People v. Turcios CA1/1 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 12/9/21 P. v. Turcios CA1/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
    ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    A159079
    v.
    ROBERTO RENE TURCIOS,                                               (Contra Costa County
    Super. Ct. No. 5-191194-0)
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Defendant Roberto Turcios had an altercation with his former romantic
    partner (Doe 1) and her 16-year-old daughter (Doe 2). During the incident,
    he struck Doe 2 on the head with a baseball bat, causing her to bleed. A jury
    convicted him of various offenses related to the altercation, including assault
    with a deadly weapon under Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1), and
    another offense with an accompanying enhancement for personal use of a
    deadly or dangerous weapon under Penal Code section 12022,
    subdivision (b)(1).1 He was sentenced to three years in prison.
    On appeal, Turcios’s sole contention is that the trial court erred by
    instructing the jury in a manner that allowed it to conclude that the baseball
    We shall refer collectively to this assault conviction and enhancement
    1
    as the “weapons conviction and enhancement.” All further statutory
    references are to the Penal Code.
    1
    bat was an inherently deadly weapon, requiring reversal of the weapons
    conviction and enhancement. We agree with the parties that the court’s
    instructions were erroneous under People v. Aledamat (2019) 
    8 Cal.5th 1
    (Aledamat), which was decided shortly before the case was submitted to the
    jury. We also conclude that the error was prejudicial, although not for any
    reason advanced by Turcios. Accordingly, we reverse the weapons conviction
    and enhancement and remand for further proceedings.
    I.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
    BACKGROUND
    Turcios lived with Doe 1 and Doe 2 in their Pittsburg home for about
    10 years before he and Doe 1 ended their relationship. Doe 1 obtained a
    restraining order against him a few months before the altercation, which
    occurred on July 1, 2018.
    Doe 2 testified that on that day, she was in her bedroom with her
    boyfriend when she heard noises and saw her mother’s bedroom door close.
    Doe 2 suspected that Turcios had entered the house and gone into her
    mother’s bedroom, where Doe 1 was lying in bed recovering from a back
    injury. Doe 2 went to her mother’s bedroom and saw Turcios lying on the bed
    next to Doe 1. Concerned, Doe 2 asked her mother if she was all right, but
    there was no response. Doe 2 left her mother’s bedroom to call a friend for
    help, but she then heard Doe 1 scream her name.
    According to Doe 1, Turcios, who appeared to be drunk, had entered her
    bedroom, lay down on the bed with her, and told her he loved her. He then
    “began to squeeze [her] neck” and told her he was going to kill her, at which
    point she yelled for Doe 2. In contrast to Doe 2, Doe 1 did not recall her
    daughter being in the room before Doe 1 yelled for help.
    2
    Doe 2 testified that after she heard her mother yell for help, she
    grabbed a wooden baseball bat, ran into her mother’s bedroom, and yelled at
    Turcios to leave. Doe 2’s boyfriend followed her and stood by the door.
    Turcios kicked Doe 2, and she dropped the bat without having swung it.
    Turcios picked up the bat and, while still on the bed, kicked Doe 2 a second
    time. He then hit Doe 2 in the back of the head with the bat. Doe 2 sat down
    on the bed, and Turcios hit her again with the bat, this time on her forehead.
    Doe 2 felt herself bleeding, started to scream, and left the bedroom.
    Doe 1 testified that after Turcios hit her daughter, she “grabbed him by
    the shirt” and told Doe 2’s boyfriend to call the police. Turcios stated, “You
    know what is going to happen if you call the police,” which Doe 1 testified she
    interpreted as a threat because “[h]e always used to say that if we ever called
    the police, he was going to kill us.” Turcios then hit her arm with the
    baseball bat, bruising it, before leaving the room. Doe 1 testified that she
    also injured her knee during the incident, although she was not sure whether
    Turcios hit her on the knee with the bat as well.
    According to Doe 2’s boyfriend, after Doe 2 left the bedroom Doe 1 “had
    [Turcios] in a choke hold,” and the boyfriend got onto the bed and punched
    Turcios in the face. The boyfriend then rose to call the police, at which point
    Turcios “held the bat over . . . Doe 1’s head” and said, “If you call the police,
    I’m going to kill her.” The boyfriend testified that in an attempt to calm
    Turcios, he told the other man that he would not call the police and put down
    his phone.
    Doe 2 and her boyfriend eventually went outside, and Turcios and
    Doe 1 exited the house shortly afterward. Doe 2’s boyfriend said, referring to
    Doe 2, “She’s bleeding,” and Turcios responded, “I didn’t hit her; I did not
    touch her.” He then quickly drove away from the scene. Doe 2 was
    3
    eventually taken by ambulance to a hospital and received two stitches to the
    front of her head.
    A year later, Turcios was charged by information with seven felonies
    and several accompanying enhancements. The offenses involving Doe 1 were
    infliction of corporal injury to an intimate partner, assault with a deadly
    weapon, criminal threats, and dissuading a witness by force or threat. The
    offenses involving Doe 2 were child abuse under conditions likely to produce
    great bodily injury, corporal injury to a child, and assault with a deadly
    weapon. Turcios was also charged with the misdemeanor of disobeying a
    domestic relations court order.2
    The jury convicted Turcios of the counts of assault with a deadly
    weapon against Doe 2 and corporal injury to a child, including an
    enhancement accompanying the latter charge for personal use of a deadly or
    dangerous weapon under section 12022, subdivision (b)(1), but it found not
    true enhancements for causing great bodily injury that were alleged as to
    both crimes. The jury also convicted Turcios of the misdemeanor charge. He
    was acquitted of the remaining felonies, although the jury found him guilty of
    the lesser included misdemeanors against Doe 1 of battery of an intimate
    partner and simple assault, and the lesser included misdemeanor against
    2 The felony charges were brought under sections 273.5, subdivision (a)
    (corporal injury to intimate partner), 245, subdivision (a)(1) (both assault
    charges), 422 (criminal threats), 136.1 (witness dissuasion), 273a,
    subdivision (a) (child abuse), and 273d, subdivision (a) (corporal injury to
    child). The misdemeanor charge was brought under section 273.6,
    subdivision (a).
    4
    Doe 2 of child abuse under circumstances not likely to produce great bodily
    injury.3
    The trial court denied probation and sentenced Turcios to the low term
    of two years for corporal injury to a child and a consecutive term of one year
    for the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon. The court also imposed
    concurrent terms of 364 days in jail each for the battery of Doe 1 and the
    violation of a domestic relations order and stayed terms for the remaining
    convictions under section 654. Thus, the total unstayed term was three years
    in prison.
    II.
    DISCUSSION
    As we have said, Turcios’s only contention on appeal is that the trial
    court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury, a claim we review de novo.
    (People v. Hernandez (2013) 
    217 Cal.App.4th 559
    , 568.) Turcios maintains
    that as a result of the instructional error we must reverse the weapons
    conviction and enhancement. The Attorney General concedes that error
    occurred but argues that it was harmless. We conclude that reversal is
    required.
    1.   Additional facts
    Under section 245, subdivision (a)(l), “commit[ting] an assault upon the
    person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm”
    is a felony offense. The trial court instructed the jury under CALCRIM
    No. 875 on the elements of this crime. The instruction informed the jury that
    a conviction required the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
    Turcios acted with a deadly weapon. Jurors were instructed, consistent with
    3The convictions for the lesser included offenses were under
    sections 243, subdivision (e)(1) (battery), 240 (simple assault), and 273a,
    subdivision (b) (child abuse).
    5
    governing law, that “[a] deadly weapon other than a firearm is any object,
    instrument, or weapon that is inherently deadly or one that is used in such a
    way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily
    injury.” (See People v. Aguilar (1997) 
    16 Cal.4th 1023
    , 1028–1029; see also In
    re B.M. (2018) 
    6 Cal.5th 528
    , 530.)
    A similar instruction was given regarding the enhancement for
    personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon alleged in connection with the
    count of corporal injury to a child. Under section 12022, subdivision (b)(1),
    “personally us[ing] a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of a
    felony” is punishable by an additional year in custody. The jury was
    instructed under CALCRIM No. 3145 that the enhancement could be found
    true only if the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Turcios
    personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon, which was defined as “any
    object, instrument, or weapon that is inherently deadly [or dangerous] or one
    that is used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause
    death or great bodily injury.”4 The instruction further directed the jury that
    “[i]n deciding whether an object is a deadly weapon,” it was to “consider all
    the surrounding circumstances, including when and where the object was
    possessed[,] [and any other evidence that indicates whether the object would
    be used for a dangerous, rather than a harmless, purpose].” Neither of the
    instructions, however, defined the meaning of an “inherently” deadly or
    dangerous weapon.
    4 Although the weapons conviction and enhancement differ in that the
    former requires use of a “deadly weapon” and the latter requires use of a
    “deadly or dangerous weapon,” the same principle applies that a weapon can
    qualify as such based on either its inherent nature or the way in which it is
    used. (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 6, fn. 2.)
    6
    2.     Discussion
    Turcios argues that CALCRIM Nos. 875 and 3145 were legally
    erroneous because they each presented both an impermissible theory and a
    permissible theory for a finding against him. The impermissible theory
    allowed the jury to find him guilty by concluding that the baseball bat was an
    inherently deadly weapon as a matter of law. (See Aledamat, supra,
    8 Cal.5th at pp. 6–7.) The permissible theory allowed the jury to find him
    guilty by concluding that the baseball bat was deadly because of the way he
    used it. (See id. at p. 7.) An instruction that provides both a valid and
    invalid theory for conviction is prejudicial unless it did not affect the verdict
    beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at pp. 9–11; see Chapman v. California
    (1967) 
    386 U.S. 18
    , 24.)
    Our analysis relies on Aledamat, which also involved CALCRIM
    Nos. 875 and 3145.5 (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 4–5.) In Aledamat,
    the parties conceded that those instructions were erroneous because they
    permitted the jury to find that the weapon at issue, a box cutter, was either
    an inherently dangerous weapon or used in a way likely to cause great bodily
    injury or death. (Id. at pp. 4–6.) Because a box cutter is not an inherently
    dangerous weapon as a matter of law, the instructions thus presented an
    incorrect and a correct theory by which the jury could find that the
    implement was a deadly weapon. (Id. at pp. 6–7.)
    The Attorney General concedes that a baseball bat is not an inherently
    dangerous weapon because it “can be, and usually is, used for innocent
    purposes.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 6; People v. King (2006)
    
    38 Cal.4th 617
    , 624.) Thus, just as it was error for the trial court to give
    5 Aledamat was issued on August 26, 2019. The instructions here were
    read to the jury on October 1, 2019.
    7
    instructions in Aledamat that allowed the jury to decide that a box cutter was
    an inherently deadly weapon, it was error for the trial court to give
    instructions here that allowed the jury to decide that the baseball bat was an
    inherently deadly weapon.
    Aledamat then turned to the issue of which standard for assessing
    prejudice applies. (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 9.) The Supreme Court
    first explained that the theory for finding that the box cutter was a deadly
    weapon because it was inherently dangerous was not merely unsupported by
    the evidence but “legally erroneous—i.e., of a kind the jury is not equipped to
    detect.” (Id. at pp. 7–8.) This was so because CALCRIM Nos. 875 and 3145
    “did not define what ‘inherently deadly’ meant, [and] the jury would not be
    equipped to know that, contrary to what the instruction suggested, a box
    cutter is not an inherently deadly weapon” as a matter of law. (Aledamat, at
    p. 8.) The Court held that when a trial court gives instructions that provide
    both a valid and a legally erroneous theory to convict, “[t]he reviewing court
    must reverse the conviction unless, after examining the entire cause,
    including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, it
    determines the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” under the
    Chapman standard for federal constitutional error. (Id. at p. 3.)
    We conclude that the instructional error requires reversal under this
    standard, albeit for a reason that neither party addresses: the jury’s verdict
    on the child-abuse count. Turcios was charged under section 273a,
    subdivision (a), which authorizes imprisonment of “[a]ny person who, under
    circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death,
    willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable
    physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child,
    willfully causes or permits the person or health of that child to be injured, or
    8
    willfully causes or permits that child to be placed in a situation where [the
    child’s] person or health is endangered.” (Italics added.) The jury acquitted
    Turcios of that crime, instead convicting him of the lesser included offense
    under subdivision (b) of the same statute, which makes it a misdemeanor to
    engage in the identical four types of conduct when done “under circumstances
    or conditions other than those likely to produce great bodily harm or death.”
    (Italics added.)
    The only difference between the greater offense under section 273a,
    subdivision (a), and lesser included offense under section 273a,
    subdivision (b), is whether the prohibited conduct “ ‘was under circumstances
    or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death,’ i.e., under
    conditions ‘in which the probability of serious injury is great.’ ” (People v.
    Sargent (1999) 
    19 Cal.4th 1206
    , 1223.) Indeed, the jury was instructed that
    “the difference between Count Four [the charge under section 273a,
    subdivision (a)] and the lesser is that Count Four requires circumstance[s]
    likely to produce great bodily harm or death, whereas the lesser[]included
    [offense] does not have that requirement, only that it be unjustifiable
    physical pain or mental suffering.” Thus, by returning a verdict on the lesser
    included offense, the jury necessarily found that Turcios did not inflict abuse
    on Doe 2 under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily
    injury.
    In light of this finding, we cannot rule out the possibility that the jury
    relied on the impermissible theory for convicting Turcios of the weapons
    charge and enhancement, i.e., that the baseball bat was an inherently
    dangerous weapon as a matter of law. The jury was instructed under the
    permissible theory that it could find the baseball bat was a deadly weapon if
    it was “used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause
    9
    death or great bodily injury.” But the only identified act to support the child-
    abuse charge was the hitting of Doe 2 with the baseball bat, which was also
    the basis for the other charges involving Doe 2. Since the jury concluded that
    the child abuse was committed under circumstances that were not likely to
    produce great bodily injury, it is difficult to see how it could have also
    concluded that the baseball bat was used in a way likely to cause great bodily
    injury, as required under the permissible theory to support the weapons
    conviction and enhancement.6 Even if such findings could be reconciled with
    each other under some theoretical version of the facts, the jury’s rejection of
    the conclusion that Turcios abused Doe 2 under circumstances or conditions
    likely to produce great bodily harm or death creates a reasonable possibility
    that the weapons conviction and enhancement were based, not on the
    permissible theory that the baseball bat was used in a deadly manner, but
    instead on the impermissible theory that the baseball bat was inherently
    dangerous.
    In arguing that the instructional error was harmless, the Attorney
    General overlooks the jury’s verdict on the child-abuse charge and focuses on
    the facts that Turcios was acquitted of the charge of assault with a deadly
    weapon against Doe 1 and found guilty only of the lesser included offense of
    simple assault under section 240. The only difference between the two
    6 The converse would not necessarily be true, had Turcios been
    convicted of felony child abuse but acquitted of assault with a deadly weapon.
    For example, in People v. Clark (2011) 
    201 Cal.App.4th 235
    , the Court of
    Appeal concluded that there was “nothing inconsistent” about the fact the
    defendant was acquitted of an assault count requiring the use of force likely
    to cause great bodily injury yet convicted of felony child abuse. (Id. at p. 252.)
    As the decision explained, the use of force is but one circumstance or
    condition to be evaluated in determining whether injury was willfully
    inflicted on a child under circumstances “likely to produce great bodily harm
    or death” under section 273a, subdivision (a). (Clark, at p. 243.)
    10
    offenses is whether the assault was committed with a deadly weapon. (See
    §§ 240, 245, subd. (a)(1).) Thus, according to the Attorney General, because
    the prosecutor argued that Turcios was guilty of assault with a deadly
    weapon based on his hitting Doe 1 with the baseball bat, the jury must have
    concluded that the baseball bat was not a deadly weapon in order to return a
    verdict of simple assault. In turn, says the Attorney General, the jury must
    have concluded that the baseball bat was not an inherently deadly weapon,
    meaning the weapons conviction and enhancement were not based on the
    impermissible theory but instead on the permissible theory of how the bat
    was used against Doe 2.
    This argument is unpersuasive because conduct other than hitting
    Doe 1 with the baseball bat could have supported the verdict of simple
    assault. Specifically, evidence was presented that Turcios choked Doe 1.
    Thus, the jury could have found that Turcios never hit Doe 1 with the
    baseball bat but still committed assault by choking her.7 We are not
    persuaded otherwise just because the prosecutor argued that hitting Doe 1
    with the baseball bat was the basis of the assault charge. Of course, the jury
    needed to conclude that Turcios hit Doe 1 with the baseball bat if it was going
    to find him guilty of assault with a deadly weapon on her. But the
    prosecutor’s omission of an argument about how the jury might reach a
    conviction on the lesser included offense of simple assault would not have
    necessarily conveyed that the act of hitting Doe 1 with the baseball bat was
    the only possible basis for any assault conviction.8
    7Although we do not detail it, there was significant evidence calling
    into question the credibility of both Doe 1 and Doe 2’s boyfriend, a possible
    explanation for the jury’s verdicts on the counts involving Doe 1.
    8Indeed, although the prosecutor argued that the hitting of Doe 1 with
    the baseball bat also supported the charge of corporal injury to an intimate
    11
    We acknowledge that the prosecutor never argued that the jury could
    convict Turcios on the weapons charge or enhancement if it found the
    baseball bat was an inherently deadly weapon. To the contrary, the
    prosecutor urged the jury to conclude that the baseball bat was a deadly
    weapon based on the manner in which Turcios used it. Absent the verdict on
    the child-abuse charge, we might agree that this circumstance, in
    combination with the evidence and arguments as a whole, “leave[s] no
    reasonable doubt that the jury made the [necessary] findings.” (Aledamat,
    supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 10.) But because the jury found that Turcios assaulted
    Doe 2 with the baseball bat yet also found that he committed child abuse
    under circumstances not likely to produce great bodily harm, we cannot
    conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury found the baseball bat was
    used in a way likely to cause great bodily injury.
    Finally, we consider the proper disposition. Turcios argues that the
    weapons conviction should be reversed and the weapons enhancement should
    be vacated. The Attorney General does not address the issue. We disagree
    that a full reversal of the conviction is warranted, as the error affects only the
    element of use of a deadly weapon and there can be no dispute that the
    evidence supports the lesser included offense of simple assault. (See People v.
    Edwards (1985) 
    39 Cal.3d 107
    , 118; People v. Moretto (1994) 
    21 Cal.App.4th 1269
    , 1278; see also § 1260.) Accordingly, we reverse the weapons conviction,
    vacate the weapons enhancement, and remand with directions that if the
    partner, he told the jury to find true the weapons enhancement for that
    charge “[i]f you believe he used a bat when he did that.” (Italics added.) This
    suggested that some conduct other than hitting Doe 1 with the bat could also
    support a conviction of corporal injury to an intimate partner and, in turn,
    the lesser included offense of misdemeanor battery of an intimate partner of
    which Turcios was ultimately convicted.
    12
    People do not elect to retry Turcios for assault with a deadly weapon and the
    enhancement for personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon attached to
    the conviction of corporal injury to a child, the judgment shall be modified to
    reflect a conviction of simple assault under section 240.
    III.
    DISPOSITION
    The conviction for assault with a deadly weapon (count 6) is reversed,
    and the enhancement for personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon
    (count 5) is vacated. If the People do not elect to retry Turcios for this crime
    and enhancement, the judgment shall be modified to reflect his conviction on
    count 6 for simple assault under Penal Code section 240 and to strike the
    enhancement on count 5. In either case, Turcios shall receive a new
    sentencing hearing. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
    13
    _________________________
    Humes, P.J.
    WE CONCUR:
    _________________________
    Banke, J.
    _________________________
    Sanchez, J.
    People v. Turcios A159079
    14
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A159079

Filed Date: 12/9/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/9/2021