Moradian v. Rideshare Port Management CA2/3 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 12/2/21 Moradian v. Rideshare Port Management CA2/3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    RAYMOND MORADIAN,                                              B301784
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                             Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BC496400
    v.
    RIDESHARE PORT
    MANAGEMENT, LLC, et al.,
    Defendants and Appellants.
    APPEAL from a judgment and orders of the Superior Court
    of Los Angeles County, Kenneth R. Freeman, Judge. Judgment
    and orders affirmed; appeals dismissed.
    Koletsky, Mancini, Feldman & Morrow, Jason N. Cirlin
    and Kristyn J. Mintesnot for Defendants and Appellants.
    Capstone Law, Ryan H. Wu, Liana Carter and Robert
    Drexler; The Hamideh Firm and Basil A. Hamideh for Plaintiff
    and Respondent.
    _________________________
    Defendants Rideshare Port Management, LLC (Rideshare),
    Prime Time Shuttle, Inc. (Prime Time), Airport Transportation
    Associates, LLC (Airport Transportation), Red Vans Management
    Services, Inc. (Red Vans), and Rattan Joea appeal a judgment
    confirming an arbitration award in favor of plaintiff Raymond
    Moradian and other post-judgment orders.
    The trial court vacated the judgment against Rideshare
    and Prime Time, concluding a bankruptcy stay protected them
    from state court action. Because they are not subject to the
    judgment, Rideshare and Prime Time are not proper parties
    to this appeal, and we must dismiss their appeal accordingly.
    As for the remaining defendants, the record shows they
    failed to petition to vacate the arbitration award within the
    100-day period mandated under Code of Civil Procedure sections
    1286.4, 1288, and 1288.2.1 Because their failure to comply with
    this deadline deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to vacate the
    award against them, the non-debtor defendants cannot establish
    prejudicial error as a matter of law. We affirm the judgment
    against the non-debtor defendants and the post-judgment orders.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Defendants operate the Prime Time Shuttle airport
    transportation service.2 Moradian worked for defendants as
    a shuttle van driver for over 200 workdays in 2011 and 2012.
    On November 29, 2012, Moradian filed this action against
    Rideshare, Prime Time, and Airport Transportation for alleged
    1     Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure,
    unless otherwise designated.
    2     Unless otherwise specified, the term “defendants” refers to
    Rideshare, Prime Time, Airport Transportation, Red Vans, and
    Joea, collectively.
    2
    Labor Code violations. He asserted a representative claim under
    the Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.,
    PAGA) and several causes of action in his personal capacity. The
    complaint generally alleged defendants misclassified Moradian
    and other non-exempt employees as independent contractors,
    resulting in numerous wage and hour violations.
    On September 12, 2013, Rideshare, Prime Time, and
    Airport Transportation filed a motion to compel arbitration
    and to stay the litigation. Joea (who was not named as a
    defendant at the time) offered a supporting declaration in his
    capacity as Managing Member of Rideshare, authenticating
    an Owner-Operator Sub-Carrier Agreement between Rideshare
    and Moradian. The agreement required arbitration of “any
    controversy or claim between the parties” to be submitted
    to arbitration under JAMS Rules of Practice and Procedure.
    The agreement also stipulated that “if either party fails to appear
    at any properly-noticed arbitration proceeding, an award may
    be entered against such party despite said failure to appear.”
    On November 20, 2013, the trial court granted defendants’
    motion to compel arbitration of the individual claims, and
    severed and stayed the PAGA claim pending completion
    of the arbitration.
    On June 9, 2014, Moradian submitted his demand and
    statement of claims in arbitration, naming Rideshare, Prime
    Time, and Airport Transportation as respondents. JAMS
    assigned the arbitration to the Honorable Steven J. Stone (Ret.).
    On June 29, 2016, after taking the deposition of Joea
    (whom the arbitration respondents designated the person
    most qualified to testify regarding the relevant labor practices),
    3
    Moradian amended his arbitration claim to name Red Vans
    and Joea as respondents in the arbitration.
    On February 28, 2017, defendants asked the arbitrator
    to dismiss Joea from the action. Moradian opposed the request,
    expressing concern that Joea could be using the entity defendants
    as an alter ego to protect assets from an eventual judgment.
    To resolve the issue, the arbitrator authorized Moradian to
    propound a total of 15 discovery requests about the corporate
    structure and financial status of each company.
    On March 1, 2017, Moradian propounded written discovery
    regarding the alter ego issues. On April 19, 2017, defendants
    provided limited responses, refusing to disclose certain financial
    information. Moradian sent a meet and confer letter requesting
    supplemental responses. Defendants did not respond.
    On June 5, 2017, the arbitrator notified the parties that
    defendants’ arbitration fee payment was delinquent.
    On July 11, 2017, Moradian moved to compel compliance
    with the arbitrator’s discovery order.
    On July 13, 2017, the arbitrator ordered defendants to pay
    $44,228.84 in past-due arbitration fees, to provide supplemental
    responses to Moradian’s discovery requests, and to produce
    all financial documents requested within 10 calendar days.
    Defendants did not pay the arbitration fees or supplement
    their responses by the ordered deadline.
    On August 10, 2017, Moradian moved for terminating
    sanctions based on defendants’ violation of the arbitrator’s
    orders.
    On September 15, 2017, Moradian moved for a liability
    finding. Relying on deposition testimony by Joea and other
    defense witnesses, Moradian argued defendants had “failed to
    4
    overcome the presumption under California law that [Moradian]
    was an employee rather than an independent contractor.”
    The arbitrator ordered defendants to file a response to
    Moradian’s pending motions by October 9, 2017. Defendants
    failed to respond by the ordered deadline.
    On October 10, 2017, the arbitrator granted defendants’
    request for a one-week extension to submit responses to
    Moradian’s motion to compel compliance with discovery,
    motion for sanctions, and motion for a liability finding.
    Despite receiving the extension, defendants failed to respond
    to the pending motions.
    On October 19, 2017, the arbitrator entered an order
    granting Moradian’s request for a liability finding and award
    against defendants. Citing evidence submitted with Moradian’s
    request, the arbitrator found the nature of Moradian’s
    relationship with defendants, defendants’ ability to terminate
    the relationship, and defendants’ ability to control Moradian’s
    work, among other factors, weighed in favor of finding an
    employer-employee relationship. The arbitrator also found the
    deposition testimony given by defendants’ designated witnesses
    established the “different ‘companies’ [were] alter egos of the
    other” and, “in the absence of ordered discovery” regarding their
    financial relationships that defendants refused to provide, the
    arbitrator concluded all defendants were jointly and severally
    liable for the wage and hour violations. The arbitrator ordered
    Moradian to submit briefing on damages and attorney fees
    to determine the monetary amount of the award.
    On October 25, 2017—six days after the arbitrator issued
    its order finding defendants jointly and severally liable for
    Moradian’s injuries—Rideshare filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
    5
    and provided notice to the trial court. On October 27, 2017,
    the trial court entered a minute order acknowledging the case
    (including the related arbitration) was automatically stayed
    for all purposes.
    On December 6, 2017, the bankruptcy court extended a
    litigation injunction for non-debtor entities related to Rideshare,
    including the four other defendants in this action. However, on
    July 16, 2018, the bankruptcy court terminated the non-debtor
    injunction in an order denying Rideshare’s motion to confirm its
    plan of reorganization. The bankruptcy court found Rideshare’s
    disclosure statement did not contain adequate information and
    its plan for reorganization was “patently un-confirmable.”
    On August 3, 2018, the trial court entered an order lifting
    the stay on arbitration against the non-debtor defendants to
    allow Moradian to “seek individual damages through the current
    Arbitrator.” The order confirmed the “matter continues to be
    stayed with respect to Rideshare.”
    On November 9, 2018, Moradian submitted briefing on
    damages and attorney fees to the arbitrator. The arbitrator
    ordered the non-debtor defendants to submit their opposition
    by November 27, 2018. The non-debtor defendants failed to
    file a response.
    On November 29, 2018, “to provide full due process to the
    parties . . . [and] to provide the Parties an opportunity to verbally
    express their views,” the arbitrator requested a conference call
    with the parties. On January 14, 2019, the arbitrator held
    the call. Defendants’ counsel and Joea appeared on defendants’
    behalf. Defendants made no argument regarding the bankruptcy
    and asserted only that they had no funds to pay a judgment.
    6
    On January 15, 2019, the arbitrator issued the final
    arbitration award, awarding Moradian $121,519.31 for unpaid
    wages, prejudgment interest, unreimbursed business expenses,
    and statutory penalties, plus $1,000,000 in attorney fees and
    $31,264.76 for litigation costs and expenses. On January 16,
    2019, the arbitrator’s office served defendants with a signed
    copy of the final arbitration award.
    On February 8, 2019, Moradian filed a petition to
    confirm the arbitration award in the trial court. The court
    set defendants’ opposition deadline for March 28, 2019 and
    the hearing on the petition for April 11, 2019 (71 and 85 days,
    respectively, after defendants were served with the final
    arbitration award). The court expressly admonished defendants
    and their counsel about the consequences of failing to oppose
    the petition: “If there is no opposition to this petition filed by
    the hearing date, then there will be no reason not to confirm the
    arbitration award. In other words, if you do nothing, the award
    will be confirmed, and there will be a judgment.” Defendants’
    counsel responded: “Understood.”
    On April 8, 2019, Prime Time filed a voluntary petition
    for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Prime Time did not, however, notify
    the trial court or Moradian of the automatic bankruptcy stay,
    despite the requirement to do so under rule 3.650(b)(4) of the
    California Rules of Court.3
    Defendants never submitted an opposition or response to
    Moradian’s petition to confirm the arbitration award. Nor did
    they make an appearance at the April 11, 2019 hearing.
    3     Rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
    7
    On April 11, 2019, the trial court granted Moradian’s
    unopposed petition to confirm the arbitration award.4 The
    court also “lifted [the stay] for Plaintiff to add parties added
    in the arbitration” and granted Moradian leave to add those
    respondents in the arbitration (Red Vans and Joea) who were
    not named as defendants in the complaint. The court deferred
    entry of judgment pending the resolution of Moradian’s PAGA
    claims.
    On April 19, 2019, Moradian filed doe amendments adding
    Red Vans and Joea as named defendants in the action. Moradian
    served Red Vans with the summons and complaint on May 23,
    2019, and served Joea on May 27, 2019.
    On April 23, 2019, the bankruptcy court denied Rideshare’s
    motion to approve its amended disclosure statement with
    prejudice and dismissed the bankruptcy case. On April 26, 2019,
    4      In its written ruling, the court reviewed the statutory
    grounds for vacating an arbitration award and found there was
    “nothing before the Court which indicates the arbitrator exceeded
    his powers; that the award was procured by fraud, corruption, or
    other undue means; that the arbitrator was required to disqualify
    himself; or that the Defendants’ right to challenge the award was
    substantially prejudiced by the arbitrator’s refusal to postpone
    the hearing.” In the absence of grounds to vacate or to modify
    the award, the court recognized it was statutorily “compelled to
    approve the award in its current form.” (See § 1286 [If a petition
    to confirm an arbitration award “is duly served and filed, the
    court shall confirm the award as made, whether rendered in
    this state or another state, unless in accordance with this chapter
    it corrects the award and confirms it as corrected, vacates the
    award or dismisses the proceedings.”].)
    8
    Moradian notified the trial court of the dismissal and asked the
    court to lift the bankruptcy stay for Rideshare.
    On May 20, 2019, Prime Time’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy
    case closed after the trustee determined there was “no property
    available for distribution from the estate.”
    On June 4, 2019, Moradian filed and served a request to
    voluntarily dismiss his PAGA claim without prejudice in order
    to have judgment entered on his individual claims.
    On July 22, 2019, the trial court held a status conference.
    Defendants’ counsel requested more time to consider options
    for responding to the arbitration award and its confirmation.
    The trial court rejected the request, stating defendants had
    already had ample opportunity to contest the arbitration award.
    The court granted Moradian’s request to dismiss his PAGA claim
    and entered judgment on the arbitration award. Consistent with
    the confirmed award, the judgment provided that Rideshare,
    Prime Time, Airport Transportation, Red Vans, and Joea were
    jointly and severally liable for Moradian’s damages, attorney fees,
    and litigation costs.
    On August 7, 2019, defendants filed notices of intention
    to move for new trial and to vacate the judgment. On
    August 20, 2019, they filed three motions: a motion to set aside
    the judgment and enter a new judgment under section 663;
    a motion to vacate the order confirming the arbitration award,
    the decision to enter judgment, and the judgment under
    section 473, subdivisions (b) and (d); and a motion for new trial
    under section 657. The motions argued the arbitrator’s award
    was contrary to the evidence and law; the attorney fee award
    was excessive; the arbitrator exceeded his authority in issuing
    the award; the automatic stay precluded litigation against
    9
    Rideshare and Prime Time while their bankruptcy petitions were
    pending; judgment could not be entered against the non-debtor
    defendants while the bankruptcy stay was in effect; and Red
    Vans and Joea were not properly added to the state court action.
    On October 4, 2019, after a hearing on the three motions,
    the trial court entered its order partially granting the motion
    to vacate the judgment under section 473 as to Rideshare and
    Prime Time and denying the other motions as moot. Because
    the arbitrator entered the final award while the automatic
    bankruptcy stay enjoined litigation against Rideshare, the court
    concluded “[t]he action taken by the arbitrator as to Rideshare
    . . . was void” under federal law. Similarly, the court reasoned
    its order confirming the arbitration award was void with respect
    to Prime Time because, despite Prime Time’s failure to notify the
    court of the bankruptcy, the automatic stay was “self-executing”
    upon Prime Time filing its petition. However, because the
    bankruptcy court had lifted the non-debtor injunction before
    any of the challenged arbitration and state court proceedings
    occurred, the court concluded there was “no reason” to vacate
    the award, confirmation order, or judgment as to the non-debtor
    defendants.
    DISCUSSION
    1.      Rideshare and Prime Time Do Not Have Standing
    to Appeal the Judgment or Post-Judgment Orders
    Notwithstanding an appealable order or judgment, an
    appeal may be taken only by a party who has standing to appeal.
    (Sabi v. Sterling (2010) 
    183 Cal.App.4th 916
    , 947 (Sabi).)
    The rule of appellate standing is codified in section 902,
    which provides: “Any party aggrieved may appeal in the cases
    prescribed” for appeals in a civil action. (Italics added.) A party
    10
    is aggrieved only if its “rights or interests are injuriously affected
    by the judgment.” (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971)
    
    5 Cal.3d 730
    , 737 (Carleson); see also § 902, Code Commission
    Notes [“A party not affected by a judgment cannot take an
    appeal.”].) The injury “ ‘ “must be immediate, pecuniary, and
    substantial and not nominal or a remote consequence of the
    judgment.” ’ ” (Carleson, at p. 737.) The standing requirement
    is jurisdictional. (Sabi, at p. 947.)
    The trial court vacated the judgment and order confirming
    the arbitration award against Rideshare and Prime Time,
    granting their motion for relief under section 473. Because
    these defendants are not parties affected by the judgment
    or confirmation order, and because they are not aggrieved
    by the order granting them the relief they requested, they
    have no standing to appeal.5 Accordingly, we must dismiss
    their appeal.6 (See Sabi, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 947.)
    5     Rideshare and Prime Time also purport to appeal from
    the order denying their new trial motion and several other
    interlocutory orders. Like the interlocutory orders, “an order
    denying a motion for new trial is not independently appealable
    and may be reviewed only on appeal from the underlying
    judgment.” (Walker v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan
    Transportation Authority (2005) 
    35 Cal.4th 15
    , 19; cf. § 904.1,
    subd. (a)(4) [order granting a new trial is appealable].) Because
    Rideshare and Prime Time lack standing to appeal the judgment,
    we also have no jurisdiction to consider their appeal from the
    various orders listed in their notice of appeal.
    6     Additionally, as Moradian emphasizes, the trial court’s
    order partially vacating the judgment remanded the claims
    against Rideshare and Prime Time to arbitration. Consequently,
    there is no final judgment from which these defendants could
    11
    2.    The Trial Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Vacate
    the Judgment Against Red Vans and Joea
    Red Vans and Joea contend the trial court was compelled to
    vacate the judgment and dismiss the action against them under
    section 583.250, because Moradian failed to serve them with
    the summons and complaint within three years of commencing
    the action. (See § 583.210.)7 They also argue dismissal was
    appeal. (See Sy First Family Ltd. Partnership v. Cheung (1999)
    
    70 Cal.App.4th 1334
    , 1345 [order remanding claims to arbitration
    “constituted an interlocutory rather than a final ruling”]; Griset
    v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 
    25 Cal.4th 688
    , 697 [“an
    appeal cannot be taken from a judgment that fails to complete
    the disposition of all causes of action between the parties”].)
    Moreover, because these defendants petitioned to compel
    arbitration in the first place, they cannot reasonably contend
    they are aggrieved by the court’s ruling returning the matter
    to arbitration. (See Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 737.)
    7      Section 583.210 provides: “(a) The summons and complaint
    shall be served upon a defendant within three years after the
    action is commenced against the defendant. For the purpose
    of this subdivision, an action is commenced at the time the
    complaint is filed. [¶] (b) Proof of service of the summons shall be
    filed within 60 days after the time the summons and complaint
    must be served upon a defendant.”
    Under section 583.250, subdivision (a), “If service is not
    made in an action within the time prescribed in this article: [¶]
    (1) The action shall not be further prosecuted and no further
    proceedings shall be held in the action. [¶] (2) The action shall
    be dismissed by the court on its own motion or on motion of any
    person interested in the action, whether named as a party or not,
    after notice to the parties.” These requirements “are mandatory
    and are not subject to extension, excuse, or exception except as
    expressly provided by statute.” (§ 583.250, subd. (b).)
    12
    compelled under rule 3.110(b), because Moradian failed to file
    proofs of service with the court within 30 days of adding them
    as defendants to the action.8 We disagree on both counts.
    Section 583.240 governs computation of the three-year
    period for effecting service of process mandated under section
    583.210. As pertinent here, section 583.240 provides: “In
    computing the time within which service must be made pursuant
    to this article, there shall be excluded the time during which
    any of the following conditions existed: . . . (b) The prosecution
    of the action or proceedings in the action was stayed and the stay
    affected service.”
    Red Vans and Joea emphasize Moradian commenced this
    action on November 29, 2012, but he did not serve them with
    the summons and complaint until May 23 and May 27, 2019—
    more than six years later. However, on September 12, 2013,
    Rideshare, Prime Time, and Airport Transportation filed a
    motion to compel arbitration and to stay the litigation. And,
    on November 20, 2013, the trial court granted defendants’
    motion, necessarily staying the action as required under section
    1281.4.9 The record shows it was not until April 11, 2019—
    8      Rule 3.110(b) provides, in pertinent part: “When the
    complaint is amended to add a defendant, the added defendant
    must be served and proof of service must be filed within 30 days
    after the filing of the amended complaint.”
    9     Section 1281.4 provides, in pertinent part: “If a court of
    competent jurisdiction, whether in this State or not, has ordered
    arbitration of a controversy . . . , the court in which such action or
    proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a party to such action
    or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration
    is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such
    earlier time as the court specifies.” (Italics added.)
    13
    more than five years later—that the trial court ordered “[t]he
    stay is lifted for Plaintiff to add parties [to the court action]
    added in the arbitration.” When that five-year period is excluded
    from the computation of time for effecting service of process, we
    find (as the trial court did) that Moradian served Red Vans and
    Joea with the summons and complaint well within the required
    three years.10 (See, e.g., Highland Stucco & Lime v. Superior
    Court (1990) 
    222 Cal.App.3d 637
    , 644 [in complex asbestos
    litigation, where trial court “stayed all proceedings in the action
    on non[-]abatement issues,” stay “clearly affected the service
    of process in that it precluded service upon additional defendants
    until the stay was lifted” and thus was to be excluded from
    computation of three-year period under sections 583.210 and
    583.240].)
    As for the 30-day deadline under rule 3.110(b) for filing
    proof of service after amending the complaint to add a defendant,
    rule 3.110(f) states that “[i]f a party fails to serve and file
    pleadings as required under this rule, . . . the court may issue
    an order to show cause why sanctions shall not be imposed.”
    (Italics added.) Red Vans and Joea argue the trial court was
    required to vacate the judgment and dismiss the action against
    them because Moradian amended his complaint to add them as
    defendants on April 19, 2019, but he did not file proofs of service
    until August 29, 2019—more than 130 days later. The trial court
    addressed Moradian’s late filing of the proofs of service in its
    order denying the motions to vacate, and the court exercised its
    10     In filing the proofs of service on August 29, 2019, Moradian
    also complied with the three-year and 60-day deadline under
    section 583.210, subdivision (b) when the five-year stay period
    is excluded.
    14
    discretion not to set an order to show cause regarding sanctions
    under rule 3.110(f). As the undisputed record shows Red Vans
    and Joea were named as respondents in Moradian’s arbitration
    claim, they participated in the arbitration proceedings, and they
    were served with the summons and complaint before the trial
    court entered judgment against them, we cannot say the court
    abused its discretion by declining to issue an order to show cause
    for the failure to timely file proofs of service.11
    In any event, even if sanctions had been warranted, the
    trial court correctly determined that dismissal of the action was
    not authorized for a violation of rule 3.110(b). Rule 2.30 specifies
    the sanctions that are permitted for a violation of the California
    Rules of Court relating to general civil cases. (Rule 2.30(a).)
    Rule 2.30(b) provides that, “[i]n addition to any other sanctions
    permitted by law, the court may order a person . . . to pay
    reasonable monetary sanctions to the court or an aggrieved
    person, or both, for failure without good cause to comply with
    the applicable rules.” (Italics added.) Red Vans and Joea have
    not cited, and we are not aware of, any other law (besides rule
    2.30(b)) authorizing sanctions for violation of the 30-day deadline
    under rule 3.110(b). Thus, the trial court had no discretion to
    11     Contrary to Red Vans’s and Joea’s argument in their
    motions to vacate the judgment, the record shows they were
    served with the summons and complaint (on May 23 and May 27,
    2019, respectively) before the trial court entered the July 22, 2019
    judgment. Thus, there is no merit to their renewed contention
    that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment
    against them when it did. (See § 410.50, subd. (a) [“Except
    as otherwise provided by statute, the court in which an action
    is pending has jurisdiction over a party from the time summons
    is served on him.” (Italics added.)].)
    15
    dismiss Red Vans and Joea from the action for this rule violation,
    and the court correctly concluded as much. The trial court
    did not err in refusing to vacate the judgment against these
    defendants.
    3.     The Non-Debtor Defendants Cannot Establish
    Prejudice Because They Failed to Petition to
    Vacate the Arbitration Award Before the 100-day
    Jurisdictional Deadline Lapsed
    The non-debtor defendants advance several arguments that
    they contend compelled the trial court to vacate the judgment
    entirely or to order a new trial. However, as we will explain,
    none of these arguments is sufficient to establish reversible error
    because the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to vacate the
    arbitration award when defendants filed their post-judgment
    motions.
    “Arbitration is designed to provide expeditious resolutions
    of disputes. It is the ‘policy of the law . . . to favor arbitration
    as a means of providing a summary disposition of controversies,
    [and] every reasonable intendment is indulged to give effect to
    such proceedings.’ [Citation.] ‘Every presumption favors [an
    arbitration] award, and therefore the merits of an award, either
    on questions of law or fact, are generally not subject to review.’ ”
    (Knass v. Blue Cross of California (1991) 
    228 Cal.App.3d 390
    , 393
    (Knass); see Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 
    3 Cal.4th 1
    , 9
    (Moncharsh) [“[T]he Legislature has expressed a ‘strong
    public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively
    inexpensive means of dispute resolution.’ [Citations.]
    Consequently, courts will ‘ “indulge every intendment to
    give effect to such proceedings.” ’ ”].)
    16
    An arbitration award that has not been vacated or
    confirmed “has the same force and effect as a contract in writing
    between the parties to the arbitration.” (§ 1287.6.) If a petition
    to confirm an arbitration award “is duly served and filed, the
    court shall confirm the award as made, . . . unless in accordance
    with [the arbitration statutes] it corrects the award and confirms
    it as corrected, vacates the award or dismisses the proceedings.”
    (§ 1286, italics added.) “If an award is confirmed, judgment shall
    be entered in conformity therewith,” and the judgment is to be
    treated in all respects like a judgment in “a civil action of the
    same jurisdictional classification.” (§ 1287.4.)
    The trial court is authorized to vacate an arbitration award
    upon narrow statutory grounds, “[s]ubject to [s]ection 1286.4.”
    (§ 1286.2, subd. (a); see Knass, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 393.)
    Under section 1286.4, the “court may not vacate an award unless:
    . . . [a] petition or response requesting that the award be vacated
    [or corrected] has been duly served and filed” and all parties are
    before the court. (§ 1286.4, subds. (a)–(b), italics added; Knass, at
    p. 393; Abers v. Rohrs (2013) 
    217 Cal.App.4th 1199
    , 1205 (Abers).)
    Under section 1288, “[a] petition to vacate an award or to correct
    an award shall be served and filed not later than 100 days
    after the date of the service of a signed copy of the award on
    the petitioner.” Section 1288.2 likewise provides: “A response
    requesting that an award be vacated or that an award be
    corrected shall be served and filed not later than 100 days
    after the date of service of a signed copy of the award.”12
    12    In many instances, a response must be filed and served
    well before the 100-day jurisdictional deadline. Section 1290.6
    provides that “[a] response shall be served and filed within
    10 days after service of the petition except that if the petition
    17
    The statutory “deadlines for challenging and confirming
    arbitration awards serve important goals.” (Eternity Investments,
    Inc. v. Brown (2007) 
    151 Cal.App.4th 739
    , 746 (Eternity
    Investments).) “A challenge to an award—to correct or vacate it—
    typically requires the trial court to make factual determinations.
    [Citation.] Consequently, a challenge must be made soon after
    the award is served—within 100 days—while the evidence is
    fresh and witnesses are available. But absent a challenge, there
    may be no need for judicial intervention. The award is treated as
    a contract (§ 1287.6), and the prevailing party has a substantially
    longer period—up to four years (similar to the four-year statute
    of limitations for breach of contract (§ 337, subd. 1))—to obtain
    satisfaction of the award before resorting to the courts. In the
    event of satisfaction, judicial relief will not be necessary,
    conserving court resources. If, however, the award is not
    satisfied, the prevailing party may convert it into an enforceable
    is served [by mail], the response shall be served and filed
    within 30 days after service of the petition.” Unlike the 100-day
    jurisdictional deadline, the time for serving and filing a response
    “may be extended by an agreement in writing between the
    parties to the court proceeding or, for good cause, by order of
    the court.” (§ 1290.6.) However, section 1288.2 takes precedence
    over section 1290.6, and a trial court has no jurisdiction to vacate
    an award if a request is filed beyond 100 days, even if the request
    responds to a petition to confirm. (Law Finance Group, LLC v.
    Key (2021) 
    67 Cal.App.5th 307
    , 320, 316, 318 (Law Finance); see
    Douglass v. Serenivision, Inc. (2018) 
    20 Cal.App.5th 376
    , 384–385
    [“ ‘[a] response to a petition’ to confirm an award ‘may request
    the court to . . . vacate the award’ (§ 1285.2), but a response
    containing such a request is only timely if it is ‘served and filed
    not later than 100 days’ after the responding party was served
    with a signed copy of the award (§ 1288.2)”].)
    18
    judgment by way of a petition to confirm. (§§ 1287.4, 1288.)
    And confirmation will be a simple process absent a prompt,
    timely challenge to the award.” (Ibid.)
    In sum, “[t]he trial court’s power to vacate an arbitration
    award is governed by statute, and the deadline for seeking such
    relief is mandatory.” (Abers, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1211.)
    “[T]he 100-day limitation for a petition to vacate an arbitration
    award is jurisdictional” and a trial court has no authority
    to vacate an arbitration award absent the petitioning party’s
    compliance with this statutory mandate. (Ibid., italics added;
    Santa Monica College Faculty Assn. v. Santa Monica Community
    College Dist. (2015) 
    243 Cal.App.4th 538
    , 544–545 [“The filing
    and service deadline for a petition to vacate is jurisdictional;
    noncompliance deprives a court of the power to vacate an award
    unless the party has timely requested vacation in response to
    a petition to confirm.”]; see also Law Finance Group, supra, 67
    Cal.App.5th at p. 322 [“Like section 1288, section 1288.2 imposes
    a strict 100-day deadline to file and serve a request to vacate.
    It is similarly jurisdictional.”].) Unless a petition to vacate or
    correct the arbitration award is filed before the statutory 100-day
    deadline passes, “the court has no option but to confirm the
    award if requested to do so within four years of its issuance.”
    (Abers, at pp. 1211–1212, citing § 1286; see also § 1288
    [“A petition to confirm an award shall be served and filed not
    later than four years after the date of service of a signed copy
    of the award on the petitioner.”].)
    On January 16, 2019, the arbitrator’s office served a
    signed copy of the final award on defendants. Thus, the 100-day
    deadline to file and serve a petition to vacate the award under
    section 1288 expired on April 26, 2019. Defendants did not file
    19
    a petition to vacate the arbitration award. Nor did they respond
    to Moradian’s petition to confirm the award by the March 28,
    2019 deadline the trial court ordered. (See § 1290.6 [authorizing
    extension of 10-day deadline to respond to petition for
    confirmation of arbitration award “for good cause, by order
    of the court”].) Due to defendants’ failure to timely petition
    to vacate the award, the trial court was statutorily mandated
    to “confirm the award as made.” (§ 1286; Abers, supra, 217
    Cal.App.4th at pp. 1211–1212; Eternity Investments, supra,
    151 Cal.App.4th at p. 745 [“[C]onfirmation of an award is the
    mandatory outcome absent the correction or vacatur of the award
    or the dismissal of the petition.” (First italics added.)].) And,
    upon confirming the award, the court was statutorily compelled
    to enter judgment in conformity with the award’s terms.
    (§ 1287.4 [“If an award is confirmed, judgment shall be entered
    in conformity therewith.” (Italics added.)].) The trial court
    lacked jurisdiction to do otherwise.
    The non-debtor defendants acknowledge the 100-day
    time limit imposes a jurisdictional constraint on the trial court’s
    authority to vacate the arbitration award, yet they contend it
    placed no constraint on the court’s authority to rule on their post-
    judgment motions challenging the arbitration award’s validity.
    First, they argue where “an arbitration award is void ab initio,
    it need not be the subject of a timely petition to vacate” for the
    court to set aside an order or judgment based upon the award.
    They maintain the award and order confirming it were entered
    in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay and, therefore,
    section 473, subdivision (d) authorized the trial court to
    “ ‘set aside [the] void judgment or order,’ ” notwithstanding
    the jurisdictional bar to vacating the award. Second, they
    20
    assert their appeal concerns “decisions that were insufficiently
    supported, legally erroneous and contrary to law, particularly
    the Arbitration Award,” and they argue “[s]uch erroneous actions
    taken by the Arbitrator make the arbitration award itself invalid
    and void in its entirety.” We reject both arguments.
    The contention that the bankruptcy stay rendered the
    arbitration award subject to the non-debtor defendants’ post-
    judgment attack fails for two reasons. First, as the trial court
    recognized, the non-debtor defendants were not subject to a
    bankruptcy stay when the arbitrator issued the final award,
    because the bankruptcy court had terminated the non-debtor
    injunction several months earlier. Federal law specifies that
    a bankruptcy petition automatically stays “the commencement
    or continuation . . . of a judicial, administrative, or other action
    or proceeding against the debtor.” (
    11 U.S.C. § 362
    (a)(1), italics
    added.) Consistent with federal law, our state courts have
    recognized “ ‘the automatic stay protects only the debtor,’ ” and
    “the ‘[b]ankruptcy of one defendant in a multidefendant case does
    not stay the case as to the remaining [non-debtor] defendants.’ ”
    (Higgins v. Superior Court (2017) 
    15 Cal.App.5th 973
    , 979–980;
    Cross v. Cooper (2011) 
    197 Cal.App.4th 357
    , 365, fn. 2 [“the
    automatic stay of judicial proceedings against a debtor in
    bankruptcy does not apply to non[-]debtor codefendants”]; Danko
    v. O’Reilly (2014) 
    232 Cal.App.4th 732
    , 748 [“ ‘The automatic
    stay does not . . . apply to non[-]debtor entities such as corporate
    affiliates, corporate officers, codefendants, guarantors or general
    partners.’ ” (First italics added.)].) That rule applies with special
    force here, as the bankruptcy court terminated the non-debtor
    injunction upon an express finding that Rideshare’s plan for
    reorganization was “patently un-confirmable.” As our Supreme
    21
    Court has said, because federal law specifies that the automatic
    stay operates for the benefit of the debtor, a non-debtor “is not
    in a position to complain of the flaunting of the claimed authority
    of the bankruptcy court which that court did not choose to
    exercise, or of invasions into the field of alleged exclusive control
    as to property which it in effect had abandoned.” (Beck v. Unruh
    (1951) 
    37 Cal.2d 148
    , 153; accord In re Pecan Groves (9th Cir.
    1991) 
    951 F.2d 242
    , 245 [“[I]f the [bankruptcy] trustee does
    not seek to enforce the protections of the automatic stay,
    no other party may challenge acts purportedly in violation
    of the automatic stay.”].)13
    13     For the same reasons, the fact that the arbitration award
    holds all defendants jointly and severally liable as alter egos
    for Moradian’s damages does not render the award void. As
    the bankruptcy court observed in Pavers & Road Builders Dist.
    Council Welfare Fund v. Core Contracting of N.Y., LLC (E.D.N.Y.
    2015) 
    536 B.R. 48
    , “[j]ust because two entities are alter egos
    does not make them both debtors under the Bankruptcy Code.
    It simply means they are liable for each other’s debts. If the
    non-debtor entity wants that protection, it need only file its own
    petition.” (Id. at p. 51.) To hold otherwise “ignores the plain
    language of [
    11 U.S.C. § 362
    (a)(1)], which provides that the
    automatic stay protects only the debtor, not non-debtor entities.”
    (Ibid. [criticizing dictum in In re Adler (E.D.N.Y. 2013) 
    494 B.R. 43
    , 53 suggesting the automatic stay forecloses judicial action
    against non-debtor alter egos of debtor corporation].) Here,
    of course, we have more than inaction by the non-debtor
    defendants—we have the bankruptcy court expressly
    determining they should no longer enjoy the protection of the
    bankruptcy stay. In this circumstance, it would be nonsensical
    to hold the arbitrator’s award and alter ego finding retroactively
    bestowed bankruptcy protection on the non-debtor defendants
    after the bankruptcy court deliberately removed that protection.
    22
    Second, even if we agreed that a violation of the bankruptcy
    stay as to Rideshare and Prime Time rendered the arbitration
    award void as to the non-debtor defendants, this still would
    not authorize the trial court to vacate the award or to set aside
    the judgment entered upon it after the 100-day jurisdictional
    deadline lapsed. Defendants cite Tearlach Resources Limited
    v. Western States Internat., Inc. (2013) 
    219 Cal.App.4th 773
     for
    the proposition that “ ‘[t]he court may . . . on motion of either
    party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment
    or order’ ” under section 473. (Tearlach, at p. 779, quoting § 473,
    subd. (d).) However, Tearlach considered only whether the time
    limitations applicable to a motion to set aside a judgment for
    “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect” under
    section 473, subdivision (b) also applied to a motion to set aside
    a void judgment under section 473, subdivision (d). (Tearlach, at
    p. 779.) The Tearlach court correctly recognized that section 473,
    subdivision (d) “does not place any time limit on bringing such
    a motion” (Tearlach, at p. 779), but the court did not address
    a situation like we have here, where the trial court entered a
    judgment under a statutory mandate after it had lost jurisdiction
    to take any other action on the underlying controversy. (See
    Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 
    37 Cal.4th 659
    , 680 [“ ‘An
    opinion is not authority for propositions not considered.’ ”].)
    (See Pavers, at p. 51 [further criticizing Adler dictum, observing
    it would make “the automatic stay into a provision that can
    only be applied with the benefit of hindsight,” as it would allow
    “extensive litigation in the non-bankruptcy court, and then
    invalidate[ ] everything that occurred” upon an alter ego
    finding].)
    23
    In People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2017)
    
    14 Cal.App.5th 127
     (Financial Casualty), the reviewing court
    addressed and rejected the appellant’s attempt to “invoke
    [section] 473, subdivisions (b) and (d) for relief from a
    jurisdictional bar.” (Id. at p. 140.) The appeal concerned Penal
    Code section 1305, subdivision (j), which mandates that a motion
    to vacate a bail forfeiture must be “ ‘filed in a timely manner
    within the 180-day period’ ” after the court declares the
    forfeiture. (Financial Casualty, at p. 138.) As with the statutes
    prescribing the requirements to vacate an arbitration award,
    when a court “ ‘does not strictly follow [the bail forfeiture]
    statutes [it] acts in excess of its jurisdiction.’ ” (Ibid.) Because
    the appellant filed its motion for vacatur outside the mandatory
    180-day period, the Financial Casualty court held the trial
    court had no jurisdiction to consider the motion, and section 473,
    subdivision (d) could not be used “to create jurisdiction where
    there is none.” (Financial Casualty, at p. 141; see Maynard v.
    Brandon (2005) 
    36 Cal.4th 364
    , 372 (Maynard) [section 473 “does
    not offer relief from mandatory deadlines deemed jurisdictional
    in nature”].)
    The Abers court reached the same conclusion with respect
    to the 100-day jurisdictional deadline for a petition to vacate
    an arbitration award and section 473’s provision for mandatory
    relief based on an attorney’s declaration of error. (Abers, supra,
    217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1202–1203.) Equating the 100-day
    deadline with the jurisdictional “deadline for filing an appeal,”
    the Abers court emphasized that “the court loses jurisdiction
    to vacate the award if the petition is not timely served and filed.”
    (Id. at p. 1203.) And, like the Financial Casualty court, the Abers
    court rejected the contention that section 473 could be invoked
    24
    to relieve a party of its failure to comply with a jurisdictional
    deadline, holding: “Once jurisdiction is lost, it cannot be
    retroactively reinstated.” (Abers, at p. 1203; see also Knass,
    supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 394 [“The fact the award was reduced
    to a judgment does not resurrect [the] opportunity to challenge
    it.”].)
    We agree with Financial Casualty and Abers, and likewise
    conclude that section 473 cannot be invoked to circumvent the
    jurisdictional deadline for filing and serving a petition to vacate
    an arbitration award.14 As the Abers court aptly observed, any
    other result “would be an effective nullification of the statutory
    100-day limitation on filing and serving a petition to vacate,”
    and “[w]e cannot endorse such a result.” (Abers, supra, 217
    14     We acknowledge there are a handful of cases suggesting
    relief is available under section 473 for late-filed petitions to
    vacate. (See Eternity Investments, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 746; DeMello v. Souza (1973) 
    36 Cal.App.3d 79
    , 84; Elden v.
    Superior Court (1997) 
    53 Cal.App.4th 1497
    , 1512.) However,
    as our colleagues in Division Two recently noted, “none of
    those cases actually granted relief under section 473, and their
    statements are therefore arguably dicta.” (Law Finance Group,
    supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 322, fn. 9.) Moreover, as both the
    Law Finance Group and Abers courts determined, these cases are
    not persuasive “for the simple reason that none of them makes
    any effort to persuade.” (Abers, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p.
    1212; Law Finance Group, at p. 322, fn. 9].) In any event, we
    agree with the Abers court that these cases are simply
    inconsistent with the rule announced by the Supreme Court in
    Maynard and must be rejected on that basis. (Abers, at p. 1212;
    Maynard, 
    supra,
     36 Cal.4th at p. 372 [section 473 “does not offer
    relief from mandatory deadlines deemed jurisdictional in
    nature”].)
    25
    Cal.App.4th at p. 1212; see Eternity Investments, supra, 151
    Cal.App.4th at p. 746 [discussing important policy goals served
    by 100-day limitation].)
    Defendants’ contention that the award was subject to
    post-judgment challenge because the arbitrator’s decisions were
    “insufficiently supported, legally erroneous and contrary to law”
    fares no better. The narrow grounds for vacating an arbitration
    award include the ground that “[t]he arbitrators exceeded their
    powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting
    the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted.”
    (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(4).) In Moncharsh, our Supreme Court
    addressed what had been a frequent contention that an
    arbitrator exceeded his powers “because the arbitrator reached
    an erroneous decision” on the law and the evidence. (Moncharsh,
    
    supra,
     3 Cal.4th at p. 28.) The Moncharsh court rejected
    the contention under the “rule of limited judicial review,”
    emphasizing it is well settled that “ ‘arbitrators do not exceed
    their powers merely because they assign an erroneous reason
    for their decision.’ ” (Ibid.) Here, we need not invoke the limited
    judicial review principle because any contention that defendants
    might have made about the arbitrator exceeding his powers with
    respect to the law, the evidence, or the arbitration rules had to
    be made in a petition to vacate the award, filed and served within
    the 100-day jurisdictional period under section 1288.15 Once that
    15     Notably, defendants make the same argument that the
    arbitrator “demonstrably disregarded evidence, erred, and
    exceeded his arbitral powers” under the JAMS rules in a section
    of their opening brief under the heading: “THE ARBITRATOR
    EXCEEDED HIS POWERS.” (Boldface and underlining
    omitted.) They also make these arguments with respect to
    26
    period elapsed, all contentions about the arbitrator exceeding his
    powers were effectively forfeited as a basis for post-confirmation
    relief. (See Louise Gardens of Encino Homeowners’ Assn., Inc.
    v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (2000) 
    82 Cal.App.4th 648
    , 659 [“A
    party who fails to timely file a petition to vacate under section
    1286 may not thereafter attack that award by other means on
    grounds which would have supported an order to vacate.”].)
    We need not discuss the non-debtor defendants’ other
    arguments. As appellants, these defendants bear the burden of
    establishing not only error, but also prejudice—i.e., that in the
    absence of the claimed error it is reasonably probable they would
    have obtained a more favorable result. (Cassim v. Allstate Ins.
    Co. (2004) 
    33 Cal.4th 780
    , 800; Waller v. TJD, Inc. (1993) 
    12 Cal.App.4th 830
    , 833 [“Prejudice is not presumed, and the burden
    is on the appealing party to demonstrate that a miscarriage of
    justice has occurred.”].) Because the non-debtor defendants failed
    to petition to vacate the arbitration award within the 100-day
    jurisdictional period, the trial court had no option but to confirm
    the award and to enter judgment in conformity therewith.
    (§§ 1286, 1287.4; Abers, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1211–
    1212.) And, because the result the trial court reached was
    statutorily mandated, none of the non-debtor defendants’
    arguments about the trial court’s reasons for rejecting their post-
    judgment motions is sufficient to establish prejudice as a matter
    of law. (See Mike Davidov Co. v. Issod (2000) 
    78 Cal.App.4th 597
    ,
    610 [“there can be no prejudicial error from erroneous logic or
    their new trial motion, which, like their other post-judgment
    motions, could not be used to obtain relief on grounds that
    had to be asserted in a petition to vacate the award before
    the jurisdictional deadline lapsed.
    27
    reasoning if the decision itself is correct”].) Simply put, because
    the trial court lacked jurisdiction to do anything other than
    confirm the arbitration award and enter judgment in conformity
    with it, the non-debtor defendants cannot demonstrate they
    would have obtained a more favorable result, regardless of
    the claimed error.
    DISPOSITION
    The appeals of Rideshare Port Management, LLC and
    Prime Time Shuttle, Inc. are dismissed. The order confirming
    the arbitration award, the judgment thereupon, and the post-
    judgment orders are affirmed. Moradian is entitled to his costs.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    EGERTON, J.
    We concur:
    LAVIN, Acting P. J.
    HILL, J.
    
    Judge of the Santa Barbara County Superior Court,
    assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6
    of the California Constitution.
    28