Singh v. Prasifka CA2/7 ( 2021 )


Menu:
  • Filed 10/22/21 Singh v. Prasifka CA2/7
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SEVEN
    TAJINDER SINGH,                                                  B302113
    Plaintiff and Appellant,                                 (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BS173944)
    v.
    WILLIAM J. PRASIFKA, in his
    official capacity as Executive
    Director of the Medical Board of
    California et al.,
    Defendants and Respondents.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
    Los Angeles County, Mary H. Strobel and Barbara M. Scheper,
    Judges. Reversed with directions.
    Fenton Law Group, Benjamin J. Fenton, Dennis E. Lee,
    and Alexandra de Rivera for Plaintiff and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Gloria L. Castro, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General, Robert McKim Bell, Supervising
    Deputy Attorney General, and Peggie Bradford Tarwater and
    Claudia Morehead, Deputy Attorneys General for Defendants
    and Respondents.
    ______________________________
    INTRODUCTION
    Tajinder Singh took a test required to become a licensed
    physician in California four times, and failed each time. Then,
    according to Singh, he discovered he had a disability that affected
    his test-taking ability. He took the test a fifth time, with
    medication for his disability, and passed.
    The Medical Board of California, however, has a four-
    strikes-and-you’re-out rule: An applicant for a medical license
    only gets four chances to pass the test. When the Medical Board
    refused to count his passing score on the fifth test, Singh sued the
    Medical Board and its executive director, William J. Prasifka
    (collectively, the Medical Board), for disability discrimination
    under federal and state statutes and a writ of mandate under
    Code of Civil Procedure section 1085.
    The trial court sustained demurrers by the Medical Board
    without leave to amend. Because we accept as true Singh’s
    allegation that using his fifth test score would accommodate his
    disability, and because the reasonableness of a proposed
    accommodation is a factual question on which the Medical Board
    has the burden of proof and which therefore cannot be resolved
    on demurrer, we reverse and direct the trial court to enter a new
    order overruling the demurrers to the disability discrimination
    causes of action (but sustaining the demurrer to the cause of
    action for a writ of mandate).
    2
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A.      Singh Unsuccessfully Requests an Accommodation
    from the Medical Board for a Learning Disability
    In 2013 Singh completed his medical studies at the Ross
    University School of Medicine in Dominica, in the course of which
    he passed Step 1 and Step 2 of the United States Medical
    Licensing Examination (USMLE). Singh then began a residency
    program in California that required him to pass Step 3 of the
    USMLE. He failed the test four times: in March 2015, October
    2015, March 2016, and December 2016.
    In 2017, while Singh was preparing to take the Step 3 test
    a fifth time, his tutor observed Singh “had sufficient knowledge to
    pass the exam” and suggested Singh might have “undiagnosed
    anxiety.” At his tutor’s suggestion, Singh visited his primary
    care physician, who diagnosed him with “performance-related
    anxiety and prescribed propranolol, a calming agent.” In August
    2017 Singh, this time “while taking propranolol,” took the Step 3
    examination again and passed.
    Singh, however, faced a problem: Business and Professions
    Code section 2177, subdivision (c)(1),1 provides, “An applicant
    shall have obtained a passing score on all parts of Step 3 of the
    [USMLE] within not more than four attempts in order to be
    eligible for a physician’s and surgeon’s certificate” (italics added).
    Section 2177, subdivision (c)(2), provides one exception to this
    four-attempt rule: “Notwithstanding paragraph (1), an applicant
    who obtains a passing score on all parts of Step 3 . . . in more
    than four attempts and who meets the requirements of
    1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Business and
    Professions Code.
    3
    Section 2135.5 shall be eligible to be considered for issuance of a
    physician’s and surgeon’s certificate.” The exception under
    section 2135.5, however, is for physicians who are licensed in
    another state. It requires, among other things, that the applicant
    “hold an unlimited and unrestricted license as a physician and
    surgeon in another state and has held that license continuously
    for a minimum of four years prior to the date of application.”
    (§ 2135.5, subd. (a).) Because Singh did not meet the
    requirements of section 2135.5, he did not qualify for the
    exception to the four-attempt rule.
    In November 2017 Singh wrote the Medical Board. He
    stated that, as a result of “a learning disability,” he was “unable
    to pass the USMLE Step 3 until his 5th attempt” and that the
    Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) required the Medical
    Board to provide him “a reasonable accommodation” to the four-
    attempt rule in section 2177. He proposed, as an accommodation,
    that the Medical Board accept the passing score he received on
    his fifth attempt or, alternatively, allow him to take and pass a
    different examination “in lieu of passing the USMLE Step 3
    within four . . . attempts.”
    In response, the Medical Board wrote that a request for a
    reasonable accommodation under the ADA “needs to be sought at
    the time an individual requests to take an examination.” The
    Medical Board cited section 2177, subdivision (c)(1), as requiring
    “an applicant to pass Step 3 within four attempts in order to be
    eligible for a physician’s and surgeon’s certificate” and stated that
    “[t]he Board does not have the authority to waive a statutory
    requirement.”
    4
    B.      Singh Files This Action, and the Trial Court Sustains
    Demurrers by the Medical Board Without Leave To
    Amend
    In June 2018 Singh filed a petition for writ of mandate
    (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085) and complaint against the Medical
    Board. In support of his cause of action for writ relief in the
    operative, second amended petition and complaint, Singh alleged
    that he had a “medical disability,” namely, “performance-related
    anxiety”; that he “did not identify [ ] or receive diagnosis for” this
    disability “until after his fourth attempt to take the USMLE
    Step 3 exam”; that under 42 United States Code section 1983,
    Title II of the ADA, the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973
    (
    29 U.S.C. § 794
    ), and the California Fair Housing and
    Employment Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.), the
    Medical Board had a ministerial duty not to discriminate against
    him on the basis of his disability; and that the Medical Board
    violated that duty when it refused to provide him a reasonable
    accommodation regarding the four-attempt requirement in
    section 2177, subdivision (c)(1). Singh sought a writ of mandate
    ordering the Medical Board to deem his fifth, successful attempt
    to pass Step 3 “sufficient to qualify him for medical licensure” or,
    in the alternative, to engage in a good faith interactive process
    “to determine effective reasonable accommodations for his
    disability.” Singh also asserted three causes of action seeking
    that same relief as an injunction: violation of Title II of the ADA,
    violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and
    discrimination under FEHA.
    The trial court sustained a demurrer by the Medical Board
    to the cause of action seeking a writ of mandate on the ground it
    failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. In
    5
    particular, the court concluded Singh had “not alleged a
    ministerial duty owed by [the Medical Board] to issue him a
    medical license, provide a reasonable accommodation, or engage
    in interactive process with respect to the four-attempt rule under
    section 2177[, subdivision (c)], the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act,
    [FEHA], or 42 U.S.C. section 1983.” Concluding that Singh had
    three opportunities “to plead a writ claim” and that his opposition
    to the demurrer failed to show a reasonable probability he could
    amend to do so, the court denied him leave to amend.
    In a separate proceeding, the trial court also sustained a
    demurrer by the Medical Board to the remaining three causes of
    action on the ground they did not state facts sufficient to
    constitute a cause of action. The court agreed with the Medical
    Board that Singh had “not sufficiently alleged that he is a
    qualified individual to state each cause of action because he has
    not met the licensing board’s essential eligibility requirements for
    applicants.” Here, too, the court denied leave to amend. The
    court signed and filed an order dismissing the case, from which
    Singh timely appealed. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 581d.)
    DISCUSSION
    A.    Standard of Review
    On appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer, we
    examine the petition and complaint de novo “‘to determine
    whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under
    any legal theory, such facts being assumed true for this purpose.’”
    (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of
    Supervisors (2010) 
    48 Cal.4th 32
    , 42; accord, International
    Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 848 v. City of Monterey Park
    6
    (2019) 
    30 Cal.App.5th 1105
    , 1109; see SJJC Aviation Services,
    LLC v. City of San Jose (2017) 
    12 Cal.App.5th 1043
    , 1051 [“[o]ur
    review is governed by settled standards, which apply equally
    whether a demurrer challenges a complaint or a petition”]; Jones
    v. Omnitrans (2004) 
    125 Cal.App.4th 273
    , 277 [“[o]n appeal from
    a dismissal entered after an order sustaining a demurrer to a
    petition for writ of mandate, we review the order de novo,
    determining independently whether the petition states a cause of
    action as a matter of law”].) “‘“[I]t is error for a . . . court to
    sustain a demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action
    under any possible legal theory.”’” (Aryeh v. Canon Business
    Solutions, Inc. (2013) 
    55 Cal.4th 1185
    , 1201.) “‘We deem to be
    true all material facts that were properly pled, as well as all facts
    that may be inferred from those expressly alleged.’”
    (International Brotherhood, at p. 1109.)
    B.    The Trial Court Erred in Sustaining the Demurrer to
    Singh’s Causes of Action Under the ADA, the
    Rehabilitation Act, and FEHA
    Singh argues that he alleged sufficient facts to constitute
    causes of action for violation of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act,
    and FEHA. The Medical Board argues he did not. He did.
    1.      Singh Alleged Sufficient Facts To Constitute
    Causes of Action for Violation of the ADA and
    the Rehabilitation Act
    Under Title II of the ADA, “no qualified individual with a
    disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
    participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
    programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
    7
    discrimination by any such entity.” (
    42 U.S.C. § 12132
    ; see K.M.
    ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified School Dist. (9th Cir. 2013)
    
    725 F.3d 1088
    , 1096.) “‘To state a claim of disability
    discrimination under Title II, the plaintiff must allege four
    elements: (1) the plaintiff is an individual with a disability;
    (2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive
    the benefit of some public entity’s services, programs, or
    activities; (3) the plaintiff was either excluded from participation
    in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs,
    or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public
    entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or
    discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff’s disability.’” (In re
    M.S. (2009) 
    174 Cal.App.4th 1241
    , 1252; see E.R.K. ex rel. R.K. v.
    Hawaii Dept. of Educ. (9th Cir. 2013) 
    728 F.3d 982
    , 992 (E.R.K.).)
    A prima facie case for disability discrimination under section 504
    of the Rehabilitation Act “is identical, except that the plaintiff
    must also prove that the relevant program receives federal
    financial assistance.” (E.R.K., at p. 992; see Lovell v. Chandler
    (9th Cir. 2002) 
    303 F.3d 1039
    , 1052 [“The ADA applies only to
    public entities, whereas the [Rehabilitation Act] proscribes
    discrimination in all federally-funded programs.”].) In fact,
    “‘there is no significant difference in the analysis of rights and
    obligations created by’” section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and
    Title II. (K.M. ex rel. Bright, at p. 1098.)
    The “‘ADA’s broad language brings within its scope
    anything a public entity does’” (Hason v. Medical Bd. of
    California (9th Cir. 2002) 
    279 F.3d 1167
    , 1172-1173), including
    licensing by the Medical Board. (See id. at p. 1173 [the Medical
    Board’s “medical licensing clearly falls within the scope of
    Title II”]; 
    28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130
    (b)(6) [a “public entity may not
    8
    administer a licensing . . . program in a manner that subjects
    qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the
    basis of disability”], 35.130(b)(8) [a “public entity shall not impose
    or apply eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out
    an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with
    disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any service, program,
    or activity, unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for
    the provision of the service, program, or activity being offered”].)
    And the Medical Board does not dispute it receives federal
    financial assistance or otherwise contend the Rehabilitation Act
    does not apply to the Medical Board’s licensing program.
    The Medical Board challenges only the second element of
    the four elements Singh must allege to establish the Medical
    Board violated Title II and the Rehabilitation Act, i.e., that he is
    “otherwise qualified” to receive a medical license from the
    Medical Board. But Singh alleged that element sufficiently to
    state a cause of action.
    a.    The “Otherwise Qualified” Element
    Under both Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act,
    a person with a disability is “qualified” to receive government
    benefits or services or to participate in a government program or
    activity if the person “is one who, ‘with or without reasonable
    modifications to rules, policies, or practices, . . . meets the
    essential eligibility requirements’ for such benefits, services, or
    participation.” (Fry v. Saenz (2002) 
    98 Cal.App.4th 256
    , 263
    (Fry); see 
    42 U.S.C. § 12131
    (2) [Title II definition of “[q]ualified
    individual with a disability”].) Borrowing language from Title I
    of the ADA, which concerns employment discrimination and
    defines a qualified individual “in terms of employment”
    9
    (Mary Jo C. v. New York State & Local Retirement System
    (2d Cir. 2013) 
    707 F.3d 144
    , 169 (Mary Jo C.),2 courts explaining
    the elements of a Title II claim often state that “otherwise
    qualified” means the person with a disability can meet the
    essential eligibility requirements of the services at issue “with or
    without reasonable accommodation.” (See, e.g., Estate of Martin
    v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (9th Cir. 2009) 
    560 F.3d 1042
    , 1047; Zukle v. Regents of University of California (9th Cir.
    1999) 
    166 F.3d 1041
    , 1046 (Zukle); see also Wong v. Regents of
    University of California (9th Cir. 1999) 
    192 F.3d 807
    , 816, fn. 26
    (Wong) [“Although Title II of the ADA uses the term ‘reasonable
    modification’ rather than ‘reasonable accommodation,’ these
    terms do not differ in the standards they create.”].)
    Title II’s definition of a “qualified” person with a disability
    “thus distinguishes between two categories of requirements:
    (1) rules, policies, or practices, which are subject to the
    requirement of reasonable modification, and (2) essential
    eligibility requirements, which are not.” (Mary Jo C., supra,
    707 F.3d at pp. 155-156.) “Cases interpreting the ‘essential
    eligibility requirement’ language indicate that whether an
    2      “Title I’s definition speaks in terms of employment: ‘As
    used in [Title I,] . . . “qualified individual” means an individual
    who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
    essential functions of the employment position that such
    individual holds or desires.’ [Citation.] But Title II defines the
    same term instead as an individual who ‘meets the essential
    eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the
    participation in programs or activities provided by a public
    entity.’” (Mary Jo C., supra, 707 F.3d at p. 169, citing 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 12111
    (8), 12131(2); see Wong v. Regents of University of
    California (9th Cir. 1999) 
    192 F.3d 807
    , 816, fn. 26.)
    10
    eligibility requirement is essential is determined by consulting
    the importance of the requirement to the program in question.”
    (Id. at p. 157; see Fry, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 264
    [“A program eligibility requirement which could discriminate
    against the disabled may be deemed essential only if the
    program’s purposes could not be achieved without the
    requirement.”]; Pottgen v. Missouri State High School Activities
    Assn. (8th Cir. 1994) 
    40 F.3d 926
    , 929 (Pottgen) [age limit was an
    essential eligibility requirement in a high school baseball
    program because of the requirement’s “immense importance” to
    the program].)3
    “This reading is re[i]nforced by the regulations
    implementing the relevant section of the ADA, which require
    ‘[a] public entity [to] make reasonable modifications in policies,
    practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to
    avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public
    entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would
    fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or
    activity.’ [Citation.] The regulations indicate that ‘essential
    eligibility requirements’ are those requirements without which
    the ‘nature’ of the program would be ‘fundamentally alter[ed].’”
    (Mary Jo C., supra, 707 F.3d at p. 158, citing 
    28 C.F.R. § 35.130
    (b)(7); see Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc. (9th Cir. 2013)
    
    731 F.3d 901
    , 910 [“Federal law requires public entities to ‘make
    reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures
    3     The court in Pottgen conducted this analysis, at least in
    part, under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, but stated the
    analysis “necessarily affect[ed]” and was “[c]onsistent with” the
    court’s analysis under Title II of the ADA. (Pottgen, supra,
    40 F.3d at pp. 929-931.)
    11
    when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on
    the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate
    that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the
    nature of the service, program, or activity.’”]; Pottgen, 
    supra,
    40 F.3d at p. 930 [age limit was an essential eligibility
    requirement because waiving it “would constitute a fundamental
    alteration in the nature of the baseball program”].)
    Stated another way, an eligibility requirement is not
    “essential” if a “reasonable accommodation” to the requirement
    would enable the person to qualify for the benefit (McElwee v.
    County of Orange (2d Cir. 2012) 
    700 F.3d 635
    , 643; Marshall v.
    New York State Public High School Athletic Assn., Inc. (W.D.N.Y.
    2017) 
    290 F.Supp.3d 187
    , 199 (Marshall))—where “reasonable
    accommodation” means an accommodation that does not impose
    on the program “‘undue financial and administrative burdens’” or
    require a “‘fundamental alteration in the nature of [the]
    program.’” (Pottgen, 
    supra,
     40 F.3d at p. 930; see E.R.K., supra,
    728 F.3d at p. 993 [accommodation was not reasonable because it
    “would represent a ‘fundamental’ change” for the program];
    Mark H. v. Hamamoto (9th Cir. 2010) 
    620 F.3d 1090
    , 1098
    [“Reasonable accommodation does not require an organization to
    make fundamental or substantial alterations to its programs.”];
    Wong, 
    supra,
     192 F.3d at p. 817 [an accommodation is not
    “reasonable” if it would “substantially alter” the program]; see
    also E.R.K., at p. 992 [under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act,
    “a plaintiff who requires an accommodation to meet a program’s
    essential eligibility requirements can establish the ‘otherwise
    qualified’ element of the prima facie case only by producing
    ‘evidence of the existence of a reasonable accommodation’”].)
    “‘Accordingly, the “reasonableness” of an accommodation and the
    12
    “essentialness” of an eligibility requirement are inextricably
    intertwined and must be examined together.’” (Marshall, at
    p. 199; see Castellano v. City of New York (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
    
    946 F.Supp. 249
    , 254 [“When reviewing a challenge to the
    eligibility requirements of a program, a court must first review
    each eligibility requirement to determine whether or not the
    requirement is essential—which entails determining whether an
    accommodation is reasonable—and then must determine whether
    the individual has met those requirements that are essential.”].)
    Thus, “[t]he question whether a particular accommodation
    is reasonable ‘depends on the individual circumstances of each
    case’ and ‘requires a fact-specific, individualized analysis of the
    disabled individual’s circumstances and the accommodations that
    might allow him to meet the program’s standards.’” (Vinson v.
    Thomas (9th Cir. 2002) 
    288 F.3d 1145
    , 1154; accord, Mark H. v.
    Hamamoto, 
    supra,
     620 F.3d at p. 1098; see Martinez v. County of
    Alameda (N.D.Cal. 2021) 
    512 F.Supp.3d 978
    , 985 (Martinez)
    [“determining whether a modification is reasonable or would
    result in a fundamental alteration ‘is an intensively fact-based
    inquiry’”]; Marshall, supra, 290 F.Supp.3d at p. 199 [the question
    “‘requires a fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry, not only into the
    benefits of the accommodation but into its costs as well’”].)
    Moreover, a public entity’s assertion that a requested
    accommodation is unreasonable “is an affirmative defense for
    which the asserting public entity bears the burden of proof.”
    (Martinez, at pp. 984-985; see Hindel v. Husted (6th Cir. 2017)
    
    875 F.3d 344
    , 347 [“‘Fundamental alteration’ is an affirmative
    defense under the ADA providing that governmental entities
    need not accommodate disabled individuals if doing so ‘would
    result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service,
    13
    program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative
    burdens.’”]; K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified School Dist.,
    supra, 725 F.3d at p. 1096 [“[t]he public entity has the burden to
    prove that a proposed action would result in undue burden or
    fundamental alteration”].)
    For these reasons, a public agency’s contention that a
    requested accommodation is unreasonable is “typically fact-based
    and not capable of resolution on the basis of the pleadings alone.”
    (Hindel v. Husted, supra, 875 F.3d at p. 347; see Mary Jo C.,
    supra, 707 F.3d at p. 153 [“It is a factual issue ‘whether [a]
    plaintiff[’s] proposed modifications . . . amount to “reasonable
    modifications” which should be implemented, or “fundamental
    alterations,” which the state may reject.’”]; Crowder v. Kitagawa
    (9th Cir. 1996) 
    81 F.3d 1480
    , 1485 [whether the plaintiff’s
    proposed accommodations constituted reasonable modifications
    or fundamental alterations could not be determined as a matter
    of law and required findings of fact].) “Case law and ADA
    regulations underscore that whether a requested policy
    modification . . . would result in a fundamental alteration or
    undue burden is a fundamentally factual question, inappropriate
    for disposition prior to discovery.” (Martinez, supra,
    512 F.Supp.3d at p. 985.)4
    4      Citing Fry, supra, 
    98 Cal.App.4th 256
     at pages 264-265, the
    Medical Board asserts there are “two different approaches to
    resolve challenges to governmental entities’ decisions to deny
    benefits or services in reliance on rules alleged to be essential
    eligibility requirements”—a “program-based approach” and an
    “individual-based approach”—and the Medical Board urges us to
    adopt the former. To the extent that acknowledging there are in
    fact two different approaches or adopting a “program-based
    14
    b.     Analysis
    Singh alleged his proposed accommodations—including
    that the Board allow his fifth, successful attempt at Step 3 of the
    USMLE to qualify him for medical licensure—are reasonable.
    That factual allegation is one that at this stage we generally
    must accept as true.5 (See Mathews v. Becerra (2019) 
    8 Cal.5th 756
    , 762 [in determining whether the complaint states facts
    sufficient to constitute a cause of action, “we must accept the
    facts pleaded as true”]; see also Martinez, supra, 512 F.Supp.3d
    at p. 984 [“On a motion to dismiss [under Federal Rules of Civil
    Procedure, rule 12(b)(6)], all factual claims—such as [plaintiff’s]
    claim that the accommodation she requested was reasonable—
    must be accepted as true.”].) And because we accept the
    allegation as true, Singh sufficiently alleged he is “otherwise
    approach” is inconsistent with our discussion of the law, we
    decline to do either.
    5     Rodrigo v. Carle Foundation Hospital (7th Cir. 2018)
    
    879 F.3d 236
    , on which the Medical Board heavily relies and
    which affirmed a summary judgment on a developed factual
    record (id. at pp. 242-244), is distinguishable for this reason. It is
    also distinguishable because it concerned an ADA claim in the
    employment context, not the licensing context, and therefore the
    court had to determine whether the examination requirement at
    issue was an “essential function” of the plaintiff’s job, not
    whether it was an essential eligibility requirement. To make
    that determination, the court applied an analysis that is not
    applicable here. (See 
    id. at p. 242
     [“In determining whether a
    particular duty is an essential function, we consider the
    employer’s judgment, the employee’s written job description, the
    amount of time the employee spends performing that function,
    the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the
    function, and the experiences of past and current workers.”].)
    15
    qualified” under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act to
    receive a medical license from the Board. (See E.R.K., supra,
    728 F.3d at p. 992.)
    The Medical Board makes a number of unpersuasive
    arguments that Singh is not “otherwise qualified” as a matter of
    law. Several of these—for example, that Singh “concedes . . . he
    does not satisfy the requirements of . . . sections 2177 or 2135.5,”
    that the requirements in those sections are “unambiguous” and
    “mandatory” and give the Medical Board no discretion to create
    an exception for Singh, and that Singh’s requested
    accommodation was unreasonable as a matter of law because he
    made it “after he became disqualified by operation of law”—all
    rest on the same faulty premise: that the four-attempt rule is an
    essential eligibility requirement (and any modification of it would
    be an unreasonable accommodation) because it is statutory. But
    “statutes are no more immune to judicial scrutiny for ADA
    compliance than are rules or regulations.” (Fry, supra,
    98 Cal.App.4th at p. 264.) And where an eligibility requirement
    is not “essential” as discussed, “the fact that it is embodied in a
    statute . . . makes no difference.” (Ibid; see, e.g., Crowder v.
    Kitagawa, 
    supra,
     81 F.3d at p. 1486 [remanding for a
    determination whether the plaintiffs’ proposed modifications to
    Hawaii’s statutory quarantine for service dogs were reasonable
    under the ADA].)
    Citing Zukle, 
    supra,
     
    166 F.3d 1041
    , the Medical Board
    argues its decisions that it had “to enforce the four-attempt
    requirement, that Singh is not otherwise qualified, and that no
    reasonable accommodation exists,” are “entitled to deference.”
    But Zukle addressed ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims
    concerning academic decisions made by an educational
    16
    institution. (Id. at p. 1042.) And in that context the Ninth
    Circuit held that, although “the ultimate determination of
    whether an individual is otherwise qualified must be made by the
    court,” a court should “extend judicial deference ‘to the evaluation
    made by the institution itself, absent proof that its standards and
    its application of them serve no purpose other than to deny an
    education to handicapped persons.’” (Id. at pp. 1047-1048; see id.
    at p. 1048 [such deference extends to the determination that no
    reasonable accommodation is available].) But even assuming a
    similar deference applies to the determinations of a public agency
    in the context of licensing decisions, Zukle makes clear that such
    deference does not apply where, as here, the court is evaluating
    the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s allegations. As the court in Zukle
    emphasized: “The educational institution has a ‘real obligation
    . . . to seek suitable means of reasonably accommodating a
    handicapped person and to submit a factual record indicating
    that it conscientiously carried out this statutory obligation.’” (Id.
    at p. 1048.)
    The Medical Board also suggests that modifying the four-
    attempt rule would, as a matter of law, fundamentally alter its
    licensing program. In support of this suggestion the Medical
    Board cites various editions of and supplements to the Technical
    Assistance Manual (TAM) issued by the United States
    Department of Justice, which provides guidance on the
    requirements of Title II of the ADA.6 The Medical Board quotes
    6     Because Congress delegated authority to promulgate
    regulations under Title II of the ADA to the Attorney General
    (Mary Jo C., supra, 707 F.3d at pp. 169-170), the views of the
    Department of Justice on implementing Title II “warrant respect”
    17
    passages stating that a “public entity does not have to lower or
    eliminate licensing standards that are essential to the licensed
    activity to accommodate an individual with a disability” (TAM
    (1993) § II-3.7200) and that “[a]n essential eligibility requirement
    for obtaining a license to practice medicine is the ability to
    practice medicine safely and competently” (TAM (1994 supp.)
    § II-3.5300). But those provisions do not answer the question at
    issue in this case: Is the four-attempt rule an “essential”
    eligibility requirement for practicing medicine safely and
    competently? Or, conversely, could it be modified in the way
    Singh proposes without fundamentally altering the Medical
    Board’s program? As the TAM provides, in a passage quoted for
    some reason by the Medical Board, “Whether a specific
    requirement is ‘essential’ will depend on the facts of the
    particular case.” (TAM (1993) § II-3.7200.) Exactly.
    The Medical Board also cites legislative history of section
    2177 that the Medical Board asserts “reflects that the statute
    was changed [in 2006] from an unlimited number of attempts
    within a ten-year period to a limit of four attempts because it had
    been shown that applicants who took the national examination
    several times before they passed were more likely to become
    substandard physicians practicing medicine.” But as the Medical
    Board concedes, the history it cites “does not identify a specific
    number of attempts that are likely to predict substandard
    (Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring (1999) 
    527 U.S. 581
    , 597-598
    [
    119 S.Ct. 2176
    , 
    144 L.Ed.2d 540
    ]). In particular, “the TAM itself
    is entitled to substantial deference.” (Miller v. California
    Speedway Corp. (9th Cir. 2008) 
    536 F.3d 1020
    , 1028; see 
    ibid.
    [“‘The guidance provided in the technical assistance manual is an
    interpretation of the DOJ’s regulation and, as such, is entitled to
    significant weight as to the meaning of the regulation.’”].)
    18
    performance or data to support the conclusion that an applicant
    who passes in five attempts is more likely to perform below the
    standard of care than an applicant who passes in four attempts.”
    The legislative history therefore does not establish that the
    accommodation Singh proposes would modify a requirement that
    is “essential” to ensuring that licensees practice medicine safely
    and competently or would otherwise fundamentally alter the
    Medical Board’s licensing program.
    Finally, the Medical Board cites two cases it appears to
    suggest stand for the proposition that any “relaxation of its
    license qualifications is not a reasonable accommodation” as a
    matter of law. Both are distinguishable. In the first, Harris v.
    Mills (2d Cir. 2009) 
    572 F.3d 66
     (Harris), a state medical board
    revoked and refused to restore the plaintiff’s medical license after
    finding he engaged in fraud and other improper practices. (Id. at
    pp. 68, 70.) He sued the medical board under Title II of the ADA
    and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging, among other things, the
    board did not reasonably accommodate his learning disabilities
    because it denied him an “‘understanding of the impact of [his]
    disabilities.’” (Harris, at pp. 70-71, 74.) The court in Harris
    concluded the plaintiff had not stated “a reasonable
    accommodation claim.” (Id. at pp. 74, 76.)
    But in doing so, the court in Harris explained: “Even read
    liberally, [the] complaint does not . . . identify how [the plaintiff’s]
    disabilities affected the behavior that caused the revocation of his
    license, nor how those disabilities could be accommodated to
    reform this behavior. [The plaintiff] thus alleges, at core, that if
    only the defendants would ‘understand’ the impact of his
    disabilities, they would be willing to overlook the actions that
    caused him to lose his license in the first place. Generally
    19
    construed, this allegation amounts only to the contention that
    [the plaintiff’s] medical licensing qualifications should be relaxed
    in light of his disability.” (Harris, 
    supra,
     572 F.3d at p. 74; see
    
    ibid.
     [because the plaintiff “asks only for the state’s
    ‘understanding’ of the reasons why he committed those actions
    [that resulted in the loss of his license], he cannot demonstrate
    that he is ‘otherwise qualified’ for a medical license”].) In
    contrast, Singh’s allegations identify how his alleged disability
    affected his inability to meet the four-attempt rule and how the
    Medical Board could reasonably accommodate that disability. He
    has not, like the plaintiff in Harris, proposed that the Medical
    Board simply “relax” its requirement he must be qualified to
    practice medicine.
    The second case, Block v. Texas Board of Law Examiners
    (5th Cir. 2020) 
    952 F.3d 613
    , concerned a law-licensing rule in
    Texas providing that out-of-state attorneys can be admitted to
    the State Bar of Texas without taking the Texas bar examination
    “if they (1) have actively practiced law for at least five of the last
    seven years (the ‘active practice requirement’); (2) have a J.D.
    from an approved law school; and (3) have not previously failed
    the Texas bar exam.” (Id. at pp. 615-616.) After the plaintiff, a
    licensed Louisiana lawyer whose disability forced him to stop
    practicing law more than 10 years before, took and failed the
    Texas bar examination, he applied without examination,
    “explaining that his disability prevented him from satisfying the
    active practice requirement.” (Id. at p. 616.) The Texas Board of
    Law Examiners (TBLE) denied his application, and he sued,
    alleging, as relevant here, “TBLE’s refusal to waive [the active
    practice requirement] for him” violated Title II of the ADA.
    (Block, at p. 616.) The court in Block concluded the plaintiff had
    20
    not stated a claim under Title II because the modification he
    sought—waiver of the active practice requirement—was not a
    reasonable one. (Block, at pp. 618-619.)
    But as the analysis in Block suggests, the accommodation
    sought by the plaintiff there was, in essence, that there be no
    eligibility requirement for him. As the court explained: “TBLE
    protects the integrity of its bar by requiring applicants to either
    pass the Texas bar exam or meet the three requirements for
    admission without examination. The active practice requirement
    ensures that applicants have both achieved and maintained the
    skill and knowledge required to practice law in Texas. Waiving it
    to admit a lawyer who has neither passed the Texas bar exam
    nor practiced law for thirteen years would not inform TBLE of a
    vital fact: does [the plaintiff] currently have the necessary
    knowledge and skill to practice law?” (Block, supra, 952 F.3d at
    pp. 618-619.) Here, in contrast, Singh has not proposed the
    Medical Board waive the requirement that he pass Step 3 of the
    USMLE, only that it modify the four-attempt rule to
    accommodate his disability (by accepting his passing grade on the
    fifth attempt), and the Medical Board has not shown that this
    accommodation is unreasonable as a matter of law.
    2.    Singh Alleged Sufficient Facts To Constitute a
    Cause of Action for Violation of FEHA
    Singh also alleged the Medical Board discriminated against
    him based on a disability in violation of FEHA, specifically,
    Government Code section 12944, subdivision (b), which provides:
    “It shall be unlawful for a licensing board to fail or refuse to make
    reasonable accommodation to an individual’s mental or physical
    disability or medical condition.” Arguing FEHA and
    21
    “interrelated” state law “incorporate[ ] the protections of Title II
    for State-sponsored programs and activities” (see Cuiellette v.
    City of Los Angeles (2011) 
    194 Cal.App.4th 757
    , 770, fn. 2 [“FEHA
    is intended to be independent of, and provide greater protection
    than, the ADA”]), the Medical Board asserts that “the same
    analysis” applies to Singh’s allegations under FEHA. It does.
    (See Ravel v. Hewlett-Packard Enterprise, Inc. (E.D.Cal. 2017)
    
    228 F.Supp.3d 1086
    , 1095 [“courts have often ‘analyze[d] . . .
    [FEHA] and federal disability claims together, relying on federal
    authority in the absence of contrary or differing state law’”]; see
    also Humphrey v. Memorial Hospitals Assn. (9th Cir. 2001)
    
    239 F.3d 1128
    , 1133, fn. 6 [“Because the FEHA provisions
    relating to disability discrimination are based on the ADA,
    decisions interpreting federal anti-discrimination laws are
    relevant in interpreting the FEHA’s similar provisions.”].) The
    Medical Board’s challenges to Singh’s cause of action under
    FEHA fail for the same reasons its challenges to Singh’s causes of
    action under Title II and the Rehabilitation Act fail.
    C.    The Trial Court Did Not Err in Sustaining the
    Demurrer to Singh’s Petition for Writ of Mandate
    “‘Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, providing for writs
    of mandate, is available to compel public agencies to perform acts
    required by law. [Citation.] To obtain relief, a petitioner must
    demonstrate (1) no “plain, speedy, and adequate” alternative
    remedy exists [citation]; (2) “‘a clear, present, . . . ministerial duty
    on the part of the respondent’”; and (3) a correlative “‘clear,
    present, and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance
    of that duty.’” [Citations.] A ministerial duty is an obligation to
    perform a specific act in a manner prescribed by law whenever a
    22
    given state of facts exists, without regard to any personal
    judgment as to the propriety of the act.’” (International
    Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 848 v. City of Monterey Park,
    supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1111; see Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma
    County Union High School Dist. (2003) 
    29 Cal.4th 911
    , 916
    [‘“A ministerial act is an act that a public officer is required to
    perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of
    legal authority and without regard to his own judgment or
    opinion concerning such act’s propriety or impropriety, when a
    given state of facts exists.”’].)
    In the Medical Board’s demurrer to Singh’s cause of action
    seeking a writ of mandate, the Medical Board asserted that Singh
    failed “to allege facts sufficient to establish that [the Medical
    Board has] a clear, present, and ministerial duty under [Title II
    of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or FEHA] to provide a
    reasonable accommodation and engage in the interactive process
    in order to enable [Singh] to be considered for a medical
    license. . . . [S]uch actions require the exercise of judgment and
    discretion . . . .” The Medical Board also asserted that Singh
    failed “to allege facts sufficient to establish that he has a clear,
    present and beneficial right in the performance of the duty.”
    The Medical Board did not support these assertions with
    any argument or citation to legal authority in its memorandum of
    points and authorities. Neither the Medical Board nor Singh
    discussed in the trial court, or discuss on appeal, whether,
    assuming Singh stated causes of action for disability
    discrimination, the Medical Board did or did not have a
    ministerial, nondiscretionary duty to grant Singh the relief he
    seeks. Indeed, the accommodation Singh requests, either count
    his fifth test as his fourth test or allow him to take the test again,
    23
    would require the Medical Board to make a choice; i.e., to
    exercise discretion.
    It is hard to see how the Medical Board could have a
    ministerial, nondiscretionary duty to act in the manner (or in one
    of two manners) requested by Singh. Singh has not articulated
    how or why the Medical Board would have such a duty, nor has
    he shown he could amend his complaint to make such an
    allegation. Thus, the trial court did not err in sustaining the
    Medical Board’s demurrer to Singh’s cause of action for a writ of
    mandate. (See Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989)
    
    49 Cal.3d 432
    , 442 [“Mandamus will not lie to control an exercise
    of discretion, i.e., to compel an official to exercise discretion in a
    particular manner.”]; Ochoa v. Anaheim City School Dist. (2017)
    
    11 Cal.App.5th 209
    , 223, fn. 3 [“‘A writ cannot be used to control
    a matter of discretion.’”]; Wilson v. Board of Retirement of Los
    Angeles County Employees Retirement Assn. (1957)
    
    156 Cal.App.2d 195
    , 213 [trial court did not err in sustaining a
    demurrer to causes of action for writs of mandamus where “no
    mandatory duty has been shown to exist on . . . the respondent
    boards to perform the acts for which the writs were sought”]; see
    also Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 
    31 Cal.4th 1074
    , 1081
    [“The plaintiff has the burden of proving that an amendment
    would cure the defect.”].)
    24
    DISPOSITION
    The trial court’s order dismissing the case is reversed. The
    trial court is directed to vacate its orders sustaining the Medical
    Board’s demurrers, and to enter a new order overruling the
    demurrers to Singh’s causes of action for violation of the ADA,
    the Rehabilitation Act, and FEHA and sustaining the demurrer
    to Singh’s cause of action for a writ of mandate without leave to
    amend. Singh is to recover his costs on appeal.
    SEGAL, J.
    We concur:
    PERLUSS, P. J.
    IBARRA, J.*
    *     Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned
    by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
    California Constitution.
    25