People v. Wallace CA2/6 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 10/25/21 P. v. Wallace CA2/6
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SIX
    THE PEOPLE,                                                    2d Crim. No. B305348
    (Super. Ct. No. 1362689)
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                (Santa Barbara County)
    v.
    GREGORY MARSHALL
    WALLACE,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Gregory Marshall Wallace appeals from a postjudgment
    order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code1
    section 1170.95. Wallace contends the court erred in summarily
    denying his petition without appointing counsel and providing
    counsel the opportunity to file a reply brief in response to the
    prosecution’s opposition to the petition. We agree that the court
    erred in failing to appoint counsel (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
    All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
    1
    otherwise noted.
    Cal.5th 952 (Lewis)), but conclude the error was harmless
    because the record of Wallace’s conviction demonstrates he is
    ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 as a matter of law.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
    In January 2010,3 appellants [Wallace, Roberto Castaneda,
    and Christopher Jaime] were members of Lompoc’s Westside
    VLP (VLP), a Sureño gang with allegiance to the Mexican Mafia.
    VLP paid a portion of its revenue as a “tax” to the Mexican Mafia.
    If the tax was not paid, the Mexican Mafia would target VLP
    members for assault or death.
    Wallace was a high-ranking VLP member authorized to
    collect “taxes” for the gang. On January 10, Wallace was released
    from prison and began staying at his girlfriend Sonia Silva’s
    apartment in Lompoc. He met that same day with VLP member
    Joshua Lemen and VLP associates Danny Sanchez and Phillip
    Hurt. Wallace said he wanted to “tax” non-gang members who
    were selling drugs in VLP’s territory. Lemen and Sanchez gave
    Wallace the names of six local drug dealers and told some of the
    dealers they had to pay a tax to VLP.
    On January 14, Wallace asked Lemen and Sanchez to
    identify “younger homeys out there that were putting in a lot of
    work” for VLP. Wallace met with Lemen, Sanchez, Castaneda,
    Jaime, and VLP members Sergio Melgoza, Osvaldo Monroy, Ray
    2The relevant facts are recited verbatim from our 2018
    opinion affirming the judgment against Wallace. (People v.
    Castaneda (July 26, 2018, B249571) [nonpub. opn.].)
    3   All unspecified date references are to the year 2010.
    2
    Cardoza, and Francisco Vargas.4 Wallace said Lemen and
    Sanchez would sell drugs and that the others would act as a
    “gunning crew” and “really push up on the people [who] were
    selling drugs and force them to pay taxes.”
    Isidro “Pollo” Madera was a methamphetamine dealer who
    lived in Lompoc with his girlfriend Chastity Turner and her
    daughter. Madera often sold drugs in the alley near Wallace and
    Silva’s apartment. During the week prior to Madera’s murder on
    January 20, Castaneda and Cardoza went to his apartment
    several times seeking payment of the “tax.” Madera either
    refused to pay or had Turner or her daughter say he was not
    home.
    Juan Carlos Astorga lived in an apartment across the alley
    from Wallace and Silva. Astorga had allowed Madera to sell
    drugs out of his apartment. A week or so before Madera’s
    murder, Wallace went to Astorga’s apartment and demanded that
    he pay a monthly $100 tax to VLP. Wallace said things would “go
    really bad” for Astorga and Madera if they did not pay the tax.
    Wallace said he would try to collect from Madera again and left.
    Astorga called the police and reported the incident to Detective
    David Garcia.
    On January 18, Wallace met at Silva’s apartment with
    Castaneda, Jaime, Melgoza, Osvaldo Monroy, Lemen, and
    4  Cardoza and Vargas testified for the prosecution pursuant
    to plea agreements. Cardoza pled guilty to first degree murder
    and admitted gang and firearm use enhancements in exchange
    for a commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ)
    until the age of 23 or 25. Vargas pled guilty to second degree
    murder and admitted a gang enhancement for a sentence of 15
    years to life.
    3
    Sanchez. Wallace was angry and said he wanted them to kill a
    drug dealer who was refusing to pay taxes. He received two
    shotguns from Lemen and gave them to Jaime along with a sheet
    of paper with Madera’s address.
    The day of Madera’s murder, Wallace went to Astorga’s
    apartment and again accused him of selling drugs there. Wallace
    directed Carlos Correa, who was visiting Astorga, to drive
    Astorga and Jaime to Madera’s apartment. When Astorga and
    Correa returned, Wallace ordered them to walk with him to his
    apartment. Castaneda, Jaime, Vargas, Cardoza, and VLP
    members David Yang and Eric Monroy5 eventually arrived.
    Wallace donned a black mask and gloves and told the group to
    “go over there and finish him off.” Wallace said, “This fool thinks
    I’m playing, if he doesn’t pay up, blast him.”
    Castaneda, Jaime, Cardoza, Monroy, Vargas, and Yang got
    into Vargas’s car. Castaneda had a shotgun and Monroy had a
    shorter shotgun with black electrical tape on the handle. The
    guns were given to Jaime, who wrapped them in a towel and
    placed them in the truck. Vargas drove to an alley a block away
    from Madera’s apartment and parked. Wallace, Astorga, and
    Correa returned to Astorga’s apartment.
    Cardoza and Yang got out of Vargas’s car and went to see if
    Madera was home. They returned and reported that Madera was
    in the alley outside his apartment. Jaime called Wallace, who
    5Yang testified for the prosecution. He was 15 years old at
    the time of the murder. He pled guilty to second degree murder
    and admitted a gang enhancement in exchange for a DJJ
    commitment until the age of 23 or 25. Eric Monroy (Monroy),
    Osvaldo Monroy’s brother, disappeared several months after the
    murder and was still at large at the time of trial.
    4
    told him they should “blast” Madera if he refused “to pay up.”
    Castaneda and Monroy took their shotguns from the trunk and
    the group walked toward Madera’s apartment. Madera was in
    the carport fixing a flat tire on his truck. Jaime made a gesture
    to identify Madera to the others.
    Castaneda and Monroy approached Madera. One of them
    asked Madera in Spanish if he was “Pollo” and Madera replied in
    Spanish, “Yes, why[?]” Jaime, Cardoza, or Yang said, “Get him.”
    Castaneda and Monroy pulled out their guns and pointed them at
    Madera. Madera raised his hands and said, “No, no.” Castaneda
    and Monroy fired their guns at Madera. A shotgun blast from
    Monroy’s gun hit Madera in the back and he fell to the ground.
    Castaneda’s gun jammed. Castaneda, Monroy, and Vargas ran
    back to Vargas’s car. Jaime, Cardoza and Yang ran in the
    opposite direction.
    Turner witnessed the shooting as she was returning to the
    carport from her apartment. The police arrived in response to a
    911 call and found Madera lying on the ground and bleeding. He
    was transported to the hospital and later died from his injuries.
    Turner told the police that Cardoza and other VLP members had
    shot Madera.
    Wallace heard the sirens from Astorga’s apartment and
    told Astorga and Correa, “It’s done.” Wallace left and returned
    with a scale and methamphetamine, which he placed in several
    small packages.
    Police officers responding to the incident saw Cardoza
    running nearby and detained him. Yang saw the police detain
    Cardoza, so he stayed in a restaurant before walking home.
    Vargas drove to the residence of his friend Alfonso Reyes, who
    lived across the street from Astorga. Monroy told Reyes that
    5
    Monroy and Castaneda “just did something” and needed to
    destroy the evidence. Castaneda and Monroy gave their clothes
    to Reyes and took showers. Reyes burned the clothing and gave
    Castaneda and Monroy other clothes to wear.
    Monroy removed the guns from Vargas’s car. Vargas
    removed the towel along with a carrying bag for a chair. Monroy
    wrapped the guns and bag in the towel and put them in an
    apartment behind Reyes’s house. On Wallace’s orders, Jamie put
    the guns in the bag and brought them to Astorga’s apartment.
    Wallace hid the guns in the backyard. Jaime took the packages
    of drugs Wallace had assembled and left.
    While Wallace was still at Astorga’s apartment, Detective
    Garcia called Astorga and told him Madera had been killed.
    Astorga said he told the detective he was okay but did not
    elaborate because Wallace was there. After Astorga hung up,
    Wallace told him he would be using his apartment to sell drugs
    and hid some of the drugs in the backyard. Wallace said Astorga
    would suffer the same fate as Madera if he did not take care of
    the drugs and guns. After Wallace left, Astorga called Detective
    Garcia and reported what had happened. The detective and
    another officer went to Astorga’s apartment and Astorga showed
    them where the guns and drugs were hidden. Astorga and his
    son were escorted to the police station.
    Wallace was arrested several hours later at his apartment.
    When he spoke to Silva by telephone a few hours after his arrest,
    he said the “old dude” across the street still had his “stuff” and
    that his “protégé” Jaime knew this “because he was over there
    with [him].” Wallace had similar conversations with Jaime and
    Silva. The next day, Wallace called Silva and told her to convey
    to Jaime that the police were asking questions and to tell
    6
    everyone to keep quiet. Several days later, Silva told Jaime,
    Vargas, and Melgoza that Wallace wanted them to recover the
    guns from Astorga’s apartment. Jaime, Vargas, and Melgoza
    ransacked the apartment in an effort to find the guns, not
    knowing that the police had already confiscated them.
    Lompoc Police Department Agent Scott Casey testified as
    the prosecution’s gang expert. Agent Casey testified about VLP’s
    pattern of criminal activity and identified the predicate crimes
    committed by its members. Based on his review of the reports in
    the case and the trial testimony, Agent Casey opined that VLP
    would benefit from killing a drug dealer who refused to pay taxes
    to the gang. When presented with a hypothetical tracking the
    facts of the case, the agent opined that Madera’s murder was
    committed for VLP’s benefit.
    Jaime did not present any evidence in his defense.
    Castaneda offered the testimony of a private investigator who
    interviewed Turner four times. Turner told the investigator that
    the individuals who shot Madera were two older men. She also
    said the men were bigger than the two teenagers (one of whom
    was Castaneda) who came to the apartment looking for Madera.
    Wallace offered several witnesses who testified to Astorga’s
    reputation for dishonesty and untrustworthiness. Astorga’s
    stepdaughter testified that he had molested her as a child.
    Wallace also called a gang expert who opined it was doubtful that
    a VLP member who had just gotten out of prison would be given
    the power to make gang-related decisions. The expert also
    expressed doubt that someone with a leadership position in the
    gang would plan a murder while non-gang members were
    present. He further questioned whether a gang would sanction
    7
    the killing of a “nickel and dime drug runner” and give him so
    little time to pay before carrying out the crime.
    In 2013, a jury convicted Wallace, Castaneda, and Jaime of
    first degree murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189). The jury also found
    several enhancement allegations to be true, including that the
    murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang
    (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), and that Wallace committed the murder
    for financial gain and to further the activities of his gang (§ 190.2,
    subds. (a)(1), (a)(22)). Wallace was sentenced to life without the
    possibility of parole (LWOP) plus 25 years to life and nine years
    eight months. The judgment against him was subsequently
    affirmed on appeal. (People v. Castaneda, supra, B249571.)
    In December 2019, Wallace filed a petition for resentencing
    under section 1170.95 and requested the appointment of counsel.
    The petition alleged among other things that Wallace was
    convicted of first degree murder “pursuant to the felony murder
    rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine” and that
    he “could not now be convicted” of that crime because he was not
    the actual killer and “did not, with the intent to kill, aid, abet,
    counsel, command, induce, solicit, request, or assist the actual
    killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.” Wallace
    also attached a declaration from Monroy, who is currently serving
    a prison sentence on an unrelated matter, stating among other
    things that Wallace had merely directed him, Castaneda, Jaime,
    and Vargas to assault and rob Madera.
    On February 14, 2020, the People filed motion to dismiss
    the petition and attached a copy of the unpublished opinion
    affirming the judgment against Wallace. As the People noted,
    our opinion recognized that under the instructions given to the
    jury Wallace could only have been found guilty of first degree
    8
    murder as a direct aider and abettor. The People further noted
    that in finding the financial gain and gang special circumstance
    allegations to be true (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(1), (a)(22)), the jury
    necessarily found that Wallace acted with an intent to kill.
    On March 6, 2020, the trial court denied the petition
    without appointing counsel or giving appellant the opportunity to
    file a reply brief. In reaching its conclusion, the court took
    judicial notice of the trial and appellate court records in the case
    pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (b). The
    court reasoned: “While [Wallace] was convicted of first degree
    murder (without being the actual killer), the Court of Appeal on
    direct appeal rejected any claim that [Wallace’s] first degree
    murder conviction violated People v. Chiu (2014) 
    59 Cal.4th 155
    ,
    superseded by statute as stated in People v. Lopez (2019) 
    38 Cal.App.5th 1087
    , 1103, by noting the jury instructions indicated
    [Wallace] (and his codefendants) could be found guilty ‘of first
    degree murder only if they intended to kill [the victim] and acted
    with premeditation. The jury thus convicted them [i.e., including
    petitioner Wallace] under direct aiding and abetting principles
    . . . .’ The appellate court reinforced the point by observing the
    jury found [Wallace] murdered for financial gain. The financial
    gain special circumstance[] applies to murders that ‘are
    intentional and carried out for financial gain.’ (§ 190.2, subd.
    (a)(1).) The appellate court’s conclusions on direct appeal—i.e.,
    the jury unmistakably determined in light of ‘overwhelming’
    evidence and pursuant to instructions actually given that
    [Wallace] acted with malice, premeditation, and deliberation
    when committing first degree murder as a direct aider and
    abettor— render him ineligible for relief under section 1170.95.”
    (Italics omitted.)
    9
    DISCUSSION
    Appellant contends the trial court’s denial of his petition for
    resentencing without appointing counsel or affording him the
    opportunity to file a reply brief violated his rights to the
    assistance of counsel and a fair hearing under section 1170.95
    and the federal and state constitutions. We conclude the court
    erred in failing to appoint counsel or provide an opportunity for
    counsel to file a reply brief, but deem the error harmless.
    In 2018, the Legislature amended the felony murder and
    the natural and probable consequences doctrines to ensure that
    “murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
    killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
    participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
    indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f),
    p. 6678; People v. Gentile (2020) 
    10 Cal.5th 830
    , 842.) The
    Legislature then amended sections 188 and 189, and added
    section 1170.95, to provide a procedure to persons previously
    convicted of murder pursuant to the felony murder or natural and
    probable consequences theories to obtain retroactive relief.
    (Gentile, at p. 853 [“the Legislature intended section 1170.95 to
    be the exclusive avenue for retroactive relief under Senate Bill
    [No.] 1437”].) To be eligible for resentencing, a defendant must
    establish that he “could not be convicted of first or second degree
    murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective”
    as part of Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).)
    Subdivision (a) of section 1170.95 sets forth the
    requirements for a facially sufficient petition. The petitioner
    must state that the charging document allowed the prosecution to
    proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the
    natural and probable consequences doctrine; the petitioner was
    10
    convicted of first or second degree murder; and the petitioner
    could not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of
    changes to Section 188 or 189, as effective on January 1, 2019.
    Subdivision (b)(1)(A) of section 1170.95 states where and how the
    petition must be filed and specifies its required content, including
    a declaration by petitioner that he or she “is eligible for relief
    under this section, based on all the requirements of subdivision
    (a).”
    If the petition meets the requirements of section 1170.95,
    subdivisions (a) and (b), the trial court proceeds to subdivision (c)
    to assess whether a prima facie showing for relief has been made.
    In Lewis, supra, 
    11 Cal.5th 952
    , our Supreme Court held that if a
    defendant files a facially sufficient petition and requests the
    appointment of counsel, the court must appoint counsel and
    entertain further briefing. (Id. at p. 957.) Only after the
    appointment of counsel and the opportunity for briefing may the
    court consider the record of conviction to determine whether
    petitioner made a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled
    to relief. (Id. at pp. 969-970.)
    The record of conviction relates to the trial court’s inquiry,
    distinguishing petitions with potential merit from those clearly
    meritless. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) In making its
    preliminary assessment regarding petitioner’s allegations, the
    court does not engage in fact finding and must take petitioner’s
    allegations as true. (Ibid.) However, if the record of conviction,
    including the court’s documents, refute the allegations in the
    petition, the court may make a credibility determination adverse
    to petitioner. (Ibid.)
    Here, Wallace’s petition for resentencing met the
    requirements for facial sufficiency and he requested the
    11
    appointment of counsel. The trial court thus erred in summarily
    denying his petition without first appointing counsel and
    accepting briefing. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 969-970.)
    The court in Lewis nevertheless concluded that deprivation of a
    petitioner’s right to counsel in this context is state law error only,
    tested for prejudice under the standard established in People v.
    Watson (1956) 
    46 Cal.2d 818
    .) Moreover, any error in summarily
    denying a section 1170.95 petition is harmless unless the
    petitioner can show ““‘it is reasonably probable that if [he or she]
    had been afforded assistance of counsel his [or her] petition would
    not have been summarily denied without an evidentiary
    hearing.’”” (Lewis, at p. 974.)
    We conclude that the trial court’s error in failing to appoint
    counsel and provide an opportunity for briefing before
    considering the record of conviction and summarily denying the
    petition is harmless. Contrary to Wallace’s claim, the record of
    conviction unequivocally establishes that he was convicted of
    murder as a direct aider and abettor. As we noted in our opinion
    affirming Wallace’s convictions on direct appeal, the jury
    instructions indicated “[Wallace] could be found guilty of first
    degree murder only if [he] intended to kill Madera and acted with
    premeditation. The jury thus convicted [him] under direct aiding
    and abetting principles . . . .” (People v. Castaneda, supra,
    B249571.) We also recognized that in finding true the financial
    gain special circumstance allegation, the jury necessarily found
    that Wallace acted with the requisite intent to kill. (§ 190.2,
    subd. (a)(1).)
    Wallace contends that notwithstanding this unequivocal
    evidence that he was convicted as a direct aider and abettor who
    acted with an intent to kill, his petition for resentencing was
    12
    erroneously denied because he presented a declaration from
    Monroy alleging among other things that Wallace did not order
    him, Castaneda, or Jaime to kill Madera. We are not persuaded
    because “section 1170.95 does not allow relitigation of factual
    questions that were settled by a prior jury . . . .” (People v.
    Secrease (2021) 
    63 Cal.App.5th 231
    , 247, review granted June 30,
    2021, S68862.)
    DISPOSITION
    The order denying Wallace’s section 1170.95 petition is
    affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    PERREN, J.
    We concur:
    GILBERT, P. J.
    YEGAN, J.
    13
    John F. McGregor, Judge
    Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
    ______________________________
    James Koester, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
    for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Matthew Rodriguez, Acting
    Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
    General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney
    General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising Deputy Attorney
    General, Christopher G. Sanchez, Deputy Attorney General, for
    Plaintiff and Respondent.
    14
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B305348

Filed Date: 10/25/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/25/2021