Gall v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 10/29/21
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION EIGHT
    WAYNE GALL,                           B296394
    Plaintiff and Appellant,       (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BC504268)
    v.
    SMITH & NEPHEW, INC.,
    Defendant and Respondent.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
    Los Angeles County, Randolph Rogers, Judge. Affirmed.
    Brice E. Bryan & Associates, Brice E. Bryan and
    Christopher J. Brantingham for Plaintiff and Appellant.
    Shaw Koepke & Satter, John W. Shaw, Jens B. Koepke;
    Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore and David W. O’Quinn for
    Defendant and Respondent.
    ____________________
    When a hip joint deteriorates, a hip resurfacing implant is
    one possible treatment. Smith & Nephew, Inc. (or simply
    “Smith”) manufactures hip resurfacing implants. Smith’s
    product in this case had two parts: a metal ball that covers the
    top of the femur, and a cup that fits inside the hip socket. When
    a surgeon puts these ball-and-cup surfaces in the joint, the
    polished metal surfaces are supposed to allow smoother
    movement than the damaged bone or cartilage they replace.
    The patient and plaintiff in this case is Wayne Gall, who
    had this kind of hip resurfacing surgery for his left hip. Gall
    recovered and became physically active. But years later,
    convinced his implant was unsatisfactory, Gall sued Smith.
    Gall’s first theory was “failure to warn”: Smith failed
    properly to warn Gall’s surgeon, Dr. Jaime Hernandez, about the
    risks of using Smith’s product. The trial court granted summary
    judgment for Smith because Hernandez independently knew
    these risks. Hernandez stayed current by reading scientific
    publications. Whether Smith gave Hernandez redundant
    warnings did not matter, the court ruled, when Hernandez
    already had the necessary information.
    Gall’s second theory was that Smith’s product was
    defective. The trial court granted summary judgment because
    Gall did not show anything was wrong with his implant. Gall did
    show Smith’s quality control procedures once failed to satisfy
    regulatory authorities, but the trial court concluded this fact did
    not imply the parts Gall received were defective.
    The trial court also allowed a declarant to revise his
    declaration, which Gall protests.
    The trial court’s rulings were proper. We affirm.
    2
    I
    Gall sought medical help for hip pain. On November 24,
    2010, Hernandez described Gall’s treatment options. Hernandez
    recommended hip resurfacing surgery. In this procedure, the
    surgeon trims the femoral head, caps it with a metal covering,
    and puts a cup in the pelvic socket. Both implants are metal.
    These are the implants Smith makes.
    Hernandez had special training for this kind of surgery.
    He traveled to England to study with the surgeon who designed
    this implant. Hernandez has performed hundreds or thousands
    of these surgeries.
    Hernandez routinely stayed abreast of developments in his
    field. He learned about this procedure’s risks from scientific
    studies. Hernandez’s source was “science that has been
    established and researched. And I have equal access to that
    information that the people making the labels do. [¶] So before I
    look at labels, I have the information that I need. I have the
    access to the information that I need. To the science that I need
    to educate the patient prior to opening any box [containing
    Smith’s product] and looking at any [manufacturer’s] label.”
    By reading the scientific studies, Hernandez learned about
    the possible risks and side effects “years” before operating on
    Gall.
    On November 24, 2010, Hernandez advised Gall about his
    surgical options and risks. Hernandez and Gall had different
    recollections of what Hernandez told Gall that day. They
    disagreed about whether Hernandez told Gall the metal implants
    could release metal particles that could cause a soft tissue mass
    to form. This tissue mass is sometimes called a pseudotumor.
    3
    Gall claimed Hernandez told him no known medical
    consequences could arise from the metal ions.
    Hernandez had a different account. He testified he did not
    recall the particulars of his conversation with Gall. Hernandez
    had a custom, however, of discussing major complications with all
    surgery patients before he operated on them. Hernandez had a
    lengthy list of complications he customarily discussed: metal ion
    pseudotumor, tissue damage, soft tissue injury, pain, infection,
    bleeding, blood clots, bone fracture, leg length discrepancy,
    dislocation, loosening, component fracture and wear, implant
    failure, loss of limb, amputation, renal complications, nervous
    system complications, mental status changes, and systemic and
    local complications.
    Hernandez testified about what he knew of the risks on the
    date he counseled Gall: November 24, 2010. Hernandez knew
    the body’s reaction to metal-on-metal wear debris could produce
    an adverse local tissue reaction. He knew this surgery could
    cause soft tissue masses called pseudotumors.
    After the November 24, 2010 consultation, Gall decided to
    go ahead with the procedure. Hernandez performed the surgery
    on March 28, 2011.
    About a month after the operation, Gall reported good
    progress. By September 2011, Gall was walking with a normal
    gait and was playing baseball. “He has only very occasional
    anterior muscle ache with prolonged activity. No fever, chills or
    systemic complaints. He is performing all his activities.” This
    type of muscle ache, Hernandez testified, is not uncommon after
    this type of hip surgery.
    After the surgery, Gall began playing full court basketball
    in a league.
    4
    Gall eventually became concerned about blood tests
    showing somewhat elevated levels of cobalt and chromium. On
    February 16, 2014, Hernandez told Gall those test levels were
    “not concerning for implant failure.” Hernandez did not
    recommend further testing. That was Gall’s last contact with
    Hernandez.
    After that visit with Hernandez, Gall did not consult with
    other doctors about metal ion levels in his blood.
    Gall sued Smith and Hernandez. In his deposition, Gall
    testified his main concern was the ion level in his blood. After he
    filed suit, Gall got a scan showing that he possibly had developed
    a pseudotumor. There is no evidence this tissue mass is anything
    but benign. No evidence shows the mass was growing or having
    adverse or noticeable effects on Gall’s health.
    Smith moved for summary judgment, which Gall opposed.
    The court issued an eight-page tentative ruling, heard the
    motion, and granted it on February 7, 2019. Gall appealed.
    II
    We independently review the summary judgment ruling
    under the usual standard. (See Loomis v. Amazon.com LLC
    (2021) 
    63 Cal.App.5th 466
    , 475.) There are three issues on
    appeal: whether Smith’s failure to warn Hernandez harmed
    Gall; whether Smith’s product was defective; and whether the
    trial court could permit a witness to revise a declaration.
    A
    The first issue is whether there was a failure to warn.
    Tort law has a special twist when it comes to
    manufacturers, physicians, and patients. In the case of
    prescription drugs and implants, the physician stands in the
    shoes of the product’s ordinary user: a patient learns of the
    5
    properties and proper use of the drug or implant from the
    physician. In these cases, the manufacturer’s duty to warn runs
    to the physician and not to the patient. (Valentine v. Baxter
    Healthcare Corp. (1999) 
    68 Cal.App.4th 1467
    , 1483.)
    This special twist is called the “learned intermediary”
    doctrine. (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 
    7 Cal.App.5th 276
    ,
    318–320.) Its motivating force is that, for prescription drugs and
    implants, the doctor interrupts the ordinary commercial chain
    from the manufacturer to the final consumer. Patients want to
    be able to rely entirely on their doctors’ informed and
    independent judgments. The law and medical ethics both
    demand that doctors, for their patients’ benefit, evaluate
    scientific information about prescription drugs and implants.
    Manufacturers thus must warn doctors about product risks. This
    duty does not extend to patients, with whom manufacturers have
    no cost-effective channel of communication and for whom the
    data would be duplicative even if the patient could interpret it.
    (Id. at p. 319.)
    For Gall’s suit against Smith, then, the decisive issue is,
    when Hernandez counseled Gall on November 24, 2010, what
    medical risks Hernandez knew. What Hernandez told Gall is a
    different matter. That might be pertinent to Gall’s lawsuit
    against Hernandez, but that case is not before us.
    If Hernandez were fully informed about the implant’s risks
    on November 24, Smith wins on this claim, for any failure by
    Smith to inform Hernandez could not have caused Gall any harm:
    Hernandez already had the needed warning. The parties agree
    on this point.
    The trial court rightly ruled that Hernandez’s deposition
    was unambiguous. Hernandez knew about the metal ion issue
    6
    because he read the underlying scientific studies as they
    appeared. Hernandez used primary materials to keep himself
    current in his specialty and did not need or use manufacturers’
    republications and warnings.
    Gall resists this conclusion by seizing on one sentence in
    Hernandez’s deposition. Gall claims this sentence creates a
    material dispute over whether Hernandez knew about the metal
    ion risk from Smith’s product. The trial court properly rejected
    this argument. Hernandez was clear and consistent throughout
    his deposition: he knew about this risk. No other interpretation
    of this deposition is reasonable.
    The context is as follows.
    Q [by Gall’s counsel]: So since you met with him
    before this warning came out, if it had come out sooner,
    would you have told him “Hey, there was an FDA warning
    that came out and this is the information that was in
    it.” Something to that effect?
    Mr. Stockalper [Hernandez’s counsel]: Again, you’re
    characterizing this as a warning. It’s—and it’s been asked
    and answered. He’s already testified that he’s aware of this
    information. He talks to the patient about the
    information. It’s part of the risk complications. So it’s
    asked and answered. So I don’t—
    A [by Hernandez]: Yes. I would have—I would
    have—I talk to patients about all—all the information that
    is relevant to their specific situation and the science that’s
    available.
    Gall’s argument is that the Food and Drug Administration
    published information about metal ion risks between the time of
    Hernandez’s November 24, 2010 consultation and the March 28,
    7
    2011 surgery, and in the just-quoted answer Hernandez
    demonstrated in effect he did not know of the metal ion risk on
    November 24, 2010.
    Gall’s proposed interpretation is not reasonable.
    Hernandez testified he did know of the ion risk on November 24,
    2010. Hernandez’s testimony was straightforward: steadfast,
    unequivocal, and with no backtracking.
    When evaluating the record of a summary judgment
    motion, the trial court must consider all inferences reasonably
    deducible from the evidence in the opposing party’s favor. (Code
    Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
    (2001) 
    25 Cal.4th 826
    , 843, 850–851.) The court may not weigh
    the plaintiff’s evidence or inferences against the defendants’ as
    though it were sitting as the trier of fact. The court nevertheless
    must determine what the evidence or inference could imply to a
    reasonable trier of fact. (Aguilar, at p. 856.)
    The fact that Hernandez knew of the ion risk when
    counseling Gall deflates many of Gall’s other arguments. These
    arguments involve an agency alert in the United Kingdom,
    Smith’s delay in getting data to the Food and Drug
    Administration, and an allegedly deficient brochure. The
    pertinence of these arguments evaporates once Hernandez
    explained he learned of the ion risk from scientific studies. The
    agency alerts and the brochure merely repeated what Hernandez
    already knew. The secondhand reports were superfluous.
    Hernandez testified that nothing about the Food and Drug
    Administration’s warning changed his “thinking or decision
    making for Mr. Gall.” He said, “this information was already
    known by me.” The contents of this agency alert was “no news to
    anybody like me.” Gall does not suggest or offer authority for the
    8
    notion that an agency imprimatur changes the quality or
    significance of the science the agency relayed.
    The trial court properly rejected Gall’s argument on the
    failure-to-warn issue.
    B
    The second issue is whether there was a manufacturing
    defect in the product Smith supplied to Gall.
    A defective product differs either from what the
    manufacturer intended or from the standard items in the
    manufacturer’s same product line. (Barker v. Lull Engineering
    Co. (1978) 
    20 Cal.3d 413
    , 429.) A classic manufacturing defect is
    when a product leaves the assembly line in substandard
    condition, as when a crane maker means to use strong cable but
    mistakenly installs weak cable in its crane. (Ibid., citing Lewis v.
    American Hoist & Derrick Co. (1971) 
    20 Cal.App.3d 570
    , 580.)
    Gall did not show his implant came from the factory in
    substandard condition. The evidence was to the contrary. His
    implant had been checked for defects twice: once at the factory
    and again by Hernandez before he used it in Gall’s operation.
    Both inspections showed Gall’s implant was free of defects.
    Gall points to a 2010 inspection report by the Food and
    Drug Administration that criticized Smith for lacking validation
    of supplier processes. The trial court accurately characterized
    this report as showing merely that Smith’s quality control process
    did not satisfy the regulatory authorities. No evidence shows any
    defective product entered the stream of commerce.
    Gall cites no product defect precedent for substituting a
    process defect for a product defect. Gall’s opening brief cites only
    two decisions in this argument. Both decisions concern
    employment law, not defective products. (See McDonald v.
    9
    Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 
    45 Cal.4th 88
    ;
    Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (2004) 
    121 Cal.App.4th 95
    .) Nor
    does Gall attempt an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of
    his proposed doctrinal innovation. We will not embark on this
    journey without some kind of map.
    To the extent Gall attempts to argue the alleged
    pseudotumor itself is evidence of a defect, the trial court correctly
    noted this fact does not support Gall’s belief his implant was
    defective. Pseudotumors are risks of nondefective implants. This
    result is consistent with a perfect implant and is not probative of
    a defect.
    C
    Gall’s negligence claim falls with his claims about the
    failure to warn and the manufacturing defect. These claims
    share the same causation element. Gall concedes this point. We
    affirm the trial court’s rulings on the failure-to-warn and
    manufacturing defect claims. We thus likewise affirm the trial
    court’s ruling on Gall’s negligence claim.
    D
    Gall argues in his opening brief that the trial court erred by
    considering evidence attached to the declaration of attorney
    David O’Quinn in support of Smith’s motion. Gall bases this
    argument on O’Quinn’s technical violation of Code of Civil
    Procedure section 2015.5: O’Quinn executed the declaration
    outside California but did not include language stating he made
    the declaration under penalty of perjury “under the laws of the
    State of California.” O’Quinn fixed this mistake before the
    hearing. Gall’s argument is meritless. (See Hearn v. Howard
    (2009) 
    177 Cal.App.4th 1193
    , 1203–1204 [courts can properly find
    errors under section 2015.5 harmless].)
    10
    DISPOSITION
    We affirm the judgment and award costs to Smith &
    Nephew.
    WILEY, J.
    We concur:
    STRATTON, Acting P. J.
    OHTA, J. *
    *     Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
    Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
    Constitution.
    11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B296394

Filed Date: 10/29/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/29/2021