AWI Builders v. Alliant Consulting CA2/4 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 10/22/21 AWI Builders v. Alliant Consulting CA2/4
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FOUR
    AWI BUILDERS, INC., et al.,                                            B294662, B297189,
    B298699, B300834
    Plaintiffs and Appellants,
    (Los Angeles County
    v.                                                             Super. Ct. No. BC696666)
    ALLIANT CONSULTING, INC.,
    et al.,
    Defendants and Respondents.
    APPEAL from judgments and orders of the Superior Court for Los
    Angeles County, Robert B. Broadbelt III, Judge. Affirmed.
    Pacheco & Neach, Rod Pacheco, Brian Neach; Feldman &
    Associates, Inc., Mark A. Feldman, David J. Sire, Jr.; Richards, Watson
    & Gershon, Steven A. Nguy and T. Peter Pierce for Plaintiffs and
    Appellants.
    Manning & Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester, Al M. De La Cruz and
    Ladell Hulet Muhlestein for Defendants and Respondents Alliant
    Consulting, Inc. and Christa Schott.
    Koeller, Nebeker, Carlson & Haluck, William L. Haluck, Zachary
    M. Schwartz and Greg K. Koeller for Defendants and Respondents
    Anthony aka “Tony” Rackaukas, Donde McCament, Elaine Noce and
    County of Orange.
    Collins Muir + Stewart LLP, Samuel J. Muir, Rebecca J. Chmura
    and David C. Moore for Defendant and Respondent GKK Works.
    DeCarlo & Shanley, Desmond C. Lee and Yuliya S. Mirzoyan for
    Defendants and Respondents Carpenters-Contractors Cooperation
    Committee, Pete Rodriguez and David Kersh.
    Division of Labor Standards Enforcement and David D. Cross for
    Defendants and Respondents State of California and Maria Sandoval.
    _______________
    This opinion addresses multiple appeals taken from orders
    granting, or granting in part, five special motions to strike the second
    amended complaint filed by plaintiffs AWI Builders, Inc. (AWI),
    Construction Contractors Corporation (CCC), Zhirayr “Robert”
    Mekikyan, and Anna Mekikyan, and from orders awarding attorney
    fees with respect to each of those motions.1 The second amended
    complaint alleged causes of action for violation of civil rights under
    section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code (section 1983) as well
    as state tort claims against five sets of defendants: (1) Alliant
    Consulting, Inc. (Alliant) and Christa Schott (collectively, the Alliant
    defendants); (2) County of Orange (OC), Anthony aka “Tony”
    Rackaukas, Donde McCament, and Elaine Noce (collectively, the OC
    1    We ordered all of the appeals consolidated for purposes of oral
    argument and decision.
    2
    defendants); (3) GKK Works (GKK); (4) Carpenters-Contractors
    Cooperation Committee, Inc. (Quad-C), Pete Rodriguez, and David
    Kersh (collectively, the Quad-C defendants); and (5) the State of
    California (State) and Maria Sandoval (the State defendants).
    The trial court granted in full the special motions to strike (also
    known as anti-SLAPP motions, brought under Code of Civil Procedure
    section 425.16 (hereafter section 425.16)) brought by the Alliant
    defendants, the OC defendants, GKK, and the Quad-C defendants and
    dismissed all claims against those parties. The court granted in part
    the State defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion and dismissed all but the
    section 1983 claim against Sandoval.
    On appeal from these orders and the orders awarding attorney
    fees to all of the defendants, plaintiffs raise numerous arguments as to
    why the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to certain claims and how
    they established a probability of prevailing on some of the claims. We
    have considered all of those arguments, including those raised for the
    first time on appeal, and conclude the trial court did not err in granting
    the anti-SLAPP motions, and that the court conducted the proper legal
    analysis of the attorney fee motions and did not abuse its discretion in
    awarding fees to all defendants. Accordingly, we affirm all of the
    orders.
    BACKGROUND
    A.   Preliminary Background Information
    Plaintiff AWI is a public works construction company. AWI is
    owned by plaintiffs Robert and Anna Mekikyan, who also own plaintiff
    3
    CCC, another construction company. In early 2013, AWI successfully
    bid on two public works projects for Riverside County (Riverside), and
    was awarded a $14 million contract for the rehabilitation of the Public
    Defender’s building (the PD project) and a $13.5 million contract on a
    project known as the Riverside County Regional Medical Center (the
    Medical Center project). CCC was a subcontractor of AWI on the
    Medical Center project.
    Riverside hired defendant GKK as a consultant to provide
    construction management services on both the PD project and the
    Medical Center project. Issues arose during construction on the PD
    project, and by the end of 2013, AWI made Riverside officials aware
    that it was contemplating litigation; AWI filed a government claim
    against Riverside in early 2014.
    In late 2013 or early 2014, Riverside asked GKK to find a labor
    compliance specialist. After receiving bids for that work, GKK entered
    into subconsultant agreements with defendant Alliant to provide labor
    compliance services on the PD project, the Medical Center project, and
    another project that AWI previously had worked on. Alliant began to
    provide those services in January or March of 2014.2
    The events at issue in this lawsuit originate with the retention of
    Alliant to provide labor compliance monitoring services. To put in
    2      There is conflicting evidence regarding when Alliant began providing
    monitoring services with respect to the Riverside projects. Defendant Christa
    Schott, the president and sole owner of Alliant testified at one point that
    Alliant started its work on the projects in March 2014, and later testified that
    it started in January 2014. The date of the subconsultant agreement was
    April 14, 2014.
    4
    context the conduct of the various parties, an understanding of
    California’s prevailing wage law is required.
    B.   The Prevailing Wage Law
    For more than 90 years, contractors and public entities involved in
    construction of public works in California have been governed by
    California’s prevailing wage law (Lab. Code, §§ 1720-1861; originally
    enacted by Stats. 1931, ch. 397, p. 910). This law was “enacted in
    response to the economic conditions of the Depression, when the
    oversupply of labor was exploited by unscrupulous contractors to win
    government contracts when private construction virtually stopped.”
    (State Building & Construction Trades Council of California v. Duncan
    (2008) 
    162 Cal.App.4th 289
    , 294.) The law furthers the declared “policy
    of this state to vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to
    ensure employees are not required or permitted to work under
    substandard unlawful conditions or for employers that have not secured
    the payment of compensation, and to protect employers who comply
    with the law from those who attempt to gain a competitive advantage at
    the expense of their workers by failing to comply with minimum labor
    standards.” (Lab. Code, § 90.5, subd. (a); see Lusardi Construction Co.
    v. Aubry (1992) 
    1 Cal.4th 976
    , 985.)
    The prevailing wage law provides that “[e]xcept for public works
    projects of one thousand dollars ($1,000) or less, not less than the
    general prevailing rate of per diem wages for work of a similar
    character in the locality in which the public work is performed, and not
    less than the general prevailing rate of per diem wages for holiday and
    5
    overtime work fixed as provided in this chapter, shall be paid to all
    workers employed on public works.” (Lab. Code, § 1771; see also Lab.
    Code, § 1774 [“The contractor to whom the contract is awarded, and any
    subcontractor under him, shall pay not less than the specified
    prevailing rates of wages to all workmen employed in the execution of
    the contract”].)
    To ensure compliance with this requirement, the prevailing wage
    law requires each contractor and subcontractor on a public work project
    to “keep accurate payroll records, showing the name, address, social
    security number, work classification, straight time and overtime hours
    worked each day and week, and the actual per diem wages paid to each
    journeyman, apprentice, worker, or other employee employed by him or
    her in connection with the public work.” (Lab. Code, § 1776, subd. (a).)
    The term “payroll records” is defined as “[a]ll time cards, cancelled
    checks, cash receipts, trust fund forms, books, documents, schedules,
    forms, reports, receipts or other evidences which reflect job
    assignments, work schedules by days and hours, and the disbursement
    by way of cash, check, or in whatever form or manner, of funds to a
    person(s) by job classification and/or skill pursuant to a public works
    project.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 16000.)
    The contractor must inform the body awarding the contract of the
    location of the payroll records and, as relevant here, those records must
    be “available for inspection at all reasonable hours at the principal
    office of the contractor” as follows: (1) they must be “made available for
    inspection or furnished upon request to a representative of the body
    awarding the contract and the Division of Labor Standards
    6
    Enforcement [DLSE] of the Department of Industrial Relations” (Lab.
    Code, § 1776, subd. (b)(2)); (2) they must be made available to the public
    if requested (although the request must be made through either the
    body awarding the contract or DLSE)3 (Lab. Code, § 1776, subd. (b)(2));
    and (3) “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, . . . law
    enforcement agencies investigating violations of law shall, upon
    request, be provided nonredacted copies” of the payroll records (Lab.
    Code, § 1776, subd. (f)(1)). These requirements to maintain the payroll
    records and allow inspection must be reflected in the contract for the
    public work. (Lab. Code, § 1776, subd. (i).)
    The body that awarded the contract for a public work must “take
    cognizance of violations” of the prevailing wage law and must promptly
    report any suspected violations to the Labor Commissioner. (Lab. Code,
    § 1726, subd. (a).) If the awarding body determines as a result of its
    own investigation that there has been a violation, it may withhold
    contract payments after giving written notice to the contractor or
    subcontractor. (Lab. Code, §§ 1726, subd. (b), 1771.6, subd. (a).)
    If the Labor Commissioner determines after an investigation that
    there has been a violation, he or she must issue a civil wage and penalty
    assessment to the contractor or subcontractor, or both. (Lab. Code,
    § 1741, subd. (a).) The assessment must be served not later than 180
    3     The law includes measures to protect the privacy of employees when
    the payroll records are made available to the public. (Lab. Code, § 1776,
    subd. (e)). Those measures are less restricted when the member of the public
    requesting the records is a multiemployer Taft-Hartley trust fund (
    29 U.S.C. § 186
    (c)(5)) or a joint labor-management committee established under federal
    law. (Ibid.)
    7
    days after the filing of a valid notice of completion of the public work or
    180 days after acceptance of the public work, whichever occurs last.
    (Ibid.) The amount of the assessment is based upon the difference
    between the prevailing wage and the amount actually paid to each
    worker, plus a penalty of not less than $40 (or $120, if the violation was
    willful) for each calendar day for each worker paid less than the
    prevailing wage. (Lab. Code, § 1775.) If an assessment is issued, the
    body that awarded the contract must, before making any further
    payments to the contractor, withhold and retain all amounts required to
    satisfy the assessment. (Lab. Code, § 1727, subd. (a).)
    In addition to investigations by the awarding body, the Labor
    Commissioner, and law enforcement agencies, the prevailing wage law
    provides another avenue to enforce the law. Section 1771.2 of the Labor
    Code provides that “[a] joint labor-management committee established
    pursuant to the federal Labor Management Cooperation Act of 1978 (29
    U.S.C. Sec. 175a) may bring an action in any court of competent
    jurisdiction against an employer that fails to pay the prevailing wage to
    its employees, as required by this article, or that fails to provide payroll
    records as required by [Labor Code] Section 1776.”4 (Lab. Code,
    § 1771.2, subd. (a).) Such an action may be commenced no later than 18
    months after the filing of a valid notice of completion of the public work
    or 18 months after acceptance of the public work, whichever is later.
    (Ibid.)
    4   It appears that defendant Quad-C may be a joint labor-management
    committee.
    8
    The consequences for contractors and subcontractors found to
    have committed violations of the prevailing wage law are not solely
    monetary. For example, the Labor Commissioner is required to
    maintain a public list of the names of each contractor and subcontractor
    who has been found to have committed a willful violation. (Lab. Code,
    § 1741, subd. (c)(1).) The contractor’s or subcontractor’s name remains
    on the list for a minimum of three years. (Lab. Code, § 1741, subd.
    (c)(3).) If the Labor Commissioner finds that a contractor or
    subcontractor is in violation of the prevailing wage laws with intent to
    defraud, that contractor or subcontractor, or any entity in which the
    contractor or subcontractor has any interest, is ineligible to bid on or be
    awarded a contract for, or to perform work as a subcontractor on, a
    public works project for a period of not less than one year or more than
    three years. (Lab. Code, § 1777.1, subd. (a).) If the contractor or
    subcontractor is found to have committed two or more separate willful
    violations, that ban is for three years. (Lab. Code, § 1777.1, subd. (b).)
    This ban also applies if a contractor or subcontractor fails to provide a
    timely response to a request by DLSE to produce certified payroll
    records in accordance with Labor Code section 1776 (after notice and
    time to correct). (Lab. Code, § 1777.1, subd. (c).)
    Finally, the contractor or subcontractor who violates the
    prevailing wage law may be criminally prosecuted. If the contractor or
    subcontractor fails to maintain accurate payroll records or fails to make
    them open to inspection, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor. In
    addition, a contractor or subcontractor “who takes, receives, or
    conspires with another to take or receive, for his or her own use or the
    9
    use of any other person any portion of the wages of any worker or
    working subcontractor, in connection with services rendered upon any
    public work is guilty of a felony.” (Lab. Code, § 1778.)
    With these provisions of the prevailing wage law in mind, we
    continue our summary of the facts of this case.
    C.   The Events Leading to the Present Dispute
    1.    Alliant Begins Its Labor Compliance Work
    Immediately upon being retained as a labor compliance monitor
    for Riverside, Alliant, through its president Schott, conducted a full
    labor compliance audit review of the payroll and supporting forms that
    AWI had provided for the Medical Center project. Alliant issued its
    preliminary findings to Riverside, based upon Schott’s audit, on
    March 31, 2014. Alliant reported it was apparent that AWI was using
    several subcontractors who were not on the original subcontractor list
    included in the bid paperwork, and that one of the listed subcontractors
    had its license suspended due to failure to comply with bonding
    requirements. Alliant also reported that multiple contractors appeared
    to be paying less than the prevailing wage, and that many contractors
    (including AWI) had missed a pre-determined wage increase for some of
    the trades. Finally, Alliant reported that many required forms,
    statements, and/or information were missing.
    On April 3, 2014, Schott met with Robert Mekikyan to review
    labor law requirements regarding the Medical Center project. Schott
    explained her and Alliant’s role, on behalf of Riverside, in assessing
    AWI’s and CCC’s compliance with labor laws, particularly the
    10
    prevailing wage law, with regard to Riverside’s public works
    construction projects. Schott conducted a similar meeting with Mr.
    Mekikyan regarding the PD project on May 7, 2014. At both meetings,
    Schott provided to Mr. Mekikyan three-page checklists for AWI and for
    CCC setting forth labor law requirements applicable to each contract.
    Each checklist included a paragraph stating that contractors and
    subcontractors were required under Labor Code section 1776 to keep
    accurate payroll records and that those records “shall be made available
    for inspection at all reasonable hours at the principal office of the
    contractor/subcontractor . . . pursuant to Labor Code Section 1776.”
    Each checklist was signed by the payroll officer for AWI or CCC. The
    payroll officers for both AWI and CCC also signed a “Certification of
    Understanding and Authorization” for both the Medical Center project
    and the PD project that, among other things, certified that the
    principals and the authorized payroll officers of AWI and CCC had read
    and understood the labor wage standards pertaining to each project,
    and would provide the documents required under the labor laws.5
    5     In addition, the contracts that AWI had entered into with Riverside for
    the PD project and for the Medical Center project had included, in accordance
    with Labor Code section 1776, subdivision (i), a provision stating: “The
    Contractor, and each subcontractor, shall keep an accurate record showing
    the names of and actual hours worked each calendar day and each calendar
    week by all laborers, workmen, and mechanics employed by them in
    connection with the Work contemplated by this Contract, which record shall
    be open at all reasonable hours to the inspection of the County or its officers
    or agents and to the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement of the
    Department of Industrial Relations.”
    11
    As part of its labor compliance monitoring, Alliant went on site at
    both projects to interview workers. In early May 2014, Schott expressed
    concern to principals at GKK that the hours worked, classifications
    used, and total number of documented workers on site were not
    accurately reflected in AWI’s payroll records. Therefore, she told GKK
    that she would issue a formal request for information to AWI to verify
    that all workers were being paid the appropriate prevailing wage.6 In
    June 2014, Alliant made a formal request to AWI for copies of cancelled
    checks and time sheets for the Medical Center project; AWI refused to
    comply.
    2.    Riverside Terminates Its Contract With AWI For the PD
    Project
    As noted, disputes arose in late 2013 between AWI and Riverside
    regarding the PD project, and AWI threatened litigation. Riverside
    retained GKK as a consultant to address the threatened litigation,
    assess Riverside’s liability, and make recommendations. By mid-2014,
    Riverside concluded it was in its best interest, and in the best interest
    of the PD project, to pursue a termination for convenience with AWI.
    GKK subsequently was retained by Riverside to provide construction
    management services to facilitate the termination of AWI from the
    6      Schott also told GKK that she had been informed that the Riverside
    district attorney’s office was pursuing criminal charges against Mr. Mekikyan
    and AWI. Apparently, Riverside deputy county counsel Marsha Victor had
    told Schott about the purported criminal investigation. It appears, however,
    that the Riverside district attorney’s office did not start an investigation until
    April of 2015.
    12
    project and the transition to a new general contractor. AWI was
    removed from the PD project in late July 2014. However, AWI
    continued its work on the Medical Center project.
    3.    Alliant Obtains Documents From a Locked File Cabinet
    Alliant continued its labor compliance monitoring of AWI’s
    Riverside projects. During one of Alliant’s site visits to the Medical
    Center project, a worker approached Alliant employees and told them
    that all journeymen AWI workers were paid a flat hourly rate of $16 per
    hour, and that they worked 10 hours per day and most Saturdays but
    were not given any break periods or overtime pay. The worker also told
    the Alliant employees that AWI stored time sheets and daily sign-in
    sheets in its job trailer on site.
    Schott consulted with Riverside deputy county counsel Marsha
    Victor regarding what could be done to obtain the payroll records AWI
    kept in its job trailer. After that consultation, on October 24, 2014, an
    Alliant employee and Chuck Waltman, an official from Riverside, went
    to the Medical Center project site trailer with a document scanner to
    scan the payroll records, including the time sheets and daily sign-in
    sheets, stored there. When they arrived, AWI staff called Mr.
    Mekikyan on the phone to tell him that Waltman and an Alliant
    employee were at the trailer and demanding documents. Mr. Mekikyan
    spoke on the phone with Waltman, and told him that Waltman did not
    have his permission to be in his office or to access the documents.
    Nevertheless, Waltman and the Alliant employee broke the lock on the
    13
    file cabinet in which the documents were stored, and scanned the
    documents on site.
    Using the scanned documents, Alliant conducted a full audit,
    cross-referencing all of the hours reported on the time sheets and daily
    sign-in sheets to the certified payroll documents AWI had submitted to
    Riverside and/or Alliant. Alliant discovered that AWI had engaged in a
    substantial underreporting of hours and workers: many workers were
    not reported on the certified payroll documents, those documents
    reported four or eight hours of work when the time sheets showed the
    workers consistently worked 10 hours, and the certified documents did
    not report work performed on Saturdays and holidays even though the
    time sheets indicated work was performed on those days.
    4.    Schott Files Complaints With the Labor Commissioner
    Based upon the information from the scanned documents, as well
    as an affidavit signed by an AWI worker stating that AWI workers were
    paid $16 per hour with no overtime pay, on November 20, 2014, Schott
    filed complaints with the Labor Commissioner regarding AWI’s and
    CCC’s violation of the prevailing wage law with respect to the Medical
    Center project. A few weeks later, in December 2014, Schott filed
    similar complaints against AWI and CCC with respect to the PD
    project.
    All of the cases were assigned to Maria Sandoval, an investigator
    for the DLSE. Sandoval communicated directly with Schott, and Schott
    provided her with the information Alliant had obtained, including
    contact information for workers on the two projects. Sandoval reviewed
    14
    the records that Schott had provided; she also sent questionnaires to
    workers who were listed on AWI’s certified payroll reports and
    interviewed those workers who responded. In mid-2015, the DLSE
    issued a civil wage and penalty assessment of more than $500,000
    against AWI for the PD project; the issuance of the assessment allowed
    Riverside to withhold payments it owed to AWI under the contract.
    Schott continued to provide information to Sandoval about the Medical
    Center project, which was still ongoing.
    AWI requested review of the PD project penalty assessment, and
    asked DLSE for copies of any documents DLSE relied upon in its
    determination to issue the assessment. Although a party against whom
    a civil wage and penalty assessment has been issued has a right to
    obtain copies of those documents, Sandoval’s supervisor told Sandoval
    not to release the questionnaires.7 Sandoval then contacted Schott to
    verify that DLSE could allow AWI to copy the documents Schott
    provided to Sandoval, including affidavits from workers, time sheets
    Alliant obtained from the job trailer, and pay stubs. Although Schott
    conceded that AWI was entitled under the prevailing wage law to look
    at the documents, she contacted Dan Stack with the Riverside district
    attorney’s office to ask how she should respond Stack then went to see
    Sandoval, looked at the files she had, and instructed her that DLSE was
    7     Under the prevailing wage law, the DLSE is required during its
    investigation to keep confidential the name of, and any other information
    that may identify, any employee who reports a violation. (Lab. Code, § 1736.)
    15
    not to release the affidavits, questionnaires, and certain notes that
    contained the identity of complaining workers.
    5.    Investigations of AWI by Quad-C and the Riverside and OC
    District Attorneys’ Offices
    The DLSE was not the only agency investigating AWI’s alleged
    labor law violations. On May 30, 2014, representatives of the Iron
    Workers Union brought to the OC district attorney’s office forged labor
    documents relating to a public work project that AWI was constructing
    in OC (the OC Fair project). Shortly thereafter, defendant Donde
    McCament, a deputy district attorney in the Public Works Unit of the
    OC district attorney’s office, and defendant Elaine Noce, an investigator
    for that office, initiated a criminal investigation into AWI’s possible
    unlawful business practices relating to the OC Fair project. As part of
    that investigation, on December 17, 2014, Noce served a search warrant
    for the bank records of AWI, CCC, and the Mekikyans.
    Sometime before March 2015, defendant Quad-C had begun an
    investigation into AWI’s compliance with labor laws at the Medical
    Center project. According to defendant Pete Rodriguez, who worked for
    Quad-C, it was Quad-C’s practice to conduct investigations into possible
    violations and take their findings to district attorneys’ offices.
    Rodriguez had met Schott at a workshop and knew that she was
    working on the Medical Center project; they assisted each other in their
    16
    investigations by sharing information they had found regarding those
    violations.8
    By March 2015, the Riverside district attorney’s office also had
    begun its own investigation of AWI, CCC, and the Mekikyans. As part
    of that investigation, Riverside district attorney investigator Daniel
    Stack met with Schott to discuss AWI. Stack had told Schott to bring to
    their meeting any information she had about AWI; Schott brought
    Alliant’s reports of action for the PD project and the Medical Center
    project.
    At around the same time, Schott also met with McCament and
    Noce in the OC district attorney’s office. By April 3, 2015, at the
    request of McCament and Noce, Schott was gathering information
    regarding workers at the PD project and Medical Center project who
    also worked at the OC Fair project. Riverside knew of, approved, and
    paid for Schott’s work in assisting the OC district attorneys’ office.
    Over the next few months or more, Schott met several times with
    the Riverside and OC district attorney’s offices, both separately and
    together. Rodriguez from Quad-C attended some of those meetings. In
    one of the early meetings, Schott and Rodriguez were asked to contact
    some of the workers at the Medical Center project to gather evidence
    regarding AWI’s compliance with the prevailing wage law. One of the
    workers from whom Schott and Rodriguez sought to get information
    8     Rodriguez was better able to communicate with some of the workers
    because he spoke Spanish and Schott did not, although she had employees at
    Alliant who were native Spanish speakers.
    17
    was Todd Hawk, who had been the site superintendent on the PD
    project. On March 12, 2015, Schott wrote to Rodriguez that Hawk
    “collected and kept the workers time sheets and he knew
    EVERYTHING that [Mr. Mekikyan] was up to. For some reason
    however, [Mr. Mekikyan] takes care of him financially so [Hawk] won’t
    talk though he has teased us that he may.” Sometime later, Hawk (who
    had attended the meeting Schott had held with Mr. Mekikyan in May
    2014 to review AWI’s obligations under the prevailing wage law)
    provided documents to Alliant.
    In July 2015, at the request of Riverside district attorney
    investigator Stack, Schott drafted a narrative for Stack to use to obtain
    a search warrant, which described the alleged scheme by Mr. Mekikyan,
    AWI, and CCC to violate the prevailing wage law. Schott had sent her
    first draft of the narrative to Rodriguez to have him give it more
    “oomph” because she had no experience drafting this kind of document.
    Rodriguez asked defendant David Kersh (also of Quad-C) for help;
    Kersh rewrote the draft, and Rodriguez forwarded it to Schott, who
    then forwarded it to Stack.
    On October 6, 2015, the Riverside and OC district attorneys’
    offices jointly obtained search warrants for the Mekikyans’ home and
    business locations; the search warrants were executed the following
    day. Schott continued to provide information regarding possible
    violations of the prevailing wage law to the OC district attorney’s office
    at least through November 2016. The OC district attorney’s office
    ultimately filed a civil complaint against AWI, CCC, and the Mekikyans
    18
    on February 20, 2018, for violations of state labor codes and unlawful,
    unfair, and fraudulent business practices.
    D.     The Complaint and Anti-SLAPP Motions
    AWI filed the original complaint in this action on March 8, 2018.
    The operative second amended complaint was filed on April 20, 2018,
    before any defendant had filed an answer or responsive pleading to the
    original or first amended complaints. The complaint alleged seven
    causes of action, as follows:
    • First cause of action for violation of civil rights under section 1983,
    brought by the Mekikyans against all defendants except the State
    of California and OC, alleging that defendants conspired to create,
    cause, encourage or seek unlawful investigations and prosecutions
    by district attorney offices, and unlawful investigations and
    administrative prosecutions by DLSE.
    • Second cause of action for violation of civil rights under section
    1983, brought by the Mekikyans against OC (a Monell claim),9
    alleging that OC and its district attorney, defendant Rackaukas,
    failed to adequately train or supervise prosecutors to ensure they
    follow constitutional guarantees.
    • Third cause of action for negligent interference with contractual
    relations, brought by all plaintiffs against all defendants, alleging
    interference with plaintiffs’ contracts with Riverside, the State of
    9      Monell v. Department of Social Services (1978) 
    436 U.S. 658
     (Monell).
    19
    California, subcontractors, suppliers, bond companies, and owners
    of other construction projects.
    • Fourth cause of action for negligent interference with prospective
    economic opportunity, brought by all plaintiffs against all
    defendants, alleging interference with plaintiffs’ probable
    economic opportunities with respect to a variety of multi-million
    dollar construction projects.
    • Fifth cause of action for intentional interference with contractual
    relations, brought by all plaintiffs against all defendants.
    • Sixth cause of action for intentional interference with prospective
    economic opportunity, brought by all plaintiffs against all
    defendants.
    • Seventh cause of action for negligent supervision, brought by all
    plaintiffs against GKK, alleging that GKK failed to monitor the
    activities and conduct of Alliant.
    Each set of defendants filed special motions to strike under section
    425.16. The trial court granted in full the motions filed by the Alliant
    defendants, the OC defendants, GKK, and the Quad-C defendants, and
    dismissed the complaint in its entirety as to those defendants. The
    court denied the State defendants’ motion as to the section 1983 claim
    alleged against Sandoval and granted the motion as to the remaining
    claims alleged against both State defendants. Further details regarding
    the allegations of the complaint, the motions, and the trial court’s
    rulings will be provided, as necessary, in the Discussion portion of this
    opinion.
    20
    DISCUSSION
    Plaintiffs do not challenge the trial court’s rulings on the anti-
    SLAPP motions as to all claims and defendants. Instead, plaintiffs
    limit their challenges to the following:
    • With respect to the first cause of action as alleged against the
    Alliant defendants, McCament, Noce, GKK, and the Quad-C
    defendants, plaintiffs contend that section 1983 claims are not
    subject to the anti-SLAPP statute. Plaintiffs also contend they
    established a probability of prevailing as to the Alliant
    defendants, McCament, Noce, and the Quad-C defendants.
    • With respect to the second cause of action against OC, plaintiffs
    contend the conduct alleged is not protected under the anti-
    SLAPP statute.
    • Plaintiffs do not challenge the court’s rulings as to any defendant
    with respect to the third cause of action.
    • With respect to the fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action as
    against the State defendants only, plaintiffs contend the anti-
    SLAPP statute does not apply to the extent the claims are based
    upon the State defendants’ withholding of information it relied
    upon in issuing the civil wage and penalty assessment.
    • With respect to the fifth cause of action as against the Alliant
    defendants and GKK, plaintiffs contend they established a
    probability of prevailing.
    • With respect to the seventh cause of action against GKK, plaintiffs
    contend their claim does not arise from conduct protected by the
    21
    anti-SLAPP statute and, in any event, they established a
    probability of prevailing.
    In addition to these challenges, plaintiffs challenge an evidentiary
    ruling of the trial court with respect to the anti-SLAPP motions brought
    by the OC defendants, GKK, and the Quad-C defendants, in which the
    court sustained those defendants’ objections to the admission of Schott’s
    deposition testimony. Finally, plaintiffs challenge the awards of
    attorney fees to each set of defendants on three grounds: (1) section
    1983 preempts the mandatory attorney fee provision of section 425.16;
    (2) the trial court failed to conduct the proper legal analysis; and (3) the
    trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees to the OC defendants
    for time spent reviewing their investigative records.
    We begin our discussion with a brief summary of the law
    governing anti-SLAPP motions, then address the evidentiary ruling,
    followed by plaintiffs’ contentions as to each of the challenged causes of
    action, and finally the award of attorney fees to each set of defendants.
    A.   Law Governing Anti-SLAPP Motions
    The anti-SLAPP statute “is designed to protect defendants from
    meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak
    and petition on matters of public concern. [Citations.] To that end, the
    statute authorizes a special motion to strike a claim ‘arising from any
    act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free
    speech under the United States Constitution or the California
    Constitution in connection with a public issue.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)”
    (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 
    7 Cal.5th 871
    , 883–884
    22
    (Wilson).) Such claims will be stricken “unless the court determines
    that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the
    plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
    A special motion to strike may be directed at entire causes of
    action as pleaded in the complaint, or at specific allegations within a
    cause of action. As the Supreme Court explained in Baral v. Schnitt
    (2016) 
    1 Cal.5th 376
    , “[t]he anti-SLAPP procedures are designed to
    shield a defendant’s constitutionally protected conduct from the undue
    burden of frivolous litigation. It follows, then, that courts may rule on
    plaintiffs’ specific claims of protected activity, rather than reward artful
    pleading by ignoring such claims if they are mixed with assertions of
    unprotected activity.” (Id. at p. 393.)
    A special motion to strike involves a two-step process. First, the
    defendant bringing the motion must demonstrate that the plaintiff’s
    claims arise from protected conduct in which the defendant has
    engaged. Second, if the defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts
    to the plaintiff to demonstrate that those protected claims “have at least
    ‘minimal merit.’” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State
    University (2017) 
    2 Cal.5th 1057
    , 1061 (Park).)
    “The defendant’s first-step burden is to identify the activity each
    challenged claim rests on and demonstrate that that activity is
    protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. A ‘claim may be struck only if the
    speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not
    just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which
    liability is asserted.’ [Citation.] To determine whether a claim arises
    23
    from protected activity, courts must ‘consider the elements of the
    challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those
    elements and consequently form the basis for liability.’ [Citation.]
    Courts then must evaluate whether the defendant has shown any of
    these actions fall within one or more of the four categories of ‘“act[s]”’
    protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p.
    884.)
    Those four categories of protected acts are found in subdivision (e)
    of section 425.16. That subdivision provides that an “‘act in furtherance
    of a person’s right of petition or free speech . . . in connection with a
    public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing
    made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other
    official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement
    or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or
    review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
    proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or
    writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in
    connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in
    furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the
    constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or
    an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e).)
    We review the trial court’s determination on a special motion to
    strike de novo. Like the trial court, “‘[w]e consider “the pleadings, and
    supporting and opposing affidavits . . . upon which the liability or
    defense is based.” [Citation.] However, we neither “weigh credibility
    [nor] compare the weight of the evidence. Rather, [we] accept as true
    24
    the evidence favorable to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluate the
    defendant’s evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted
    by the plaintiff as a matter of law.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Flatley v.
    Mauro (2006) 
    39 Cal.4th 299
    , 326.)
    B.   Evidentiary Ruling
    In opposing each of the anti-SLAPP motions, the primary source
    of evidence plaintiffs relied upon in attempting to establish a
    probability of prevailing was the transcript of a deposition of Schott
    taken on January 17, 2017 and March 6, 2017 in a lawsuit AWI filed
    against Riverside. The OC defendants, GKK, the Quad-C defendants,
    and the State defendants objected to the consideration of Schott’s
    deposition testimony, and the trial court sustained on hearsay grounds
    the objections of the OC defendants, GKK, and the Quad-C defendants.
    Therefore, the court did not consider the Schott testimony when ruling
    on those three motions. However, by the time the trial court ruled on
    the State defendants’ motion, the California Supreme Court had
    decided Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co.
    (2019) 
    6 Cal.5th 931
    , in which the Court held that a transcript of
    testimony given under oath, although hearsay, is admissible for
    purposes of prosecuting or opposing an anti-SLAPP motion. (Id. at pp.
    943–944.) Accordingly, the trial court overruled the State defendants’
    objection to the Schott testimony.
    In appealing from the orders granting the motions brought by the
    OC defendants, GKK, and the Quad-C defendants, plaintiffs contend
    the trial court prejudicially erred in refusing to consider Schott’s
    25
    testimony, and that the court’s orders should be reversed on this basis.
    While we agree the trial court erred in excluding Schott’s testimony, we
    decline to reverse on this ground. Instead, in conducting our de novo
    review we will consider all of the evidence submitted by the parties,
    including the Schott testimony.
    C.   First Cause of Action (Section 1983 Claim)
    1.    Step One: Applicability of Anti-SLAPP Statute
    In the first cause of action under section 1983, the Mekikyans
    alleged that the Alliant defendants, McCament, Noce, GKK, the Quad-C
    defendants, and Sandoval, acting under color of law through their
    participation and service as agents of law enforcement or government
    agencies, deprived plaintiffs of their constitutional rights by conspiring
    and acting to create, cause, encourage, or seek unlawful investigations
    and prosecutions by the OC and Riverside district attorneys’ offices and
    the DLSE. In the trial court, plaintiffs argued that none of the claims
    alleged in the complaint, including the section 1983 claim, arose from
    conduct protected under the anti-SLAPP statute because the gravamen
    of their claims related to the defendants’ soliciting and causing
    procurement of AWI’s confidential and proprietary documents and their
    participation in strategy meetings, and therefore did not implicate any
    defendant’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights to petition or free
    speech.
    The trial court rejected plaintiffs’ characterization of the basis for
    their claims, finding instead that, with respect to the section 1983
    claim, all of the injury-producing conduct was undertaken as part of
    26
    criminal investigations or in connection with an issue under
    consideration in an official proceeding. Therefore, the court found that
    the section 1983 claim was subject to the anti-SLAPP statute under
    section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(2) and (e)(4).
    On appeal, plaintiffs do not argue that their section 1983 claim
    does not arise from conduct that comes within scope of the anti-SLAPP
    statute. Instead, they argue that the anti-SLAPP statute cannot be
    applied to section 1983 claims at all because its application would affect
    plaintiffs’ substantive federal rights. Plaintiffs acknowledge in their
    opening briefs that they did not raise this issue below, but they ask this
    court to exercise its discretion to consider this purely legal issue. We
    will do so. (JKC3H8 v. Colton (2013) 
    221 Cal.App.4th 468
    , 477 [noting
    that an appellate court may exercise its discretion to consider a new
    theory on appeal where the issue is one of law alone].) Unfortunately
    for plaintiffs, however, this new theory does not assist them.
    The issue whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies to section 1983
    claims filed in a California state court has been addressed in four
    published appellate opinions, the most recent of which was issued after
    plaintiffs had filed two of the four appellants’ opening briefs in this
    matter. As that recent opinion explains, “[a]n analysis of whether to
    apply the anti-SLAPP statute to a federal claim [brought] in state court
    begins with the observations that the anti-SLAPP statute is a
    procedural law, rather than a substantive immunity [citations], and
    that a forum generally applies its own procedural law to cases before it.
    [Citation.] As such, the anti-SLAPP statute will apply to adjudication
    of a federal claim in state court unless either (1) ‘the federal statute
    27
    provides otherwise’ [citation], or (2) the anti-SLAPP statute ‘affect[s]
    plaintiffs’ substantive federal rights,’ and is thus preempted.” (Patel v.
    Chavez (2020) 
    48 Cal.App.5th 484
    , 487–488, italics omitted (Patel).)
    As plaintiffs note in their opening briefs, and as the Patel court
    observed, the three prior cases to consider the issue addressed only the
    first possibility, relying only on the procedural versus substantive
    distinction and finding that nothing in section 1983 imposes federal
    procedural law upon state courts trying civil rights actions. (Patel,
    supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 488, citing Bradbury v. Superior Court
    (1996) 
    49 Cal.App.4th 1108
    , 1117–1118; Vergos v. McNeal (2007) 
    146 Cal.App.4th 1387
    , 1392, fn. 4; Tichinin v. City of Morgan Hill (2009)
    
    177 Cal.App.4th 1049
    , 1055–1056.) Plaintiffs’ contention that the anti-
    SLAPP statute does not apply to section 1983 claims is based upon the
    second possibility, i.e., that the anti-SLAPP statute interferes with
    section 1983’s operation in protecting a plaintiff’s federal rights.
    Plaintiffs argue that that interference arises with respect to the award
    of attorney fees: while a prevailing defendant in a section 1983 case
    may recover attorney fees only in exceptional cases (see, e.g., Herb
    Hallman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash-Holmes (9th Cir. 1999) 
    169 F.3d 636
    ,
    645), the anti-SLAPP statute mandates an award of attorney fees to a
    prevailing defendant (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 
    24 Cal.4th 1122
    , 1141–
    1142 (Ketchum)). Thus, plaintiffs argue that the anti-SLAPP statute is
    preempted because it subjects section 1983 plaintiffs to liability for
    attorney fees they would not otherwise be required to pay.
    28
    We disagree. As plaintiffs note, whether a state procedural law
    applies to a federal claim in state court “turns on ‘whether the state law
    purports to alter or restrict federally created rights.’” (Citing Williams
    v. Horvath (1976) 
    16 Cal.3d 834
    , 837.) But the anti-SLAPP statute’s
    mandatory fee provision does not apply unless the plaintiff is unable to
    demonstrate that the federal claim he or she has alleged has “at least
    ‘minimal merit’” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1061), under a standard in
    which the court must accept as true the evidence favorable to the
    plaintiff and does not weigh credibility or compare the weight of the
    evidence (Flatley v. Mauro, 
    supra,
     39 Cal.4th at p. 326). In other words,
    the mandatory fee provision comes into play only after it has been
    established that the plaintiff’s federal claim has no merit. And while
    we acknowledge that the specter of liability for the defendant’s attorney
    fees might discourage some plaintiffs from bringing questionable claims
    that arise from a defendant’s exercise of his or her constitutional right
    of petition or free speech, it cannot be said that the anti-SLAPP
    statute’s mandatory fee provision alters or restricts section 1983’s
    operation. Or, as the Patel court put it, the possibility that some
    plaintiffs might be discouraged from pursuing some section 1983 claims
    “does not rise to the level of defeating a plaintiff’s ability to vindicate
    his [or her] federal rights through a section 1983 claim, particularly in
    light of the low bar plaintiffs must meet in order to save such claims
    and avoid attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Patel, supra,
    48 Cal.App.5th at p. 490.)
    29
    2.    Step Two: Probability of Prevailing
    We need not go into detail regarding plaintiffs’ showing in the
    trial court, or the trial court’s rulings, on step two of the anti-SLAPP
    motion procedure. Instead, we address only the arguments plaintiffs
    make on appeal.
    As plaintiffs observe, “[t]o state a claim for relief in an action
    brought under § 1983, [plaintiffs] must establish that they were
    deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
    States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of
    state law.” (American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan (1999) 
    526 U.S. 40
    , 49–50.) Plaintiffs contend that the deprivation in the present case
    was committed under color of state law: they note that McCament and
    Noce of the OC district attorney’s office do not dispute that they acted
    under color of state law, and argue that the Alliant defendants and the
    Quad-C defendants could be held liable under section 1983 as willful
    participants in joint action with the state or its agents. (Citing Kirtley
    v. Rainey (9th Cir. 2003) 
    326 F.3d 1088
    , 1092.) Plaintiffs also contend
    that all of these defendants deprived plaintiffs of their constitutional
    rights by violating the Fourth Amendment in two ways.
    First, plaintiffs contend that by secretly collecting documents and
    other information to assist in the prosecution of plaintiffs, often at the
    request of McCament and Noce, the Alliant defendants and the Quad-C
    defendants (along with McCament and Noce) conducted unreasonable
    searches without plaintiffs’ consent in violation of the Fourth
    Amendment. (Citing U.S. v. Mazzarella (9th Cir. 2015) 
    784 F.3d 532
    ,
    539–540.) Second, plaintiffs contend that McCament, Noce, and the
    30
    Alliant defendants committed a separate violation of plaintiffs’ Fourth
    Amendment rights when an Alliant employee and a Riverside official
    (Waltman) entered AWI’s business office at the Medical Center project
    and, despite Mr. Mekikyan’s expressed denial of permission, scanned
    documents that were in a locked file cabinet. We find no violation of the
    Fourth Amendment in either instance.
    The first clause of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
    Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
    persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
    seizures, shall not be violated.” (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) “This text
    protects two types of expectations, one involving ‘searches,’ the other
    ‘seizures.’ A ‘search’ occurs when an expectation of privacy that society
    is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.” (U.S. v. Jacobsen
    (1984) 
    466 U.S. 109
    , 113.) The United States Supreme Court has
    “consistently construed this protection as proscribing only governmental
    action; it is wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an
    unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an
    agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any
    governmental official.’” (Ibid.) Thus, a violation of this provision occurs
    only if an agent of the government conducts a warrantless search of
    materials or premises over which the possessor has a reasonable
    expectation of privacy. (Maryland v. Macon (1985) 
    472 U.S. 463
    , 469.)
    In this case, even assuming that to the extent the Alliant
    defendants and Quad-C defendants obtained materials or information
    at the behest of the OC defendants or the Riverside district attorney’s
    office they acted under color of law, plaintiffs had no reasonable
    31
    expectation of privacy over those materials or information.10 The
    evidence in the record is that the materials or information these
    defendant obtained consisted of the names and contact information of
    people who worked at the PD project site or the Medical Center project
    site, time sheets, daily sign-in sheets, cancelled checks showing the
    payments made to the workers, and other information related to the
    wages paid to workers at both sites. In other words, defendants
    obtained “payroll records” as defined in section 16000 of the California
    Code of Regulations that, under Labor Code section 1776 and the
    contracts plaintiffs signed, plaintiffs were required to make available to
    Riverside and its agents (such as the Alliant defendants), law
    enforcement agencies (such as the OC and Riverside district attorneys’
    offices), and members of the public (such as the Quad-C defendants). As
    such, plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to
    those materials and information.
    Plaintiffs argue that even if they did not have a reasonable
    expectation of privacy over the payroll records, they presented evidence
    that at least some of the documents the Alliant defendants obtained
    10     Moreover, to the extent plaintiffs assert that the Alliant defendants
    collected the information in that file cabinet at the behest of McCament and
    Noce, there is no evidence to support this assertion. Instead, the evidence in
    the record establishes that McCament and Noce were unaware of the
    existence of any investigation of AWI in Riverside until at least December 16,
    2014, two months after the Alliant defendants scanned the documents in the
    file cabinet, and that Schott did not meet or communicate with McCament or
    Noce until sometime around March of 2015. Thus, there is no evidence to
    support the assertion that the Alliant defendants were acting under color of
    law with respect to this event.
    32
    were confidential, sensitive, or privileged. They also argue that Schott’s
    admission in her deposition testimony that Alliant procured documents
    without consent by breaking into a locked cabinet establishes that there
    was an unlawful search of a business premises. Not so.
    First, the only evidence plaintiffs offer to support their assertion
    that the Alliant defendants obtained confidential documents other than
    payroll records is the declaration by Mr. Mekikyan that plaintiffs filed
    in opposition to the Alliant defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. But that
    declaration states only that a supervisor with AWI (Hawk), had access
    to confidential, sensitive, and privileged documents regarding AWI and
    CCC, and that Mr. Mekikyan “[is] aware that” Hawk “sold [his]
    company’s documents” to Schott and “stole documents from my
    companies and gave them to” the OC district attorney’s office, Alliant,
    and the Quad-C defendants. Mr. Mekikyan does not explain how he
    became “aware” of Hawk’s conduct, nor does he identify exactly what
    documents Hawk purportedly gave to any of the defendants.11 Thus,
    11     In his declaration filed in opposition to GKK’s anti-SLAPP motion
    (which was filed after the trial court had granted the Alliant defendants’ anti-
    SLAPP motion), Mr. Mekikyan provided an additional detail. Although he
    still declared that he “[is] aware” that Hawk “sold [his] company’s
    documents” to Schott, who then delivered them to the OC district attorney’s
    office, the new declaration states that he “later became aware that Mr. Hawk
    stole documents, confidential bank and tax information included, from my
    companies and gave them to” the OC district attorney’s office, Alliant, and
    the Quad-C defendants. The addition of “confidential bank and tax
    information” is insufficient to show that the documents included anything
    other than payroll records, since pay stubs and cancelled paychecks, which
    Schott admitted were some of the documents she obtained, would include
    bank and tax information.
    33
    the declaration does not provide evidence that any of the defendants
    gathered confidential material from Hawk.
    Plaintiffs argue that even without Mr. Mekikyan’s declaration,
    “[a] reasonable inference may be drawn that at least some of the
    documents gathered by Alliant were non-payroll records, to which
    [plaintiffs] had a reasonable expectation of privacy,” because Schott
    never testified that Alliant gathered only payroll records. But a
    reasonable inference must have some basis in the evidence. (Evid.
    Code, § 600, subd. (b) [“An inference is a deduction of fact that may
    logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts
    found or otherwise established in the action”].) And, while it is true
    that Schott never explicitly testified that Alliant gathered only payroll
    records, the only documents or information to which she referred in her
    testimony were payroll records; there was no testimony about the
    gathering of any non-payroll-related confidential information.
    Second, even if Alliant acted under color of law when it obtained
    the time sheets and sign-in sheets from the locked cabinet in AWI’s job
    site trailer (although it is clear that it did not do so at the behest of the
    OC district attorney’s office, as explained in fn. 10, ante), there was no
    unlawful search. By accepting a public work construction job—and by
    signing the contract for the Medical Center project—AWI agreed to
    comply with Labor Code section 1776. That statute provides that
    payroll records “shall be available for inspection at all reasonable hours
    at the principal office of the contractor.” (Lab. Code, § 1776, subd. (b).)
    Therefore, AWI did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with
    34
    respect to its on-site office to the extent it was storing its payroll records
    there.
    In short, because plaintiffs did not have a reasonable expectation
    of privacy with regard to payroll records or the office in which they were
    stored, the defendants’ gathering of documents and other information
    did not constitute an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth
    Amendment. As this is the only conduct plaintiffs have identified on
    appeal as the basis for their section 1983 claim against the Alliant
    defendants, McCament, Noce, and the Quad-C defendants, their claim
    fails as a matter of law. Therefore, the trial court did not err in
    granting those defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions with respect to that
    claim.
    D.    Second Cause of Action (Section 1983 Monell Claim)
    1.    Step One: Applicability of Anti-SLAPP Statute
    The second cause of action alleges a section 1983 claim under
    Monell, supra, 
    436 U.S. 658
    , against OC for violation of the Mekikyan’s
    civil rights. The cause of action includes several paragraphs alleging
    unethical behavior by defendant Rackaukas generally, as well as a
    failure to train his employees, which the complaint alleges established a
    custom of unethical behavior. The complaint then alleges that
    Rackaukas’s and the OC district attorney’s office’s “failure to
    adequately train and or supervise prosecutors to ensure they follow
    constitutional guarantees such as due process, the Fourth Amendment
    right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and other rights of
    citizens, proximately caused the harm to Plaintiffs described herein.”
    35
    In their anti-SLAPP motion, the OC defendants did not
    distinguish between the first cause of action and the second cause of
    action with regard to the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Instead,
    they argued that plaintiffs’ unlawful labor violations and business
    practices with regard to the OC Fair project was an issue under
    consideration and review by an executive body (the OC district
    attorney’s office) and therefore the OC defendants’ conduct and
    statements made during the investigation into plaintiffs’ conduct was
    protected under subdivisions (e)(2) and (e)(4) of section 425.16. In
    granting the anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court also did not distinguish
    between the first and second (or the other) causes of action in the first
    step of its analysis. Instead, it found that the conduct upon which
    plaintiffs sought to hold the OC defendants liable was “the entire four-
    year criminal investigation into Plaintiffs’ business practices as a whole
    and not a singular event that occurred during the course of the
    investigation. Therefore, the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ claims against the
    County Defendants is actually the allegation that the County
    Defendants conspired with Schott (and others) to illegally investigate
    Plaintiffs’ businesses for labor code violations in order to help both
    Riverside County and Orange County in avoiding payments to AWI for
    certain construction projects and in avoiding any legal repercussions
    from doing so.”
    On appeal, plaintiffs fault the OC defendants for failing to address
    in their motion how OC’s alleged policy and custom of failing to
    adequately train and supervise prosecutors and employees qualifies as
    protected activity. Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by following
    36
    the OC defendants’ lead in lumping the failure to train and supervise
    allegations with the different and separate allegations of investigatory
    and prosecutorial misconduct asserted in the other causes of action.
    Plaintiffs assert that the allegations that OC failed to train and
    supervise are entirely separate from the allegations of investigatory and
    prosecutorial misconduct, and do not describe conduct protected by the
    anti-SLAPP statute. We disagree.
    As noted, “[t]o determine whether a claim arises from protected
    activity, courts must ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and
    what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently
    form the basis for liability.’” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.) In
    City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris (1989) 
    489 U.S. 378
     (City of Canton), the
    United States Supreme Court explained what must be proved to
    establish a Monell claim: “a municipality can be liable under § 1983
    only where its policies are the ‘moving force [behind] the constitutional
    violation.’ Only where a municipality’s failure to train its employees in
    a relevant respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of
    its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city
    ‘policy or custom’ that is actionable under § 1983. . . . [¶] In resolving
    the issue of a city’s liability, the focus must be on adequacy of the
    training program in relation to the tasks the particular officers must
    perform.” (Id. at pp. 389–390.)
    In other words, the determination whether a municipality is liable
    under a Monell claim turns on the whether the specific constitutional
    violation alleged was the result of a training program that was “so
    likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the
    37
    policymakers of the [municipality] can reasonably be said to have been
    deliberately indifferent to the need [for more or different training].”
    (City of Canton, 
    supra,
     489 U.S. at p. 390.) Thus, plaintiffs’ Monell
    claim cannot be established without a showing that (1) McCament’s and
    Noce’s investigation was conducted in accordance with OC’s training
    program and (2) that the training program was so likely to result in the
    Fourth Amendment violations alleged here that OC can reasonably be
    said to have been indifferent to the need for more or different training.
    Therefore, for purposes of the first step analysis under the anti-SLAPP
    statute, the Monell claim arises, at least in part, on McCament’s and
    Noce’s conduct during their investigation in anticipation of criminal
    and/or civil prosecution of plaintiffs.
    There cannot be any question that an investigation by a district
    attorney’s office into possible unlawful or unfair business practices of a
    contractor on a public work project constitutes “conduct in furtherance
    of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition . . . in connection
    with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4);
    cf. Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 
    47 Cal.App.4th 777
    , 784 [communications preparatory or in anticipation of
    litigation are protected by the anti-SLAPP statute]; accord, Briggs v.
    Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 
    19 Cal.4th 1106
    , 1115.)
    Therefore, we conclude plaintiffs’ second cause of action for violation of
    civil rights under section 1983 arises from conduct protected by the
    anti-SLAPP statute.
    38
    2.    Step Two: Probability of Prevailing
    Plaintiffs do not separately challenge the trial court’s ruling with
    regard to whether they established a probability of prevailing. As
    discussed in Section C.2., ante, because plaintiffs did not have a
    reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to payroll records or the
    office in which they were stored, the defendants’ gathering of documents
    and other information did not constitute an unlawful search in violation
    of the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim
    necessarily fails, and we affirm the trial court’s ruling granting the OC
    defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion with regard to the second cause of
    action.
    E.   Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action With Respect to the State
    Defendants (Negligent and Intentional Interference With
    Prospective Economic Opportunity and Intentional Interference
    With Contract Claims)
    1.    Step One: Applicability of Anti-SLAPP Statute
    In their anti-SLAPP motion, the State defendants identified the
    allegations upon which plaintiffs’ claims against Sandoval and the State
    were based, including allegations that Sandoval had withheld
    documents that AWI and CCC had requested. The State defendants
    then argued that all of the claims were based upon conduct protected
    under subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2) of section 425.16 because the acts at
    issue “were made in connection with an official proceeding authorized
    by law.”
    39
    In their opposition to the State defendants’ motion, plaintiffs
    addressed the first step analysis as to all claims in a single paragraph.
    Plaintiffs argued that the anti-SLAPP statute does not protect claims
    “‘arising from any act having any connection, however remote, with an
    official proceeding,’” and that the State defendants could not “fairly to
    be said to be exercising any constitutional right, including one that is
    captured by CCP § 425.16(e)(1) or (2).”
    In finding that all of the claims were subject to the anti-SLAPP
    statute the trial court noted that plaintiffs failed to cite to evidence or
    the allegations of the complaint in support of their argument. The court
    also observed that plaintiffs did not dispute that the allegations against
    the State defendants were based upon the investigation by the DLSE,
    nor did plaintiffs dispute “that such conduct includes preparation of
    written or oral statements in furtherance of the DLSE investigation,
    including Sandoval’s refusal to hand over documents requested by AWI
    and CCC.”
    On appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred because their
    fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action against the State defendants
    arose from the State defendants’ conduct in withholding documents,
    and not from any written or oral statements. Therefore, plaintiffs argue
    that subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2) of section 425.16 do not apply because
    those subdivisions apply only to written or oral statements or writings.
    Plaintiffs also argue that the anti-SLAPP statute’s catchall provision,
    subdivision (e)(4), does not apply because the State defendants had a
    mandatory duty to release the documents to AWI, and their failure to
    40
    do so was not in furtherance of any right of petition or free expression.
    We disagree.
    First, we have held that the failure to disclose information in
    connection with an official proceeding falls within section (e)(2) of the
    anti-SLAPP statute. (Suarez v. Trigg Laboratories, Inc. (2016) 
    3 Cal.App.5th 118
     (Suarez).) In Suarez, the plaintiff had entered into an
    agreement with the defendant business and its owner to provide
    business consulting services at a set hourly rate. After several months
    the parties orally agreed to expand the scope of the work, for which the
    plaintiff would receive, among other compensation, a percentage of any
    sale of the defendant business. (Id. at p. 120.) The relationship
    between the parties broke down, and the defendant terminated the
    plaintiff’s employment. The plaintiff then sued the defendant business
    for quantum meruit to recover the fair value of the services he had
    rendered. (Id. at p. 121.) While settlement negotiations were going on
    in that case, the owner of the defendant business learned that a
    prospective investor intended to submit a letter of intent to purchase
    the business, and the owner instructed the parties involved to
    communicate only with his attorney in order to “keep the contents [of
    the letter of intent] within attorney client privilege” for purposes of the
    quantum meruit lawsuit. (Ibid.) Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff, who
    was unaware of the potential sale of the business, agreed to settle the
    quantum meruit case. (Ibid.)
    When the plaintiff later learned that the defendant had concealed
    the letter of intent from him, he filed another lawsuit against the
    defendant seeking to rescind the settlement agreement based upon the
    41
    defendant’s fraudulent concealment of the prospects for sale of the
    business. (Suarez, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at pp. 121–122.) The
    defendant filed an anti-SLAPP motion, asserting that the plaintiff’s
    claims arose out of communications that took place during the course of
    the quantum meruit action. The trial court granted the motion, and the
    defendant appealed, arguing that the plaintiff’s claims were not
    premised on the defendant’s statements, but rather on its active
    concealment and nondisclosure of the letter of intent. (Id. at pp. 122–
    124.)
    We affirmed the trial court’s ruling. We noted that in Navellier v.
    Sletten (2002) 
    29 Cal.4th 82
     (Navellier), the Supreme Court examined
    whether the anti-SLAPP statute applied to an action alleging
    misrepresentations and failure to disclose. (Suarez, supra, 3
    Cal.App.5th at pp. 123–124.) In that case, the defendant failed to
    disclose that he was not in agreement with the terms of a release in a
    federal action, and that failure to disclose induced the plaintiffs to file
    an amended federal action; the defendant then claimed that he did not,
    and did not intend to, release his claims. (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th
    at p. 89.) The Supreme Court found that the defendant’s conduct in the
    negotiation and execution of the release—his “acts (or omissions)”—fell
    within subdivision (e)(2) of the anti-SLAPP statute. (Id. at p. 90.)
    We observed that the Supreme Court’s finding “is consistent with
    established free speech jurisprudence,” which holds that the right to
    free speech “encompasses what a speaker chooses to say, and what a
    speaker chooses not to say.” (Suarez, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 124.)
    42
    Therefore, we held that the defendant’s failure to disclose the letter of
    intent was protected under subdivision (e)(2) of the anti-SLAPP statute.
    (Id. at p. 125.) The Third District relied upon this holding in
    Crossroads Investors, L.P. v. Federal National Mortgage Assn. (2017) 
    13 Cal.App.5th 757
     (Crossroads), in reversing the trial court’s denial of an
    anti-SLAPP motion as to a claim arising from the defendant’s failure to
    provide information the plaintiff had requested in a bankruptcy case.
    (Id. at p. 779.) The appellate court had ruled in a prior opinion12 that
    the claim did not arise from protected activity, finding that a
    defendant’s silence was not protected under the express language of the
    anti-SLAPP statute. But by the time the court reconsidered the appeal,
    we had issued our decision in Suarez. Relying upon our decision and
    the Supreme Court’s decision in Navellier, the Third District held that
    “failure to disclose can be protected petitioning activity for purposes of
    . . . section 425.16.” (Crossroads, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 779, fn. 9.)
    Plaintiffs do not address these cases in their briefs. Instead, they
    rely upon Swanson v. County of Riverside (2019) 
    36 Cal.App.5th 361
    (Swanson) to argue that subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2) of section 425.16
    do not apply to non-communicative conduct such as the withholding of
    documents. Swanson is distinguishable. In that case, an individual
    was taken by the police to a county medical center for an involuntary
    72-hour hold under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150. The
    12    The Supreme Court had granted review of the case, depublished the
    original opinion, and transferred the matter back to the appellate court to
    reconsider the appeal in light of Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 
    1 Cal.5th 376
    .
    43
    medical center released him before 72 hours had elapsed, and he
    returned home, where he bludgeoned three people to death. Surviving
    family members sued the county for negligence, and the county filed a
    special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. (Swanson,
    supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 364.) The trial court denied the motion, and
    the appellate court affirmed.
    The appellate court rejected the county’s contention that the
    plaintiffs’ claim arose from the county’s evaluation and recommendation
    that the individual be discharged, which the county asserted was a
    statement made in an official proceeding. (Swanson, supra, 36
    Cal.App.5th at p. 372.) The court observed that the plaintiffs “have not
    sued the County because of the substance of statements made in
    connection with the [72-hour hold] procedures. They have sued the
    County to challenge as negligent the decision to release [the individual]
    before the expiration of 72 hours. Thus, the gravamen of the complaint
    is negligence. [¶] . . . There is nothing in the County’s decision to
    release [the individual] before the 72-hour hold that implicates the
    rights of free speech or petition.” (Id. at p. 373.) Therefore, the court
    held that the plaintiffs’ claims did not arise from conduct protected by
    the anti-SLAPP statute. (Ibid.)
    Plaintiffs here describe the Swanson court’s holding as turning on
    the distinction between conduct and speech, and attempt to analogize
    the circumstances in Swanson with the circumstances in the present
    case, arguing that plaintiffs’ claims “arise from Sandoval’s unlawful
    conduct in withholding documents—not from any written or oral
    44
    statements.” Their analogy is inapt. The court in Swanson did not base
    its holding on the distinction between conduct and speech. Instead, it
    found the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply because the plaintiffs’
    claims were based upon the county’s negligence in its medical
    treatment. Swanson does not assist plaintiffs here, where the claims
    arose from Sandoval’s withholding of documents in the course of an
    official proceeding. That conduct is protected under subdivision (e)(2) of
    the anti-SLAPP statute, as explained in Crossroads, Suarez, and
    Navellier.
    But even if that subdivision did not apply, we conclude that the
    conduct at issue is protected under the catchall provision of section
    425.16, subdivision (e)(4).
    We note that plaintiffs did not argue in the trial court that this
    provision did not apply. Nevertheless, plaintiffs ask that we exercise
    our discretion to consider their argument on appeal, since it raises a
    question of law. Inasmuch as it was the State defendants’ burden to
    establish that the causes of action arose from conduct protected by the
    anti-SLAPP statute, but they failed to address whether the conduct at
    issue came within the catchall provision, we will address plaintiffs’
    argument.
    In arguing that subdivision (e)(4) of the anti-SLAPP statute does
    not apply, plaintiffs rely upon Anderson v. Geist (2015) 
    236 Cal.App.4th 79
     (Anderson). In that case, the plaintiff alleged that deputies of the
    San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department unlawfully entered her home to
    attempt to execute a bench warrant that had been recalled and, in the
    45
    process, made defamatory statements to the plaintiff’s neighbors. (Id.
    at p. 82.) The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the defendants alleging
    various claims arising from the deputies’ allegedly unlawful conduct.
    The defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court
    denied, finding that the defendants failed to support their motion with
    affidavits or declarations, and that the defendants failed to show that
    the action arose from an act in furtherance of the defendants’ right of
    petition or free speech. (Id. at p. 84.)
    The appellate court affirmed. The court explained: “Execution of
    an arrest warrant is of course ‘an act in furtherance of a criminal
    prosecution,’ as defendants put it. But that does not necessarily make
    it ‘conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of
    petition’ in the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). At base,
    the execution of a warrant is not an exercise of rights by the peace
    officer; it is the performance of a mandatory duty, at the direction of the
    court. [Citation.] Because peace officers have no discretion in whether
    or not to execute a warrant issued by the court, it seems unlikely that a
    lawsuit asserting claims arising from such activity could have the
    chilling effect that motivated the Legislature to adopt the anti-SLAPP
    statute, or that extending protections of the anti-SLAPP statute to such
    activity would serve the statute’s goals. [Citation.] [¶] Moreover, to
    qualify for protection under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4), the
    conduct at issue must be ‘in connection with a public issue or an issue of
    public interest’—that is, it must ‘concern[] a topic of widespread public
    interest and contribute[] in some manner to a public discussion of the
    topic.’ [Citation.] In their briefing on appeal, defendants fail to make
    46
    any argument as to why their execution of a warrant in the
    circumstances of this case—a routine misdemeanor warrant in a case
    that apparently attracted precisely zero public interest or discussion—
    might meet this standard, and we find nothing in the record that might
    support an argument to that effect.” (Anderson, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th
    at pp. 86–87.)
    Anderson is distinguishable. In contrast to that case, in the
    present case Sandoval withheld documents during the course of an
    administrative proceeding in which she was a representative of one of
    the parties, i.e., the DLSE, an agency of the State, and thus was part of
    the petitioning conduct. The determination of what documents should
    be withheld involved some exercise of discretion, since DLSE is required
    under Labor Code section 1736 to keep confidential any information
    that may identify any employee who reported a violation. Thus, unlike
    in Anderson, it is likely that a lawsuit asserting claims arising from the
    exercise of that discretion as part of the petitioning process could have
    the chilling effect the Legislature sought to eliminate by enacting the
    anti-SLAPP statute. Finally, while the execution of the warrant in
    Anderson was done in connection with a case that had no relation to
    any public issue, the withholding of documents in the present case was
    done in connection with an administrative proceeding involving an
    important public issue, i.e., the violation of labor laws by contractors on
    a public work project. In short, we hold that plaintiffs’ state tort claims
    based upon the State defendants’ withholding of documents are
    protected by subdivision (e)(4) of the anti-SLAPP statute.
    47
    2.     Step Two: Probability of Prevailing
    Plaintiffs do not challenge the trial court’s ruling as to step two of
    the anti-SLAPP analysis, relying solely on their assertion that the anti-
    SLAPP statute does not apply. Accordingly, having found that the
    statute does apply, we affirm the trial court’s ruling granting the State
    defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion as to the fourth, fifth, and sixth causes
    of action.
    F.    Fifth Cause of Action With Respect to the Alliant Defendants and
    GKK (Intentional Interference With Contract Claim)
    Plaintiffs do not challenge the trial court’s ruling that the fifth
    cause of action with respect to the Alliant defendants and GKK arose
    from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. Therefore, we
    will address only the court’s ruling that plaintiffs failed to establish a
    probability of prevailing on the fifth cause of action for intentional
    interference with contractual relations against those defendants.
    In the fifth cause of action, plaintiffs alleged that defendants knew
    or had reason to know that plaintiffs had valid contracts with Riverside
    and the State, as well as “existing contractual relations with numerous
    other entities, including but not limited to subcontractors, suppliers,
    bond companies, and the owners of construction projects within the
    counties of Riverside, Orange and Los Angeles.” The complaint alleged
    that defendants intentionally disrupted “the contractual relationships,”
    which damaged plaintiffs.
    The complaint did not identify exactly which contracts allegedly
    were disrupted and caused damage to plaintiffs. Nor did plaintiffs
    48
    identify those contracts in their oppositions to the Alliant defendants’
    and GKK’s anti-SLAPP motions. In their opening brief on appeal from
    the trial court’s ruling on those motions, however, plaintiffs identify
    AWI’s contract for the PD project as the contract with which the Alliant
    defendants and GKK interfered.
    Plaintiffs contend they established a probability of prevailing
    against the Alliant defendants because they presented evidence that
    Alliant and Schott knew of the existence of the contract for the PD
    project and “set out to disrupt the contractual relationship between
    AWI and Riverside” by gathering documents from AWI without Mr.
    Mekikyan’s knowledge, falsely advising GKK (the project manager) that
    the Riverside district attorney’s office was pursuing criminal charges
    against Mr. Mekikyan and AWI, interacting directly with Riverside
    instead of communicating through GKK, and visiting the PD project site
    10 to 15 times between May and July of 2014, when AWI was
    terminated from the project. Plaintiffs contend this evidence—along
    with evidence purportedly showing that Schott had an incentive to see
    AWI replaced with a new contractor—shows that Alliant and Schott’s
    actions “were designed to induce Riverside to terminate its contract
    with AWI on the PD Office Project.” And, since they presented evidence
    that Riverside terminated its contract with AWI in July 2014 and that
    as a result AWI lost future revenue under the contract, plaintiffs
    contend they established that Alliant and Schott intentionally
    interfered with AWI’s contract with Riverside for construction of the PD
    project.
    49
    With regard to GKK, plaintiffs contend that as Alliant’s employer
    on the PD project, GKK was vicariously liable for intentional
    interference with the contract under the rule of respondeat superior.
    They assert they established a probability of prevailing against GKK
    because they presented evidence that GKK employed Alliant and
    oversaw its performance of labor compliance services on the PD project
    and was responsible for Alliant’s actions; since Schott’s interference
    with the PD project was foreseeable, GKK was liable for that
    interference under the rule of respondeat superior.
    The fault in plaintiffs’ argument is that even assuming the
    evidence submitted was sufficient to establish intentional interference
    with the PD contract, the statute of limitations barred their claim. The
    statute of limitations for an intentional interference with contractual
    relations claim is two years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 339(1); Kolani v. Gluska
    (1998) 
    64 Cal.App.4th 402
    , 408.) “Generally speaking, a cause of action
    accrues at ‘the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its
    elements.’” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 
    35 Cal.4th 797
    ,
    806 (Fox.) The elements of a cause of action for intentional interference
    with contractual relations are: “‘(1) a valid contract between plaintiff
    and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3)
    defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of
    the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the
    contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage.’” (Quelimane Co. v.
    Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 
    19 Cal.4th 26
    , 55.) In the present
    case, the cause of action was complete when the contractual
    relationship was disrupted, which immediately caused the alleged
    50
    damages. That occurred in July 2014, when Riverside terminated its
    contract with AWI for the PD project. Plaintiffs did not file the original
    complaint in this action until March 2018, more than four years after
    that termination.
    Plaintiffs contend, however, that the statute of limitations does
    not bar their claim because of the discovery rule. Under the discovery
    rule, accrual of a cause of action is postponed “until the plaintiff
    discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action. [Citations.] [¶]
    A plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of action when he or she ‘has
    reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its elements.’” (Fox, supra,
    35 Cal.4th at p. 807.) The California Supreme Court has explained that
    “by discussing the discovery rule in terms of a plaintiff’s suspicion of
    ‘elements’ of a cause of action, it was referring to the ‘generic’ elements
    of wrongdoing, causation, and harm. [Citation.] In so using the term
    ‘elements,’ we do not take a hypertechnical approach to the application
    of the discovery rule. Rather than examining whether the plaintiffs
    suspect facts supporting each specific legal element of a particular
    cause of action, we look to whether the plaintiffs have reason to at least
    suspect that a type of wrongdoing has injured them.” (Ibid.) Once
    becoming aware of an injury, “plaintiffs are required to conduct a
    reasonable investigation . . . and are charged with knowledge of the
    information that would have been revealed by such an investigation.”
    (Id. at p. 808.)
    Here, plaintiffs were aware of the injury when Riverside
    terminated the PD project contract in July 2014, or at the latest when
    Schott filed her complaint against AWI regarding the PD project in
    51
    December 2014. They contend, however, they were not aware of the
    alleged wrongdoing until March 2017, when Schott was deposed in the
    lawsuit AWI brought against Riverside. In support of this contention,
    they point to the declaration of Mr. Mekikyan, in which he stated that
    he was not aware of the involvement of the Riverside and OC district
    attorneys’ offices investigations or of Schott’s assistance or true
    intentions until that deposition. But the fifth cause of action (as
    described in the appellants’ opening brief) was based upon the Alliant
    defendants’ and GKK’s alleged interference with the PD project
    contract, and the evidence establishes that the Riverside and OC
    district attorneys’ offices did not contact Schott until around March of
    2015, after the PD project contract was terminated. Thus, the district
    attorneys’ investigations, and Schott’s assistance with those
    investigations, played no part in the termination of the PD project
    contract. Accordingly, the discovery rule does not apply to postpone the
    accrual of plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action against the Alliant defendants
    and GKK.
    G.    Seventh Cause of Action (Negligent Supervision Claim)
    1.    Step One: Applicability of Anti-SLAPP Statute
    In their seventh cause of action, plaintiffs alleged that GKK had a
    duty to supervise and monitor the activities and conduct of Alliant, and
    that GKK breached that duty by negligently failing to adequately
    supervise Alliant, which caused plaintiffs injury. GKK did not directly
    address these allegations in the first step of its analysis in its anti-
    SLAPP motion, instead arguing that “all of GKK’s alleged actions in the
    52
    [complaint] were part of the County of Riverside’s pre-litigation
    consulting activities and are therefore protected.”
    In their opposition to the motion (which was filed shortly after the
    trial court granted the Alliant defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion),
    plaintiffs also fail to directly address the allegations of the seventh
    cause of action. Instead, plaintiffs simply stated that “[t]he gravamen
    of the [entire complaint] is that GKK improperly and negligently
    supervised its agent, Alliant,” then quoted (without any analysis) from
    a variety of cases in which courts cautioned that the anti-SLAPP
    statute does not apply in all cases in which the First Amendment is
    implicated or in which there is any connection with an official
    proceeding.
    In its reply brief, GKK noted plaintiffs’ attempt to recharacterize
    the complaint as arising from GKK’s alleged negligent supervision. It
    argued that all of the conduct alleged involved “speech and acts”
    concerning an issue under consideration by a legislative body
    (Riverside’s investigation into plaintiffs’ labor practices) and “a matter
    made open to the public that concerns an issue of public interest”
    (including the expenditure of taxpayer dollars and the public interest in
    overseeing the appropriation of public funds), and therefore all claims
    arose from conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. (Citing
    § 425.16, subds. (e)(1) to (e)(4).) GKK specifically argued that its
    “conduct in their relationship with ALLIANT . . . is protected activity
    under [subd. (e)(4) of § 425.16].”
    Addressing the seventh cause of action in its order granting
    GKK’s motion, the trial court noted that the negligent supervision claim
    53
    was based upon different conduct by GKK than the other claims. The
    court agreed with GKK’s assertion in its reply brief that the negligent
    supervision claim arose from GKK’s acts and omissions in furtherance
    of petitioning activity, i.e., a governmental investigation into AWI’s
    labor practices. The court therefore found that GKK met its burden to
    show that all causes of action alleged against it arose from conduct
    protected under subdivisions (e)(2) and (e)(4) of the anti-SLAPP statute.
    On appeal, plaintiffs argue that neither subdivision applies to
    their negligent supervision claim because that claim “arises from the
    financial injury [plaintiffs] incurred as a result of GKK failing
    adequately to supervise Alliant and Schott under their contract. . . .
    GKK’s failure to do so is not a matter of public concern.” Plaintiffs
    point to the Supreme Court’s decision in Rand Resources, LLC v. City of
    Carson (2019) 
    6 Cal.5th 610
     (Rand), in which Rand Resources (Rand)
    had been hired by the City of Carson as the city’s exclusive agent to
    negotiate with the National Football League (NFL) about the possibility
    of building a football stadium in the city. After the city replaced Rand
    with a different developer, Rand sued the city, its mayor, and the rival
    developer. (Id. at p. 614.) The complaint included allegations that the
    rival developer and the mayor exchanged confidential emails to discuss
    matters relating to building a stadium in the city, that the mayor
    regularly sent the rival developer confidential city documents related to
    the development of a stadium, and that the mayor and the rival
    developer were involved in discussions regarding how to get around the
    city’s agreement with Rand. The complaint also alleged that the rival
    developer, with the knowledge and support of the city and its mayor,
    54
    contacted NFL representatives and purporting to be an agent of the city
    with respect to bringing an NFL franchise to the city. (Id. at p. 618.)
    Examining Rand’s claims for tortious breach of contract and fraud,
    the Supreme Court noted that the crux of those claims was that the
    defendants concealed and affirmatively lied about the city’s breach of
    the exclusivity provision in its agreement with Rand. Rand alleged that
    the mayor and rival developer conspired to conceal that breach by
    meeting in secret, exchanging confidential emails, and other conduct,
    and that the mayor and other defendants made affirmative
    misrepresentations regarding their knowledge of the rival developer’s
    activities and the status of the city’s agreement with Rand. (Rand,
    supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 622.) The Supreme Court found that although the
    claims arose from the defendants’ statements, those statements were
    not made in connection with an issue before the city council (and thus
    were not protected under subd. (e)(2) of § 425.16) or an issue of public
    interest (and thus not protected under subd. (e)(4)).
    Addressing subdivision (e)(4), the court stated: “[T]he parties
    agree that building an NFL stadium in the City is a matter of public
    interest. But defendants’ speech concerned only the narrower issue of
    who should represent the City in the negotiations with the NFL. The
    affirmative misrepresentations, for instance, concerned only the
    falsehoods that [the mayor] did not know [the rival developer] and was
    not aware of his involvement in the NFL negotiations, and that the City
    would continue to let Rand be its exclusive agent if his company made
    ‘reasonable progress.’ Neither of these statements was directed to the
    public issue of whether to ‘hav[e] an NFL team, stadium, and associated
    55
    developments in Carson’ or what trade-offs might be entailed in the
    process. [Citation.] Rather, what [the mayor and another defendant]
    misrepresent—the issue ‘in connection with’ their statements—was the
    identity of the City’s agent in negotiations with the NFL.” (Rand,
    supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 623.)
    In rejecting the defendants’ argument that “the issue of who
    served as the City’s agent was a matter of public significance because
    ‘the better the negotiating party, the more likely that an NFL stadium
    would be delivered,’” the court “reject[ed] the proposition that any
    connection at all—however fleeting or tangential—between the
    challenged conduct and an issue of public interest would suffice to
    satisfy the requirements of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4).
    [Citations.] [¶] At a sufficiently high level of generalization, any
    conduct can appear rationally related to a broader issue of public
    importance. What a court scrutinizing the nature of speech in the anti-
    SLAPP context must focus on is the speech at hand, rather than the
    prospects that such speech may conceivably have indirect consequences
    for an issue of public concern.” (Rand, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 625.)
    Seizing upon this language, plaintiffs here argue that although
    “GKK’s failure to properly supervise Alliant and Schott has at a very
    general level some connection to the assertedly public issue of the
    investigation of AWI[,] . . . the specific conduct being challenged—
    GKK’s negligence in shirking its supervisorial duties—is not itself an
    issue of public interest.” Plaintiffs, however, take an overly specific
    view of the conduct being challenged. To be sure, the conduct alleged
    was GKK’s purported negligent supervision. But what GKK was
    56
    supervising was the investigation into violations of labor laws by a
    contractor on public works projects. By supervising, GKK was
    participating—albeit negligently (allegedly)—in the investigation
    itself—an investigation preparatory to filing administrative claims
    against AWI and CCC. Therefore, plaintiffs’ claim for negligent
    supervision arose from GKK’s petitioning conduct “in connection with a
    public issue.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)
    2.    Step Two: Probability of Prevailing
    Plaintiffs contend they established a probability of prevailing
    because they submitted evidence that GKK allowed Alliant to operate
    without any oversight, which allowed Alliant and Schott to (1) obtain
    information from AWI without Mr. Mekikyan’s knowledge; (2) take
    documents from AWI’s office without permission or a warrant; (3)
    provide AWI documents to the OC district attorney’s office without a
    warrant; (4) provide information to the OC and/or Riverside district
    attorneys’ offices for those offices to obtain search warrants; (5) file
    complaints with DLSE and then urge DLSE not to release certain
    documents when AWI requested them; (6) exaggerate the magnitude of
    AWI’s wage violations to the OC district attorney’s office; and (7)
    misrepresent to the OC district attorney’s office that AWI prohibited
    Schott from talking to AWI’s subcontractors.
    As discussed in Section C.2., ante, in light of the prevailing wage
    law, there was nothing improper in Alliant or Schott obtaining
    information from AWI’s payroll records, whether as part of her
    investigation on behalf of Riverside or as an agent of the OC and/or
    57
    Riverside district attorneys’ offices. With regard to the alleged
    exaggeration or misrepresentation to the OC district attorney’s office,
    there was no evidence presented to suggest that those statements were
    acted upon or caused any damage to plaintiffs. Finally, while there is
    evidence that Sandoval from the DLSE contacted Schott to ask whether
    DLSE should allow AWI to copy certain documents that Schott had
    provided to DLSE, there is no evidence to show that GKK’s alleged
    failure to supervise Alliant or Schott caused plaintiffs harm due to
    DLSE’s withholding of documents. The evidence shows that at the time
    Sandoval contacted Schott, Schott (at Riverside’s direction) was
    assisting the Riverside district attorney’s office with its own
    investigation of AWI. The evidence also shows that immediately after
    Sandoval contacted Schott, Schott contacted Riverside district attorney
    investigator Stack to ask him to respond to Sandoval’s question, and
    Stack then went to the DLSE to look at the documents to determine if
    the release of those documents might jeopardize the case against AWI.
    Thus, to the extent Schott participated in DLSE’s decision to withhold
    documents from AWI, it was the Riverside district attorney’s office,
    rather than Schott, that made the determination whether to
    recommend withholding them.
    In short, plaintiffs failed to present evidence sufficient to establish
    a probability of prevailing on the negligent supervision claim, i.e.,
    evidence to show that GKK’s alleged failure to properly supervise
    Alliant and Schott caused injury to plaintiffs. Accordingly, we affirm
    the trial court’s ruling granting GKK’s anti-SLAPP motion with regard
    to the seventh cause of action.
    58
    H.   Attorney Fee Awards
    Following the granting of their anti-SLAPP motions, each group of
    defendants filed motions for attorney fees under section 425.16. The
    Alliant defendants sought $227,180 in fees; the trial court awarded
    $85,155. The OC defendants sought $93,445; the trial court awarded
    $71,655. GKK sought $70,460.30; the trial court awarded $39,577. The
    Quad-C defendants sought $114,375.33 for the anti-SLAPP motion and
    $15,475 for the fee motion; the trial court awarded a total of $77,673.60
    for both motions. And the State defendants sought $11,087.50; the trial
    court awarded $6,037.55.
    Plaintiffs appeal from all five orders. With respect to all of the
    orders, plaintiffs argue that mandatory fee provision set forth in section
    425.16, subdivision (c) is preempted by federal law when applied to a
    section 1983 cause of action. With respect to all of the orders except the
    one awarding fees to the State defendants, plaintiffs argue the trial
    court did not apply the proper legal test in evaluating the fee motions
    because the court failed to determine whether the fees related to
    duplicative legal arguments in several of the anti-SLAPP motions
    should have been significantly reduced. Finally, plaintiffs contend the
    trial court erred by awarding fees to the OC defendants for time spent
    reviewing thousands of pages of investigative records, arguing that that
    effort was completely unnecessary to the legal arguments those
    defendants asserted in their anti-SLAPP motion. We address each
    argument in turn.
    59
    1.    Federal Preemption
    Plaintiffs’ argument that federal law preempts application of the
    anti-SLAPP statute’s mandatory fee provision to a section 1983 claim is,
    like plaintiffs’ argument that the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to
    section 1983 claims at all, raised for the first time on appeal. Because it
    is a pure question of law, we will exercise our discretion to consider it.
    As we discussed in Section C.2., ante, as a procedural law, the
    anti-SLAPP statute (including its attorney fee provision) applies to the
    adjudication of a federal claim brought in state court “unless either (1)
    ‘the federal statute provides otherwise’ [citation], or (2) the anti-SLAPP
    statute ‘affect[s] plaintiffs’ substantive federal rights,’ and is thus
    preempted.” (Patel, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 488.) Plaintiffs concede
    that federal law provides no express basis to exempt a section 1983
    claim from application of the anti-SLAPP statute. However, they argue
    that the mandatory fee provision of the anti-SLAPP statute affects
    plaintiffs’ substantive federal rights.
    As plaintiffs observe, the United States Supreme Court has held
    that a defendant who prevails on a section 1983 claim may recover his
    or her attorney fees under section 1988 of title 42 of the United States
    Code (section 1988) “only where the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or
    brought to harass or embarrass the defendant.” (Hensley v. Eckerhart
    (1983) 
    461 U.S. 424
    , 429, fn. 2.) Plaintiffs contend that the anti-SLAPP
    statute’s mandatory fee provision is preempted by federal law because it
    “undermines entirely Congress’ remedial regime for Section 1983
    violations” because a defendant is automatically entitled to attorney
    fees without having to show that plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim was
    60
    objectively frivolous. Plaintiffs also contend the mandatory fee
    provision affects plaintiffs’ federal rights and thus is preempted because
    it strips courts of the discretion that section 1988 provides to deny fees
    to defendants who prevail on section 1983 claims. We are not
    persuaded.
    What plaintiffs’ arguments ignore is that defendants who prevail
    on an anti-SLAPP motion against a section 1983 claim are not awarded
    attorney fees because they prevailed on a section 1983 claim. They are
    awarded fees to compensate them for defending against a meritless
    claim brought by a “party seeking to ‘chill the [defendants’] valid
    exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for
    the redress of grievances.’” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1131; see
    also Liu v. Moore (1999) 
    69 Cal.App.4th 745
    , 750 [“The purpose of
    section 425.16 is clearly to give relief, including financial relief in the
    form of attorney’s fees and costs, to persons who have been victimized
    by meritless, retaliatory SLAPP lawsuits because of their ‘participation
    in matters of public significance’”].) As we observed in Del Rio v. Jetton
    (1997) 
    55 Cal.App.4th 30
    , where we held that section 1988 does not
    preempt a claim for malicious prosecution brought by a party who
    prevailed on a section 1983 claim: “State law is preempted to the extent
    that it actually conflicts with federal law, as when it is impossible for a
    private party to comply with both state and federal requirements, or
    when the state law imposes an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
    will of Congress. [Citation.] No such obstacle exists in this case.
    Congress intended the fee-shifting provision in section 1988 to
    encourage plaintiffs to bring good faith civil rights actions, and to deter
    61
    plaintiffs from bringing civil rights actions which lack foundation.” (Id.
    at pp. 36–37.) The anti-SLAPP statute’s mandatory fee provision is
    entirely consistent with that congressional intent. In short, there is no
    federal preemption.
    2.    Duplicative Time
    The method for computing attorney fees for a successful anti-
    SLAPP motion is well established. The court “begins with a touchstone
    or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent
    and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . involved in
    the presentation of the case.’” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1131–
    1132.) The fee award “should ordinarily include compensation for all
    the hours reasonably spent.’” (Id. at p. 1133.) However, the court “must
    carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended; ‘padding’ in
    the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to
    compensation.” (Id. at p. 1132.)
    The Supreme Court has instructed that “[t]he ‘“experienced trial
    judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in
    his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will
    not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly
    wrong.”’” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.) “‘“‘A decision will not
    be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. “An
    appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting
    its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.” [Citation.] In the
    absence of a clear showing that its decision was arbitrary or irrational,
    62
    a trial court should be presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate
    objectives and, accordingly, its discretionary determinations ought not
    be set aside on review.’ [Citation.]” Accordingly, an abuse of discretion
    transpires if “‘the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason’” in making
    its award of attorney fees. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Premier Medical
    Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 
    163 Cal.App.4th 550
    , 557 (Premier Medical).)
    In the present case, plaintiffs try to avoid the deferential abuse of
    discretion standard of review by contending that the trial court failed to
    conduct the proper legal analysis in ruling on defendants’ attorney fee
    motions because it failed to examine whether defendants sought fees
    reflecting duplicative efforts. (569 East County Boulevard LLC v.
    Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 
    6 Cal.App.5th 426
    , 434 [“the
    determination of whether the trial court selected the proper legal
    standards in making its fee determination is reviewed de novo [citation]
    and, although the trial court has broad authority in determining the
    amount of reasonable legal fees, the award can be reversed for an abuse
    of discretion when it employed the wrong legal standard in making its
    determination”].) However, the trial court’s orders granting the
    attorney fee motions belie plaintiffs’ assertion that the court failed to
    select the proper legal standards. In fact, in each order, the trial court
    noted its obligation to award fees only for the hours reasonably
    expended, and to reduce the award where an attorney’s efforts were
    duplicative. And, in each order, the trial court excluded hours it
    concluded were unnecessary or duplicative.
    63
    That the trial court did not expressly state it was reducing the
    hours for which it awarded fees due to the fact that there were
    numerous arguments made by multiple sets of defendants is not
    evidence that the court did not apply the proper legal analysis. The
    court was not required to issue a statement of decision with specific
    findings, and “‘“[a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to
    support [the judgment] on matters as to which the record is silent, and
    error must be affirmatively shown.”’” (Ketchum, 
    supra,
     24 Cal.4th at p.
    1140; see also Rey v. Madera Unified School Dist. (2012) 
    203 Cal.App.4th 1223
    , 1244 [“It is the trial court’s role to examine the
    evidence and we presume the trial court performed its duty”].) In any
    event, plaintiffs’ assertion that fees should not be awarded for hours
    expended on arguments when multiple defendants raised substantially
    similar arguments is not supported by law or logic. Plaintiffs cite to no
    case law, and we have found none, that holds a trial court is required to
    reduce an attorney fee award to account for arguments made by
    multiple parties represented by separate attorneys. Moreover, while
    some of the arguments made by the defendants may have been
    “duplicative,” the work done by the attorneys for each set of defendants
    was not necessarily unreasonable. The attorneys for each set of
    defendants owed a duty to their clients, and to the court, to conduct
    their own analysis of the issues to ensure that the issues they raised
    had a basis in law and the facts.
    The trial court was “‘“the best judge of the value of professional
    services rendered in his court.”’” (Ketchum, 
    supra,
     24 Cal.4th at p.
    1132.) We have no cause to second guess its determination here.
    64
    3.    Review of Investigative Records
    The OC defendants’ attorney fee motion sought to recover fees for
    the hours their attorneys spent reviewing “voluminous documentation”
    from the OC district attorney’s office.13 As one of the attorneys stated
    in his declaration filed in support of the motion, he “had to spend
    numerous hours reviewing the [district attorney’s] extensive, four-year
    criminal investigation into Plaintiffs’ illegal business practices . . .
    because the [district attorney’s] investigation was the crux of Plaintiffs’
    [complaint], [and he] could not prepare an appropriate defense to
    Plaintiffs’ allegations until [he] had comprehensively analyzed said
    investigation. The expenses incurred reviewing this information was
    ‘inextricably intertwined’ with [the OC defendants’] anti-SLAPP motion,
    and necessary in order for [them] to succeed on such motion.”
    Plaintiffs argued in opposition to the OC defendants’ motion that
    fees for the hours spent reviewing the OC district attorney’s
    investigation should not be awarded because that review was not
    necessary to bring an anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court addressed
    plaintiffs’ argument in its order awarding fees. It credited the OC
    defendants’ attorney’s statement that the review and analysis of the
    documents related to the OC district attorney’s investigation was
    “inextricably intertwined” with the anti-SLAPP motion, and found that
    13     This review of documentation was listed in a chart the OC defendants
    submitted in support of their motion, which set out the number of hours
    billed by each attorney every month, with a list of tasks for each month. The
    review of documentation was one of many tasks listed in May 2018; one of the
    attorneys billed 23.4 hours that month, and the other attorney billed 51.5
    hours.
    65
    billing for that review and analysis was not unreasonable or unrelated
    to the anti-SLAPP motion.
    On appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court’s conclusion
    “‘exceeded the bounds of reason’ in the context of the legal ground
    advanced in the [OC defendants’] anti-SLAPP motion” because none of
    the OC defendants’ legal defenses asserted in that motion had anything
    to do with the investigative files. It is not enough for plaintiffs to
    simply argue that the details of the OC district attorney’s investigation
    was not necessary to the arguments the OC defendants made in the
    anti-SLAPP motion. Plaintiffs must make “‘“‘a clear showing that [the
    trial court’s] decision was arbitrary or irrational’”’” before we may
    conclude there was an abuse of discretion. (Premier Medical, supra, 163
    Cal.App.4th at p. 557.) They have not done so here. Accordingly, we
    affirm the trial court’s order.
    //
    //
    //
    //
    //
    //
    //
    //
    //
    66
    DISPOSITION
    All of the orders granting the special motions to strike and
    motions for attorney fees filed by defendants are affirmed. All of the
    defendants shall recover their costs on appeal.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    WILLHITE, J.
    We concur:
    MANELLA, P. J.
    COLLINS, J.
    67