People v. Vega CA2/1 ( 2021 )


Menu:
  • Filed 12/27/21 P. v. Vega CA2/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    THE PEOPLE,                                                      B312386
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. KA088697)
    v.
    ANTHONY MICHAEL VEGA,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
    Los Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Judge. Remanded with
    directions.
    Jennifer Peabody, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
    Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Michael R. Johnsen, Deputy
    Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    ____________________________
    Defendant and appellant Anthony Michael Vega is
    currently serving a sentence of more than 29 years for four
    counts of armed robbery. In March 2021, the Secretary of the
    Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) sent
    a letter to the trial court recommending that the court recall
    Vega’s sentence under Penal Code1 section 1170, subdivision (d)
    and resentence him in light of recent amendments to the law
    giving trial courts the discretion to strike certain sentence
    enhancements that had previously been mandatory. Vega
    contends that the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting
    his request, and denied him due process by failing to allow
    him an opportunity to be heard on the issue. We do not reach
    the merits, but instead remand the case for reconsideration in
    light of recently enacted Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021−2022
    Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 1540), which changes the
    standards and procedures for considering recommendations
    to resentence defendants.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
    In 2010, a jury convicted Vega of four counts of home
    invasion robbery (§§ 211, 213, subd. (a)(1)(A)), and found that
    he personally used a firearm in the commission of the crimes
    (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). The court sentenced him to 29 years
    8 months in prison, including 16 years 8 months for the firearm
    enhancements.
    In 2017, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 620
    (2017−2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 620), which amended
    1 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory
    references are to the Penal Code.
    2
    section 12022.53 to provide that “[t]he court may, in the
    interest of justice pursuant to [s]ection 1385 and at the time
    of sentencing, strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise
    required to be imposed by this section. The authority provided
    by this subdivision applies to any resentencing that may occur
    pursuant to any other law.” (§ 12022.53, subd. (h).) The effect
    of this law was to give the trial court discretion to strike
    serious-felony and firearm enhancements that had previously
    been mandatory. (See People v. Johnson (2019) 
    32 Cal.App.5th 26
    , 67−68.)
    In March 2021, the CDCR sent the trial court a letter
    recommending under section 1170, subdivision (d) that the
    trial court recall Vega’s sentence and resentence him in light
    of Senate Bill No. 620. The letter noted that Vega had not
    violated any prison rules, and had participated in extensive
    rehabilitative programming while serving his sentence. The
    trial court denied the motion, stating, “[a]lthough the court
    acknowledges its new-found discretion under [Senate Bill No.]
    620 to strike [or] dismiss gun use enhancements, it is the court’s
    position that petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought given
    the gravity of the offenses for which he stands convicted. The
    court’s opinion does not and will not change despite . . . Vega’s
    exemplary behavior demonstrated and documented by the
    [CDCR].”
    DISCUSSION
    Vega contends that the trial court abused its discretion
    by failing to consider relevant factors such as Vega’s lack of prior
    serious criminal history, his age and medical conditions—he is
    63 years old and permanently disabled—and by determining that
    his post-conviction conduct could never overcome the seriousness
    3
    of the offenses to justify resentencing him. He also contends
    that the trial court violated his right to due process by denying
    him notice and an opportunity to be heard before ruling on his
    petition.
    We need not reach the merits of Vega’s contentions because
    the Legislature recently enacted Assembly Bill No. 1540, which
    alters both the procedural and substantive law regarding
    resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d). Because this
    case will not become final until after January 1, 2022, when the
    new law becomes effective, we agree with the Attorney General
    that it is in the interest of judicial economy to remand the case
    to the trial court to reconsider the petition under the new law.
    Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), as currently constituted,
    creates a mechanism for recalling a defendant’s sentence and
    resentencing him at any time upon the recommendation of
    the secretary of the CDCR or certain other officials. If the court
    elects to follow the CDCR’s recommendation, it must “resentence
    the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously
    been sentenced, provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater
    than the initial sentence.” (Ibid.) “[U]nder the recall provisions
    of section 1170, subdivision (d), the resentencing court has
    jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the sentence, and not just
    the portion subjected to the recall.” (People v. Buycks (2018)
    
    5 Cal.5th 857
    , 893.) It “may . . . impose any otherwise lawful
    resentence suggested by the facts available at the time of
    resentencing.” (Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 
    53 Cal.3d 442
    , 456.)
    The statute does not establish any procedural requirements
    the court must follow in addressing a recommendation from
    the CDCR; indeed, it “apparently does not require the court to
    respond to the recommendation.” (Id. at p. 459.)
    4
    Assembly Bill No. 1540 amends this law, moving the
    resentencing provisions currently codified at section 1170,
    subdivision (d)(1) to a newly created section 1170.03.2 The
    bill also changes the law in several respects. Section 1170.03
    preserves the procedure by which the secretary of the CDCR and
    certain other officials may recommend recalling a defendant’s
    sentence. Under the new statute, however, when an official
    submits a resentencing recommendation, the court must “provide
    notice to the defendant and set a status conference within
    30 days after the date that the court received the request. The
    court’s order setting the conference shall also appoint counsel
    to represent the defendant.” (§ 1170.03, subd. (b)(1).) Before
    the court can deny a defendant resentencing, it must provide
    “a hearing where the parties have an opportunity to address
    the basis for the intended denial or rejection.” (§ 1170.03,
    subd. (a)(8).) The court must also “state on the record the
    reasons for its decision to grant or deny recall and resentencing.”
    (§ 1170.03, subd. (a)(6).)
    Under the new law, the court gains the authority to
    “[v]acate the defendant’s conviction and impose judgment on
    any necessarily included lesser offense or lesser related offense,
    whether or not that offense was charged in the original pleading,
    and then resentence the defendant to a reduced term of
    imprisonment,” subject to the concurrence of the defendant and
    the local district attorney. (§ 1170.03, subd. (a)(3)(B).) Finally,
    the law creates “a presumption favoring recall and resentencing
    of the defendant, which may only be overcome if a court finds the
    2
    All citations to section 1170.03 are to the law as effective
    January 1, 2022.
    5
    defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”
    (§ 1170.03, subd. (b)(2).)
    The trial court denied Vega’s petition before Assembly
    Bill No. 1540 was enacted, and in doing so, it did not have
    reason to apply the requirements of the new law. It did not
    appoint counsel to represent Vega or hold a hearing, and
    it did not apply a presumption in favor of recalling and
    resentencing him.
    We agree with the Attorney General that it is in
    the interest of judicial economy to remand the case for
    reconsideration of the CDCR recommendation under
    section 1170.03. The CDCR has already decided that
    Vega is a worthy candidate for recall and resentencing.
    It would be a waste of resources to decide this case under
    the existing law, potentially leading the CDCR to file a
    new recommendation to recall Vega’s sentence under the
    new standards of section 1170.03.
    6
    DISPOSITION
    The case is remanded to the trial court with instructions
    to vacate its order denying resentencing and to commence
    new proceedings under section 1170.03 after January 1, 2022.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
    We concur:
    CHANEY, J.
    CRANDALL, J.*
    * Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court,
    assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6
    of the California Constitution.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B312386

Filed Date: 12/27/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/27/2021