People v. Bridges CA2/3 ( 2021 )


Menu:
  • Filed 10/21/21 P. v. Bridges CA2/3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    THE PEOPLE,                                                   B309404
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. A649931)
    v.
    TOMMY BRIDGES,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County, John J. Lonergan, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
    Thomas Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
    for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
    Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Ryan M. Smith, Deputy
    Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    ——————————
    In 1990, Tommy Bridges was convicted of, among other
    offenses, first degree murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 189)
    with true findings on a lying-in-wait special circumstance
    allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (15)) and a personal-use-of-a-firearm
    enhancement allegation (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). In October 2020,
    Bridges filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section
    1170.95. The superior court, without first appointing counsel
    or allowing an opportunity for briefing, summarily denied the
    petition. Because the record of conviction establishes that
    Bridges was ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 as a
    matter of law, any error committed by the superior court in
    denying the petition was harmless. We affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
    Bridges’s Trial for Murder and Attempted Murder
    During the evening of September 17, 1988, Marvin Christy
    (Christy), the murder victim in this case, was standing at the
    corner of 90th Street and Avalon Boulevard in the City of Los
    Angeles with David Conley (Conley) and John Dailey (Dailey),
    the attempted murder victims, and with Ronyell Smith (Smith).
    1 Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references
    are to the Penal Code.
    2 We derive the factual and procedural background in part
    from this court’s prior opinion affirming Bridges’s judgment of
    conviction with a modification in sentencing. (People v. Bridges
    (Oct. 12, 1993, B057697) [nonpub. opn.].) On this court’s own
    motion, we take judicial notice of our prior opinion. (Evid. Code,
    §§ 452, 459, subd. (a).)
    2
    Conley and Christy were members of the Grape Street Crips
    gang; Smith was a member of the “Rolling 30’s,” or Harlem Crips.
    Across the street, Howard Brown (Brown), a Rolling 30, was
    standing in front of his mother’s house.
    Between 9:00 and 9:30 p.m., a burgundy van emerged from
    an alley, paused briefly near where the victims and Smith were
    standing, made a left turn and disappeared heading eastward on
    90th Street. Bridges, a member of the 89 Family Blood gang, was
    driving. Upon seeing the van, Conley suggested that the group
    leave. Smith did leave and walked across the street to join
    Brown. Smith left because, earlier that day, Bridges had
    approached him and said Smith was “good as a dead man” if he
    was “from Avalon” and was on the street that night. Brown had
    also been approached by Bridges earlier in the day and told “Bet’
    not be any Crips on the street.”
    Between five and 10 minutes after the van left, Bridges
    and two other men stepped from an alley between duplexes on
    Avalon, positioned themselves next to a group of automobiles,
    and after approximately two minutes, began shooting at Christy,
    Conley and Dailey. Bridges fired an Uzi; the other two men fired
    shotguns.
    The victims had their backs to the attackers when the
    shooting began. Christy was shot in the head and immediately
    fell to the ground. As he lay on the ground calling out, “Oh lord,
    help me!” Bridges approached to within three or four feet and
    shot him several more times.
    Conley and Dailey ran. Dailey was hit by gunfire. Conley
    escaped around the corner of Avalon and 91st Street and from
    there fired back at the attackers with a .25 caliber automatic
    handgun. Conley was unable to see the attackers from where he
    3
    was firing, but he fired in the direction where he heard footsteps,
    hoping his shooting would persuade the attackers to stop firing at
    the wounded Christy.
    Christy died of his wounds. James Ribe, a medical
    examiner in the Los Angeles County Coroner’s office, testified
    that Christy sustained two fatal gunshots wounds and 16
    additional gunshot wounds which were not in themselves fatal.
    Appellant’s mother testified that her husband, an
    independent contractor for the United States Post Office, was
    making a run to the Mojave Desert in the burgundy van on the
    night of September 17, 1988, and was just leaving the Bridges
    home on 90th Street at approximately 9:30 p.m. She testified
    that her husband resembled Bridges in appearance. Delfina
    Urbina, a resident of an apartment adjacent to the shooting
    scene, testified there were no outside lights at her apartment
    building on the night of the shootings. Andre Wilkins, who
    owned a business at the corner of 90th and Avalon, testified
    that on the night of the shootings, he closed his business at
    7:30 p.m. and turned off all the lights.
    Bridges’s Verdict, Sentence, and Appeal
    The jury convicted Bridges of one count of first degree
    murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189) and found true the special
    circumstance allegation that the murder was committed
    while lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (15)) and the enhancement
    allegation that Bridges personally used a firearm during the
    commission of the offense (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The jury also
    convicted Bridges of two counts of attempted murder (§§ 664,
    187) with a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) as to
    4
    each count and a great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7)
    as to one of the counts. Bridges was sentenced to two consecutive
    terms of life without the possibility of parole, plus two additional
    years.
    On appeal from his judgment of conviction, Bridges
    challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the lying-in-
    wait theory of first degree murder and the lying-in-wait special
    circumstance. In affirming the judgment, we concluded the
    evidence was sufficient to support Bridges’s first degree murder
    conviction, stating, “Evidence that Bridges and his companions
    emerged from a darkened alley while the victims’ backs were
    turned to them, positioned themselves next to a group of parked
    cars, and fired without warning was evidence from which a
    reasonable trier of fact could conclude the attackers ‘lay in wait’
    for the victims within the meaning of section 189.” We further
    concluded that, even if the evidence had not supported a lying-
    in-wait theory of murder, a “finding of premeditation and
    deliberation was abundantly supported by evidence that Bridges
    told witnesses during the afternoon preceding the shootings that
    if any Crips were on the street that night, they were ‘good as
    dead’; evidence that Bridges and his companions emerged from
    an alley carrying firearms, took aim and fired; and most
    emphatically, evidence that Bridges stood three to four feet from
    Christy and continued to fire at him as he lay on the ground
    calling for help.”
    We also concluded the evidence was sufficient to support
    the lying-in-wait special circumstance. As we explained, “the
    jury could reasonably find physical concealment and a
    substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time
    to act from the circumstances that Bridges and his companions
    5
    first drove past the victims and paused, then appeared to leave
    the vicinity, then emerged five to [10] minutes later from a
    darkened alley while the victims’ backs were turned, positioned
    themselves next to a group of parked cars, and fired without
    warning from that protected location.”
    Bridges’s Petition for Resentencing
    On October 26, 2020, Bridges, representing himself, filed
    a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. Checking
    boxes on the printed form petition, Bridges declared under
    penalty of perjury that he had been convicted of first or second
    degree murder pursuant to the felony-murder rule or the natural
    and probable consequences doctrine, and that he could not now
    be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes
    made to sections 188 and 189. In his petition, Bridges also
    requested the appointment of counsel during the resentencing
    process.
    On November 4, 2020, the superior court summarily denied
    the petition without appointing counsel for Bridges or inviting
    briefing by the parties. In its minute order, the court concluded
    that Bridges was not entitled to relief as a matter of law because
    he was “the actual killer.” The court noted that Bridges “shot
    and killed” the victim using an Uzi, and that as the victim “called
    out ‘oh lord, help me,’ [Bridges] walked up to him within three to
    four feet and shot him several more times.” The court also
    concluded that Bridges was not entitled to relief because the
    prosecution “did not proceed under a theory of felony murder or
    murder under the natural and probable consequences theory,”
    but rather “argued that the murder was deliberate, willful[,] and
    premeditated.”
    Bridges timely appealed.
    6
    DISCUSSION
    Overview of Section 1170.95
    Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
    Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) amended murder liability under
    the felony murder rule and natural and probable consequences
    doctrine. (People v. Lewis (2021) 
    11 Cal.5th 952
    , 957 (Lewis);
    People v. Gentile (2020) 
    10 Cal.5th 830
    , 842–843.) It amended
    the felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e),
    which provides that a participant in the perpetration or
    attempted perpetration of qualifying felonies is liable for felony
    murder only if the person: (1) was the actual killer; (2) was not
    the actual killer but, with the intent to kill, acted as a direct
    aider and abettor in the murder; or (3) was a major participant in
    the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
    human life, as described in section 190.2, subdivision (d). (See
    Gentile, supra, at p. 842.) It amended the natural and probable
    consequences doctrine by adding section 188, subdivision (a)(3),
    which states that malice shall not be imputed to a person based
    solely on his or her participation in a crime. (Id. at p. 843.)
    Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1170.95, which created
    a procedure whereby persons convicted of murder under a now-
    invalid felony murder or natural and probable consequences
    theory may petition the superior court to vacate the murder
    conviction and resentence the petitioner on any remaining
    counts. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; People v. Gentile,
    supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) A petitioner is eligible for relief if he
    or she: (1) was charged with murder by means of a charging
    document that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
    of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
    consequences doctrine; (2) was convicted of first or second degree
    7
    murder; and (3) could no longer be convicted of first or second
    degree murder due to the changes to sections 188 and 189
    effectuated by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).)
    If the petition contains all the required information,
    including a declaration by the petitioner that he was convicted
    of murder and is eligible for relief (§ 1170.95, subd. (b)(1)(A)),
    section 1170.95, subdivision (c) requires the superior court to
    appoint counsel to represent the petitioner, if requested; to direct
    the prosecutor to file a response to the petition and permit the
    petitioner to file a reply; and to determine if the petitioner has
    made a prima facie showing that he is entitled to relief. (See
    Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 959–960.)
    In determining whether the petitioner has made the
    requisite prima facie showing that he or she falls within the
    provisions of section 1170.95 and is entitled to relief, the superior
    court properly examines the record of conviction, “allowing the
    court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those
    that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
    Appellate opinions “are generally considered to be part of the
    record of conviction” that the court may review in evaluating
    whether the petitioner has established a prima facie case. (Id.
    at p. 972.) The “prima facie inquiry under [section 1170.95,]
    subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous prima facie inquiry
    in habeas corpus proceedings, ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s
    factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
    regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
    or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue
    an order to show cause.” ’ [Citations.] . . . [Citations.] ‘However,
    if the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s]
    facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the
    8
    court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to
    the petitioner.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 971.)
    If a petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement
    to relief, the superior court must issue an order to show cause
    (§ 1170.95, subd. (c)), and hold a hearing to determine whether
    to vacate the murder conviction and resentence the petitioner
    (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(1)). At that hearing, the prosecution has
    the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    petitioner is ineligible for relief (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3))—that
    is, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    petitioner is guilty under a theory that remains valid after
    Senate Bill 1437’s enactment. (See People v. Clements (2021)
    
    60 Cal.App.5th 597
    , 615, review granted Apr. 28, 2021, S267624;
    People v. Rodriguez (2020) 
    58 Cal.App.5th 227
    , 230, review
    granted Mar. 10, 2021, S266652; People v. Lopez (2020)
    
    56 Cal.App.5th 936
    , 949, review granted Feb. 10, 2021, S265974;
    but see People v. Duke (2020) 
    55 Cal.App.5th 113
    , 123, review
    granted Jan. 13, 2021, S265309 [holding substantial evidence
    standard applies at a § 1170.95, subd. (d)(3) hearing].) Both
    the prosecution and the petitioner may rely on the record of
    conviction or offer new or additional evidence to meet their
    respective burdens. (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).) If the prosecution
    fails to sustain its burden of proof, the court must vacate the
    murder conviction and any allegations and enhancements
    attached to it, and resentence the petitioner on the remaining
    counts. (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).)
    The Error in Denying Bridges’s Petition Without
    Appointing Counsel Was Harmless
    In Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at page 957, the California
    Supreme Court, resolving a conflict among the courts of appeal,
    9
    held that a petitioner seeking relief under section 1170.95 is
    “entitled to the appointment of counsel upon the filing of a
    facially sufficient petition [citation] and that only after the
    appointment of counsel and the opportunity for briefing may the
    superior court consider the record of conviction to determine
    whether ‘the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that he or
    she is entitled to relief.’ ”
    Our Supreme Court, however, also held that a superior
    court’s failure to appoint counsel to represent a petitioner when
    assessing whether he or she has made a prima facie showing of
    entitlement to relief under section 1170.95, subdivision (c) is
    state law error only, reviewable for prejudice under the harmless
    error standard of People v. Watson (1956) 
    46 Cal.2d 818
    . (Lewis,
    supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 973–974.) Under this standard, a
    petitioner must “ ‘demonstrate there is a reasonable probability
    that in the absence of the error he . . . would have obtained a
    more favorable result.’ [Citations.] More specifically, a petitioner
    ‘whose petition is denied before an order to show cause issues has
    the burden of showing “it is reasonably probable that if [he or
    she] had been afforded assistance of counsel his [or her] petition
    would not have been summarily denied without an evidentiary
    hearing.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 974.)
    In this case, because Bridges checked the necessary boxes
    on his form petition, the superior court erred in denying the
    petition without first appointing counsel and allowing an
    opportunity for briefing. The error was harmless, however,
    because the record of conviction establishes that Bridges was
    ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. (See People v.
    Mancilla (2021) 
    67 Cal.App.5th 854
    , 864 [error in denying
    petition at prima facie stage without appointing counsel was
    10
    harmless where “the record of conviction establishes [petitioner]
    is ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 as a matter of law”].)
    To be eligible for relief under section 1170.95, Bridges was
    required to show that he “could not be convicted of first or second
    degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189” made
    by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).) Bridges could not
    make such a showing, however, because the record of conviction
    conclusively demonstrates that he was the actual killer. As set
    forth in our prior opinion, Bridges told witnesses on the afternoon
    preceding the shooting that if any Crips were on the street that
    night, they were “good as dead.” Later that night, Bridges and
    his companions emerged from an alley and fired their weapons at
    Christy and the other victims, and then, as the wounded Christy
    lay on the ground pleading for help, Bridges approached him
    within three to four feet and shot him several more times. In
    affirming Bridges’s conviction for first degree murder, we
    concluded the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction
    under either a lying-in-wait theory or a premeditated murder
    theory. We further explained that this was a case where the
    evidence of premeditation was “so convincing . . . that the
    reviewing court can conclude with confidence that the jury must
    have based its verdict upon that theory.” Because Bridges was
    convicted of premeditated murder as the actual killer of Christy,
    he was not eligible for relief under section 1170.95. (See Lewis,
    supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 967 [Senate Bill 1437 was enacted “ ‘to
    ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is
    not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was
    not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
    reckless indifference to human life’ ”].)
    11
    Moreover, even if Bridges was not the actual killer but
    rather an aider and abettor, he still would be ineligible for
    resentencing as a matter of law. “Senate Bill 1437 does not
    eliminate direct aiding and abetting liability for murder because
    a direct aider and abettor to murder must possess malice
    aforethought.” (People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 848.)
    “[E]xpress malice requires an intent to kill.” (People v. Delgado
    (2017) 
    2 Cal.5th 544
    , 571.) Here, by finding the lying-in-wait-
    special circumstance allegation to be true, the jury necessarily
    found that Bridges acted with the intent to kill. (See, e.g., People
    v. Fayed (2020) 
    9 Cal.5th 147
    , 203 [“To determine whether an
    aider and abettor who is not the actual killer can be subject to the
    lying-in-wait special circumstance, ‘the questions are whether
    defendant, with the intent to kill, aided and abetted the victim’s
    killing, and whether the actual killer intentionally killed the
    victim by means of lying in wait’ ”]; People v. Nelson (2016) 
    1 Cal.5th 513
    , 549 [“ ‘lying-in-wait special circumstance requires
    intent to kill’ ”]; People v. Sandoval (2015) 
    62 Cal.4th 394
    , 416
    [lying in wait “ ‘is the functional equivalent of proof of
    premeditation, deliberation, and intent to kill’ ”].)
    Accordingly, whether Bridges was the actual killer or
    aided and abetted the killing with an intent to kill, he could
    still be convicted of murder notwithstanding Senate Bill 1437’s
    amendments to sections 188 and 189. Because Bridges was
    ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 as a matter of law,
    there is no reasonable probability that he would have obtained a
    more favorable result if counsel had been appointed and given
    the opportunity for briefing. Under these circumstances, the
    error in denying the petition without first appointing counsel
    was harmless.
    12
    DISPOSITION
    The order denying Tommy Bridges’s Penal Code section
    1170.95 petition is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    MATTHEWS, J.*
    We concur:
    LAVIN, Acting P. J.
    EGERTON, J.
    *Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
    Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
    Constitution.
    13
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B309404

Filed Date: 10/21/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/21/2021