Foley Investments v. Alisal Water Corp. ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 11/16/21; Certified for Publication 12/9/21 (order attached)
    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FOLEY INVESTMENTS, L.P.,                                 D079045
    Plaintiff and Appellant,
    v.
    (Super. Ct. No. 17CV002074)
    ALISAL WATER CORPORATION,
    Defendant and Respondent.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Monterey County,
    Susan J. Matcham and Marla O. Anderson, Judges. Affirmed.
    Noland, Hamerly, Etienne & Hoss and Michael Masuda for Plaintiff
    and Appellant.
    Law Offices of John A. Biard, Steven R. Myers and William P.
    Schneider for Defendant and Respondent.
    Foley Investments, LP (Owner) asserted inverse condemnation and tort
    claims against Alisal Water Corporation dba Alco Water Service (Alco) after
    an Alco-owned water main that runs through a portion of Owner’s apartment
    complex repeatedly ruptured. In the first phase of a bifurcated bench trial,
    the court ruled against Owner on its inverse condemnation claim. The court
    found the water main did not serve a “public use” for inverse condemnation
    purposes because Alco installed the main under a private contract with
    Owner’s predecessor for the sole benefit of the subject property. In the second
    phase, the court found the tort claims were barred by “fire protection”
    immunity (Pub. Util. Code, § 774)1 because Alco constructed and maintained
    the main on the subject property in a particular way to meet the property’s
    particular fire protection needs. The court entered judgment in Alco’s favor.
    On appeal, Owner contends the trial court erred by finding the water
    main does not serve a public use for purposes of the inverse condemnation
    claim, and by finding fire protection immunity bars the tort claims. As we
    will explain, based on the historical facts as found by the trial court, we find
    no error and affirm the judgment.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    The Santana Apartments are a residential apartment complex located
    at 1235 Garner Avenue (the Property) in Salinas. Alco provides water service
    to the Property via a 12-inch main (the Santana main).
    In 2017, Owner filed a lawsuit against Alco alleging the Santana main
    ruptured in 2015 and 2016, causing extensive damage to the Santana
    Apartments. Owner asserted claims for inverse condemnation, nuisance,
    trespass, and negligence. A few months after filing suit, Owner amended its
    complaint to allege the Santana main had since ruptured a third time.
    By stipulation, the trial court bifurcated the trial. In phase 1, the court
    would decide the “public use” element of Owner’s inverse condemnation
    1      Public Utilities Code section 774 states in part: “No water corporation
    which has undertaken to provide fire protection service . . . shall be liable for
    any . . . damage to or loss of property resulting from a failure to . . .
    maintain . . . any equipment or other fire protection facility or service.”
    Further undesignated statutory references are to the Public Utilities Code.
    2
    claim. If the court found the Santana main served a public use, Owner would
    dismiss its remaining tort claims and phase 2 would consist of a jury trial
    solely on inverse condemnation damages. If, however, the court found the
    Santana main did not serve a public use, the court would dismiss the inverse
    condemnation claim and phase 2 would consist of a jury trial on Owner’s
    remaining tort claims.
    Phase 1 Trial
    Evidence
    During the phase 1 trial, Owner’s general partner and an engineering
    expert testified on Owner’s behalf, and Alco’s president and an engineering
    expert testified on Alco’s behalf. We set forth their testimony in the light
    most favorable to the judgment. (See Border Business Park, Inc. v. City of
    San Diego (2006) 
    142 Cal.App.4th 1538
    , 1554 [“we defer to the express or
    implied factual findings of the trial court”].)
    Alco is a privately owned water company regulated by the Public
    Utilities Commission (PUC). It serves about 9,000 metered service
    connections in the eastern portion of Salinas. Alco obtains its water from
    underground wells, and distributes it through a system of interconnected
    water mains located primarily under city streets.
    Alco’s usual practice for providing water service to a property is to run
    a service line from an Alco main to a meter at the property’s boundary, from
    which point the property owner is responsible for installing and maintaining
    service lines to the property.
    In 1986, before the Property was developed, Alco installed an
    underground well and pump within an exclusive easement toward the
    eastern boundary of the Property. Alco connected the well to a main beneath
    Cortez Street (the Cortez main), located east of the Property.
    3
    In late 1986, the Property’s prior owner (Developer) began developing
    the Santana Apartments on the Property. The fire marshal required that
    Developer install two fire hydrants on interior portions of the Property.
    Developer and Alco entered into a “main extension contract” under which
    Alco agreed to install the Santana main on the Property to meet the fire
    hydrants’ minimum flow requirements. Developer designed the Santana
    main, with input from Alco. Alco’s president testified that, but for
    Developer’s particular needs vis-à-vis the fire hydrants, Alco would not have
    installed the Santana main on the Property. Instead, Alco would have
    followed its usual practice of providing water service to the boundary line, as
    Alco had done for neighboring apartment complexes. Developer granted Alco
    easements for the Santana main over the Property; Alco did not take the land
    by eminent domain.
    The Santana main originates at an Alco main beneath Garner Avenue
    (the Garner main) to the west of the Property, and terminates at a “gate
    valve” within Alco’s well easement on the eastern end of the Property. The
    other side of the gate valve connects to Alco’s well and the Cortez main via a
    smaller 10-inch pipe. Alco’s president and engineering expert acknowledged
    that if the gate valve were opened, water would flow between the Garner
    main and Cortez main—and throughout Alco’s entire distribution system.
    And an Alco map of its distribution system appears to show the Garner main
    and Cortez main connecting via the Santana main and gate valve. This
    configuration led Owner’s expert to opine that Alco’s use of a valve (rather
    than a cap) rendered the Santana main an integral part of Alco’s overall
    distribution system, thus serving a public use.
    4
    But Alco’s president testified that Alco has never opened the valve.
    Indeed, for operational concerns involving sediment and disinfection, it is
    against Alco’s policy to open the valve. Alco’s engineering expert testified the
    closed valve was designed to function as a simpler and less expensive cap for
    the Santana main.2 Owner’s engineering expert conceded that “[i]f the gate
    valve has remained closed all these years, . . . in essence [it] has served as a
    cap,” and the Santana main “serves no customers other than those that are
    actually on the Santana Apartments parcel.”
    The Santana main directly feeds the two fire hydrants on the Property.
    Alco’s expert testified that because these hydrants are located in the interior
    portion of the gated Santana Apartments complex, firefighters would not use
    the hydrants when fighting fires at neighboring properties. Thus, the
    hydrants benefit only the Property.
    The Santana main also indirectly feeds the Santana Apartments’
    individual buildings via nine 2-inch service laterals that branch off from the
    Santana main. All of the ruptures at issue in this case occurred in the 12-
    inch Santana main, not the 2-inch service laterals.
    The Santana Apartments consist of 81 units that house about 400
    occupants. However, Alco has only a single customer at the Property:
    Owner. Alco does not bill the apartment’s individual tenants.
    Ruling
    The trial court found the Santana main does not serve a public use.
    The court made three key factual findings that brought the case more in line
    2     The alternative was to install an actual cap, which would require
    installation of a concrete “thrust block” to reinforce the cap against the
    thousands of pounds of water pressure exerted by the main. Concrete thrust
    blocks are complex and expensive to install. By contrast, a gate valve simply
    and inexpensively functions as a cap by using the water pressure from the
    opposite side of the valve as a thrust block.
    5
    with the authority on which Alco relied (Cantu v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co.
    (1987) 
    189 Cal.App.3d 160
     (Cantu)) than the authority on which Owner relied
    (Barham v. Southern Cal. Edison (1999) 
    74 Cal.App.4th 744
     (Barham)).3
    First, the court found it significant that Alco installed the Santana main
    pursuant to a contract, rather than pursuant to its eminent domain
    authority. Second, the court found that although Alco’s use of a valve rather
    than a cap “is arguably a sign that further distribution was intended,” the
    record contained “no evidence that the valve was ever opened,” which
    “supports the conclusion that [Alco] did not use the [Santana] main as a part
    of its overall distribution system, and did indeed use the valve as a cap.”
    Third, the court consequently found the Santana “main only serviced the
    residents of the apartment complex and was not designed to deliver water
    over a greater area.”
    Phase 2
    Instead of proceeding to a phase 2 jury trial on Owner’s remaining tort
    claims, by stipulation the court proceeded to try Alco’s fire protection
    immunity defense, which, if successful, would bar all of Owner’s tort claims.
    The parties further stipulated the court could consider all the evidence that
    was admitted during the phase 1 trial. They did not present any new
    testimony.
    The parties filed trial briefs arguing their respective positions on the
    immunity issue. Alco argued it was entitled to immunity because instead of
    adhering to its usual practice of simply bringing a small-diameter pipe to a
    meter at the property line, Alco entered into a main extension contract with
    Developer to install a large-diameter main on the Property “specifically . . . as
    a fire protection main . . . to meet [Developer]’s peculiar fire protection
    3     We discuss Cantu and Barham at length in Discussion part I, below.
    6
    requirements” with respect to the two “privately-owned fire hydrants.” Alco
    also cited the fact that its PUC tariff governing water service to the fire
    hydrants specifically incorporates the immunity statute.4 Alco maintained
    the “incidental use of” the Santana main to provide domestic water service to
    the Santana Apartments did not preclude immunity.
    Owner argued in its trial brief that Alco was not entitled to immunity
    because the statute applies only to firefighting (rather than fire protection)
    equipment and activity. Further, Alco’s main extension contract with
    Developer stated in the “PURPOSE OF CONTRACT” section that the
    Santana main “will be used for the purpose of furnishing public utility water
    service” to the Property. And although the contract also included a “FIRE
    PROTECTION” section setting forth fire hydrant flow requirements, the
    PUC’s Main Extension Rule No. 15, which was incorporated into the contract,
    stated, “Extensions solely primarily for fire hydrant [or] private fire
    protection . . . shall not be made under this rule.” Owner maintained these
    provisions indicate the Santana main primarily serves the apartment
    complex’s domestic water needs, rather than a fire protection purpose.
    After hearing argument from counsel, the trial court found that fire
    protection immunity bars Owner’s tort claims. The court found the Santana
    main constitutes fire protection equipment because it “was designed in such a
    way to be able to provide adequate water to the hydrants,” and “is supplying
    water to the hydrants.” The court also found that providing a “compliant
    water delivery system to the fire hydrants” was the reason Alco went “beyond
    its normal meter service” of delivering water to the property boundary, and
    4     Publicly regulated utilities must file tariffs with the PUC setting forth
    rates and other terms and conditions. (See Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell
    (1988) 
    198 Cal.App.3d 1225
    , 1232.) “ ‘A public utility’s tariffs filed with the
    PUC have the force and effect of law.’ ” (Ibid.)
    7
    instead installed the Santana main on the Property. Once there, the Santana
    main provided domestic water service to the apartment complex merely as a
    “convenience.”
    The court entered judgment in Alco’s favor.
    DISCUSSION
    I. The Santana Main Does Not Serve a Public Use
    Owner contends the trial court erred by finding the Santana main does
    not serve a public use, thus disposing of Owner’s inverse condemnation claim.
    Owner does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial
    court’s factual findings regarding the Santana main. Therefore, we review de
    novo whether those now-undisputed facts establish that the Santana main
    serves a public use. (Cantu, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 163; Barham, supra,
    74 Cal.App.4th at p. 752.) We conclude they do not.
    “An inverse condemnation action . . . is an eminent domain action
    initiated by one whose property was taken or damaged for public use.”
    (Pacific Bell v. City of San Diego (2000) 
    81 Cal.App.4th 596
    , 601 (Pacific Bell);
    see Cal. Const., art. I, § 19.) “The fundamental policy underlying the concept
    of inverse condemnation is that the costs of a public improvement benefiting
    the community should be spread among those benefited rather than allocated
    to a single member of the community.” (Pacific Bell, at p. 602; see Belair
    v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist. (1988) 
    47 Cal.3d 550
    , 558.)
    “A successful inverse condemnation claimant must prove that a public
    entity has taken or damaged its property for a public use.” (Pacific Bell,
    supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 602; see San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior
    Court (1996) 
    13 Cal.4th 893
    , 939-940.) “ ‘A public use is “a use which
    concerns the whole community as distinguished from a particular individual
    or a particular number of individuals.” ’ ” (Customer Co. v. City of
    8
    Sacramento (1995) 
    10 Cal.4th 368
    , 381; see City of Los Angeles v. Superior
    Court (2011) 
    194 Cal.App.4th 210
    , 221.)
    Alco contends Cantu, supra, 
    189 Cal.App.3d 160
     establishes that the
    Santana main is not a public use, whereas Owner contends Barham, supra,
    
    74 Cal.App.4th 744
     establishes it is a public use. We agree with Alco.
    In Cantu, the developer of a subdivision contracted with a utility
    company to provide electrical and gas service to the 16 lots within the
    subdivision. (Cantu, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 162.) The utility installed a
    trench within the subdivision to accommodate its electrical and gas lines.
    (Id. at p. 163.) Years later, during heavy winter rains, a landslide occurred in
    the subdivision, damaging the plaintiffs’ home. (Ibid.) The plaintiffs sued
    the utility for inverse condemnation, alleging the utility’s trench was a
    contributing cause of the landslide. (Ibid.) Following a bench trial, the court
    found the utility liable in inverse condemnation. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal
    reversed, finding the utility facilities at issue were “for a private use and
    therefore inverse liability principles are inapplicable.” (Id. at p. 164.)
    The Cantu court based its finding of no public use on two key
    circumstances. (Cantu, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at pp. 164-165.) First, the
    court found it “would be unfair” (id. at p. 165) to impose inverse
    condemnation liability when “service was provided pursuant to a contract
    between the private developer and [the utility]” rather than by the utility’s
    exercise of its eminent domain authority (id. at p. 164). The court reasoned
    that whereas a utility’s acquisition of property by eminent domain reflects
    “an economic business decision to assume liability in the event damage to
    neighboring property is proximately caused by its improvement,” the “same
    cannot be said . . . where [an] easement was granted by [a] private developer
    at no cost to [the utility].” (Id. at p. 165.)
    9
    Second, the Cantu court found it significant that the utility trench “was
    designed to fulfill an individual need” for a single subdivision—it was not
    part of a larger system “designed to transmit electricity over a much greater
    area and which would exist even if these particular plaintiffs were not
    customers.” (Cantu, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at pp. 164-165.) Because the
    utility facilities “did not benefit the public at large but [were] for the private
    use of the plaintiffs and their neighbors,” the court found that imposing
    inverse condemnation liability would be inconsistent with the doctrine’s
    underlying rationale that “the risks of injury [from public activity] should be
    spread over society.” (Id. at p. 165.)
    In Barham, on which Owner relies, homeowners sued an electrical
    utility for damage caused to their property by a wildfire that allegedly started
    when Santa Ana winds caused the utility’s overhead power lines to break.
    (Barham, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 747-748.) The power lines were part
    of a “circuit” that “provide[d] electric service to more than 1,000 households.”
    (Id. at p. 754.) A jury found in the homeowners’ favor on their tort claims,
    but the trial court, relying heavily on Cantu, rejected their inverse
    condemnation claim. (Id. at pp. 747, 754.) The homeowners appealed the
    latter ruling, and the Court of Appeal reversed. (Id. at pp. 747-748.)
    In reversing, the Barham court distinguished the power lines at issue
    in its case from the trench at issue in Cantu. (Barham, supra, 74
    Cal.App.4th at p. 754.) Whereas the trench in Cantu was “found to have been
    designed to fulfill an individual need” and thus “was ‘unlike the construction
    of permanent transmission towers or power lines . . . which are designed to
    transmit electricity over a much greater area,’ ” those were “precisely the
    type of facilities” at issue in Barham. (Barham, at p. 754.) The Barham
    court found inapplicable the Cantu court’s “public policy” concern about
    10
    “spread[ing] the cost to the public at large through inverse liability” because
    the power lines in Barham provided “a much greater service to the public at
    large.” (Barham, at p. 754.)
    Under the facts as found by the trial court, we find Cantu dispositive.
    First, as with the utility company in Cantu, Alco installed the Santana main
    pursuant to a contract with a private developer, rather than through its
    eminent domain authority. (Cantu, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 164.) Thus,
    Alco did not make the type of “economic business decision” that justifies
    imposing inverse condemnation liability. (Id. at p. 165.)
    Second, as with the trench in Cantu, the Santana main was “designed
    to fulfill an individual need.” (Cantu, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 164.) Alco
    constructed and maintained a 12-inch main directly on the Property (as
    opposed to merely delivering water to the Property’s boundary) specifically to
    meet the flow requirements of the fire hydrants, which benefit only the
    Property. (Id. at p. 165 [“the trench was installed specifically to furnish
    electrical service for plaintiffs and their neighbors”].)
    Also as with the trench in Cantu, and unlike the power lines in
    Barham, the Santana main does not provide “service to the public at large”
    (Barham, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 754) via facilities “designed to transmit
    [service] over a much greater area” (Cantu, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 164).
    The trial court expressly found that the gate valve at the end of the Santana
    main “indeed” functioned as a cap. Under this circumstance, Owner’s expert
    conceded the main “serves no customers other than those that are actually on
    the Santana Apartments parcel.”
    Owner emphasizes the possibility that Alco could open the valve in the
    future, in which case the Santana main would serve the public at large. (See,
    e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Parachini (1972) 
    29 Cal.App.3d 159
    , 164
    11
    [“In determining” whether “the taking of property is necessary to the public
    use . . . , the court is entitled to consider not only present needs, but those
    which can be fairly anticipated on account of future growth.”].) But Alco’s
    president and engineering expert testified it was Alco’s policy not to open the
    valve, that there were operational reasons for not doing so (sediment and
    disinfection concerns), and that Alco intended the valve to serve as a simpler
    and less expensive cap. The trial court reasonably concluded from this
    testimony—and Alco’s 32-year history of never having opened the valve—that
    Alco did not intend to do so in the future. (Id. at p. 165 [“Whether a use can
    be ‘fairly anticipated’ is essentially a factual issue . . . .”].)
    Owner also argues that, even assuming the valve serves as a cap, the
    Santana main nevertheless serves a public use because it serves
    approximately “400 people” who live in the Santana Apartments, which is
    “far more than the 16 homes in Cantu.” This argument fails for several
    reasons. First, it ignores the fact that Alco has only one customer at the
    Property: Owner. Second, it conflates people and homes—a more apt
    comparison would be of the Santana Apartments’ 81 units to Cantu’s 16
    homes and Barham’s 1,000 households. When properly framed, the Property
    is more akin to the subdivision in Cantu than the dispersed households in
    Barham. Finally, the argument ignores the significance of the parties’
    private contract and the overarching risk-spreading policy considerations
    underlying inverse condemnation. (See Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v.
    Southern California Edison Co. (2012) 
    208 Cal.App.4th 1400
    , 1406, fn. 4
    [noting the importance of the private contract in Cantu].)
    Owner cites several cases to support the proposition that a finding of
    public use is determined “not upon the fact of who or how many may be using
    or may be expected to use the particular service, but rather upon whether use
    12
    of the service is available to anyone in a position to use it regardless of who
    he may be.” (Slemons v. Southern California Edison Co. (1967) 
    252 Cal.App.2d 1022
    , 1028; see Madera Ry. Co. v. Raymond Granite Co. (1906)
    
    3 Cal.App. 668
    , 682-683.) However, whereas Cantu is directly on point, none
    of the cited cases involve issues even remotely similar to the issue before us.
    (Slemons, at p. 1024 [property owners sought to remove utility poles from
    their property; no inverse condemnation claim, and “[n]o evidence was
    produced or apparently available to establish the basis upon which the poles
    and power lines were installed”]; Madera Ry., at pp. 682-683 [addressing
    whether a railroad company formed by a granite mining company had
    eminent domain authority to condemn a portion of another mining company’s
    land to build a railroad on which steam trains would transport granite, wood,
    and cattle, and which “would be an additional convenience to the
    neighborhood generally,” italics added]; Sherman v. Buick (1867) 
    32 Cal. 241
    ,
    255 [roads connecting residences or farms to a main road are not “private”
    because “[t]hey are open to every one, who may have occasion to use them,
    and are therefore public”].) “ ‘It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for
    propositions not considered.’ ” (Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc. (2020)
    
    52 Cal.App.5th 360
    , 386-387.)
    In sum, we conclude the Santana main serves “a private use and
    therefore inverse liability principles are inapplicable.” (Cantu, supra,
    189 Cal.App.3d at p. 164.)
    II. Fire Protection Immunity Applies
    Owner also contends the trial court erred in finding section 774’s fire
    protection immunity bars Owner’s tort claims. Based, again, on the trial
    court’s factual findings regarding the nature and purpose of the Santana
    main, we conclude fire protection immunity applies.
    13
    Section 774 provides that “[n]o water corporation which has
    undertaken to provide fire protection service . . . shall be liable for any . . .
    damage to or loss of property resulting from a failure to provide or
    maintain . . . any equipment or other fire protection facility or service . . . .”5
    The Legislature enacted this statute in 1972 to provide water companies with
    the same immunities that the Government Code provides to public entities
    engaged in fire protection service. (Valley Title Co. v. San Jose Water Co.
    (1997) 
    57 Cal.App.4th 1490
    , 1496, 1501 (Valley Title); see Gov. Code, §§ 850,
    850.2, 850.4.) Immunity for “fail[ing] to . . . maintain” fire protection
    equipment or facilities (§ 774, italics added) includes a water company’s
    failure to “keep [such equipment or facilities] in good repair” (Valley Title, at
    p. 1504).
    It is undisputed that Alco is a water corporation within the meaning of
    section 774. What is disputed is whether the Santana main constitutes fire
    protection equipment such that Alco’s construction and maintenance of it
    constitutes the provision of fire protection service for which Alco is immune.
    We conclude it does.
    The courts have made clear that fire protection immunity applies to
    water lines and equipment that supply fire hydrants, sprinklers, and other
    fire protection systems. (Valley Title, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 1493 [water
    pipe connecting distribution main to building’s “fire protection system”]; New
    5      Section 774 states in full: “No water corporation which has undertaken
    to provide fire protection service, nor any employee of such corporation acting
    in the course and scope of his employment, shall be liable for any death or
    injury to a person or damage to or loss of property resulting from a failure to
    provide or maintain an adequate water supply or pressure, or any equipment
    or other fire protection facility or service; provided, that such immunity from
    liability shall not exceed that of a public agency or any of its employees, as
    the case may be, under similar circumstances. Nothing in this section shall
    preclude the enforcement of any rule, regulation, or order of the [PUC].”
    14
    Hampshire Ins. Co. v. City of Madera (1983) 
    144 Cal.App.3d 298
    , 304 [“a
    valve in a city water system used to furnish water to fight fires is part of the
    city fire protection ‘facilities’ ”] (New Hampshire); Heieck and Moran v. City of
    Modesto (1966) 
    64 Cal.2d 229
    , 230-231, 233 [same]; Lanier Investments
    v. Department of Water & Power (1985) 
    170 Cal.App.3d 1
    , 8 [same, even
    where “the malfunctioning water valve was installed on private property
    pursuant to a ‘specific contract’ made for the ‘specific purpose’ of protecting
    ‘specific property’ against fire damage”]; Pacific Bell, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 602 [cast iron pipe connected to city’s distribution system that fed fire
    hydrant constitutes fire protection equipment; however, immunity did not
    apply to inverse condemnation claim].)
    The courts have also made clear that fire protection immunity applies
    even when there is no fire or active firefighting. (Valley Title, supra,
    57 Cal.App.4th at p. 1504 [“section 774 provides immunity from damages
    resulting from a failure to maintain (or keep in good repair) fire protection
    facilities or equipment, even where those damages arise from the fire
    protection equipment itself and not in connection with a fire”]; Razeto v. City
    of Oakland (1979) 
    88 Cal.App.3d 349
    , 351, 353 [immunity applied to water
    15
    damage caused when vandals opened a fire hydrant when there was no
    fire].)6
    What the courts have not made clear is the extent to which fire
    protection immunity applies when—as is the case here—equipment or
    facilities that serve a fire protection purpose (supplying water to fire
    hydrants) also serve a purpose unrelated to fire protection (supplying
    domestic water to the apartment complex).
    At least one court has implicitly held that fire protection immunity
    applies to facilities that serve both fire protection and non-fire protection
    purposes. (See New Hampshire, supra, 
    144 Cal.App.3d 298
    .) The facility at
    issue in New Hampshire was a city “water valve located several blocks away”
    from a building that burned. (Id. at p. 301, italics added.) The court’s
    reference to this several-block distance suggests the court was aware that the
    valve likely served purposes unrelated to fire protection, yet the court
    nevertheless found that fire protection immunity applied.
    Courts have also held that other immunity statutes apply even when a
    facility is used both for the purpose specified in the immunity statute and for
    6      The cases on which Owner relies to support a contrary conclusion are
    distinguishable because they involve public entities providing services
    unrelated to fire protection, which are not subject to fire protection immunity.
    (See Varshock v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2011) 
    194 Cal.App.4th 635
    , 649-650 [no immunity for driving a fire engine to the scene
    of a fire, but immunity for operating it once there]; Wilson v. County of San
    Joaquin (2019) 
    38 Cal.App.5th 1
    , 13 [no fire protection immunity for fire
    department’s provision of emergency medical services]; Lewis v. Mendocino
    Fire Protection Dist. (1983) 
    142 Cal.App.3d 345
    , 346 [no fire protection
    immunity for negligently rescuing a camper trapped beneath a fallen tree];
    Vedder v. County of Imperial (1974) 
    36 Cal.App.3d 654
    , 660 [no fire protection
    immunity for fire caused by city’s negligent storage of chemicals on city
    property without adequate fire protection measures]; Potter v. City of
    Oceanside (1981) 
    114 Cal.App.3d 564
    , 565 [no fire protection immunity where
    fire captain’s instructions for addressing a ruptured gas line caused a fire].)
    16
    other unspecified purposes. (See, e.g., Loeb v. County of San Diego (2019)
    
    43 Cal.App.5th 421
    , 432-434 [recreational “trail immunity” under Gov. Code,
    § 831.4 applied even though trail was used for both recreational and
    nonrecreational purposes]; Burgueno v. Regents of University of California
    (2015) 
    243 Cal.App.4th 1052
    , 1061 [trail immunity applied to bike path
    designed and used for commuting, but which was also used for recreation].)
    We conclude it is appropriate to apply fire protection immunity to
    Owner’s tort claims because the appellate record establishes that fire
    protection was a substantial or significant factor in Alco’s decision to
    construct and maintain the Santana main on the Property. Specifically,
    Alco’s president testified that but for the Property’s specific fire protection
    needs, the Santana main would not exist. Instead, in accordance with its
    usual practice, Alco would have delivered water to the Property’s boundary,
    from which point Developer would have been responsible for installing and
    maintaining onsite infrastructure. Indeed, this is precisely what Alco did
    with neighboring apartment complexes. But the Property had a specific fire
    protection requirement for two fire hydrants. So Alco deviated from its usual
    practice and installed on the Property a 12-inch water main designed to meet
    the hydrants’ flow requirements. Significantly, all the ruptures at issue here
    occurred in this main, rather than in the service laterals designed to meet the
    apartment complex’s domestic water needs. Because the Santana main
    would not exist on the Property but for the Property’s specific fire protection
    needs, we conclude section 774 applies, and bars Owner’s tort claims.
    We are unpersuaded by Owner’s contention that certain provisions in
    the contract between Alco and Developer preclude fire protection immunity.
    Specifically, Owner cites the fact the contract states the Santana main “will
    be used for the purpose of furnishing public utility water service,” and that
    17
    the contract incorporates PUC Rule 15, which precludes contracts “primarily
    for fire hydrant or private fire protection” purposes. But we do not find it
    necessary that fire protection be the sole or even primary purpose in order for
    fire protection immunity to apply to a mixed use facility; it is sufficient that
    fire protection be a substantial or significant purpose. This is a question of
    fact, which the trial court resolved in favor of applying immunity. The
    substantial evidence discussed above supports the trial court’s findings in
    this regard.7
    Owner argues that granting immunity to Alco under the present
    circumstances would lead to absurd results, like immunizing a water
    company if its employee assaulted someone while inspecting a water meter,
    or incentivizing water companies to pretextually install a single fire hydrant
    somewhere “remote[ ]” as a means of immunizing the entire system for
    delivering contaminated water. These hypotheticals bear no similarity to the
    facts before us, and ignore that assault remains a crime; property owners can
    insure against many forms of damage to their property; and section 774
    expressly does not “preclude the enforcement of any [PUC] rule, regulation,
    or order” regarding water quality or public safety. (§ 774.)
    In sum, because the facts as found by the trial court establish that fire
    protection was a substantial or significant factor in Alco constructing and
    maintaining the Santana main on the Property, we conclude section 744
    immunity bars Owner’s tort claims.
    7      Contrary to Owner’s suggestion, no “sleight of hand” arises from the
    fact that different judges presided over phases 1 and 2. As noted, the parties
    stipulated that the phase 1 evidence was admissible in phase 2, and the
    parties discussed this evidence in their phase 2 trial briefs and submitted
    excerpts of it to the phase 2 judge.
    18
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed. Alco is entitled to its costs on appeal.
    HALLER, Acting P. J.
    WE CONCUR:
    DATO, J.
    GUERRERO, J.
    19
    Filed 12/9/21
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FOLEY INVESTMENTS, L.P.,                    D079045
    Plaintiff and Appellant,
    (Super. Ct. No. 17CV002074)
    v.
    ALISAL WATER CORPORATION,
    ORDER CERTIFYING
    Defendant and Respondent.            OPINION FOR PUBLICATION
    THE COURT:
    The opinion in this case filed November 16, 2021, was not certified for
    publication. It appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication
    specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), the requests pursuant to
    rule 8.1120(a) for publication are GRANTED.
    IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for
    publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and
    ORDERED that the words “Not to Be Published in the Official Reports”
    appearing on page one of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be
    published in the Official Reports.
    HALLER, Acting P. J.
    Copies to: All parties
    

Document Info

Docket Number: D079045

Filed Date: 12/9/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/9/2021