In re Caden C. CA1/1 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 12/21/21 In re Caden C. CA1/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
    certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
    certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    In re Caden C., a Person Coming
    Under the Juvenile Court Law.
    SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN
    SERVICES AGENCY,                                                A162420
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                            (City and County of San Francisco
    v.                                                              Super. Ct. No. JD15-3034)
    CHRISTINE C.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    This is the sixth time we have issued an opinion in these dependency
    proceedings involving young Caden C. (See In re Caden C. (2019) 
    34 Cal.App.5th 87
     (Caden C. I), revd. In re Caden C. (2021) 
    11 Cal.5th 614
    (Caden C.); In re Caden C. (Dec. 9, 2020, A160213) (Caden C. III) [nonpub.
    opn.]; C.C. v. Superior Court (Sept. 10, 2020, A160270) (C.C. II) [nonpub.
    opn.]; In re Caden C. (May 22, 2020, A158063) (Caden C. II) [nonpub. opn.];
    C.C. v. Superior Court (Aug. 28, 2017, A151400) (C.C. I) [nonpub. opn.].)1
    On our own motion, we take judicial notice of our prior opinions in
    1
    this matter for relevant background. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (c) & (d),
    459, subd. (a); see People v. Morris (2015) 
    242 Cal.App.4th 94
    , 97, fn. 2.)
    1
    Our high court has also weighed in, issuing an opinion in May 2021 which
    analyzes the beneficial relationship exception to adoption in the context of
    this case. (Caden C., at pp. 629–641.) In the meantime, Caden’s dependency
    proceeded to a second permanency planning hearing at which the juvenile
    court found Caden adoptable, declined to apply the beneficial relationship
    exception to adoption, and terminated the parental rights of Christine C.
    (mother). On appeal, mother contends that the juvenile court committed
    reversible legal error in its rejection of the beneficial relationship exception.
    We disagree and affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A.    Summary of Prior Proceedings
    A detailed history of these extended juvenile dependency proceedings
    can be found in our prior opinions in this matter, and we will not repeat it
    here. To summarize, during mother’s 30-year history with the child welfare
    system, all six of her children have been removed from her care due to her
    chronic substance abuse, neglectful conduct, and involvement in domestic
    violence. (Caden C. I, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 92.) Caden, mother’s
    youngest child, was initially removed in September 2013 at the age of four.
    (Id. at pp. 92–93.) After extended attempts at reunification, a permanency
    planning hearing was held for Caden in February 2018 pursuant to section
    366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.2 The juvenile court found Caden
    adoptable but declined to terminate parental rights, citing the beneficial
    relationship between Caden and mother. Caden was placed in a permanent
    All section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
    2
    otherwise specified.
    2
    plan of long-term foster care with his caregiver, Ms. H. (Id. at pp. 91, 102–
    103.)
    In September 2018, the juvenile court held a six-month post-
    permanency review for Caden, maintaining him in long term foster care. In
    advance of the minor’s March 2019 post-permanency review, the Agency
    recommended that a new section 366.26 hearing be set so that the juvenile
    court could again consider adoption by his then-caregiver Ms. H. as Caden’s
    permanent plan. At the continued hearing on April 9, the court set the
    second permanency planning hearing for July 31, 2019. 3 Later that same
    day, we issued our opinion in Caden C. I, supra, 
    34 Cal.App.5th 87
    , reversing
    the juvenile court’s reliance on the beneficial relationship exception to
    adoption in Caden’s first permanency planning hearing.
    On July 24, 2019, the Supreme Court granted review in Caden C. I. At
    the second permanency planning hearing on July 31, 2019, the juvenile court
    continued the permanency issue for a progress report in light of the Supreme
    Court’s grant of review. However, it ordered a reduction in mother’s
    visitation with Caden from monthly to once every other month due to her
    continuing destabilizing behaviors.4 The permanency planning hearing was
    Mother filed a writ petition challenging this setting order, and we
    3
    denied that petition on its merits in September 2020. (See C. C. II, supra,
    A160270.)
    The juvenile court found that contrary to the requirements of her
    4
    visitation, mother regularly gave excessive and inappropriate gifts to Caden
    which caused conflict in the foster home. Mother also interfered in Caden’s
    relationship with his therapist despite clear evidence the minor benefitted
    from the therapeutic relationship. When given the opportunity to attend one
    of Caden’s soccer games, mother sent demanding and hostile text messages to
    Ms. H. so that all contact had to be stopped. Mother then attempted to reach
    Ms. H. directly by calling on a blocked number. Mother appealed from the
    court-ordered reduction in visitation, and in May 2020, we affirmed the
    juvenile court’s order. (See Caden C. II, supra, A158063.)
    3
    then continued repeatedly without any finding of good cause or a
    determination that further delay was in Caden’s best interests. (See Caden
    C. III, supra, A160213.) The juvenile court and parties apparently believed,
    incorrectly, that the second permanency planning hearing should not be held
    until the proceedings in the Supreme Court with respect to the first
    permanency planning hearing had been resolved. Given the length of time
    that passed while the second permanency planning hearing was pending,
    mother argued that a post-permanency review hearing under section 366.3
    was required and must be held in its place. The juvenile court disagreed,
    reasoning that mother could present evidence in support of her interests at
    the upcoming permanency planning hearing. The court subsequently set a
    contested hearing over three dates in September and October 2020, granted
    mother’s request for a bonding study, and denied her request for a stay of the
    pending permanency planning hearing.
    Mother appealed from the court’s failure to hold a post-permanency
    review hearing and in December 2020, we affirmed the juvenile court’s order.
    (See Caden C. III, supra, A160213.) In doing so, we expressed concern over
    the significant delay in the case and its impact on Caden’s need for
    permanency and stability. Given that almost three years had elapsed since
    the first permanency planning hearing, we determined that the scheduled
    permanency planning hearing should move forward as expeditiously as
    possible. To address mother’s claims, we concluded that the section 366.3
    hearing should trail the permanency planning hearing and any necessary
    findings be made if the court declined to terminate parental rights.
    B.    Events Since Our Last Opinion
    Ms. H. gave notice in July 2020 that she could no longer provide an
    adoptive home for Caden, and the Agency began looking for a new placement.
    4
    After three and a half years with Ms. H., Caden was moved to a new
    placement on November 10, 2020. Ms. H. requested the move for several
    reasons: the financial hardship her family was facing due to the pandemic;
    the stress caused by her separation from her partner; mother’s referral of Ms.
    H. to the child abuse hotline for emotional abuse after Caden misplaced his
    iPad; and conflict between Caden and Ms. H.’s younger son, due, in part, to
    jealousy caused by mother’s excessive gift giving.
    The hotline call took place after mother’s virtual visit with Caden in
    May 2020. Mother reported to the hotline that someone in the home had
    stolen Caden’s iPad, which was untrue but led to a licensing investigation.
    As it turned out, Caden’s iPad had slipped in between a desk and a couch.
    Ms. H. told the social worker that the incident “was the final straw in a long
    history of the mother constantly interfering with the placement and the rules
    of her home.” While the decision to move Caden was incredibly difficult for
    Ms. H., she felt she could not commit to the permanency Caden deserves. 5
    Given this development, both minor’s counsel and the Agency requested that
    the contested hearing be continued so that Caden’s situation could be
    clarified. The court set pre-trial motions on December 28 and continued the
    contested permanency planning hearing to three days in January 2021.
    Caden’s long-term therapist, Ms. Hirschfield, retired in July 2020 and
    Caden’s new therapist, Ms. Sarria, worked with the minor to process the loss
    associated with leaving Ms. H.’s home. Ms. Sarria stated that while Caden
    was initially devastated by the move, he had transitioned smoothly, showed
    5
    Mother filed a section 388 motion in September asserting that a
    permanency planning hearing was no longer appropriate because of Caden’s
    pending placement with new caregivers. At a hearing on September 15,
    2020, the juvenile court denied mother’s modification request, stating that
    the issues raised by mother would all be addressed in the upcoming
    permanency planning hearing.
    5
    resilience in settling into the new placement, and appeared more relaxed
    since the move. The caregivers stated Caden was starting to open up and
    talk to them. They were working with him on vocalizing his needs and were
    supportive of him maintaining contact with his previous school community
    and Ms. H. Caden recently told the social worker that he liked the placement
    so far and felt he had more freedom and more responsibilities.
    Caden was reported to be adjusting well to his new placement. He had
    made friends, enjoyed cooking dinner with his caregivers, was open to trying
    new things, had bonded with the family dog “Bear,” and liked to ride his bike
    around his new neighborhood. He was participating in several outdoor
    camps during the winter break from school and would be visiting Ms. H. and
    her family. Caden was attending his old school virtually through the end of
    the school year. He was still working approximately three grade levels
    behind in most subjects, but his current caregivers were supporting him
    academically.
    In advance of the December 28, 2020 hearing, the Agency filed a status
    review report on December 18 recommending placement of Caden in foster
    care with a goal of guardianship. The Agency reported that mother had
    provided the Agency with letters from her therapist and sign-in sheets for
    substance abuse groups. According to the therapist, “ ‘mother has been
    engaged in counseling for three years and . . . she has begun making
    intentional steps to curbing the intensity of her emotional reactions when
    events trigger anger.’ ” However, when mother spoke to the social worker
    about Caden’s placement change in August 2020, she became upset, yelling
    and swearing. During the same conversation, mother admitted to drinking
    alcohol the previous week and using methamphetamine within the previous
    three or four months. The Agency continued to express concern that mother’s
    6
    inability to follow basic visitation rules would negatively impact Caden’s
    current placement, as it had previous placements. 6 For example, although
    the social worker had a clear conversation with mother about approved
    Christmas gifts prior to the November 2020 visit, mother ignored the
    conversation and brought extra gifts. The Agency concluded that Caden
    continued to benefit from reduced contact with mother because he was less
    dysregulated and disruptive in placement. Nevertheless, the Agency wanted
    Caden to stabilize in his placement before discussing permanency.
    Caden’s new court appointed special advocate (CASA) also filed a
    report in advance of the December 28, 2020 hearing. Per his CASA, Caden
    was enthusiastic, active, enjoyed participating in activities with others, and
    was eager to share his knowledge. He demonstrated impressive physicality.
    During a visit after Caden was told he would be moving from Ms. H.’s home,
    the minor expressed sadness and anger and was otherwise quiet, showing no
    interest in anything. However, the CASA was “pleasantly surprised” at the
    minor’s resilience on her first visit to his new home. Caden appeared very
    relaxed and interactive. He was excited to share that he already knew how to
    get to the local park and that he was getting a weekly allowance, with
    possible extra money for doing chores. Caden was the only child in the home
    and had his own room. The current caregiver seemed to be taking a great
    interest in the minor’s well-being. The CASA summarized Caden’s new
    6As we detailed in Caden C. I, mother’s poor boundaries and impulsive
    behaviors led to the failure of a previous placement with Ms. H. in 2016.
    Caden lost two other potentially permanent placements in February 2017
    and May 2017 due to mother’s disruptive conduct. (Caden C. I, supra, 34
    Cal.App.5th at pp. 96–98.) Although Ms. H. then agreed to take the minor
    back, Caden’s long-term placement with Ms. H. was disrupted once again by
    mother as discussed above.
    7
    placement as “stimulating, supportive, safe, and enjoyable” for the minor.
    Caden expressed to his CASA that he wanted to stay in contact with Ms. H.
    According to the CASA, Caden’s teachers described him as calm and
    laid back, with no disciplinary issues. Caden was not participating in his
    sports teams due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and he missed his teammates
    and playing sports. However, his current caretakers had taken him skiing
    and were planning to teach him to snowboard. The minor was very healthy.
    The CASA reported that Caden was “passionate about the things he
    loves . . . curious, aware of his environment, and like[d] exploring.” He asked
    her questions ranging from “ ‘where did rap music come from?’ ” to “ ‘how
    does somebody get into a place like [UC Berkeley]?’ ” In sum, she enjoyed
    spending time with him.
    At the December 28 hearing, minor’s counsel objected to the Agency’s
    recommendation that the minor remain in foster care rather than proceed to
    a permanency planning hearing. Caden’s caregivers had informed counsel
    the previous day that they were willing to provide permanency for Caden,
    either through adoption or, failing that, guardianship. The Agency indicated
    that it would need to follow up with the caregivers and provide any more
    recent information to the court. Mother’s counsel then requested a
    continuance, but the juvenile court stated it would only entertain such a
    request by written motion. The court maintained the January 2021 dates for
    the contested permanency planning hearing. 7
    On January 5, 2021, the Agency filed an updated assessment report,
    indicating that it was recommending adoption and termination of parental
    rights. Although Caden had only been living in his new placement for a short
    7Mother filed a motion for continuance of the permanency planning
    hearing on January 4, which—after opposition from the Agency and minor’s
    counsel—was denied by the juvenile court as not in Caden’s best interests.
    8
    time, his caregivers were open to permanency, including adoption, and stated
    they wanted what was in the minor’s best interests. They expressed joy
    regarding Caden being a part of their family and lives. The caregivers had
    successfully fostered a handful of children over the previous few years and
    had expressed the hope of providing permanency for a child in post-
    permanency status if the opportunity arose. There appeared to be no
    impediments to adoption. Caden told the social worker that he felt safe and
    comfortable in the placement and wanted to remain there. The social worker,
    however, had not explicitly discussed a plan of adoption with the minor,
    hoping to give the relationship time to progress naturally without forcing
    Caden to choose between his conflicting feelings regarding missing his
    mother and forming an attachment with a family who could provide him with
    permanence.
    With respect to visitation, the Agency reported that mother’s inability
    to comply with set rules and court-ordered expectations had not changed.
    The Agency remained concerned that mother “consistently projects her
    dissatisfaction onto Caden instead of listening to what he thinks and feels.”
    She also places guilt on the minor for becoming comfortable in a placement.
    At the virtual visit in March 2020, for example, mother asked several times
    whether Caden was okay—stating that he looked “miserable and unhappy”—
    despite the fact that the minor continued to assure mother he was fine. At
    the end of the visit, mother stated: “ ‘I know something is wrong and you just
    don’t want to say it.’ ” Caden ignored the comment. At the May 2020 virtual
    visit, the social worker had to intervene and remind mother not to discuss the
    case. Mother became angry and cried several times during the visit,
    escalating when Caden mentioned his iPad was missing. Mother promised
    9
    Caden she would get to the bottom of the issue, crying and yelling that
    “Caden deserved everything good in the world.”
    C.    The Second Permanency Planning Hearing
    i. Motion to Quash Minor’s Testimony
    Caden’s second permanency planning hearing was held over four days
    in January 2021.8 At the beginning of the hearing on January 11, 2021, the
    juvenile court considered minor’s motion to quash mother’s subpoena of
    Caden’s testimony. Minor’s counsel argued that Caden’s wishes could be
    presented by other means and that testifying would be traumatizing for the
    minor and could undermine his nascent stability in his current placement.
    Counsel further asserted that it would place Caden in the “psychologically
    untenable” position of choosing between his desire for a permanent, stable
    home and his loyalty to mother. In addition, Caden had informed his
    attorney that he did not want to testify, even if it was done virtually or in
    chambers. Mother opposed the motion to quash. Mother’s counsel argued
    that Caden’s firsthand testimony was needed because the reports variously
    indicated that Caden did not want to discuss adoption, that it was difficult for
    him to discuss it, or that he had conflicting feelings or contrary messages.
    During this exchange, Caden became very emotional and began to cry. He
    stated: “I wanted to say that I don’t talk about it because every single thing I
    say to you guys, you guys never consider it.” Relying on In re Jennifer J.
    (1992) 
    8 Cal.App.4th 1080
    , 1088–1089, the juvenile court found that it would
    be harmful to Caden to require his testimony and that his feelings were
    expressed well in Agency reports. The court assured Caden that it had been
    8Caden was present via videoconference for the first day of the
    hearing, the morning of the second day, and for argument and decision, but
    otherwise did not attend. Mother appeared via the video platform for most of
    the hearing.
    10
    reading the reports and what the minor had indicated, and while it could not
    promise what it was going to do, the court heard him.
    ii.   Testimony of Social Worker
    The social worker Elizabeth Short testified that she had been assigned
    to Caden’s case since April 2019. She described Caden as a “really funny”
    and “really engaging” 11-and-a-half-year-old boy with a wide variety of
    hobbies. Although she thought she knew what he looked like when relaxed,
    she was seeing something different since the minor moved to his new
    placement. Caden was smiling a lot more and just seemed more comfortable.
    He was trying many new things, including new foods, and was very positive
    about it. He was taking bass guitar lessons arranged by his CASA. And he
    had done a wilderness skills camp over school break which he “really, really
    liked.” The caregivers worked remotely, and they took turns supporting
    Caden’s distance learning. According to the social worker, there was a level
    of joking and camaraderie around the placement that was unusual so soon
    after a move. She noted in this regard that Caden told her he didn’t know
    people bought cheese in blocks instead of pre-shredded in bags and asked her
    if she knew anyone who shredded their own cheese. Caden was observed
    laughing at this testimony. The foster parents had “nothing but lovely
    things” to say about Caden and his adjustment. They kept him connected to
    his former community in Novato. He had slumber parties with his friends
    and communication with Ms. H.9
    9 In a recorded sidebar, Agency counsel informed the juvenile court
    that, during a break in the social worker’s testimony, mother had made
    inappropriate threats through the video platform that she would find the
    caregivers, which were heard by Caden, the caregivers, and the CASA.
    Specifically the caregivers heard mother state, “ ‘We are going to expletive
    find you,’ ” while the CASA heard: “ ‘Don’t worry. I believe we will find
    you.’ ” In addition, both the court and the social worker had observed mother
    11
    Ms. H. had informed the social worker that there was a time, early in
    Caden’s case, when she and mother had an “okay relationship,” but it
    deteriorated over the years with mother’s communications often devolving
    into harassment. Both Ms. H. and Caden’s former therapist told the social
    worker they saw positive changes in Caden after his visitation with mother
    was reduced to once every other month. The minor was less irritable, he
    exhibited less dysregulation in his mood, there was less arguing in the foster
    home, and Caden was able to follow the home rules.
    Ms. Short testified that mother was generally consistent with
    visitation, and Caden looked forward to seeing her. However, when mother
    discussed the case with Caden during visits, it affected him negatively and
    she communicated inaccurate information, which led Caden not to trust what
    the social workers told him. For example, mother told Caden that his
    dependency case was all his attorney’s fault—that counsel had some sort of
    vendetta against mother—which Caden continued to believe, and which
    negatively impacted his ability to trust his attorney and other adults. At one
    point, Caden asked the social worker why he had been removed, stating that
    he had never seen mother use drugs and that she told him that she did not
    use them. During the May 2020 virtual visit, mother brought up the case,
    making statements such as “this isn’t Caden’s fault” and “ ‘they just didn’t
    want me to have you.’ ” When mother became upset and began to cry and
    yell, Caden was “visibly bothered” by her behavior. Ms. H. reported that,
    frequently mouthing things during the hearing while muted, which at times
    appeared to be directed communications. The court admonished mother not
    to make any further improper communications on the video platform,
    whether they be threatening or in anger or by mouthing. Mother, however,
    was unable to refrain from moving about, mouthing, and yelling while on
    mute.
    12
    after the visit, Caden went straight to his room, put his head under the
    pillow, and didn’t want to talk about what happened.
    The social worker opined that, if parental rights were terminated, it
    would be a good thing for Caden to have some contact with his mother
    throughout his teen years in a controlled, supervised setting. She testified
    that, according to a May 2018 contact note in the case file, Caden had
    reportedly scratched himself at that time because he missed mother. Ms.
    Short also testified that it had been very difficult for Caden to deal with
    multiple transitions between different foster families. As he has gotten older,
    Caden has felt ambivalent about his situation because he likes living in a
    safe and stable home, but he also likes having a relationship with mother.
    She stated the Agency’s view “that a stable and predictable caregiver is what
    can help guide Caden through the difficulties that he has experienced and
    witnessed while in [mother’s] care and that that can be one of the things that
    would really help him through, especially through his teenage years, to be
    able to self-regulate better, to help heal his mental health, and kind of
    stabilize some of these issues that came up while he was in [mother’s] care.”
    Finally, when asked to summarize her experience with mother, the social
    worker said “unpredictable.”
    iii.   Mother’s Bonding Expert
    Mother’s bonding expert, Dr. Molesworth, submitted an updated
    bonding study during the contested permanency planning hearing. 10 Dr.
    Molesworth observed Caden and mother for two hours in July 2020 and two
    hours in October 2020. He interviewed Caden alone on both of those
    occasions. He also interviewed mother on January 17, 2021. After the July
    10 His prior bonding study is summarized in our prior published opinion
    in this matter. (See Caden I, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 101–102.)
    13
    visit, Caden told Dr. Molesworth that he missed mother every day and
    wished he could see her every day. On a scale of 1 to 100, he missed mother
    100. If he did not live with Ms. H., he would also miss her 100. He would
    like to live with mother and Ms. H. on alternating weeks. After the visit in
    October 2020, Caden acknowledged that he sometimes thought about other
    things and did not miss mother, but stated he missed her 99 out of 100. He
    told Dr. Molesworth he was happy living with Ms. H. but would like to see
    mother more—two to three hours or a whole day. Caden elaborated: “[W]hen
    I grow up, I want to see [mother] a lot, I want to keep in touch with all my
    family including [Ms. H.]. I want to invite them to dinner and go to a movie.
    I don’t want to be one of those people who does not have their family.”
    (Italics omitted.)
    Mr. Molesworth opined that Caden continued to have a significant,
    positive bond with mother. Although their interactions were less exuberant
    than three years ago, Dr. Molesworth felt this could be due to Caden’s
    developmental stage. Caden, however, also reported strong feelings for Ms.
    H., whom he stated he loved like a mom. According to Dr. Molesworth,
    Caden’s emotions and thinking regarding his bond with mother had evolved
    since his last evaluation. There was evidence of some nuance and flexibility
    in his thinking, as mother is no longer the sole focus of his emotional life.
    Rather, his “affectionate emotions” towards Ms. H. revealed that Caden can
    have “strong feelings towards other significant emotional figures in his life.”
    Nevertheless, Dr. Molesworth opined that if Caden were deprived of
    contact with mother it would be a major loss. He would experience emotional
    distress and pain, and it would likely have a negative effect on his self-
    regard. Dr. Molesworth acknowledged that, while initially devastated by his
    removal from Ms. H., Caden adjusted well to his new home. He opined,
    14
    however, that the loss of mother would be on a different order. Mother
    represented an “affectionate and loving maternal figure” for Caden. She is a
    repository of “aspects of his history and life experiences, the one person who
    has been a fixture in his life.” The loss of his mother would be “likely to
    contribute to depression and chronic stress and have an enduring impact on
    his psychology.”
    Dr. Molesworth reported that, although guardianship would allow a
    parent to petition for reunification in the future, mother had stated to him
    that she did not intend to do so. He acknowledged that a guardianship could
    be negatively impacted should mother create disruptions by intruding into
    the parenting of the legal guardians. Mother’s unsolicited intrusions, even if
    well-intentioned, could be confusing for Caden. In addition, Caden’s special
    needs render him vulnerable to emotional regression during periods of
    increased stress. However, “his special needs may be addressed, and his
    emotional vulnerabilities buffered, by adults who are attuned and responsive
    to his needs.”
    Dr. Molesworth testified at the contested hearing as mother’s only
    witness. He qualified by stipulation as an expert in the areas of child
    psychology and child development, bonding and attachment, bonding study
    evaluations, and forensic psychology. He had completed seven bonding
    studies in dependency cases in the last four years. He did not do any
    collateral interviews with the social worker or Caden’s current therapist for
    his 2021 evaluation.
    Dr. Molesworth testified regarding the contents of both his 2017 and
    2021 bonding studies. He elaborated that the depressive features associated
    with Caden’s loss of mother could possibly include episodes of depressed
    mood, self-harm, substance abuse, and acting out behaviors. He described
    15
    Caden as “a fairly expressive guy” who could “talk about his feeling quite
    readily” and was “easy to have a conversation with.” He also reiterated that
    there could be a “disruptive influence” by mother in the context of a legal
    guardianship.
    iv.   Agency Expert
    The Agency’s expert, Dr. Alicia Lieberman, submitted an updated
    clinical consultation report during the contested permanency planning
    hearing.11 She had consulted on Caden’s case since 2016. Her report, dated
    January 22, 2021, discussed some of the limitations of Dr. Molesworth’s
    updated bonding study. For example, the bonding study focused on the
    “affectional bond” between Caden and mother, which had never been
    disputed. It failed, however, to consider the extensive evidence of
    dysregulation and disruptive behavior associated with Caden’s visits with
    mother. In addition, the bonding study did not address mother’s behaviors
    that were detrimental to the minor’s mental health, such as mother’s
    repeated disruption of his placements, undermining of Caden’s relationships
    with his foster parents, displays of crying and anger during visits, and refusal
    to abide by the visitation rules with resulting conflict. This conduct placed an
    emotional burden on the minor, whose attachment to his mother is
    characterized by intense worry about her well-being. It caused Caden to
    adopt a “caretaking role that he is too young to uphold without serious
    detriment to his healthy development.”
    Mother’s persistent interference over the years had caused Caden to
    lose “important opportunities to maintain stable relationships with adults
    who were invested in his wellbeing and willing to provide a permanent home
    11Her prior clinical consultation report is summarized in our prior
    published opinion in this matter. (See Caden I, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at
    pp. 100–101.)
    16
    to him.” There was a high risk this behavior would continue in Caden’s
    current placement. Because of this, placement decisions other than adoption,
    such as legal guardianship, posed “unacceptable risks for Caden’s wellbeing.”
    Dr. Lieberman cautioned this would be “the last chance that Caden has for
    placement stability and the benefits that it will provide for his healthier
    development as an adolescent and into adulthood.”
    The adoption recommendation was made after a careful weighing of the
    risks and benefits. According to Dr. Lieberman, continued placement
    instability as Caden makes the challenging transition into adolescence
    represents “a clear danger to this child’s ability to acquire emotional stability
    as an adult.” Dr. Lieberman acknowledged that termination of parental
    rights and adoption would “present emotional challenges for Caden.”
    However, they would “also free him to process the separation from his
    mother, to focus on deepening his relationships with the new parent figures,
    and to plan for how he wants to re-establish a connection with his mother
    when he is able to do so from a more autonomous developmental stage.” In
    sum, giving Caden the experiences of “a solid home with predictable
    relationships and healthy, growth-promoting routines has been the least
    detrimental course of action for him for many years.”
    Dr. Lieberman testified as a rebuttal witness at the contested hearing.
    She was accepted as an expert in parent-child bonding and attachment with
    a specific focus on childhood trauma and its impact on children. She did not
    perform a bonding study and did not speak with or observe mother and
    Caden. Instead, she provided a clinical consultation after reviewing the
    breadth of data. Specifically, she reviewed the entire child welfare file, met
    with different participants in the case, had a long conversation with Caden’s
    initial therapist, spoke with Ms. H., and took part in numerous meetings
    17
    with the different service providers involved with Caden over the course of
    years.
    Dr. Lieberman testified that when his visits with mother were reduced
    from weekly to monthly, a part of Caden was sad and upset but he did not
    have a decline in performance at school and his behavior in the home was
    more stable. When visits were reduced to every other month, Caden was
    upset and emotional, but he worked through it with Ms. H. and the social
    worker, recovered very well, and his behavior afterwards actually stabilized.
    Dr. Lieberman further testified that not being able to see his mother as much
    as he would like was “a manageable stress” for Caden. Just because a child
    has vulnerabilities doesn’t mean that any particular stress is worse than
    other kinds of stress. Separating a child from a parent when that child
    experienced physical or emotional abuse or neglect under that parent’s care
    can actually be a therapeutic intervention. Such a child might have a
    connection with that parent that has loving components but that also has
    components of fear and anger.
    v.    Argument and Decision
    Minor’s counsel and Agency counsel both argued in favor of termination
    of parental rights and a permanent plan of adoption. In making his remarks,
    minor’s counsel expressed sadness that “once again [a] hearing [t]hat is
    supposed to be about Caden has turned out to be a hearing about his
    mother.” In contrast, mother’s attorney argued that Caden was not generally
    adoptable and that there was insufficient evidence he was specifically
    adoptable by his current caregivers, making termination of parental rights
    improper. Moreover, even if the court found Caden adoptable, mother’s
    counsel contended that termination of parental rights was still inappropriate
    due to the existence of a beneficial relationship between Caden and mother.
    18
    The juvenile court announced its decision on February 2, 2021. It first
    found Caden to be generally adoptable by clear and convincing evidence. The
    court then considered application of the beneficial relationship exception to
    the case. It found regular visitation by mother to the extent permitted by
    court order. It next turned to the question of “whether the nature and extent
    of a particular parent-child relationship is sufficient to be deemed beneficial
    for purposes of the exception.” The court found that there was an emotional
    bond between Caden and mother. It stated, however, that in determining
    whether a relationship is beneficial “you have to look at all of the different
    factors, including all the unique factors in this case.”
    The court considered the entire history in the matter and concluded
    that mother’s relationship with Caden was not beneficial because it was not a
    positive, parental relationship. Rather than being nurturing, it was
    disruptive and deprived him of stability and permanence with different
    caregivers. The court assured Caden that it had read and heard everything
    Caden had said, and it had also considered the minor’s need for safe and
    predictable caregiving given his history. The court finally determined that
    the benefit of an adoptive home for Caden outweighed “any benefit that could
    have arisen” from his relationship with mother. This timely appeal followed.
    II. DISCUSSION
    A.    The Supreme Court’s Caden C. Decision
    Several months after the second permanency planning hearing in this
    matter, our high court issued its opinion in Caden C., supra, 
    11 Cal.5th 614
    .
    The Supreme Court recognized that the juvenile court’s February 2021
    termination of mother’s parental rights rendered the case moot. (Id. at
    p. 629, fn. 3.) However, noting that the beneficial relationship exception “is of
    great importance and one of the most litigated issues in dependency
    19
    proceedings,” and that the questions presented might otherwise evade
    review, the court decided to retain and decide the matter. (Ibid.)
    Specifically, the Supreme Court granted review to clarify the applicability of
    the beneficial relationship exception—especially “whether a parent must
    show progress in addressing issues such as drug abuse that led to the child’s
    dependency in order to establish the exception”—and to resolve a conflict in
    the appellate courts regarding the appropriate standard of review for
    decisions involving the exception. (Id. at p. 629.)
    The beneficial relationship exception is “limited in scope.” (Caden C.,
    supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) As our high court summarized, the exception
    “requires a parent to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, . . . that
    the parent has regularly visited with the child, that the child would benefit
    from continuing the relationship, and that terminating the relationship
    would be detrimental to the child.” (Id. at p. 629; see also § 366.26, subd.
    (c)(1)(B)(i).) In other words, to take advantage of the exception, a parent
    must prove: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the
    continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of
    parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., at p. 631.) The
    Supreme Court noted that, pursuant to relevant statutory provisions, when a
    juvenile court determines that the beneficial relationship exception applies, it
    is tantamount to concluding that “adoption or termination is not ‘in the best
    interest of the child.’ ” (Ibid., quoting § 366.36, subd. (c)(4)(A).) The Court
    then addressed each element of the beneficial relationship exception in turn.
    “The first element—regular visitation and contact—is straightforward.
    The question is just whether ‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into account
    ‘the extent permitted by court orders.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
    p. 632, quoting In re I.R. (2014) 
    226 Cal.App.4th 201
    , 212.) Visits and contact
    20
    are important in this context because they can “ ‘continue[] or develop[] a
    significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.’ ” (Ibid.,
    quoting In re Autumn H. (1994) 
    27 Cal.App.4th 567
    , 575 (Autumn H.).) We
    review a juvenile court’s finding with respect to regular visitation and contact
    for substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 639.) The Agency concedes in this appeal
    that mother has satisfied the first element.
    “As to the second element, courts assess whether “the child would
    benefit from continuing the relationship,” and thus the focus is on the child.
    (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632, quoting § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i),
    italics added.) In determining whether the relationship is beneficial—that is,
    “strong, positive, and affirming” for the child (id. at p. 634)—juvenile courts
    may consider “a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of
    the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect
    of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ”
    (Ibid., quoting Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) In addition,
    “courts often consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk
    about their parents.” (Ibid.) A parent’s struggles, such as those that led to
    the dependency, “speak to the benefit (or lack thereof) of continuing the
    relationship and are relevant to that extent.” (Id. at p. 638.) Such continuing
    struggles “may mean that interaction between parent and child at least
    sometimes has a ‘ “negative” effect’ on the child.” (Id. at p. 637, quoting
    Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)
    Courts must be mindful, however, that parent-child relationships do
    not necessarily conform to a particular pattern. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
    at p. 632; [“ ‘parenting styles and relationships differ greatly between
    families’ ”].) Moreover, “it is not necessary—even if it were possible—to
    calibrate a precise ‘quantitative measurement of the specific amount of
    21
    “comfort, nourishment or physical care” ’ ” that a parent provides during
    visitation. (Ibid., quoting In re Brandon C. (1999) 
    71 Cal.App.4th 1530
    , 1538
    (Brandon C.).) Finally, the Supreme Court recognized that “sometimes . . . a
    relationship involves tangled benefits and burdens.” (Id. at p. 634.) It
    emphasized that information from expert psychologists who have either
    observed the child and parent or can synthesize others’ observations is
    important when determining the psychological importance of the relationship
    to the child. (Id. at pp. 632–633 & fn. 4.) A juvenile court’s finding with
    respect to the existence of a beneficial relationship is “essentially a factual
    determination” and is also reviewed for substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 640.)
    In addressing the third element—whether termination of the parental
    relationship would be detrimental—our high court was guided by the seminal
    decision interpreting the beneficial relationship exception, Autumn H., supra,
    
    27 Cal.App.4th 567
    . Autumn H. held that, in assessing detriment, the
    juvenile court “must decide whether the harm from severing the child’s
    relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of placement
    in a new adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 631–632, citing
    Autumn H., at p. 575.) “Because terminating parental rights eliminates any
    legal basis for the parent or child to maintain the relationship, courts must
    assume that terminating parental rights terminates the relationship.” (Id. at
    p. 633.) Thus, the question for the juvenile court is “what life would be like
    for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.”
    (Ibid.) In this context, “the court acts in the child’s best interest in a specific
    way: it decides whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the
    security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.’ ” (Ibid.,
    quoting Autumn H., at p. 575.)
    22
    Under this analysis, termination may be detrimental “[e]ven where it
    may never make sense to permit the child to live with the parent.” (Caden
    C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) Thus, the permanency planning hearing “is
    decidedly not a contest of who would be the better custodial caregiver.”
    (Ibid.) Rather, “understanding the harm associated with severing the
    relationship is a subtle enterprise—sometimes depending on more than just
    how beneficial the relationship is.” (Ibid.) When a parent-child relationship
    “involves tangled benefits and burdens,” the juvenile court “faces the complex
    task of disentangling the consequences of removing those burdens along with
    the benefits of the relationship.” (Ibid.) Under such circumstances, a court
    could find that “terminating a relationship with negative aspects would have
    some positive effects that weigh in the balance—and may tip it in favor of
    severing the parental relationship to make way for adoption.” (Id. at p. 635.)
    When reviewing the juvenile court’s conclusion with respect to this
    third element, underlying factual findings—regarding, for example, specific
    features of the child’s relationship with the parent, the harm or benefit
    related to the child’s loss of those features, how harmful the total loss would
    be, and how an adoptive placement may offset or even counterbalance those
    harms—are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
    at p. 640.) However, the juvenile court’s ultimate determination of
    detriment—which weighs the harm of losing the parental relationship
    against the benefits of placement in an adoptive home—requires the court to
    “engage in a delicate balancing of these determinations as part of assessing
    the likely course of a future situation that’s inherently uncertain” and is thus
    properly reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court
    acknowledged that where, as here, “the appellate court will be evaluating
    the factual basis for an exercise of discretion, there likely will be no
    23
    practical difference in application of [the substantial evidence and abuse of
    discretion standards of review].’ ” (Id. at p. 641.) Thus, the hybrid standard
    endorsed by our high court embodies “the principle that ‘[t]he statutory
    scheme does not authorize a reviewing court to substitute its own judgment
    as to what is in the child’s best interests for the trial court’s determination in
    that regard, reached pursuant to the statutory scheme’s comprehensive and
    controlling provisions.’ ” (Ibid., quoting In re Zeth S. (2003) 
    31 Cal.4th 396
    ,
    410.)
    B.      The Juvenile Court did not Commit Legal Error in Finding no
    Beneficial Relationship in This Case
    At a permanency planning hearing held in accordance with section
    366.26, the juvenile court is charged with determining the most appropriate
    permanent plan of out-of-home care for a dependent child that has been
    unable to reunify. (In re Casey D. (1999) 
    70 Cal.App.4th 38
    , 50, disapproved
    of on other grounds in Caden C. at p. 636, fn. 5.) When reunification efforts
    with a parent fail, as they did in this case, the focus shifts from family
    preservation “to the needs of the child for permanency and stability.” (In re
    Marilyn H. (1993) 
    5 Cal.4th 295
    , 309.) As the most permanent of the
    available options, adoption is the plan preferred by the Legislature. (Autumn
    H., 
    supra,
     27 Cal.App.4th at p. 573.) Indeed, when a court finds that a child
    is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated, it must select
    adoption as the permanent plan unless a parent shows that termination of
    parental rights would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the
    statutory circumstances delineated in section 366.26. (§ 366.26, subd.
    (c)(1)(B); Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 630–631.) At issue in this appeal
    is the beneficial relationship exception to adoption set forth in section 366.26,
    subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).
    24
    At the 2021 permanency planning hearing in this matter, the juvenile
    court found Caden to be generally adoptable, and mother does not challenge
    this determination on appeal. Thus, the juvenile court was statutorily
    required to terminate mother’s parental rights absent proof by mother of a
    beneficial relationship. On appeal, mother does not suggest that substantial
    evidence fails to support the juvenile court’s factual finding that no beneficial
    relationship existed. Instead, she raises a legal challenge, claiming that the
    juvenile court erred by requiring mother to show that she occupied a
    “parental role” during her visitation with Caden, an improper factor under
    the beneficial relationship exception as recently elucidated by Caden C. We
    are not persuaded.
    Mother focuses on a single statement made by the juvenile court in
    rendering its decision. The court stated at one point with respect to the
    beneficial relationship exception that “you have to look at all the different
    factors, including all of the unique factors in this case, but what it speaks to
    is that the benefit necessarily talks about a parental relationship. It talks
    about that that particular ongoing contact, which was limited in this case by
    the court order, is such that it would create a parental role in Caden’s
    visitation. [¶] And I can’t find that here.”
    Mother acknowledges that the beneficial parent-child relationship
    involves “a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent”
    the severance of which would cause great harm to the child. (Autumn H.,
    supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) She asserts that requiring a parent to
    demonstrate that they occupy a “parental role” during visitation is not an
    element of the beneficial relationship to adoption, and therefore amounted to
    legal error. In making this claim, she relies on many of the same cases the
    Supreme Court cited with approval in Caden C. Mother argues that “it is not
    25
    necessary—even if it were possible—to calibrate a precise ‘quantitative
    measurement of the specific amount of “comfort, nourishment or physical
    care” ’ ” that a parent provides during visitation. (Caden C, supra, 11 Cal.5th
    at p. 632, quoting Brandon C., supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1538.) She
    emphasizes that parental relationships do not necessarily conform to a
    particular pattern. (Ibid., citing In re Grace P. (2017) 
    8 Cal.App.5th 605
    ,
    614–615; In re S.B. (2008) 
    164 Cal.App.4th 289
    , 299 (S.B.); In re Jasmine D.
    (2000) 
    78 Cal.App.4th 1339
    , 1350, disapproved of on other grounds in Caden
    C. at p. 636, fn. 5.) And she points out that the beneficial relationship
    exception does not require a showing of “day-to-day contact” between the
    parent and child or the existence of a “primary attachment.” (See S.B., at pp.
    299–301.)
    We do not disagree with any of the foregoing legal points. However, we
    cannot conclude that the juvenile court’s comment about a “parental role”
    suggests that the court was requiring mother to demonstrate “some idealized
    version of what a parent-child relationship should look like.” Rather, when
    the juvenile court’s statement is viewed in the context of its overall remarks
    and the record as a whole, it is clear the court was explaining that Caden did
    not enjoy a positive and nurturing emotional attachment to mother because of
    mother’s disruptive and destabilizing behaviors and their negative impact on
    the minor.
    When the juvenile court addressed the first element of the beneficial
    relationship exception—regular visitation and contact—the court explained
    that this element “is a purely quantitative analysis, and it is limited to the
    extent permitted by court orders . . . .” The court did not suggest that it
    viewed visitation through the litmus test of a parental role, and it readily
    found that mother had satisfied the first element of the exception.
    26
    In discussing the second element, whether the parent-child relationship
    is beneficial to the minor, the court explained that “[you] have to look at that
    and see if that continuing contact then results in a benefit to Caden and
    whether the nature and extent of a particular parent-child relationship is
    sufficient to be deemed beneficial for purposes of the exception.” That is a
    correct statement of the law. (See Autumn H., 
    supra,
     27 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 575 [beneficial relationship exception “applies only where the court finds
    regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive,
    emotional attachment from child to parent”]; see also Caden C., supra, 11
    Cal.5th at p. 632, quoting Autumn H.)
    After noting that the inquiry required looking at “all of the different
    factors,” the court made the statement about mother playing a parental role
    during visitation which she claims was legal error. The court, however, went
    on to explain: “[A]nd the reason I can’t find that here is that all of the
    readings that I have, the visitation, et cetera, goes to the disruption of that
    goal rather than an encouragement of it.” The court was plainly focused on
    mother’s disruptive behaviors—whether in visitation or in her interactions
    with Caden, foster families, therapists, and others—and the negative and
    destabilizing effect those interactions had on Caden. The court expressly
    noted that Caden had not been the cause of the disruptions in his foster
    placements. Later in the hearing, the court stated: “[T]he foster parents
    have also expressed a concern about the involvement of [] mother and
    ongoing visitation contact with Caden as being the primary reasons for the
    child not being able to connect and settle into a permanent home, and so the
    very thing that I have found in regards to regular visitation was the very
    means upon which that permanency had been in some manner undermined.”
    27
    In discussing Dr. Molesworth’s bonding study, the court remarked that
    Dr. Molesworth talked about “emotional contact” between mother and Caden,
    but his study did not talk about a “parental role,” meaning that the
    relationship between Caden and mother was not “a parental one, a nurturing
    one.” (Italics added.) Thus, the court’s comments about a parental role in
    this case reflected a determination that mother’s regular visitation and
    contact with Caden did not result in a positive and nurturing attachment,
    i.e., that it was not a beneficial relationship for the minor.
    At oral argument in this matter, mother’s counsel suggested that
    insufficient evidence supported this determination, or at least that the
    evidence in support of the court’s finding was stale. The record clearly belies
    this claim. Mother’s negative behaviors have included her disruption of
    multiple foster placements by making unwarranted reports and interfering
    with the foster parents’ caregiving practices and routines, undermining
    Caden’s relationship with the foster parents, exposing Caden to displays of
    anger and crying during visits, making Caden feel guilty for becoming
    comfortable in a foster home, discussing the case at visitation and conveying
    inaccurate or misleading information, and refusing to abide by visitation
    guidelines, causing conflict within the foster family households. The record is
    replete with instances in which Caden became dysregulated and emotionally
    distraught by these interactions, grew distrustful of adults around him, and
    was deprived of an opportunity to develop stable and nurturing relationships
    in other foster households. Mother’s disruptive behaviors extended well into
    2020 and beyond, with a May 2020 virtual visit that degenerated into mother
    crying and yelling, mother’s referral of Ms. H. to a child abuse hotline over a
    misplaced iPad that contributed to Caden’s loss of adoptive placement with
    Ms. H. in July, a November 2020 virtual visit in which mother once again
    28
    ignored gift-limitation rules, and mother having to be admonished by the
    juvenile court about inappropriate comments and gestures at the permanency
    planning hearing in January 2021.
    We find the recent cases cited by mother to be distinguishable. (See In
    re D.M. (2021) 
    71 Cal.App.5th 261
     (D.M.); In re J.D. (2021) 
    70 Cal.App.5th 833
     (J.D.); In re B.D. (2021) 
    66 Cal.App.5th 1218
     (B.D.).) In B.D., the
    juvenile court rejected the beneficial relationship exception to adoption by
    “rel[ying] heavily, if not exclusively, on the fact that the parents had not
    completed their reunification plans and were unable to care for the children
    based on their long-term and continued substance abuse. The juvenile court,
    however, did not examine how the parents’ continued substance abuse
    impacted the nature of the parent-child relationship.” (B.D., at p. 1228.)
    This was contrary to the Supreme Court’s discussion of the beneficial
    relationship exception in Caden C. (See Caden C., at p. 638 [a parent’s
    struggles are only relevant to the extent they “speak to the benefit (or lack
    thereof) of continuing the relationship”]; id. at p. 634 [termination of parental
    rights may be detrimental “[e]ven where it may never make sense to permit
    the child to live with the parent”].)
    The appellate court in B.D. also concluded that it was not clear from
    the record whether the juvenile court had properly examined “the nature of
    the parent-child relationship” and “whether a significant positive emotional
    attachment existed between the parents and children.” (B.D., supra, 66
    Cal.App.5th at p. 1228.) Finally, the social worker testified in B.D. that she
    believed the beneficial relationship exception did not apply due to the
    parents’ “inability to attend to the children’s day-to-day needs” and the fact
    that “the children looked to their grandmother to meet their daily needs.”
    (Id. at p. 1229.) Thus, the social worker improperly “equated a parental
    29
    role . . . with the ability to parent ‘on a fulltime basis’ ” and erred in
    concluding that the child’s attachment to the parent must be the primary
    attachment. (Id. at pp. 1229–1230.) Under these circumstances, the
    appellate court reversed the order terminating parent rights and remanded
    the matter for reconsideration “based on a proper application of governing
    law.” (Id. at p. 1222.)
    Here, in contrast, the juvenile court did not consider mother’s
    completion of services or her ability to parent on a full-time basis. Instead, as
    discussed above, it focused on her disruptive behaviors and how they
    negatively impacted Caden, an approach expressly endorsed by the Supreme
    Court in Caden C. Unlike B.D., there is ample evidence in the record
    concerning the nature of the parent-child relationship here, including years of
    social worker reports and four reports by experts.
    Finally, while the social worker in B.D. improperly equated “parental
    role” with primary attachment and ability to parent full-time, in this case the
    juvenile court concluded that mother’s contact with Caden was not “parental”
    because it was not positive—i.e., stabilizing and nurturing. The B.D. court,
    itself, recognized that “[a] positive attachment between parent and child is
    necessarily one that is not detrimental to the child but is nurturing and
    provides the child with a sense of security and stability.” (B.D., supra, 66
    Cal.App.5th at p. 1230.) That is exactly the inquiry the juvenile court
    undertook here.
    Mother’s reliance on J.D. is similarly misplaced. Our colleagues in
    Division Two of this District reversed a termination of parental rights
    because it could not determine on the record before it whether the juvenile
    court’s ruling complied with the principles announced by the Supreme Court
    in Caden C. while the matter was on appeal. (J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at
    30
    p. 840.) In terminating parental rights, the juvenile court made “few explicit
    factual findings.” (Id. at p. 851.) “It acknowledged J.D. has a relationship
    with [the] mother and that it is a positive one. But it found their relationship
    did not ‘amount to [a] parental bond’ and that ‘severing the relationship that
    does exist would not be so detrimental as to outweigh permanency for [J.D.]’ ”
    (Ibid.)
    The J.D. court expressed concern about the lack of objective
    information in the record regarding the quality of the mother’s relationship
    with J.D. (J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 861.) The appellate court
    observed that “by the time the juvenile court scheduled the section
    366.26 hearing, the agency’s prior reports should already have provided
    objective, disinterested information about the quality of J.D.’s attachment to
    his mother, which would have assisted the court in evaluating the beneficial
    relationship exception when [the] mother asserted it.” (Ibid.) They did not.
    (Id. at p. 860; see id. at p. 862 [noting that there was no bonding study or
    other expert opinion in the case].) Finally, the social worker in J.D. opined,
    that the mother did not prove a beneficial relationship because “J.D.
    looked to [his caregiver], not mother, for comfort, support, structure and to
    meet his needs,” and had previously said that he wanted “ ‘to be [the
    caregiver’s] son.’ ” (Id. at p. 859.) As the appellate court recognized: “A
    child’s emotional attachments are not a zero-sum game.” Thus, “such
    evidence does not preclude a finding [J.D.] had a significant positive
    attachment to mother.” (Ibid.)
    Given the conclusory nature of the juvenile court’s findings on the
    second element, the appellate court noted that the juvenile court’s reference
    to “parental” role might have encompassed factors that Caden C. deems
    irrelevant,” such as failing to comprehend “that more than one person can
    31
    occupy an important, emotional role for a child even if one—the
    nonreunifying parent—is incapable of providing for the child’s everyday
    needs and well-being.” (Id. at pp. 864–865.) For all these reasons, the J.D.
    court deemed it “prudent” to remand the matter for reconsideration in light of
    Caden C. (Id. at p. 863; see also D.M., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 270
    [juvenile court improperly equated “parental role” with attendance at medical
    appointments and understanding their medical needs].)
    None of the issues identified in these cases which warranted remand
    are present here. The juvenile court in this case discussed at length its
    finding that mother’s relationship with Caden was not beneficial. While in
    the cases cited by mother the juvenile courts’ conclusions that there was no
    “parental bond” were either ambiguous or based on improper factors, here the
    juvenile court made clear that mother’s bond with Caden was not “parental”
    because it was not nurturing and was disruptive to his permanence and
    stability. As discussed above, substantial evidence supports the juvenile
    court’s finding that mother’s negative and destabilizing behaviors have been
    detrimental to Caden. Finally, there is exhaustive evidence here from both
    the social worker reports and expert witnesses regarding the psychological
    importance of Caden’s relationship with mother.
    At bottom, the juvenile court was concerned that the focus on Caden’s
    best interests had been lost somewhere during this extended and highly
    litigated case. In rendering its decision, it acknowledged the court’s own
    responsibility in making insufficient efforts towards permanency for the
    young minor. It also observed: “[W]e are running . . . in circles, and in the
    center of that circle is [mother] and not Caden.” The court decidedly put the
    focus back where it belongs, on Caden. As it eloquently explained to Caden:
    “[T]he reason I am doing this is not to be mean. The reason I am doing this is
    32
    because I want you to grow. I want you to learn. I want you to live. I want
    you to reach forward into life with curiosity and not back down from it from
    fear. You need folks to help you to learn to do those things.” It explained
    further: “[W]hy I am doing this is because you will then get yourself in a
    position to be Caden, to be Caden, and I look forward to seeing that Caden.”
    We look forward to that eventuality as well.
    In Caden C., the Supreme Court emphasized that the standard of
    review with respect to the beneficial relationship exception embodies “the
    principle that ‘[t]he statutory scheme does not authorize a reviewing court to
    substitute its own judgment as to what is in the child’s best interests for the
    trial court’s determination in that regard, reached pursuant to the statutory
    scheme’s comprehensive and controlling provisions.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11
    Cal.5th at p. 641.) Having concluded that the juvenile court made its
    determination in accordance with relevant law, we see no reason to disturb
    its thoughtful determination.12
    III. DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    12
    Mother additionally argues that, given the juvenile court’s legal
    error, we must reverse the juvenile court’s termination of parental rights
    because it is reasonably probable that, but for that error, the juvenile court
    would not have rejected the beneficial relationship exception to adoption in
    this case. Having concluded that no error occurred, we need not address
    mother’s claim that the error was not harmless.
    33
    _________________________
    Sanchez, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    _________________________
    Margulies, Acting P. J.
    _________________________
    Banke, J.
    A162420
    34
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A162420

Filed Date: 12/21/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2021