Marriage of Mobley and Williams CA4/2 ( 2013 )

Filed 6/26/13 Marriage of Mobley and Williams CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re the Marriage of KAREN ANN
MOBLEY and JOHN RASEY
WILLIAMS.
KAREN ANN MOBLEY,
E054128
Respondent,
(Super.Ct.No. SWD1100308)
v.
OPINION
JOHN RASEY WILLIAMS,
Appellant.
BUXBAUM & CHAKMAK
Objector and Appellant
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Judith C. Clark,
Judge. Dismissed.
Buxbaum & Chakmak and John Chakmak for Appellants.
Karen Ann Mobley, in pro. per., for Respondent
In this appeal, we were asked to decide whether the trial court erred in
disqualifying a law firm from representing a husband in a dissolution action when
the law firm had jointly represented the husband and his wife (1) in preparing a
will and trust for the wife as part of a joint estate planning, (2) in a limited liability
company jointly owned by them, and (3) in their dispute with a neighbor.
However, after receipt of the tentative opinion, appellants requested the appeal be
dismissed because the matter had been settled. The request is unopposed.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS
Beginning in 1985, Appellant Buxbaum and Chakmak (the Law Firm)
began representing John Rasey Williams (Husband) in both his business and
personal matters. On September 28, 2002, Husband married respondent Karen
Mobley (Wife). Prior to the marriage, the couple entered into a Prenuptial
Agreement. The couple has one child.
On January 25, 2011, Husband filed for dissolution of marriage in Clark
County, Nevada (case No. D-11-441003-D).1 On February 7, Wife initiated this
action by filing a Petition for Legal Separation (the Petition). The Petition was
amended on February 22. On April 8, Husband moved to quash the Petition based
on the dissolution action in Nevada. In May, Wife filed a motion to disqualify the
Law Firm from representing Husband on the grounds that a “substantial
relationship” existed by virtue of the fact that the Law Firm represented both
1 A subsequent decree of divorce was entered in the Nevada action on June
2, 2011.
Husband and Wife with respect to their wills, trusts, and businesses. Husband
opposed the motion and a hearing was held on June 8. After considering the
evidence presented, along with argument of counsel, the trial court found that the
Law Firm “has a conflict of interest and is disqualified from representing
[Husband] in this action.” On July 7, Husband filed his motion for
reconsideration, which was denied on August 10, 2011. That same day, the trial
court granted Husband’s motion to quash, dismissing Wife’s Petition. Both
Husband and the Law Firm appeal.2
After this case was fully briefed and a tentative opinion had been drafted
and mailed to the parties in April, the Law Firm contacted this court on April 19,
2013, requesting that the appeal be dismissed because the case had been settled.
On May 9, we requested that appellants provide us with the date of settlement. By
letter filed June 6, 2013, the Law Firm informed this court that the typewritten
date on the settlement agreement is January 1, 2013, although the parties probably
signed the agreement on another date in January.
II. REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.244(c)(2),3 “On receipt of a
request or stipulation to dismiss, the court may dismiss the appeal and direct
2 “Disqualified attorneys themselves have standing to challenge orders
disqualifying them. [Citation.]” (A.I. Credit Corp., Inc. v. Aguilar & Sebastinelli
(2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1077.)
3All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court unless
otherwise indicated.
immediate issuance of the remittitur.” We note that dismissal is discretionary.
While this court strongly encourages parties to resolve their differences, if
possible, via the settlement process, once the case has been fully briefed, it is
assigned to a justice for preparation of the tentative opinion. To that end, valuable
court resources are engaged in reviewing the entire record, researching the issues
raised, and drafting the tentative opinion. Out of courtesy to the court and all
parties involved, when settlement of a case is being discussed, the party initiating
those settlement discussions should request a stay of further action in order to
avoid wasting valuable judicial resources. Moreover, rule 8.244(a)(1) states: “If a
civil case settles after a notice of appeal has been filed either as a whole or as to
any party, the appellant who has settled must immediately serve and file a notice
of settlement in the Court of Appeal.” (Italics added.)
“Since 1851, California appellate courts have been statutorily authorized to
impose sanctions for the prosecution of frivolous civil appeals. [Citations.] Thus,
under the present statute, section 907 of the Code of Civil Procedure (section 907),
if a reviewing court has found an appeal ‘was frivolous or taken solely for delay, it
may add to the costs on appeal such damages as may be just.’ Though the instant
appeal is not frivolous within the meaning of In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31
Cal.3d 637, 649 . . . and not taken for the purpose of delay, and section 907 is
therefore inapplicable, the reasoning of courts that have imposed sanctions under
section 907 is nevertheless pertinent to [the Law Firm’s] conduct. Because the
traditional purpose of imposing sanctions under section 907 was to compensate the
respondent for being put to the expense of defending a frivolous appeal or one
taken solely for the purpose of delay, costs were ordinarily made payable to the
respondent to compensate him or her for the costs necessarily incurred in
answering the frivolous appeal. Increasingly, however, sanctions for the filing of
frivolous appeals have also been made payable to the court. As [our colleagues in
the First District, Division Four] pointed out in the much-cited opinion in Finnie v.
Town of Tiburon (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1 . . . respondents ‘are not the only
parties damaged when an appellant pursues a frivolous claim. Other appellate
parties, many of whom wait years for a resolution of bona fide disputes, are
prejudiced by the useless diversion of this court’s attention. [Citation.] In the
same vein, the appellate system and the taxpayers of this state are damaged by
what amounts to a waste of this court’s time and resources. [Citations.]
Accordingly, an appropriate measure of sanctions should also compensate the
government for its expense in processing, reviewing and deciding a frivolous
appeal. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]
“This reasoning is as applicable to the instant appeal as it is to those that are
frivolous. Indeed, where, as here, the rule violation did not injure the respondent,
making sanctions payable to the court may be particularly appropriate because the
misconduct would not otherwise be punishable, and judicial ability to discourage
violations of rules essential to the efficient administration of justice would be
diminished.
“Presumably for this reason, the rules of court provide that, on its own
motion (or that of a party), a Court of Appeal may impose sanctions on a party or
an attorney not only for ‘(1) Taking a frivolous appeal or appealing solely to cause
delay; [¶] (2) Including in the record any matter not reasonably material to the
appeal’s determination; [or] [¶] (3) Filing a frivolous motion;’ but also for
‘(4) Committing any other unreasonable violation of these rules.’ [Citations.]”
(Huschke v. Slater (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1160-1162, italics in original, fn.
omitted; see also rule 8.276(a)(1)-(4).)
We agree with the analysis in Huschke v. Slater, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th
1153, and conclude that the Law Firm’s failure to comply with rule 8.244(a)(1), is
arguably inexcusable and “unreasonable” under rule 8.276(a)(4). By the time of
the mailing of the tentative opinion, considerable time and resources had been
devoted to this pointless appeal. Thus, it is appropriate to sanction the Law Firm
in an amount that reflects the current cost to the court of processing this appeal
through the mailing of the tentative opinion. A 2008 case cites a cost analysis by
the clerk’s office for the Second Appellate District that estimated the cost of
processing an appeal that results in an opinion by the court to be approximately
$8,500. (In re Marriage of Gong & Kwong (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 510, 520.)
Recognizing the legal issues involved in this appeal are not complex, and the
matter did not proceed to oral argument, we would approximate a sanction of
$5,500 to be appropriate to reimburse the state for the costs of this appeal.
Notwithstanding the above, it is in our discretion to sanction the Law Firm
for its failure to comply with rule 8.244(a)(1), to dismiss the appeal under rule
8.244(c)(2), or to do both. While we are tempted to do both, we will only grant
the request and dismiss the appeal. However, let this opinion be a warning to the
appellants that any future failure to comply with rule 8.244(a)(1) will be
considered inexcusable and “unreasonable” under rule 8.276(a)(4), subject to
sanctions.
III. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
HOLLENHORST
Acting P. J.
We concur:
RICHLI
J.
MILLER
J.