013-
    v.                                                          00043371)
    UE LIMITED LLC,
    Defendant, Cross-complainant,
    and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
    John S. Meyer, Judge. Affirmed.
    Law Office of Barbara S. Farley, Barbara S. Farley; Law Offices of
    Charles J. Wisch and Charles J. Wisch for Defendant, Cross-complainant and
    Appellant.
    Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky & Popeo, Antony D. Nash and Nada
    I. Shamonki for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant, and Respondent Otay Land
    Company.
    Mara W. Elliott, City Attorney, George Schaefer, Assistant City
    Attorney, and Benjamin P. Syz, Deputy City Attorney, for Cross-defendant
    and Respondent City of San Diego.
    After Otay Land Company, LLC (Otay Land) purchased a large parcel
    of vacant land it intended to develop into a “village,” it discovered an issue
    with its title to a narrow strip within the parcel. After conducting research
    into the title to the property, Otay Land eventually learned that the strip,
    which the parties refer to as the “Pipeline Strip,” was separately conveyed
    over a century earlier for the construction of a now nonfunctioning water
    pipeline. Tracing a series of transfers over the ensuing decades, Otay Land
    eventually determined that it did not have legal title to the Pipeline Strip,
    which was instead partially owned by both appellant, UE Limited LLC (UE
    Limited), and the City of San Diego (City).
    In response, Otay Land filed this quiet title action, contending that it
    acquired title to UE Limited’s portion of the Pipeline Strip through adverse
    possession. Before trial, the City sold a portion of the Pipeline Strip to Otay
    Land. UE Limited filed a cross-complaint, alleging that contrary to Otay
    Land’s claims, the City never had an ownership interest in the Pipeline Strip
    and that Otay Land was trespassing on its land.
    At a bench trial, the trial court found in Otay Land’s favor by
    concluding that the City did have an ownership interest in the strip, which
    was partially transferred to Otay Land, and that Otay Land met its burden to
    establish its adverse possession claim as to the portion of the Pipeline Strip
    owned by UE Limited.
    UE Limited appeals the resulting judgment. It raises a variety of
    challenges on appeal, asserting the trial court erred in admitting and
    excluding evidence; the court failed to correctly interpret the deeds forming
    2
    the chain of title for the Pipeline Strip; the court erroneously concluded that
    certain laws did not preclude Otay Land’s claims; and the evidence
    supporting Otay Land’s adverse possession claim was insufficient. We
    conclude that UE Limited has failed to demonstrate any prejudicial error by
    the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    In 1998, Otay Land purchased 4,735 acres of land in a probate sale
    from the estate of Mary Marshall Rand Birch Patrick. Within these acres
    was a lot referred to as Lot 27, the focus of this action.
    Otay Land purchased the land with the intent to pursue entitlement
    and construction of a large development project. As part of that process, Otay
    Land worked with the City of Chula Vista to complete a plan to transform the
    rural, undeveloped land by obtaining the environmental review, zoning
    changes, and other approvals necessary to build a residential “village”
    including homes, schools, commercial zones, and parks.
    The entitlement process was anticipated to take several years. In the
    interim, Otay Land took steps to secure its property. The entire property was
    surrounded with fences or natural barriers, and gates were added to block
    the roads into the land. Otay Land asked any member of the public that it
    encountered on the property to leave. Beginning in 2007, Otay Land also
    hired someone to farm the land and continued to do so until construction
    work began in late 2018.
    In 2012 or 2013, during the entitlement process, Otay Land discovered
    what the parties refer to as the “Pipeline Strip,” a relatively narrow strip of
    land running through the larger parcels that appeared to potentially involve
    a separate ownership interest. Otay Land’s 1998 purchase of the land
    3
    including Lot 27 specifically excepted out the Pipeline Strip, but that fact
    apparently escaped Otay Land’s attention at the time.
    An old, metal water pipeline that was no longer in use was partially
    visible within the strip. Maps depicted the Pipeline Strip to be a 100-foot-
    wide strip of land surrounding that pipeline. After completing some research,
    Otay Land learned the pipeline was known as the Coronado Pipeline. A
    consultant retained by Otay Land originally determined that the Pipeline
    Strip was potentially owned by the heirs of the Spreckels family.
    Otay Land filed this quiet title action in 2013 to resolve the issue and
    allow its development project to proceed. The complaint named as
    defendants the Southern California Mountain Water Company—a defunct
    entity—and numerous potential Spreckels family heirs. In its complaint,
    Otay Land alleged that in 1912, fee simple ownership of the Pipeline Strip
    was acquired by the Southern California Mountain Water Company. Otay
    Land further alleged that the City of San Diego required an easement to use
    and maintain the pipeline, but that the City did not acquire fee simple
    ownership of the Pipeline Strip. Otay Land contended that when the
    Southern California Mountain Water Company subsequently dissolved,
    ownership of the Pipeline Strip was passed to its sole shareholder, John
    Diedrich Spreckels. Thus, Otay Land believed that the Strip was owned by
    Spreckels’ heirs, but asserted that it obtained ownership via adverse
    possession after its 1998 purchase of the surrounding parcels. Its complaint
    sought a quiet title determination confirming Otay Land as the owner in fee
    simple of the Pipeline Strip, subject to any easement rights of the City.
    After filing the lawsuit, Otay Land conducted further research and
    concluded that the Pipeline Strip might instead be owned by the City. In late
    2016, Otay Land discovered a deed from 1964 that appeared to convey title to
    4
    most of the Pipeline Strip to defendant UE Limited except for 25 feet of the
    Pipeline Strip width, plus a small 2.7-acre portion, retained by the City. In
    March 2017, Otay Land amended its complaint to substitute UE Limited for
    a Doe defendant named in its original complaint.
    At the same time, HomeFed Village III Master, LLC (HomeFed),
    another subsidiary of Otay Land’s parent corporation, filed a new quiet title
    complaint against UE Limited regarding several adjoining parcels of
    property, known as Lots 34 through 36, which were similarly encumbered by
    the Pipeline Strip. Pursuing the latest theory of the chain of title, HomeFed
    alleged the City quitclaimed the Pipeline Strip to UE Limited in 1964 and,
    after HomeFed’s purchase of Lots 34-36 in 2011, HomeFed obtained title to
    portions of the Pipeline Strip via adverse possession.
    In September 2017, UE Limited filed two separate cross-complaints for
    quiet title and injunctive and declaratory relief in both actions. The cross-
    complaints added the City as a cross-defendant along with Otay Land and
    HomeFed. UE Limited alleged that it retained ownership in the Pipeline
    Strip, subject to the City’s easement.
    Later that same month, the trial court consolidated the two actions,
    designating the 2013 action filed by Otay Land as the lead case. In 2018,
    Otay Land contended it acquired from the City a fee simple interest in the
    2.7-acre parcel within the Pipeline Strip on Lot 27. In response, UE Limited
    filed a second amended and supplemental cross-complaint (1) asserting that
    the 2018 transfer of the 2.7 acres was void, (2) combining the issues raised in
    its original cross-complaints to seek to quiet title to the Pipeline Strip in
    Lots 27, 34, 35, and 36, and (3) adding a new claim regarding a similar
    dispute regarding ownership of the Pipeline Strip in Lot 45. Lot 45 was also
    owned by Otay Land, but was not part of Otay Land’s original complaint.
    5
    The court subsequently granted the City’s motion to bifurcate the
    issues involving Lot 45 and portions of Lot 36 from the issues to be
    determined at trial. Other than those two issues, the case proceeded to a
    lengthy bench trial involving the issues raised in both consolidated cases and
    UE Limited’s cross-claims against Otay Land, HomeFed, and the City.
    After hearing testimony from all parties and considering the
    documentary evidence, the trial court issued a statement of decision
    regarding Otay Land’s 2013 action. The court found that in 1912, Southern
    California Mountain Water Company acquired a fee simple interest, not an
    easement, in the Pipeline Strip. The court found that after a series of
    transfers, the City acquired fee simple ownership of the Pipeline Strip in
    1961 and then quitclaimed 75 feet of the width of the Pipeline Strip to UE
    Limited’s predecessor in 1964. The court found that the 1964 quitclaim did
    not include 25 feet of the width of the strip or the separate 2.7 acres of land
    at the “Coronado Wye.” The court further found that the City subsequently
    transferred the 2.7-acre parcel to Otay Land in 2018. The court concluded
    that although UE Limited owned the 75-foot-width of the Strip after 1964
    and that the Pipeline Strip was not included in the 1998 purchase of the
    parcels including Lot 27, Otay Land subsequently adversely possessed the
    portion of the Pipeline Strip in Lot 27 owned by UE Limited. Thus, the court
    concluded that Otay Land had acquired title to the entirety of the Pipeline
    Strip at issue in this case in fee simple except for the 25-foot-wide portion
    retained by the City. In a separate statement of decision for HomeFed’s 2017
    action, the court similarly found in HomeFed’s favor.
    At the conclusion of the trial, the court recognized that it could enter
    only a partial judgment because of the consolidation of the actions and the
    outstanding bifurcated issues. The court noted that it could enter judgment
    6
    in the 2013 action “either as an interlocutory judgment or as a result of
    unconsolidating the cases.” UE Limited submitted a memorandum
    contending that judgment should not be entered until the entire consolidated
    case, including the bifurcated issues, was heard and decided.
    At a subsequent hearing, the court indicated that it intended to enter
    two separate judgments, one for the 2013 action immediately and a second
    judgment for the 2017 action following resolution of the bifurcated issues.1
    The court also stated that it would not sign any order to “de-consolidat[e]” the
    cases. On the same day, the court entered judgment in the 2013 action in
    favor of Otay Land and concluded that “UE [Limited] takes nothing by virtue
    of its cross-complaint.” UE Limited appealed from the judgment.
    DISCUSSION
    A. Scope of Appeal
    Before the parties filed their appellate briefs, and following divergent
    letter briefs on the issue of appealability, this court informed the parties that
    the appealability of the trial court’s judgment would be considered on appeal.
    In its opening brief, UE Limited asserted, albeit only in a footnote, that the
    entry of judgment in this 2013 action “was premature” due to unresolved
    issues in the 2017 action filed by HomeFed. Despite recognizing that the
    appealed judgment does not resolve the 2017 action, UE Limited raised a
    number of issues regarding that action in its opening brief, purportedly “due
    to their logical connection to the issues arising from the judgment entered in
    the [2013] case.”
    In response, Otay Land argues that UE Limited forfeited the issue of
    appealability by failing to address the issue beyond in a footnote. Otay Land
    1      The parties represent in their briefs that the bifurcated issues have yet
    to be tried.
    7
    also asks this court to disregard UE Limited’s arguments regarding issues
    arising in the still-pending 2017 action.
    We do not treat the appealability issue as forfeited. The question of
    appealability directly affects our jurisdiction such that we are “dutybound” to
    consider the issue even if not raised by the parties. (Olson v. Cory (1983) 
    35 Cal.3d 390
    , 398.)
    In a multiparty action, a judgment finally disposing of all issues
    involving one party is final as to that party and immediately appealable.
    (Justus v. Atchison (1977) 
    19 Cal.3d 564
    , 567-568; see also Stonewall Ins. Co.
    v. City of Palos Verdes Estates (1996) 
    46 Cal.App.4th 1810
    , 1830 [recognizing
    “the judicially created exception to the one final judgment rule that permits
    appeal from a judgment in a multiparty case determining all issues between
    certain parties even though issues remain to be resolved between other
    parties”].)
    Here, the judgment that is the subject of this appeal addresses all
    issues involving Otay Land. In its original complaint, Otay Land sought to
    quiet title to the entire 100-foot Pipeline Strip, which it believed it owned
    outright via adverse possession, within Lot 27. As the case proceeded, Otay
    Land modified its claim to concede that since 1964, the City owned the small
    2.7-acre parcel within the Pipeline Strip plus a remaining 25-foot portion of
    the Strip. Otay Land then purchased the 2.7 acres from the City in 2018.
    The City did not dispute Otay Land’s claim to title.
    UE Limited, on the other hand, asserted in its operative cross-
    complaint and at trial that it owned the entire Pipeline Strip. It contested
    Otay Land’s acquisition of the 2.7 acres from the City and also the
    acquisition, via adverse possession, of the 75-foot portion of the Pipeline Strip
    that was quitclaimed to UE Limited from the City in 1964. As it relates to
    8
    the City, UE Limited also contended it owned the 25-foot portion of the
    Pipeline Strip that the City claimed to have retained. The judgment quiets
    title as to both the 2.7 acres plus the 75-foot portion of the Pipeline Strip.
    Because these were the only portions of the Pipeline Strip where a
    controversy existed regarding Otay Land’s ownership, the judgment resolved
    all issues involving Otay Land.2 And because the judgment is final as to
    Otay Land, it is immediately appealable.
    However, other portions of the judgment involve issues pertaining to
    only the City and UE Limited, including the determination that the City
    owns the 25-foot portion of the Pipeline Strip despite UE Limited’s claim to
    the contrary. Because the judgment does not resolve all issues between UE
    Limited and the City raised in UE Limited’s cross-complaint, it is not a final
    judgment as to the City and the issues between those parties cannot be
    directly addressed on appeal.3 Likewise, this appeal does not involve the
    issues arising from Lots 34, 35, and 36, which are owned by HomeFed and
    not addressed in the judgment.
    Thus, we consider the issues on appeal that relate to Otay Land and its
    claim to title within Lot 27, but do not directly consider the arguments
    regarding (1) UE Limited’s challenge to the City’s claim of ownership to the
    25-foot-wide portion of the Pipeline Strip and in other parcels, and (2) any
    2     There is no indication that Otay Land asserts any interest in the real
    property claimed by UE Limited in its cross-complaint that is to be addressed
    in the bifurcated trial involving separate parcels.
    3     As we discuss post, the issues arising from the claims involving Otay
    Land indirectly affect the City’s legal claims regarding its remaining interest
    in the Pipeline Strip even if we do not directly resolve all issues involving the
    City in this appeal.
    9
    issues involving Lots 34 through 36. To the extent UE Limited raises issues
    involving those parcels, we decline to address them in this opinion.
    Thus, as framed by the trial court in its statement of decision, the trial
    and resulting judgment at issue in this appeal involve two central issues:
    (1) Otay Land’s claim that it acquired fee simple ownership of 2.7 acres from
    the City in 2018, and (2) Otay Land’s claim that it adversely possessed from
    UE Limited the remaining 75-foot-width of the Pipeline Strip in Lot 27. We
    consider each issue in turn.
    B. Otay’s Ownership Interest in 2.7 Acres Obtained from the City
    The trial court found that Otay Land and the City established that the
    2018 transfer of fee simple ownership in an approximately 2.7-acre4 parcel
    within the Pipeline Strip was valid. To determine the validity of the 2018
    transfer, the central issue at trial was the interpretation of a 1912 deed at
    the root of the chain of title. Whereas Otay Land and the City asserted the
    1912 deed transferred a fee simple interest, UE Limited asserted it conveyed
    only an easement. On appeal, UE Limited challenges the trial court’s finding
    in favor of Otay Land, contending it made erroneous evidentiary rulings and
    erred in interpreting the deed.
    1. Interpretation of the 1912 and 1914 Deeds
    The primary object in interpretating grant deeds “ ‘is to ascertain and
    carry out the intention of the parties. [Citations.] All the rules of
    interpretation must be considered and each given its proper weight, where
    necessary, in order to arrive at the true effect of the instrument.’ ” (City of
    Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court (1996) 
    13 Cal.4th 232
    , 238 (Manhattan
    4     More precisely, the parcel was 2.699 acres. The parties and the trial
    court referred to the parcel as “2.7 acres,” and we use the same
    approximation for purposes of simplicity with no intent to define the size of
    the parcel.
    10
    Beach); see Civ. Code, § 1066.) A court’s interpretation of a deed “requires, in
    the first instance, careful examination of the language in the original
    conveyance. If the intent of the parties is clear, that will control.”
    (Manhattan Beach, at p. 235.) If a court finds the conveyance to be
    ambiguous after “canvass[ing] the four corners of the deed” the court must
    then turn for assistance to any relevant statutory rules governing the
    interpretation of deeds and, if necessary, any extrinsic evidence to the extent
    it informs the parties’ intent and does not give the deed a meaning to which it
    is not susceptible. (Id. at pp. 235, 242, 246.)
    To ensure the court’s interpretation ascertains and carries out the
    intention of the parties, the Legislature has directed that “we must keep in
    mind the following: A grant is to be construed in the same manner as
    contracts in general (Civ. Code, § 1066); the deed’s language determines its
    interpretation so long as it is clear and explicit (Civ. Code, § 1638); and a
    grant is to be interpreted in favor of the grantee, except that a reservation in
    a grant is to be interpreted in favor of the grantor (Civ. Code, § 1069).”
    (County of Solano v. Handlery (2007) 
    155 Cal.App.4th 566
    , 573 (Handlery).)
    Unless the instrument suggests that a lesser estate was intended, “[a] fee
    simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a grant of real property[.]”
    (Civ. Code, § 1105.)
    “ ‘It is . . . solely a judicial function to interpret a written instrument
    unless the interpretation turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence.
    Accordingly, “[a]n appellate court is not bound by a construction of the
    contract based solely upon the terms of the written instrument without the
    aid of evidence [citations], where there is no conflict in the evidence
    [citations], or a determination has been made upon incompetent evidence.” ’ ”
    (Manhattan Beach, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 238.) However, “[w]hen extrinsic
    11
    evidence is properly admitted to interpret a deed, the trial court’s finding
    must be sustained on appeal if there is any evidence, either direct or indirect,
    contradicted or uncontradicted, which supports that finding.” (Baker v.
    Ramirez (1987) 
    190 Cal.App.3d 1123
    , 1133; Redlands v. Nickerson (1961)
    
    188 Cal.App.2d 118
    , 127.) “On an appeal challenging the interpretation
    given to a writing, . . . the substantial evidence rule will apply in cases where
    the parties present conflicting extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation.”
    (Burch v. Premier Homes, LLC (2011) 
    199 Cal.App.4th 730
    , 742 (Burch).)
    Here, the parties disagreed as to the plain meaning of the language
    found in a 1912 deed concerning the interest conveyed in the Pipeline Strip.
    In that deed, the grantor, San Diego Land Company, and the grantee, the
    Southern California Mountain Water Company, memorialized an agreement
    to “pay . . . the sum of 8237 80/100 dollars for certain lands now occupied and
    to be occupied and used by [the Southern California Mountain Water
    Company] for its pipe lines, conduits and other purposes incidental and
    necessary to the maintenance of said pipe lines and conduits, over and across
    said lands mentioned in said agreement and supplemental agreement and
    which said lands are more particularly described in the memoranda hereto
    attached and made a part of this agreement and marked Exhibit ‘A,’ which
    Exhibit ‘A’ consists of eight pages of typewritten description and memoranda
    and print map or plat consisting of four sheets, showing the location on the
    ground of the lands to be conveyed and the location on the ground of the pipe
    line and conduit of the first part now laid along and over said lands; and [San
    Diego Land Company] in consideration of the payment of the money above
    specified . . . does hereby agree to convey to the [Southern California
    Mountain Water Company] by proper covenants hereinafter contained in this
    12
    instrument, all its right, title, and interest in and to said lands mentioned in
    said memoranda marked Exhibit ‘A,’ for the purposes above mentioned.”
    The 1912 deed also states that the San Diego Land Company “does by
    these presents grant to the said Southern California Mountain Water
    Company . . . for the purposes of being occupied and used by the said
    Southern California Mountain Water Company for its pipe lines and conduits
    and for other purposes incidental and necessary to the maintenance of such
    pipe lines and conduits, all its right, title and interest in and to the lands
    described in said Exhibit ‘A.’ ”
    In the next clause, the deed states: “To have and to hold, the above
    granted and described premises unto the Southern California Mountain
    Water Company . . . its successors and assigns forever, for the said purposes
    and subject to all of the conditions in paragraph three of this agreement
    mentioned and contained.”5
    In Exhibit A, the property being transferred includes the Pipeline Strip
    at issue in this lawsuit, described as “[a] body of land along the Otay-
    Coronado pipe line . . . with a uniform width of 100 feet, being twenty feet on
    the northerly side measured from the center line of said pipe line and eighty
    feet on the southerly side of the center of said pipe line.” Exhibit A also
    includes a map depicting what is labeled as the “Pipe Line Right of Way.”
    UE Limited seizes on the use of the phrase “right of way,” in Exhibit A
    attached to the 1912 deed, to assert that the deed granted the Southern
    California Mountain Water Company—and by extension its successors—only
    5     “Paragraph Three” requires the Southern California Mountain Water
    Company to (1) establish crossings “over and across the lands described in
    Exhibit ‘A’ ” to permit the San Diego Land Company to move livestock,
    vehicles, and farm machinery across the Pipeline Strip and (2) to build a
    fence around the Pipeline Strip.
    13
    an easement to the Pipeline Strip and not fee title. UE Limited further
    contends this interpretation is bolstered by a 1914 deed in which the
    Southern California Mountain Water Company sold parts of its water system
    to the Coronado Water Company, including “all rights-of-way, rights and
    permits to place and maintain conduits and pipe lines throughout the entire
    length of the said Highland Reservoir Pipe Line, more particularly described
    as right-of-way . . . granted by the San Diego Land Company to the Southern
    California Mountain Water Company by [the 1912 deed].” (Italics added.)
    In Manhattan Beach, 
    supra,
     
    13 Cal.4th 232
    , 240-242, the California
    Supreme Court held that the term “right of way” may have different
    meanings—possibly referring to either a fee simple interest in the land or an
    easement. The Supreme Court recognized extrinsic evidence may be used to
    determine the meaning of the term in a particular instrument. (Id. at
    pp. 245-246.) Similarly, all parties in this action introduced extrinsic
    evidence, including expert opinion testimony regarding custom and usage of
    certain terms in real estate transactions, to assist in interpreting the 1912
    deed and subsequent instruments.
    Although UE Limited indicated it intended to call expert witnesses at
    trial, it also filed a motion in limine to preclude Otay Land and the City from
    introducing expert testimony from two attorneys. Specifically, UE Limited
    sought to preclude “evidence of legal conclusions or opinions regarding the
    ownership of and title to the Coronado Pipeline Property.” The trial court
    denied the motion, noting that “[t]here’s no reason why a real-estate attorney
    can’t give information regarding real-property issues. It happens all the
    time. They can’t give a legal opinion, perhaps, but assuming there’s a
    foundation that’s properly established, they can give opinions.” The court
    allowed the experts to testify to “share with the [c]ourt expert opinions that
    14
    won’t tell the [c]ourt what to do, but will give the [c]ourt information about
    matters that the [c]ourt is, perhaps, not as aware of as someone that deals
    with this day in and day out.” The court made clear the witnesses would not
    be allowed to tell the court how to resolve the case, and that it did not think
    counsel would be “foolish enough to ask those questions knowing that there’s
    going to be an objection and it’ll be sustained.”
    Otay Land’s expert, Charles Hansen, testified regarding his process for
    performing a title search and determining the chain of title. He then testified
    regarding what he believed to be the correct chain of title to the Pipeline
    Strip, describing the general format for the instruments and terms used in
    each deed that he reviewed. Hansen traced the title through several
    documents to a quitclaim deed in 1964, in which the City retained 25 feet of
    the width of the Pipeline Strip, along with the 2.7 acres, and quitclaimed the
    remainder to UE Limited’s predecessor.
    Similarly, the City called its expert, David Boss, to offer his opinion
    regarding the chain of title. Boss opined that certain language in the 1912
    deed demonstrated an intent to convey fee title.
    UE Limited objects to the admission of this expert opinion testimony.
    UE Limited contends that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting
    the experts to offer “legal conclusions in the guise of expert opinions.” As
    both parties agree, we review the trial court’s determination that the expert
    opinion testimony was admissible for an abuse of discretion. (See, e.g.,
    Summers v. A.L. Gilbert Co. (1999) 
    69 Cal.App.4th 1155
    , 1168 (Summers).)
    Generally, a trial court may consider extrinsic evidence to assist in the
    interpretation of a contract or deed. “[R]ational interpretation requires at
    least a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the
    intention of the parties. [Citations.] Such evidence includes testimony as to
    15
    the ‘circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement . . . including
    the object, nature and subject matter of the writing . . .’ so that the court can
    ‘place itself in the same situation in which the parties found themselves at
    the time of contracting.’ [Citations.] If the court decides, after considering
    this evidence, that the language of a contract, in the light of all the
    circumstances, ‘is fairly susceptible of either one of the two interpretations
    contended for . . .’ [citations], extrinsic evidence relevant to prove either of
    such meanings is admissible.” (Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage
    etc. (1968) 
    69 Cal.2d 33
    , 39-40, fns. omitted; see also SLPR, L.L.C. v. San
    Diego Unified Port Dist. (2020) 
    49 Cal.App.5th 284
    , 299-300.) Similarly, in
    Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines, Inc. (1999)
    
    74 Cal.App.4th 1232
    , 1241-1242, the court held that a trial court interpreting
    an agreement should “consider all credible extrinsic evidence offered to show
    that the instrument could or could not reasonably support the proposed
    meaning” and “[i]f, in light of the extrinsic evidence offered, the court decided
    the language was ‘reasonably susceptible’ to the meaning urged, it should
    [admit] the evidence to aid in the next step of construing the ambiguous
    language.”
    Expert opinion testimony is one form of extrinsic evidence that may be
    considered by a court. More specifically, expert testimony is admissible to
    prove custom and usage in an industry, which may help “ ‘explain the
    meaning of language and to imply terms, where no contrary intent appears
    from the terms of the contract.’ ” (Howard Entertainment, Inc. v. Kudrow
    (2012) 
    208 Cal.App.4th 1102
    , 1114; see also Varni Bros. Corp. v. Wine World,
    Inc. (1995) 
    35 Cal.App.4th 880
    , 889-890.) An attorney may offer expert
    opinion testimony regarding questions of fact, even if that testimony
    embraces an ultimate issue in a case, but may not testify regarding questions
    16
    of law. (Summers, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1178-1179.) A trial court
    may admit expert opinion testimony by an attorney when it determines the
    trier of fact “could benefit from the opinion of one who, by profession and
    experience, was peculiarly equipped to evaluate such matters in the context
    of similar disputes.” (Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1978) 
    21 Cal.3d 910
    ,
    924.)
    These same rules apply in the context of disputes over title to property.
    In Manhattan Beach, our Supreme Court noted that the trial court
    considered expert opinion testimony from surveyors to assist in determining
    whether a deed using the term “right-of-way” conveyed an easement or a fee
    simple interest. (Manhattan Beach, 
    supra,
     13 Cal.4th at pp. 249, 263.)
    In this case, UE Limited is correct that opinion testimony on a legal
    issue is inadmissible. (See Summers, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 1178.)
    However, UE Limited has failed to demonstrate the trial court committed
    reversible error on this ground. First, UE Limited has conceded that it was
    appropriate for Otay Land to present expert testimony regarding “usages of
    language at the time” the deeds were executed.6 Significant portions of the
    witnesses’ testimony were properly admissible as reflected by this concession,
    6      During Hansen’s testimony, UE Limited’s counsel expressly
    acknowledged it would be “appropriate” for Hansen to testify about “usages of
    language at the time.” Similarly, UE Limited’s counsel conceded that
    Hansen was “certainly qualified to testify as to the usages of language” and
    that he had “no problem with him, as an expert, telling [the court] what were
    the usages of language at the time.” In its reply brief, UE Limited argues for
    the first time that the experts should not have been permitted to testify
    regarding “ ‘custom and practices of the language used in conveyance
    documents.’ ” By failing to object to this opinion testimony and instead
    conceding it was admissible in the trial court, UE Limited forfeited this
    argument on appeal. (See, e.g., Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 
    203 Cal.App.4th 717
    , 726 (Duronslet) [claim that trial court erred in admitting evidence
    forfeited by failure to timely object].)
    17
    and this evidence alone supports the trial court’s ruling. Second, UE Limited
    has failed to properly preserve its claim of evidentiary error. Although UE
    Limited filed a motion in limine to exclude “opinions about who holds title to
    the Coronado Pipeline Property,” and the court denied the motion, the court
    made clear the witnesses would not be allowed to “give a legal opinion,” they
    could not “tell the [c]ourt what to do,” and if there were any questions
    designed to elicit opinion testimony on a legal issue, the court anticipated
    “that there’s going to be an objection and it’ll be sustained.” Contrary to UE
    Limited’s claim, it did not make “repeated objections” to the admission of
    purported legal opinions.7 It therefore forfeited any claim of error.
    (Duronslet, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 726.) Third, even assuming UE
    Limited’s claim of error was preserved, the claim fails on the merits. UE
    Limited contends the court “admitted that it had improperly abdicated to
    Otay Land’s expert the responsibility of deciding what the deeds meant,” and
    that the court further abdicated its role when it admitted the testimony of the
    7      UE Limited cites over 75 pages in the record when arguing the court
    erroneously admitted the testimony of experts Boss and Hansen. UE Limited
    did not lodge any objections during the cited portions of Boss’s testimony.
    During Hansen’s testimony, UE Limited objected when Hansen stated that
    certain language in the 1912 deed indicated to him that the parties were
    entering into a “present agreement” rather than a future executory one, and
    when he was asked whether it was significant that the parties called the
    1912 deed “an agreement.” The court attempted to obtain further
    clarification, stating “Well, I’m not sure what the question actually is,” and
    made clear it was not relying on the expert’s opinions to decide the case,
    stating “I’m reading along with him, whatever. He’s telling me something
    that seems, to me, pretty obvious.” UE Limited’s argument that further
    objection would be futile is belied by the record, as the court sustained
    comparable objections by Otay Land. (PM Group, Inc. v. Stewart (2007)
    
    154 Cal.App.4th 55
    , 63 (PM Group) [rejecting claim that further objection
    would have been futile where trial court sustained at least one objection to
    challenged testimony].)
    18
    City’s expert. UE Limited’s claims are inaccurate and unsupported by the
    record.8 Instead, it is clear the trial court understood it was “the [c]ourt’s
    job” to determine the proper interpretation of the documents at the
    conclusion of the bench trial, and nothing in the record suggests the court
    improperly relied on any purported legal conclusion offered by the expert
    witnesses. “Given its comments, the trial court plainly understood its role as
    arbiter of the law. And because this was a bench trial, there was no danger
    of jury confusion. In short, we find no error in the court’s decision to
    allow . . . counsel to testify.” (San Lorenzo Valley Community Advocates for
    Responsible Education v. San Lorenzo Valley Unified School Dist. (2006)
    
    139 Cal.App.4th 1356
    , 1420.) Finally, even assuming the experts sometimes
    strayed into offering opinions on questions of law when discussing the nature
    of the parties’ interests in the Pipeline Strip, any error in admitting such
    testimony was harmless. (See PM Group, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 64
    [“We are confident the admission of the opinion of a single expert on
    plaintiffs’ side to oppose the repeatedly expressed contrary opinion on
    defendants’ side does not require reversal.”].)
    Turning to the merits, we conclude the trial court’s findings regarding
    the 1912 deed, and the chain of title flowing from that deed, are supported by
    substantial evidence. Consistent with the parties’ presentation of evidence,
    8     To support its claim that the trial court “admitted that it had
    improperly abdicated” its role, UE Limited cites an isolated reference where
    the court stated with regard to Hansen: “and that was his legal opinion.
    That was his testimony, that was his expert opinion.” The court made this
    statement during trial while identifying the issues involved in the case. It
    was not part of the court’s oral intended decision or its subsequent written
    statement of decision, and does not constitute an admission in any event.
    Although the court’s statement of decision later summarized the witnesses’
    testimony, as UE Limited correctly notes in its reply, this too is not an
    admission or expression that the court was abdicating its role.
    19
    the trial court considered extrinsic evidence in interpreting the 1912 deed.9
    As stated by the court, it found there was “substantial evidence that the 1912
    deed (Ex. 4) clearly intended to convey a fee, and a fee was conveyed.” Thus,
    contrary to UE Limited’s argument that an independent standard of review
    must be applied, we instead review the trial court’s decision to determine
    whether it is supported by substantial evidence. (Burch, supra,
    199 Cal.App.4th at p. 742 [substantial evidence review applies to
    interpretation of a writing where the parties present conflicting extrinsic
    evidence].)10
    We start with the general rule that a fee title is presumed to be
    intended to pass by a grant of real property unless it appears from the grant
    that a lesser estate was intended. (Civ. Code, § 1105.) The 1912 deed does
    not demonstrate an intent to pass a lesser estate, but rather includes several
    hallmarks of a conveyance of property in fee simple.
    9     Although UE Limited contends on appeal that the experts’ opinion
    testimony should have been excluded or disregarded because no extrinsic
    evidence was necessary to interpret the deed, we note that UE Limited itself
    relied on extrinsic evidence in interpretating the 1912 deed.
    10     We would reach the same conclusion based on our independent review
    of the record. As discussed post, the language of the 1912 deed establishes
    that a fee interest was conveyed. There are several hallmarks in the deed—
    including the granting language, the inheritance language and habendum
    clause, multiple references and detailed descriptions to the land that was
    conveyed, and the presence of substantial consideration for the property—
    which all combine to support the trial court’s ruling. Additionally, the word
    “easement” is not used to describe the nature of the interest conveyed, and
    although the term “right of way” appears in one location (a map attached to
    the deed), that term can have dual meanings and does not support UE
    Limited’s position here. There was no substantial evidence rebutting the
    presumption under Civil Code section 1105 that fee title is presumed to pass
    by a grant of real property unless it appears from the grant that a lesser
    estate was intended.
    20
    The deed states that the San Diego Land Company “does by these
    presents grant to the said Southern California Mountain Water
    Company . . . all its right, title and interest in and to the lands described in
    said Exhibit ‘A.’ ” (Italics added.) The use of the word “grant” is the
    traditional language used for a conveyance of a fee. (See, e.g., Severns v.
    Union Pacific R.R. Co. (2002) 
    101 Cal.App.4th 1209
    , 1215 (Severns) [“To
    convey a fee, all that is required is the word ‘grant.’ ”].) The inheritance
    language and the habendum clause—“TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, the above
    granted and described premises unto the Southern California Mountain
    Water Company, . . . its successors and assigns forever”—are also indicative
    of a fee conveyance. (See id. at pp. 1215-1216.)
    The 1912 deed also includes repeated references to “land,”
    demonstrating that land was being transferred, not a mere easement over
    that land. In the deed, the San Diego Land Company acknowledges it is the
    “owner of said lands” and conveys “all its right, title and interest in and to
    the lands described.” The property being conveyed is described in
    “Exhibit A,” which defines the property as a “body of land.” Exhibit A
    provides a detailed description of the land and the total acreage being
    conveyed. “References to ‘land,’ particularly in conjunction with precise and
    technical designation of the location, generally indicate an intention to
    transfer the entire estate not just a limited right to pass over the property.”
    (Manhattan Beach, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 244.)
    The interpretation that the deed conveys the land, rather than mere
    access to that land via an easement, is further supported by comparing the
    interest the grantor (San Diego Land Company) retained in the 1912 deed.
    In the third paragraph of the deed, San Diego Land Company “reserves the
    right” to establish crossings “over and across the lands described in
    21
    Exhibit ‘A.’ ” (Italics added.) These references to a grantor’s limited access
    “over” or “across” land are consistent with an easement rather than a
    conveyance of the land. (See Manhattan Beach, 
    supra,
     13 Cal.4th at p. 244.)
    The use of this language to describe the grantor’s limited reserved rights, as
    contrasted to the conveyance of the land to the grantee, further supports the
    conclusion that the 1912 deed conveyed fee simple interest in the Pipeline
    Strip with the San Diego Land Company (the grantor) retaining only an
    easement to pass over the land. (Ibid.; accord Los Angeles v. Savage (1958)
    
    165 Cal.App.2d 1
    , 3-4, 6 [grant of fee of strip of land to carry electric
    transmission wires to the city, which conveyance was made “ ‘subject to
    reservations and conditions’ ” allowing grantor to use the land for certain
    purposes, was interpreted to convey to the city a fee simple interest in the
    land subject to a retained easement of the grantor].)
    Otay Land and the City also relied on the substantial consideration—
    $8,237.80—paid by the Southern California Mountain Water Company as
    evidence that a fee simple interest was conveyed rather than an easement,
    which often involves only a nominal payment.11 “Where an instrument is
    ambiguous as to whether a fee or easement was intended, the absence of
    monetary consideration or its nominal value suggests only an easement was
    intended.” (Concord & Bay Point Land Co. v. City of Concord (1991)
    11    On appeal, Otay Land relies on an online calculator created by the
    United States Bureau of Labor Statistics to represent that the sum of
    $8,237.80 near the time of the 1912 deed is equivalent to nearly $220,000 in
    present-day dollars. UE Limited does not object to this representation, but
    we decline to take judicial notice of the calculator or rely on it to reach our
    conclusion because no party made a proper request for judicial notice as
    required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a), or otherwise established
    the reliability of the calculation. (See United Teachers of Los Angeles v. Los
    Angeles Unified School Dist. (2012) 
    54 Cal.4th 504
    , 528.)
    22
    
    229 Cal.App.3d 289
    , 294.) The sum paid in the 1912 deed further supports
    the conclusion that a fee simple interest, not an easement, was conveyed.
    Additionally, the 1912 deed does not use the word “easement,” and
    there is no other limiting language supporting UE Limited’s interpretation of
    the 1912 deed. Although the 1912 deed notes that the land was to be used for
    a pipeline, it does not state that the property may only be used for a pipeline.
    (Cf. Handlery, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 574 [deed contained clear
    language of grantors’ intention to restrict use of property “only” to specific
    purposes].) Without the use of the word “only” or other terms or references
    indicating an intent to limit the interest conveyed to an easement, the
    reference to a certain intended use “merely constitutes a description of the
    intended purpose of the land rather than a limitation on its grant.”
    (Machado v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1991) 
    233 Cal.App.3d 347
    ,
    357-359 (Machado); see also Basin Oil Co. v. Inglewood (1954)
    
    125 Cal.App.2d 661
    , 664 [“[T]he vast majority of cases hold the transfer of a
    fee title is not vitiated solely for the reason that the deed contains a clause
    declaring the purpose for which it is intended the granted premises shall be
    used.”].)
    Against this substantial evidence, UE Limited relies on the words
    “right of way” handwritten on a plat map found in Exhibit A of the 1912 deed.
    UE Limited also relies on extrinsic evidence in the form of a subsequent 1914
    deed, which similarly uses the term “ ‘right of way’ ” to refer to the Pipeline
    Strip, to assert that the Southern California Mountain Water Company
    acquired only an easement. And UE Limited additionally relies on Civil Code
    section 801, which provides that “[t]he right-of-way” may be called an
    23
    easement.12 Under the substantial evidence standard of review, however,
    “[w]e do not review the evidence to see if there is substantial evidence to
    support the losing party’s version of events, but only to see if substantial
    evidence exists to support the verdict in favor of the prevailing party.” (Pope
    v. Babick (2014) 
    229 Cal.App.4th 1238
    , 1245.)
    Even considering UE Limited’s arguments regarding a “right of way,”
    this single phrase in an attachment to the deed does not establish the 1912
    deed created only an easement. Case law establishes that although the term
    “right of way” may refer to an easement, a “right of way” may also be a fee
    simple interest. In Manhattan Beach, the California Supreme Court held
    that a deed that included the term “right-of-way” transferred an entire fee
    interest, not an easement. (Manhattan Beach, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 235,
    249-250.) Similarly, in Machado, supra, 
    233 Cal.App.3d 347
    , 351, the court
    concluded that a deed transferring a “ ‘certain strip or parcel of land for a
    right of way’ ” was a grant of a fee interest, not an easement. The court in
    Machado explained that “the use of the term ‘right of way’ in a deed does not
    determine whether the interest so described constitutes an easement or a fee.
    Our courts have recognized that the use of that term can mean both an
    easement and the land held in fee simple which is used as a right of way.”
    (Id. at p. 354; see also Severns, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 1216 [concluding
    transfer of a “ ‘ “strip of land” ’ ” for a “ ‘ “right-of-way” ’ ” was an
    unambiguous transfer of a fee simple interest].)
    UE Limited tries to cabin these holdings regarding the dual meaning of
    the term “ ‘right of way,’ ” asserting that the use of the term “ ‘right of way’ ”
    12      Specifically, Civil Code section 801, subdivision (4) provides in relevant
    part: “The following land burdens, or servitudes upon land, may be attached
    to other land as incidents or appurtenances, and are then called easements:
    [¶] . . . [¶] 4. The right-of-way[.]”
    24
    to refer to a fee interest in property applies only to “railroads, canals, and
    similar instrumentalities of transportation.” (Italics added.) To support this
    assertion, UE Limited cites Manhattan Beach, which held that “courts have
    also concluded ‘the term “right of way,” when applied to railroads, canals,
    and similar instrumentalities, has no exact, well-defined meaning, but often
    is susceptible of a twofold signification. It is used indiscriminately to
    describe, not only the easement, or special and limited right to use another
    person’s land, but as well the strip of land itself that is occupied for such
    use.’ ” (Manhattan Beach, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 241.) Notably, the
    California Supreme Court did not include the limitation to “instrumentalities
    of transportation” added by UE Limited. The decision does not support the
    claim that a pipeline right-of-way must, as a matter of law, describe only an
    easement rather than a fee interest. The term right-of-way is merely
    descriptive of the purpose for which the strip of land may be used—here, as a
    pipeline—which “frequently require[s] a long strip of land along a particular
    route. This is consistent with the ordinary understanding of the words ‘right
    of way.’ ” (Miro v. Superior Court (1970) 
    5 Cal.App.3d 87
    , 97 [addressing an
    eminent domain case].)
    The context in which the “right of way” language is used is also
    significant. The 1912 deed does not refer to a grant of a right-of-way, but
    rather a grant of specifically-defined land. The reference to a “right of way” is
    not contained within the granting clause itself and appears after other key
    language discussed above. It instead is handwritten on a map which is part
    of an exhibit to the deed. Despite the ambiguous reference to a right-of-way,
    substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the 1912 deed
    included a grant of a fee simple interest in the Pipeline Strip, not only an
    easement.
    25
    UE Limited raises additional arguments on appeal regarding the 1914
    deed and subsequent conveyances. None is relevant or persuasive given UE
    Limited’s concession that it cannot prevail if the trial court correctly
    interpreted the 1912 deed.13 We have already concluded the trial court’s
    interpretation of the 1912 deed is supported by substantial evidence,
    rendering UE Limited’s remaining arguments moot. We need not address
    the remaining instruments in the chain of title in extensive detail. The
    following summary suffices and is supported by substantial evidence in the
    record: In 1914, the Southern California Mountain Water Company
    transferred its interest in the entirety of the “Highland Reservoir Pipe
    Line.”14 Included in the sale were “certain lots, pieces or parcels of real
    property and property rights situated in the County of San Diego,” including
    13    At trial, the court suggested the alternative chain of trial UE Limited
    was advancing would be irrelevant “if, hypothetically, the 1912 deed from
    San Diego Land Company to California—Southern California Mountain
    Water Company conveys a fee simple conveyance of the pipeline corridor or
    the pipeline strip . . . and if that deed conveys fee simple ownership of the
    pipeline corridor and then there is a tracing of subsequent deeds conveying
    the exact same described property.” UE Limited’s counsel responded, “I
    absolutely agree with that.” The trial court continued, “I mean, any other
    transaction from San Diego water company or anybody else is completely
    irrelevant,” and if the 1912 deed “transferred a fee, all of this other stuff
    [regarding the chain of title advanced by UE Limited] is confusing and
    completely irrelevant, isn’t it?” UE Limited’s counsel again stated, “I’m
    agreeing with the Court.” Although we need not address it, we additionally
    note that UE Limited relies heavily on a later June 5, 1912 agreement—
    which it contends “immediately superseded” the 1912 deed—to support its
    chain of title. However, this argument necessarily fails because the June 5
    agreement was never introduced as an exhibit at trial and is not part of the
    record on appeal.
    14    The parties do not dispute that this pipeline encompasses what the
    parties refer to as the Coronado Pipeline with the Pipeline Strip.
    26
    the Pipeline Strip, described as a “right-of-way, one hundred feet in width,
    being twenty feet on the north side of the Otay-Coronado Pipe Line, known
    and designated as the Highland Reservoir Pipe Line, and eighty feet on the
    south side of said pipe line, being the right of way granted by the San Diego
    Land Company to the Southern California Mountain Water Company by [the
    1912 deed.]” By referencing the 1912 deed, the 1914 deed indicates that the
    same interest that was conveyed in the 1912 deed was being conveyed by the
    1914 deed. (Kraemer v. Kraemer (1959) 
    167 Cal.App.2d 291
    , 301 [“When a
    deed refers to other instruments the latter become a part of the former, and
    all of them must be considered as a whole to determine the intention of the
    parties.”].) As already discussed, a fee simple interest was transferred in the
    1912 deed; the same is therefore true regarding the 1914 deed. In 1935, the
    Coronado Water Company conveyed fee interest in the Pipeline Strip to the
    California Water & Telephone Company. In 1961, the California Water &
    Telephone Company conveyed the Pipeline Strip to the City. In 1964, the
    City quitclaimed to UE Limited’s predecessor “all its right, title and interest
    in and to all that real property” in the Pipeline Strip except the 2.7-acre
    parcel and a 25-foot-wide strip, composed of the twelve and a half feet on
    either side of the physical pipeline. The City then transferred the 2.7-acre
    parcel to Otay Land in 2018. In summary, there is substantial evidence
    supporting a chain of title starting from the 1912 deed, conveying a fee
    interest to the Pipeline Strip, and ending with the 2018 transfer of fee title
    from the City to Otay Land of the 2.7-acre parcel within the Pipeline Strip on
    Lot 27.
    Finally, UE Limited’s reliance on Civil Code section 801 to support its
    argument that the deed only conveyed an easement is misplaced. This
    statute identifies a right-of-way as one possible type of easement (Civ. Code,
    27
    § 801, subd. (4)). “Seventeen other examples of easements are listed [in Civil
    Code section 801]. Contrary to what [UE Limited] appears to suggest, this
    does not create a presumption of an easement when a deed uses the phrase
    ‘right-of-way.’ Civil Code section 801 is simply a statutory listing of different
    types of easements.” (Severns, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 1215, fn. 2.) This
    statute is entirely consistent with the case law discussed ante, holding that
    the term right-of-way can be construed as either a fee or an easement
    depending on the particular instrument at issue.
    2. Application of the Public Utilities Act
    UE Limited asserts that the 1912 deed is void and therefore cannot
    form the basis for Otay Land’s and the City’s claims regarding their
    subsequent interests in the Pipeline Strip. To support this assertion, UE
    Limited relies on the Public Utilities Act, Public Utilities Code section 201 et
    seq. (Public Utilities Act), which first became effective in March 1912, days
    before the agreement underlying the 1912 deed was executed.15 (See Pacific
    Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Eshleman (1913) 
    166 Cal. 640
    , 667.) The Public Utilities
    Act vested the Railroad Commission (now the Public Utilities Commission)
    with new authority to regulate public utilities. (See generally Sale v.
    15     The Public Utilities Act has undergone numerous amendments since
    1912 and the sections relevant to UE Limited’s argument have been
    significantly amended or repealed. The trial court took judicial notice of the
    Public Utilities Act as it existed at the time of the 1912 deed. We refer in this
    opinion to the sections as enacted at the time of the 1912 deed unless
    otherwise stated. (Stats. 1911, Ex.Sess., ch. 14, § 1.) In a footnote in its reply
    brief, UE Limited requests that this court take judicial notice of a website
    detailing the history of the Public Utilities Commission. We decline to
    consider the request due to the failure to follow the requirements of
    rule 8.252(a) of the California Rules of Court. (Tenet Healthsystem Desert,
    Inc. v. Blue Cross of California (2016) 
    245 Cal.App.4th 821
    , 834-835 [party
    seeking judicial notice on appeal must file separate motion meeting
    requirements of rule 8.252].)
    28
    Railroad Com. of California (1940) 
    15 Cal.2d 612
    , 618 [Railroad Commission
    “is an active instrument of government charged with the duty of supervising
    and regulating public utility services and rates.”].)
    As part of this new authority, the Railroad Commission was vested
    with the duty to authorize all sales of utility systems, including water
    systems. (Crum v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp. (1934) 
    220 Cal. 295
    , 310.)
    Section 51, subdivision (a) of the Public Utilities Act provided that
    “[n]o . . . water corporation shall henceforth sell, lease, assign, mortgage or
    otherwise dispose of or encumber the whole or any part of its . . . system,
    necessary or useful in the performance of its duties to the public . . . without
    having first secured from the commission an order authorizing it so to do.”
    Any sale made without the commission’s authorization “shall be void.” (Ibid.)
    However, the section expressly states that it does not prevent “the sale, lease
    or other disposition by any public utility . . . of property which is not
    necessary or useful in the performance of its duties to the public, and any
    sale of its property by such public utility shall be conclusively presumed to
    have been of property which is not useful or necessary in the performance of
    its duties to the public, as to any purchaser of such property in good faith for
    value.” (Ibid.) “The section refers to property dedicated to public use.” (City
    of Oakland v. El Dorado Terminal Co. (1940) 
    41 Cal.App.2d 320
    , 328
    [construing comparable language in 1927 statute]; see also Henderson v.
    Oroville-Wyandotte Irrigation Dist. (1931) 
    213 Cal. 514
    , 529-530 [“No sale of
    property burdened with a public use is legal, or of any validity whatever,
    29
    unless the authority to make such sale is first given by the Railroad
    Commission.”].)16
    Here, the trial court indicated in its statement of decision that there
    was no evidence introduced at trial establishing it was necessary to obtain
    commission approval of the 1912 deed. As the trial court explained: “[T]he
    grantor to the 1912 deed was not a public utility; it was a land company. The
    grantee to the 1912 deed, Southern California Mountain Water Company,
    might have been a public utility, but there was no evidence presented to
    support a contention that a public utility needed Railroad Commission
    approval in 1912 to accept a grant of land. UE [Limited] failed to introduce
    any evidence or testimony on whether either party to the 1912 deed (Ex. 4)
    was a public utility for purposes of the Public Utilities Act. No corporate
    documentation was proffered related to either the grantee or grantor within
    Exhibit 4, and no expert was designated in relation to the Public Utilities Act
    or the relationship of the conveyance within Exhibit 4 to the subject matter of
    the Public Utilities Act.” The trial court further found this issue was only
    raised at “the very end of the trial” after UE Limited had rested. We review
    the trial court’s factual findings under a substantial evidence standard of
    review and we independently review legal issues regarding the statute’s
    16     The current statute contains almost identical provisions. (See Pub.
    Util. Code, § 851, subd. (a); see also id., subd. (c) [“This section does not
    prevent the sale, lease, encumbrance, or other disposition by any public
    utility of property that is not necessary or useful in the performance of its
    duties to the public, and any disposition of property by a public utility shall
    be conclusively presumed to be of property that is not useful or necessary in
    the performance of its duties to the public, as to any purchaser, lessee, or
    encumbrancer dealing with that property in good faith for value, provided
    that this section does not apply to the interchange of equipment in the
    regular course of transportation between connecting common carriers.”].)
    30
    applicability. (General Mills, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2012)
    
    208 Cal.App.4th 1290
    , 1302-1303.)
    We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling and
    we reject UE Limited’s contention that the 1912 deed was void based on
    operation of the Public Utilities Act. As set forth ante, section 51,
    subdivision (a) of the Public Utilities Act required commission approval for
    the sale of a water system by a water corporation. The 1912 deed, however,
    involved a sale to a water corporation of the Pipeline Strip.17 None of the
    parties contends that the grantor who conveyed the Pipeline Strip, San Diego
    Land Company, was a water corporation. Accordingly, San Diego Land
    Company was not a regulated utility subject to the commission’s jurisdiction.
    Its transfer of real property in the 1912 deed was not subject to the Public
    Utilities Act and did not require commission authorization.18
    17    For purposes of this decision, we assume without deciding that the
    Southern California Mountain Water Company constitutes a “water
    corporation” within the meaning of section 51 of the Public Utilities Act.
    18     In its reply brief, UE Limited cites section 31 of the Public Utilities Act
    and contends the commission has “the power to regulate and control all the
    public utilities of the state in all of their actions, whether purchasing or
    selling property.” (Italics modified.) Section 31 does not support UE
    Limited’s claim. (See § 31 [“The railroad commission is hereby vested with
    power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public utility in the
    state and to do all things, whether herein specifically designated or in
    addition thereto, which are necessary and convenient in the exercise of such
    power and jurisdiction.”].) This general language regarding the commission’s
    power to regulate public utilities does not override the specific language in
    section 51, or establish that commission approval of the 1912 deed was
    required. Section 51 makes clear that it operates to void only the sale of
    specified types of property by a public utility without commission approval.
    UE Limited points to no other authority supporting its argument that
    Southern California Mountain Water Company’s purchase of the Pipeline
    Strip fell within the purview of section 51.
    31
    UE Limited asserts that aside from the transfer of the Pipeline Strip,
    the 1912 deed also contained transfers of real property from the Southern
    California Mountain Water Company to the San Diego Land Company such
    that the Public Utilities Act nevertheless applies. In a separate part of the
    1912 deed (the fifth paragraph), the Southern California Mountain Water
    Company “does by these presents remise, release and forever quitclaim unto
    the said San Diego Land Company . . . all of the lands described” in earlier
    agreements between the parties. The earlier agreements are not part of the
    record. UE Limited contends that this paragraph, which it asserts is not
    severable, was subject to the Public Utilities Act because it involved a
    transfer of land by a water corporation (Southern California Mountain Water
    Company) to another party.
    However, section 51, subdivision (a) of the Public Utilities Act exempts
    from commission review and approval the transfer of any real property
    “which is not necessary or useful in the performance of its duties to the
    public.” (Italics added.) UE Limited makes no attempt to establish what
    duties Southern California Mountain Water Company purportedly owed the
    public. It further fails to describe the property transferred by the Southern
    California Mountain Water Company or to explain how the transfer of those
    lands fell within the approval jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission.19 As
    19     The Public Utilities Act only applies, as relevant to this action, to
    transfers of a “ ‘water system,’ ” defined in section 2, subdivision (w) as
    including “all reservoirs, tunnels, shafts, dams, dikes, head-gates, pipes,
    flumes, canals, structures and appliances, and all other real estate, fixtures
    and personal property, owned, controlled, operated or managed in connection
    with or to facilitate the diversion, development, storage, supply, distribution,
    sale, furnishing, carriage, apportionment or measurement of water for power,
    irrigation, reclamation or manufacturing, or for municipal, domestic or other
    beneficial use.”
    32
    noted, the earlier agreements describing the transferred land—which were
    apparently entered into in 1901—are not part of the record. Nothing in the
    record supports the conclusion that this property was necessary or useful to a
    water system or to the performance of any public functions the Southern
    California Mountain Water Company may have owed to the public.20
    In sum, as the trial court concluded, the 1912 deed was not void based
    on the failure to obtain commission approval.21
    3. Application of the Subdivision Map Act
    UE Limited argues that, assuming the City owned the Pipeline Strip,
    the division of a 2.7-acre portion of it for sale to Otay Land in 2018 violated
    the Subdivision Map Act (Gov. Code, § 66410 et seq.). We review this issue
    de novo. (Le Gault v. Erickson (1999) 
    70 Cal.App.4th 369
    , 372 (Le Gault).)
    Generally, the Subdivision Map Act establishes a range of
    requirements that must be fulfilled before a local governmental agency
    approves a subdivision of real property into multiple parcels. (See, e.g.,
    Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012)
    
    55 Cal.4th 783
    , 798-800.) “To enforce its important public purposes, the
    [Subdivision Map] Act generally prohibits the sale, lease, or financing of any
    20    Although UE Limited cites the 1912 decision of the Railroad
    Commission, the decision is not sufficient to fill the gaps in the record.
    Notably, the relevant portion of the strip conveyed by the 1912 deed is not
    part of the description in the decision of the property being sold and leased.
    There was no reliable testimony establishing how (if at all) the decision
    relates to the 1912 deed or the Pipeline Strip at issue in this case.
    21     Because we conclude the trial court correctly found that the Public
    Utilities Act did not require commission authorization for the 1912 deed, we
    need not consider the alternative arguments by Otay Land and the City
    regarding severability and whether a subsequent 1914 Railroad Commission
    decision ratified the earlier 1912 transfer.
    33
    parcel of a subdivision until the recordation of an approved map in full
    compliance with the law. ([Gov. Code,] § 66499.30, subds. (a), (b), (c).)”
    (Gardner v. County of Sonoma (2003) 
    29 Cal.4th 990
    , 999.) “[A] buyer has
    the right under [Government Code] section 66499.32 [subdivision] (a) to void
    a contract to sell real property that ‘has been divided . . . in violation of the
    provisions of [the Subdivision Map Act],’ and may exercise that right at the
    buyer’s ‘sole option’ within one year after the date of discovery of the
    violation.” (Black Hills Investments, Inc. v. Albertson’s, Inc. (2007)
    
    146 Cal.App.4th 883
    , 894 (Black Hills Investments).)
    As the trial court noted, however, UE Limited’s operative cross-
    complaint does not include a cause of action based on the Subdivision Map
    Act and it failed to assert an affirmative defense on this ground.22 The
    Subdivision Map Act also expressly does not apply to a conveyance of land to
    or from a governmental agency like the City here. (See Gov. Code, § 66426.5
    [“Any conveyance of land to or from a governmental agency, public entity,
    public utility, or subsidiary of a public utility for conveyance to that public
    utility for rights-of-way shall not be considered a division of land for purposes
    of computing the number of parcels.”], italics added; id., § 66428, subd. (a)(2)
    [conveyance to or from governmental agency, public entity, or public utility
    does not require parcel map except on individualized showing that public
    22    We reject UE Limited’s claim that a sentence in its declaratory relief
    cause of action asserting that the 2018 conveyance “ ‘is void and of no effect to
    transfer any ownership of UE’s 100-foot strip’ ” was sufficient to state a claim
    under the Subdivision Map Act. The statute was never cited or even
    mentioned in UE Limited’s cross-complaint or answer. UE Limited further
    asserts it raised the issue in discovery, but it only cites to arguments of
    counsel which are not evidence. UE Limited did mention the Subdivision
    Map Act in its trial brief and a motion during trial, but it cites no authority
    holding that this is a permissible method to adjudicate an issue that was not
    before the court based on the parties’ pleadings.
    34
    policy requires parcel map in particular case].) We need not address UE
    Limited’s contention that this exception does not apply to conveyances from a
    governmental agency like the City here.23 As we next discuss, there are
    other fundamental problems with UE Limited’s claim that preclude it from
    obtaining the relief it seeks.
    As a threshold matter, UE Limited has not shown that it has standing
    to assert a violation of the Subdivision Map Act in this case. A conveyance in
    violation of the Subdivision Map Act is voidable at the grantee’s sole option
    within one year after discovery of the violation. (Black Hills Investments,
    supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 894.) UE Limited is not a grantee entitled to
    seek this relief.24 (Le Gault, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 375 [the buyer had
    the sole choice of voiding a deed under the Subdivision Map Act; junior
    lienholder lacked standing to assert a claim based on the alleged violation].)
    Even if UE Limited had standing, its claim based on the Subdivision
    Map Act still fails because even assuming a violation occurred, it has no
    effect on title to the 2.7 acres. As the Court of Appeal explained in Save
    Mount Diablo v. Contra Costa County (2015) 
    240 Cal.App.4th 1368
    , 1379,
    footnote 8: “[A]lthough it is illegal for an owner to convey parts of a
    landholding in the absence of a recorded map ([Gov. Code,] § 66499.30,
    subds. (a) & (b)), such a conveyance is nonetheless effective to transfer title to
    the illegally conveyed portion. The grantee is not subject to criminal
    penalties and has the right, within one year of discovery, to void such a
    23     We note, however, that the statute plainly states that the exception
    from the Subdivision Map Act requirements applies to specified conveyances
    “to or from a governmental agency” (Gov. Code, § 66426.5), not just
    conveyances “to” a governmental agency.
    24    Nor did UE Limited seek injunctive relief under Government Code
    section 66499.33 prior to the sale of the 2.7-acre parcel.
    35
    transfer ([Id.,] § 66499.32, subd. (a)), but the local agency does not have a
    similar power. [Citations.] Accordingly, as both a practical and legal matter,
    a division of property through an illegal conveyance, if not voided by the
    transferee, is effective to subdivide property.” Here, as noted, Otay Land as
    the grantee/transferee is not attempting to void the conveyance.
    Transactions that violate the Subdivision Map Act are not automatically
    invalid. Thus, even assuming the 2018 conveyance violated the Subdivision
    Map Act, it has no bearing on the controversy raised in this action regarding
    title to the 2.7-acre parcel.25 The 2018 conveyance was effective to transfer
    title from the City to Otay Land.
    4. The Trial Court’s Limits on Expert Witness Testimony
    In its final argument regarding the 2.7-acre parcel, UE Limited
    contends the trial court abused its discretion by not permitting two of its
    experts to testify regarding interpretation of the 1912 deed. The trial court
    excluded some testimony from each witness for different reasons, which we
    consider in turn.
    “ ‘The trial court’s determinations on the admissibility of expert
    evidence are subject to review under the deferential abuse of discretion
    standard.’ ” (Burton v. Sanner (2012) 
    207 Cal.App.4th 12
    , 22.) “A judgment
    will not be reversed due to the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless it
    appears, upon examining the entire cause, including the evidence, a
    miscarriage of justice has resulted. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Evid. Code,
    § 354.) A miscarriage of justice occurs only when the reviewing court is
    convinced it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to the appellant
    25     As we discuss post, UE Limited raises a separate argument regarding
    the effect of Otay Land’s alleged violation of the Subdivision Map Act on its
    claim for adverse possession.
    36
    would have been reached absent the error.” (California Crane School, Inc. v.
    National Com. for Certification of Crane Operators (2014) 
    226 Cal.App.4th 12
    , 24.)26
    Before trial, the trial court informed the parties that they “get one
    expert per issue per side.” In response to that limitation, UE Limited
    represented that its real estate expert, John Hosack, would testify regarding
    “title chain” opinions while its other expert, Michael Pallamary, would testify
    regarding surveying issues and “his research of . . . digging up the chain [of
    title].”
    During its case-in-chief, UE Limited called Pallamary to testify as its
    first expert witness. Counsel for UE Limited asked Pallamary whether a
    reference to a “right-of-way” could be “used to equate to a fee” rather than an
    easement. Otay Land objected, noting the court’s ruling allowing only one
    expert per issue and UE Limited’s representation that Hosack would be the
    expert testifying regarding the interpretation of the deeds at issue. The court
    allowed limited testimony from Pallamary regarding the distinction between
    an easement and fee title, but warned counsel to not “run afoul” of the
    limitation on expert witnesses. Later in Pallamary’s testimony, UE Limited’s
    counsel again had to be reminded of this limitation. When UE Limited’s
    26     In its opening brief, UE Limited asserts that “when expert testimony
    has been erroneously excluded, that error is reversible per se.” UE Limited
    relies on Gordon v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. (2009) 
    170 Cal.App.4th 1103
    ,
    1114, which held that the exclusion of expert testimony is reversible per se
    only “when a trial court erroneously denies all evidence relating to a claim, or
    essential expert testimony without which a claim cannot be proven.” Neither
    situation applies here. In addition, because we conclude the trial court’s
    evidentiary rulings were not erroneous, we need not address UE Limited’s
    arguments regarding prejudice. (See Center for Biological Diversity v. County
    of San Bernardino (2016) 
    247 Cal.App.4th 326
    , 332; Deutsch v. Masonic
    Homes of California, Inc. (2008) 
    164 Cal.App.4th 748
    , 768, fn. 9.)
    37
    counsel asked Pallamary about the 2018 deed transferring title to the 2.7-
    acre parcel, Otay Land objected. When the court asked which expert was
    designated to testify about the deeds in the relevant chain of title, UE
    Limited’s counsel stated, “We’re going to have an expert, your Honor, tracing
    the chain of title. [¶]. . .[¶] And that’s what Mr. Hosack is going to be
    testifying to.” The court reminded UE Limited, “you’ve got your expert” to
    respond to Otay Land’s expert testimony regarding the chain of title, “but you
    don’t do it twice.” Undeterred, UE Limited’s counsel later asked Pallamary
    what the term “ ‘right-of-way’ ” refers to in a surveying map. Otay Land
    objected on the basis that UE Limited was “double dipping” to get two experts
    to testify on the interpretation of the deeds, violating the trial court’s
    limitation on repetitive expert witnesses. The trial court sustained the
    objection.
    On appeal, UE Limited challenges the exclusion of Pallamary’s
    testimony, asserting that it “was essential to the proper interpretation of the
    1912 Agreement and the parties’ disputed chains of title.” UE Limited does
    not address the basis for the trial court’s limitation of Pallamary’s testimony.
    In accordance with a San Diego Superior Court local rule, the trial court
    limited each party to one expert per issue.27 Moreover, Evidence Code
    section 723 provides that a trial court “may, at any time before or during the
    trial of an action, limit the number of expert witnesses to be called by any
    party.” This court has upheld this limitation on expert witness testimony
    and UE Limited makes no attempt to argue the rule is otherwise improper or
    inapplicable. (See South Bay Chevrolet v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
    27     Superior Court of San Diego County, Local Rules, rule 2.1.11 provides
    that “[i]t is the policy of the court that parties are limited to one expert per
    field of expertise per side, pursuant to Evidence Code section 723, absent a
    court order to the contrary.”
    38
    (1999) 
    72 Cal.App.4th 861
    , 906.) UE Limited did not dispute this rule as
    applied during trial and elected to question its other expert witness, Hosack,
    regarding interpretation of the relevant deeds and records. Based on this
    record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Pallamary’s
    duplicative expert testimony. (Ibid.)
    UE Limited acknowledges it relied on its other expert, Hosack, to
    testify regarding “the meaning of the various deeds and agreements
    constituting the chain of title for the [Pipeline Strip].” As part of Hosack’s
    testimony, UE Limited’s counsel asked him what he “interpreted [the 1912
    deed] to be.” Otay Land’s counsel objected, noting that interpretation of the
    1912 deed was beyond the scope of Hosack’s deposition testimony. Although
    Hosack represented that he was questioned about the 1912 deed in his
    deposition, he later clarified that his deposition testimony regarding that
    deed was limited to opining that the deed was void due to not receiving
    approval from the Railroad Commission, as discussed ante. Counsel for Otay
    Land represented to the court that at Hosack’s deposition, he asked if Hosack
    had expressed all of his opinions and Hosack pledged that he had and
    committed to inform Otay Land if he formed any new opinions arising out of
    his examination of the documents he had reviewed. The trial court sustained
    the objection and did not allow Hosack to testify regarding his opinions about
    the interpretation of the 1912 deed.
    UE Limited contends the trial court abused its discretion in excluding
    Hosack’s expert opinion testimony. It reiterates the argument it made at
    trial that during a deposition, “if the question isn’t asked, the expert has no
    duty to volunteer.” The trial court rejected this contention and so do we.
    “The Legislature has singled out the pretrial discovery of expert
    opinions for special treatment. When appropriate demand is made for
    39
    exchange of expert witness lists, the party is required to disclose not only the
    name, address and qualifications of the witness but the general substance of
    the testimony the witness is expected to give at trial. [Citation.] In our view,
    this means the party must disclose either in his witness exchange list or at
    his expert’s deposition, if the expert is asked, the substance of the facts and
    the opinions which the expert will testify to at trial. Only by such a
    disclosure will the opposing party have reasonable notice of the specific areas
    of investigation by the expert, the opinions he has reached and the reasons
    supporting the opinions, to the end the opposing party can prepare for cross-
    examination and rebuttal of the expert’s testimony.” (Kennemur v. State of
    California (1982) 
    133 Cal.App.3d 907
    , 919 (Kennemur).) Thus, when an
    expert offers certain specific opinions during his deposition, offers that those
    were his only opinions, and states that he will notify counsel if he forms new
    opinions before trial, a trial court may justifiably exclude testimony at trial
    going beyond the opinions expressed during the deposition. (Jones v. Moore
    (2000) 
    80 Cal.App.4th 557
    , 564-565 (Jones) [holding that even when an
    expert witness declaration arguably was broad enough to encompass the line
    of questioning sought to be presented at trial, “[w]hen an expert deponent
    testifies as to specific opinions and affirmatively states those are the only
    opinions he intends to offer at trial, it would be grossly unfair and prejudicial
    to permit the expert to offer additional opinions at trial”]; see also Easterby v.
    Clark (2009) 
    171 Cal.App.4th 772
    , 780 [“a party’s expert may not offer
    testimony at trial that exceeds the scope of his deposition testimony if the
    opposing party has no notice or expectation that the expert will offer the new
    testimony, or if notice of the new testimony comes at a time when deposing
    the expert is unreasonably difficult”].)
    40
    On appeal, UE Limited relies on other authority that establishes that
    although an expert must disclose the “general substance” of his opinions
    before trial, the failure of opposing counsel to discover each specific detail and
    fact underlying those opinions does not require the exclusion of testimony
    regarding those details at trial. (See Cooper v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals
    America, Inc. (2015) 
    239 Cal.App.4th 555
    , 594-595; Williams v.
    Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft (1986) 
    180 Cal.App.3d 1244
    , 1257-1258.)
    Those cases, however, have no bearing on the trial court’s decision in
    this case. Otay Land objected to Hosack’s trial testimony regarding the
    interpretation of the 1912 deed because he offered no general opinion on that
    document at his deposition beyond his belief the deed was void due to not
    being approved by the Railroad Commission. His failure to offer any general
    opinion regarding the interpretation of the words used in the 1912 deed
    forecloses his testimony at trial regarding that same general opinion.
    UE Limited also suggests on appeal that Otay Land “failed to offer any
    evidence from Mr. Hosack’s deposition that supported their objection.” The
    record suggests otherwise. At trial, after counsel for Otay Land read from
    Hosack’s deposition transcript, Hosack himself testified regarding the scope
    of opinions offered at his deposition. The trial court allowed the parties to
    take a break to review the deposition transcript and, following that break,
    UE Limited made no effort to demonstrate that counsel for Otay Land was
    misrepresenting the scope of Hosack’s opinions offered at the deposition.
    Instead, Hosack confirmed the opinion he provided at his deposition
    regarding the 1912 deed was limited to concluding the deed was void for
    failure to obtain approval from the Railroad Commission. Hosack also
    admitted he offered no opinions at his deposition regarding the 1914 deed,
    discussed ante, another key document at trial. After another break, UE
    41
    Limited’s counsel informed the court that she had a chance to review
    Hosack’s deposition transcript and his discussion of the 1912 deed and then
    proceeded to ask only about the issue arising from the Railroad Commission
    approval. Although the transcript of Hosack’s deposition was not admitted
    into evidence, the record sufficiently establishes that Hosack did not offer the
    opinions excluded at trial during his deposition. And UE Limited has not
    offered any evidence to the contrary. Based on the record before it, the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Hosack’s previously
    undisclosed opinions regarding the interpretation of the 1912 deed and other
    relevant documents in the chain of title. (See Jones, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 565 [“[w]hen an expert deponent testifies as to specific opinions and
    affirmatively states those are the only opinions he intends to offer at trial, it
    would be grossly unfair and prejudicial to permit the expert to offer
    additional opinions at trial”]; accord, Kennemur, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at
    p. 920.)
    C. Otay Land’s Adverse Possession Claim
    Aside from the 2.7-acre parcel and a 25-foot-wide strip claimed by the
    City, the trial court found that Otay Land obtained the remainder of the
    Pipeline Strip through adverse possession. UE Limited challenges this
    finding on appeal.
    “Adverse possession is a means to acquire ownership of land.” (Silacci
    v. Abramson (1996) 
    45 Cal.App.4th 558
    , 562.) “The elements of adverse
    possession are well established. ‘To establish title by adverse possession, the
    claimant must establish five elements in connection with his occupancy of the
    property. [Citations.] (1) Possession must be by actual occupation under
    such circumstances as to constitute reasonable notice to the owner.
    [Citations.] (2) Possession must be hostile to the owner’s title. [Citations.]
    42
    (3) The holder must claim the property as his own, either under color of title,
    or claim of right. [Citation.] (4) Possession must be continuous and
    uninterrupted for five years. [Citations.] (5) The possessor must pay all of
    the taxes levied and assessed upon the property during the period.
    [Citation.] Unless each one of these elements is established by the evidence,
    the plaintiff has not acquired title by adverse possession.’ ” (Nielsen v.
    Gibson (2009) 
    178 Cal.App.4th 318
    , 325 (Nielsen); see also Civ. Code, § 1007,
    Code Civ. Proc., §§ 324, 325.) We review the trial court’s factual findings as
    to each element under the substantial evidence standard of review. (Aguayo
    v. Amaro (2013) 
    213 Cal.App.4th 1102
    , 1109 (Aguayo).)
    1. Evidence Related to Otay Land’s Exclusive Use
    On appeal, UE Limited makes only a limited challenge to the court’s
    finding regarding the first four elements of Otay Land’s adverse possession
    claim. It asserts the trial court erred in excluding certain testimony by one of
    its witnesses, Christopher Patek, and some accompanying exhibits that UE
    Limited believed were relevant to the issue of whether Otay Land exercised
    exclusive control over the property. We disagree.
    In its complaint, filed in 2013, Otay Land alleged the relevant five-year
    period of adverse possession occurred during its ownership of Lot 27 from
    1998 until the filing of the lawsuit. At trial, Otay Land focused on
    establishing the elements of adverse possession for the Pipeline Strip within
    Lot 27 during the five-year period starting in 2007 until the lawsuit was filed
    in early 2013. During its case-in-chief, Otay Land presented evidence that
    during that five-year period, it built fences and gates around the Pipeline
    Strip, restricted access by the public, and hired a person to farm the property.
    Otay Land called Patek to testify as an adverse witness pursuant to
    Evidence Code section 776. Patek explained he was a property manager for
    43
    UE Limited since 2013. Patek testified that several times a year, he viewed
    the Pipeline Strip from a nearby freeway “pull-out.” On at least one occasion,
    he observed people running farm equipment on the Pipeline Strip. Patek also
    testified that before visiting the property as part of this litigation in 2017, he
    had last visited the property sometime before 2005. Patek subsequently
    changed his testimony to claim he visited the Pipeline Strip in 2015, after the
    lawsuit was filed, by climbing under a fence.
    The trial court required UE Limited to combine its cross-examination of
    Patek as Otay Land’s adverse witness and its own direct examination of
    Patek.28 Despite Patek’s testimony that he did not visit the Pipeline Strip
    during the five-year period preceding the lawsuit, counsel for UE Limited
    asked Patek a series of questions about whether Otay Land had constructed
    barriers to restrict access to the Pipeline Strip. The trial court sustained
    Otay Land’s objections to this testimony on the basis that Patek had not
    visited the property during the relevant time period, he lacked the foundation
    to answer the question, and any response regarding access during a different
    time period would be irrelevant. Acknowledging that Patek had not visited
    until after the lawsuit was filed, counsel for UE Limited suggested that
    “there is an inference that if you could access it today, you could have
    28     In a conclusory argument, UE Limited asserts the trial court erred in
    not following the normal order of evidence at trial. As UE Limited
    acknowledges, the trial court has broad discretion in regulating the order of
    proof and we will not disturb the trial court’s management of trial absent a
    clear showing of abuse of discretion. (Rayii v. Gatica (2013) 
    218 Cal.App.4th 1402
    , 1413.) The trial court consolidated Patek’s testimony out of concerns
    regarding the length of trial, which was extending beyond the parties’
    estimates. UE Limited fails to establish that it was prejudiced by the trial
    court’s case management or that the trial court in any way abused its
    discretion.
    44
    accessed it in past years, absent some evidence that they’ve taken away the
    access.” The court disagreed and excluded Patek’s testimony in this regard.
    Later, UE Limited asked Patek about a series of photographs he took of
    the Pipeline Strip in 2017. UE Limited proffered that these photographs of
    open gates in 2017 supported an inference that the gates were open during
    the period of adverse possession. The court again sustained Otay Land’s
    objections that the photographs were not relevant.
    On appeal, UE Limited argues that the exclusion of Patek’s testimony
    and photographs was “[i]mproper.” We review the trial court’s evidentiary
    rulings under the abuse of discretion standard of review. (Shaw v. County of
    Santa Cruz (2008) 
    170 Cal.App.4th 229
    , 281.) “This is particularly so with
    respect to rulings that turn on the relevance of the proffered evidence.
    [Citation.] This standard is not met by merely arguing that a different ruling
    would have been better. Discretion is abused only when in its exercise, the
    trial court ‘exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it
    being considered.’ [Citation.] There must be a showing of a clear case of
    abuse and miscarriage of justice in order to warrant a reversal. [Citation.] A
    trial court will abuse its discretion by action that is arbitrary or ‘ “that
    transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law.” ’ [Citations.] In
    appeals challenging discretionary trial court rulings, it is the appellant’s
    burden to establish an abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.)
    UE Limited fails to meet this burden. UE Limited does not dispute
    that Patek could not offer direct evidence on the matters at issue, but rather
    could offer only circumstantial evidence regarding the status of the fencing
    and gates on the property in 2017 to support the inference that the fencing
    and gates were similarly maintained four years earlier. (See Evid. Code,
    § 600, subd. (b) [“An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and
    45
    reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise
    established in the action.”].) However, a trial court may reasonably exclude
    evidence it deems to be overly speculative. (See, e.g., People v. Babbitt (1988)
    
    45 Cal.3d 660
    , 682 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
    evidence where “ ‘[t]he inference which [offering party] sought to have drawn
    from the [proffered evidence] is clearly speculative, and evidence which
    produces only speculative inferences is irrelevant evidence’ ”].) UE Limited
    failed to make any showing to support an inference that the state of the gates
    in 2017 was indicative of how the gates were maintained several years
    earlier. The trial court’s reasoning did not exceed the bounds of reason.
    Even assuming Patek’s proffered testimony would support a reasonable
    inference that Otay Land occasionally left a gate open during the relevant
    time period, such evidence would not defeat Otay Land’s adverse possession
    claim. An adverse possessor’s use of the property must be exclusive, but that
    exclusiveness need not be absolute. Rather, courts have consistently
    recognized that occasional breaches in fencing “do not destroy its continuity,
    unless they are permitted to remain for such a length of time as to show that
    the defendant did not intend to continue the exclusive appropriation.” (Jones
    v. Hodges (1905) 
    146 Cal. 160
    , 164; Andrus v. Smith (1901) 
    133 Cal. 78
    , 80
    [occasional trespass and damage to fence by “schoolboys” does not defeat
    evidence of exclusive possession].) Thus, Patek’s testimony that he observed
    gates had been left open on limited occasions, even if admitted, would not be
    sufficient to defeat Otay Land’s claim of exclusive possession. In light of the
    substantial evidence of Otay Land’s exclusive use of the Pipeline Strip during
    the relevant time period, Patek’s excluded testimony would have had no
    effect on the outcome of the trial. (See Tudor Ranches, Inc. v. State Comp.
    Ins. Fund (1998) 
    65 Cal.App.4th 1422
    , 1431-1432 [“even where evidence is
    46
    improperly excluded, the error is not reversible unless ‘ “it is reasonably
    probable a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached
    absent the error.” ’ ”].)
    UE Limited makes another contention regarding the trial court’s
    treatment of Patek and his testimony. It complains that the trial court’s
    comments during Patek’s testimony “clearly indicated that [the trial court]
    had already made up its mind on the [exclusive use] issue although the
    evidence had not been completed.” The record contains no such indication.
    We recognize the trial court told UE Limited’s counsel during its questioning
    of Patek that “ ‘[w]e’re . . . wasting time,’ ” but the context of the trial court’s
    statement is important. The trial court made this statement after counsel
    repeatedly tried to question Patek about whether gates were open in 2017 or
    2018 despite the trial court consistently sustaining Otay Land’s objections to
    such testimony. Eventually, UE Limited entered into a stipulation with Otay
    Land to preserve its attempts to introduce the photographs without repeated
    sustained objections. The court noted its appreciation regarding the
    stipulation as a means to avoid “spend[ing] two days wasting time.” The
    record establishes that the trial court’s comments were directed toward the
    procedural delays associated with UE Limited’s attempts to preserve its
    challenge to the exclusion of Patek’s testimony, not an indication of bias or a
    refusal to consider UE Limited’s evidence.
    2. Payment of Levied and Assessed Taxes on the Pipeline Strip
    UE Limited challenges the trial court’s finding that Otay Land paid all
    taxes levied and assessed upon the property. Under section 325,
    subdivision (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the person claiming title must
    have “timely paid all state, county, or municipal taxes that have been levied
    47
    and assessed upon the land for the period of five years during which the land
    has been occupied and claimed.”
    Here, the dispute centers on an apparent mistake by the county
    assessor’s office regarding the assessment of taxes on the Pipeline Strip in
    Lot 27. The evidence at trial established that the county generally reviews
    deeds following a sale of real property and, if some portion of an existing
    parcel is not conveyed to the new owner, it will create a new assessor’s parcel
    number (APN) for the excepted-out portion. When Otay Land purchased
    Lot 27 in 1998, the sale did not include the Pipeline Strip. However, the
    assessor’s office did not create a new APN for the Pipeline Strip. It continued
    to treat the entirety of Lot 27 as a single parcel for assessment purposes.29
    The evidence at trial established that Otay Land paid all of the
    property taxes assessed by the County of San Diego for the entirety of Lot 27,
    which did not differentiate between the Pipeline Strip within the parcel and
    the surrounding parcel. A representative from the assessor’s office testified
    that because the Pipeline Strip was not excepted out and separately assessed,
    Otay Land’s payment of property taxes for Lot 27 “mean[s] that you’re paying
    taxes for all the area depicted” in the parcel map, including the Pipeline
    Strip. Based on this evidence, the trial court concluded that Otay Land paid
    all taxes levied and assessed on all the land contained in Lot 27, including
    the Pipeline Strip.
    On appeal, UE Limited contends the trial court erred “as a matter of
    law” in finding that Otay Land paid the taxes levied and assessed on the
    Pipeline Strip, which would allow this court to apply a de novo standard of
    29    UE Limited offered evidence that when the assessor’s office became
    aware of this apparent mistake after this litigation was filed, it proposed
    creating a new APN for the Pipeline Strip in Lot 27, but has not implemented
    the change due to this pending litigation.
    48
    review. Otay Land disagrees, asserting the trial court made factual findings
    regarding the payment of taxes that this court reviews under the substantial
    evidence standard of review. (See, e.g., Finley v. Yuba County Water Dist.
    (1979) 
    99 Cal.App.3d 691
    , 698 [payment of taxes for land subject to adverse
    possession claim is “largely a question of fact”].)
    We need not resolve this dispute because we reach the same result
    regardless of which party is correct regarding the applicable standard of
    review. If Otay Land paid the taxes of the Pipeline Strip within Lot 27 due to
    the assessor’s apparent error, as the evidence at trial demonstrated, it
    satisfied all elements of its claim of adverse possession. However, even if we
    accept UE Limited’s claim that the county’s alleged mistake resulted in no
    taxes being assessed for the Pipeline Strip due to its error in not creating a
    separate APN, Otay Land has still met its burden.
    Although an adverse possessor must pay all taxes assessed and levied
    on the property at issue, the law does not require impossibilities such that if
    no taxes are assessed or levied, or alternatively if the government errs in
    some fashion in assessing and levying taxes, the party seeking to adversely
    possess the property has nevertheless met its burden. In Sorenson v. Costa
    (1948) 
    32 Cal.2d 453
    , 455-456, several neighbors discovered that they had
    been occupying lots that were shifted a half-lot to the west compared to the
    legal descriptions found in the relevant deeds. Similarly, the county’s
    assessment rolls contained mistaken descriptions of the property. (Id. at
    pp. 457-458.) When one of the neighbors had the land surveyed and
    discovered the error, two neighbors filed cross-actions seeking to quiet title
    and other relief. (Id. at p. 456.) After the trial court found that the elements
    for adverse possession were satisfied, our Supreme Court affirmed.
    Regarding the payment of taxes, the Supreme Court explained that the
    49
    evidence established “that the description [of property in the assessment
    rolls] was mistaken and that the respondent and his predecessors actually
    paid all taxes assessed for the statutory period on the land that they
    occupied.” (Id. at p. 465.) The Court held that “[w]here a claimant of title by
    adverse possession has paid the taxes actually assessed on the property
    occupied, a misdescription on the tax assessment roll or in the tax receipts
    will not generally affect the efficacy of payment under statutes requiring the
    payment of taxes in order to establish title by adverse possession.” (Id. at
    p. 466.)
    In the situation where no taxes are assessed, courts have concluded
    that this fact “ ‘would not prevent [a claimant] from acquiring title by adverse
    possession.’ ” (Newman v. Cornelius (1970) 
    3 Cal.App.3d 279
    , 291; see also
    Cavanaugh v. Jackson (1893) 
    99 Cal. 672
    , 675 [“There is reason in the law
    and impossible things are not demanded.”].) In Hagman v. Meher Mount
    Corporation (2013) 
    215 Cal.App.4th 82
    , 85-86 (Hagman), a property owner
    sought to obtain, through adverse possession, title to a strip of land after he
    inadvertently fenced in and improved an adjoining piece of property owned by
    his neighbor, a nonprofit religious organization using the land for educational
    purposes. Given the organization’s status, it qualified for a tax exemption
    and was not assessed any property taxes. (Id. at p. 86.) On appeal, the court
    explained that “[a] tax is assessed when the county assessor prepares the roll
    listing all properties subject to taxation and their assessed value” and “[a] tax
    is levied when the county’s board of supervisors fixes the tax rate and orders
    that the taxes be paid ‘in specific sums in terms of the rates so adopted.’ ”
    (Id. at p. 90.) When a property is not assessed and there is no levy of
    property taxes, the claimant “is accordingly not required to pay property
    taxes on that land under Code of Civil Procedure section 325, subdivision (b).”
    50
    (Id. at p. 91, fn. omitted; see also Ortiz v. Pacific States Properties, Inc. (1950)
    
    96 Cal.App.2d 34
    , 39 [“An adverse claimant to real property will not be
    denied acquisition of title by adverse possession for nonpayment of taxes
    when taxes have not been both levied and assessed for one or more years
    during his occupancy.”].)30
    In sum, the evidence at trial established Otay Land paid all taxes
    levied and assessed on the APN which included Lot 27 and the Pipeline Strip.
    Even if we accept UE Limited’s legal conclusion that Otay Land did not pay
    any property taxes on the Pipeline Strip within Lot 27, the undisputed
    evidence demonstrates that the failure to pay taxes was due to the fact that
    the county did not assess and levy taxes on that specific land. In this
    situation, the failure to pay taxes does not defeat a claim for adverse
    possession. Accordingly, in either scenario, Otay Land met its burden to
    establish it paid all taxes assessed and levied on the Pipeline Strip. (See
    Allen v. Allen (1911) 
    159 Cal. 197
    , 200 [party claiming adverse possession
    must establish “either that no taxes were levied and assessed upon the land,
    or that he had paid all taxes which were levied thereon”].)
    3. Unclean Hands
    Alternatively, UE Limited asserts that even if Otay Land satisfied the
    tax payment element, Otay Land was guilty of unclean hands because it was
    aware of the assessor’s alleged error and took advantage of that error to
    satisfy its adverse possession claim. The trial court rejected this claim,
    finding no legal requirement for Otay Land to alert the assessor of any error.
    30    On appeal, UE Limited asserts that the decision in Hagman was
    premised on application of the doctrine of unclean hands. Nothing in
    Hagman suggests the court considered the unclean hands doctrine in
    reaching its decision.
    51
    The court also observed “that UE [Limited] could also have done something
    with regard to the assessment of taxes on the Strip” but failed to do so.
    “Traditionally, the doctrine of unclean hands is invoked when one
    seeking relief in equity has violated conscience, good faith or other equitable
    principles in his prior conduct.” (Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. East
    Bay Union of Machinists (1964) 
    227 Cal.App.2d 675
    , 727.) The doctrine
    applies as a defense against both legal and equitable claims. (Id. at pp. 727-
    728.) “Not every wrongful act constitutes unclean hands. But, the
    misconduct need not be a crime or an actionable tort. Any conduct that
    violates conscience, or good faith, or other equitable standards of conduct is
    sufficient cause to invoke the doctrine.” (Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v.
    Superior Court (1999) 
    76 Cal.App.4th 970
    , 979.) “The doctrine of unclean
    hands is a defense to an equitable action, including an action to quiet title.”
    (Aguayo, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 1110.)
    Here, UE Limited relies on Otay Land’s inaction as the basis for its
    unclean hands defense. UE Limited asserts that “Otay Land knew that the
    Assessor had erroneously failed to create a separate APN for the Coronado
    Pipe Line Strip excepted out of the sale of Lot 27 . . . [and] [d]espite that
    knowledge, Otay Land failed to inform the Assessor of the error but sought to
    take advantage of it.” Under general principles of tort law, the failure to take
    affirmative action, absent a special relationship creating a duty to act, is
    treated differently than actual misconduct. (See, e.g., Williams v. State of
    California (1983) 
    34 Cal.3d 18
    , 23-24.) UE Limited has not cited any
    authority establishing Otay Land had an affirmative duty to correct a
    purported error by the assessor’s office that the claimant did not cause. (Cf.
    Aguayo, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 1112 [where “a party claiming adverse
    possession engages in deceitful interference with the true owner’s ability to
    52
    defeat the claim, the trial court may in its discretion apply the defense of
    unclean hands”].)
    Even assuming such a duty exists, the record does not establish Otay
    Land breached this duty where it was not aware of the tax issue until after it
    filed this lawsuit. At trial, Otay Land’s director of operations, responsible for
    the entitlement process for the parcels at issue, testified that Otay Land
    learned of the Pipeline Strip, and its attendant ownership issues, for the first
    time in 2013. That same year, Otay Land began researching the ownership
    of the Pipeline Strip. It was not until 2016 that Otay Land reached the
    conclusion that UE Limited owned the Pipeline Strip. A consultant for Otay
    Land reinforced this timeline when she testified that she discovered the
    separate ownership of the Pipeline Strip by UE Limited in 2016. That
    consultant, however, also testified that she did not research any tax issues
    related to Lot 27. Instead, Otay Land discovered the issue itself sometime
    well after the lawsuit was filed when it reviewed the assessor’s parcel map.
    As discussed ante, Otay Land focused at trial on establishing each
    element of its adverse possession claim during the five years preceding the
    filing of the lawsuit, from 2007 to 2013. The record contains no indication
    that Otay Land was aware of the apparent assessment mistake either before
    or during that time period. Without knowledge of the alleged mistake, Otay
    Land could not have reported the mistake to the assessor. Since any duty to
    report the alleged mistake could not have arisen during the relevant time
    period, Otay Land could not be found to have breached its duty even
    assuming one exists. Accordingly, UE Limited failed to establish its defense
    of unclean hands.
    UE Limited also claims that Otay Land was guilty of unclean hands
    because its adverse possession claim and, by extension, the trial court’s
    53
    judgment “effectively divided the [Pipeline Strip] into multiple additional
    parcels without [Subdivision Map Act] approval, and then merged them into
    Otay Land’s residential subdivision.” As discussed ante, an alleged violation
    of the Subdivision Map Act does not automatically void a transfer of property
    that creates multiple parcels. Nevertheless, UE Limited implies that Otay
    Land violated the Subdivision Map Act by not providing notice of the
    proposed subdivision to the adjacent property owners, which allowed Otay
    Land to proceed with its attempt to adversely possess the Pipeline Strip “by
    stealth.”
    UE Limited fails to demonstrate that a claimant seeking to adversely
    possess a portion of a property, which may effectively result in a split of a
    parcel, must comply with the Subdivision Map Act before filing a complaint.
    Regardless, even assuming the Subdivision Map Act applied to the filing of
    an adverse possession claim, UE Limited’s contentions center on whether
    Otay Land’s alleged noncompliance resulted in insufficient notice to UE
    Limited of Otay Land’s intent to adversely possess the Pipeline Strip, thereby
    violating UE Limited’s due process rights. The trial court, however,
    necessarily found that Otay Land met its burden to establish each element of
    its adverse possession claim by demonstrating that its actual possession of
    the Pipeline Strip provided reasonable notice to UE Limited. (See, e.g.,
    Nielsen, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at pp. 326-328 [claimant must establish open
    and notorious occupation of property sufficient to provide notice to actual
    owner].) It is this open and notorious possession that provides notice to an
    actual owner and nothing requires a claimant seeking to adversely possess
    property to provide actual notice of its occupation. (Ibid.) “As one California
    Court of Appeal colorfully wrote, an adverse user ‘ “ ‘must unfurl his flag on
    the land, and keep it flying, so that the owner may see, if he will, that an
    54
    enemy has invaded his domains, and planted the standard of conquest.’ ” ’ ”
    (Id. at p. 327.) UE Limited does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
    to support the trial court’s finding on this element of adverse possession.
    Accordingly, any purported failure to provide actual notice pursuant to the
    Subdivision Map Act does not defeat Otay Land’s claim.
    In sum, the evidence establishes that Otay Land satisfied every
    element of its claim of adverse possession and UE Limited failed to meet its
    burden of establishing its defense of unclean hands. The trial court therefore
    correctly found in favor of Otay Land on its claims related to Lot 27 and
    entered judgment in its favor.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed. Otay Land is entitled to its costs on appeal.
    GUERRERO, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
    DO, J.
    55
    

Document Info

Docket Number: D076415

Filed Date: 10/20/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/20/2021