People v. Sandoval CA6 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 12/27/21 P. v. Sandoval CA6
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    THE PEOPLE,                                                         H047410
    (Santa Clara County
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                               Super. Ct. No. C1649948)
    v.
    RANDOLPH SANDOVAL,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    A jury convicted defendant Randy Sandoval of second degree murder and
    attempting to dissuade a witness. It was undisputed at trial that Sandoval was not the
    actual killer. He was prosecuted for murder on theories of direct aiding and abetting,
    conspiracy to commit murder, and natural and probable consequences. After Sandoval’s
    trial, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.; (Senate
    Bill 1437)), which amended Penal Code section 188 so as to eliminate natural and
    probable consequences liability for murder.1 In legislation that will take effect on
    January 1, 2022, the Legislature further amended the law to allow “[a] person convicted
    of murder . . . whose conviction is not final [to] challenge on direct appeal the validity of
    that conviction based on the changes made to [s]ections 188 and 189 by Senate Bill
    1437.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, §2; Senate Bill No. 775 (Senate Bill 775).) On appeal,
    Sandoval contends that—given the elimination of natural and probable consequences
    liability for murder—the trial court erred in instructing the jury on that theory of liability.
    1
    All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
    He maintains that instructional error requires reversal of his conviction and remand for
    retrial. The Attorney General agrees, as do we. Accordingly, we shall reverse the
    murder conviction.
    I.     BACKGROUND
    A.     Factual Summary
    Sandoval and his girlfriend, Margaret Z., lived in San Jose next door to Roman
    Alvarado. On October 7, 2016, Sandoval lent his car to his friend Jeffrey Cooper.
    Cooper was only supposed to be gone an hour, but he still had not returned the car three
    days later. Sandoval and Margaret contacted Cooper to convince him to return the car
    without success. Early on the evening of October 10, Alvarado happened to run into
    Cooper, who was with Sandoval’s car. Alvarado drove the vehicle to Sandoval’s house
    with Cooper in the passenger seat. Sandoval went outside when Alvarado and Cooper
    arrived in his car. According to Margaret, who was watching out the window of the
    home she shared with Sandoval, Sandoval was frustrated and punched or slapped Cooper
    in the face. Sandoval then took Cooper’s belongings—including a suitcase and a storage
    bin—out of the car and threw them on the ground.
    Cooper eventually left in a cab. Records from Yellow Checker Cab Company
    showed that, on October 10, 2016, a passenger by the name of Jeffrey was picked up by a
    cab at Sandoval’s address at 6:54 p.m. and was dropped off on Ridder Park Drive at
    7:19 p.m.
    Margaret testified that, after the car was returned, Sandoval took a bag with
    several bottles of hard alcohol in it over to Alvarado’s backyard shed. At about
    8:00 p.m., Sandoval and Alvarado came inside and drank beer in Sandoval’s kitchen.
    According to Margaret, both men were intoxicated. She further testified that they were
    “in this rage, all hyped up,” and saying they were going to teach Cooper a lesson.
    Margaret testified that the two men left the house at about 9:00 p.m. Alvarado
    told Margaret, “We’re going to take care of him.” They returned at about 10:00 p.m., at
    2
    which time Alvarado said to Margaret, “He’s not gonna bother you no more. I stabbed
    him in the chest and I stabbed him in the arm.”
    Cooper was found dead in the parking lot of the Lowe’s on Ridder Park Drive.
    He was on the ground beside his vehicle, which he was living in at the time.
    The chief medical examiner for the Santa Clara County Medical Examiner
    Coroner’s Office testified that she autopsied Cooper. She testified that Cooper had
    suffered a puncture wound to the upper right chest, which punctured the chest plate,
    traversed the entire aorta, and punctured the underlying airway. The chief medical
    examiner testified that it would have required “great force” to cause those injuries.
    The injury to the aorta “caused a tremendous amount of bleeding inside the pericardial
    sac,” which surrounds the heart. She opined that so much blood accumulated in the
    pericardial sac that Cooper’s heart could no longer pump, killing him. The injury to the
    airway also caused bleeding into the lungs.
    Margaret submitted an online tip to police on October 13, 2016 identifying
    Alvarado as Cooper’s killer. Police contacted Margaret by text message and interviewed
    her in person on October 28 and November 1, 2016.
    Sandoval and Alvarado were arrested on November 2, 2016. Police interviewed
    Alvarado that evening. Alvarado told police he and Sandoval went to the Lowe’s to
    confront Cooper, Alvarado opened the vehicle door to look in, Cooper jumped up, and
    Alvarado stabbed him.
    Sandoval told police during an interview on December 27, 2016 that Alvarado
    killed Cooper. Sandoval remained in the car during the stabbing.
    B.     Procedural History
    The Santa Clara County District Attorney charged Sandoval and Alvarado with
    Cooper’s murder (§ 187; count 1). The information alleged that Alvarado had personally
    used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the commission of the crime. (§ 12022,
    3
    subd. (b)(1)). Sandoval also was charged with attempting to dissuade a witness (§ 136.1,
    subd. (b)(2); count 2).
    The defendants were tried jointly to separate juries in May and June 2018. The
    prosecutor argued that Sandoval, though not the actual killer, was criminally liable for
    Cooper’s murder as a direct aider and abettor, as a member of a conspiracy to kill
    Copper, or under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. With respect to the
    natural and probable consequences doctrine, the prosecutor’s theory was that the murder
    was a natural and probable consequence of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon or
    the crime of assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury, which Sandoval either
    aided and abetted or conspired to commit.
    On June 15, 2018, Sandoval’s jury returned verdicts of not guilty of first degree
    murder but guilty of second degree murder and guilty of attempting to dissuade a witness.
    Alvarado’s jury likewise found him not guilty of first degree murder but guilty of second
    degree murder. Alvarado’s jury further found true the allegation that Alvarado had
    personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the commission of the crime.
    In February 2019, in advance of his sentencing, Sandoval filed a section 1170.95
    petition. The prosecutor opposed the petition, which the trial court denied without
    issuing an order to show cause on August 30, 2019. At the same hearing, the court
    imposed sentence. The court sentenced Sandoval to a term of 15 years to life on count 1
    and the midterm of two years on count 2, to be served concurrently. Sandoval timely
    appealed.
    II.    DISCUSSION
    The trial court instructed Sandoval’s jury with CALCRIM No. 403 on a natural
    and probable consequences theory of murder liability. While that was a valid theory at
    the time, the Legislature has since amended the Penal Code to eliminate natural and
    probable consequences liability for murder (Senate Bill 1437) and to permit defendants to
    rely on that change in the law to challenge their convictions on direct appeal (Senate
    4
    Bill 775). Sandoval and the Attorney General agree that, as a result of Senate Bills 1437
    and 775, instruction on a natural and probable consequences theory of murder liability
    constituted prejudicial error.2
    A.     Legal Principles
    Prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 1437, “an aider and abettor [was not required
    to] personally possess malice, express or implied, to be convicted of second degree
    murder under a natural and probable consequences theory.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 
    10 Cal.5th 830
    , 847 (Gentile).) Indeed, “ ‘the mens rea of the aider and abettor with respect
    to [the nontarget] offense [was] irrelevant [because] culpability [was] imposed simply
    because a reasonable person could have foreseen the commission of the nontarget crime.’
    [Citation.]” (People v. Chiu (2014) 
    59 Cal.4th 155
    , 164, superseded by statute as stated
    in People v. Lewis (2021) 
    11 Cal.5th 952
    , 959, fn. 3.)
    Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill 1437 amended section 188 to provide that,
    outside the context of felony murder, “in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a
    crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based
    solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015 § 2.) “The natural
    and probable consequences doctrine is incompatible with this requirement . . . .”
    (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.) Accordingly, our Supreme Court has concluded
    that “Senate Bill 1437 eliminates natural and probable consequences liability for murder
    regardless of degree.” (Id. at pp. 847-848.)
    Senate Bill 1437 also enacted section 1170.95, subdivision (a), which permits a
    person convicted of murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to petition
    the sentencing court to have his or her murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced
    on any remaining counts. A person is entitled to section 1170.95 relief if, among other
    2
    The parties advance these arguments in supplemental letter briefs filed after the
    enactment of Senate Bill 775. Initially, Sandoval raised other issues on appeal, which we
    need not reach because we find the instructional error issue to be dispositive.
    5
    things, he or she “could not be convicted of first or second degree murder” following the
    enactment of Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).)
    In Gentile, our Supreme Court held that “[t]he ameliorative provisions of Senate
    Bill 1437 do not apply on direct appeal to nonfinal convictions obtained before the law
    became effective. Such convictions may be challenged on Senate Bill 1437 grounds only
    through a petition filed in the sentencing court under section 1170.95.” (Gentile, supra,
    10 Cal.5th at pp. 851-852.)
    In 2021, while this case was pending on appeal, the Legislature enacted Senate
    Bill 775. Among other things, Senate Bill 775 amends section 1170.95 to provide that
    “[a] person convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter whose conviction is
    not final may challenge on direct appeal the validity of that conviction based on the
    changes made to Sections 188 and 189 by Senate Bill 1437 (Chapter 1015 of the Statutes
    of 2018).” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, §2.) Senate Bill 775 will take effect on January 1, 2022.
    (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c)(1) [absent urgency clause, statutory amendments
    enacted during regular session of the Legislature become effective on January 1 of the
    following year].) Because there is no possibility that Sandoval’s judgment will be final
    by that effective date, we address the impact of that legislation on his conviction.
    (People v. Vieira (2005) 
    35 Cal.4th 264
    , 306 [a “judgment is not final until the time for
    petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court has
    passed”]); People v. Lizarraga (2020) 
    56 Cal.App.5th 201
    , 206 [“a petition for writ of
    certiorari is timely filed within 90 days after entry of judgment of a state court of last
    resort”].)
    B.     Analysis
    Here, the trial court instructed the jury on a theory of murder liability that remains
    valid—direct aiding and abetting. The trial court also instructed on a theory of murder
    liability that is invalid due to changes made to section 188 by Senate Bill 1437—natural
    and probable consequences. Thus, so-called alternative-theory error—where the jury is
    6
    instructed on a legally adequate theory of guilt and a legally inadequate one (e.g., one that
    is contrary to law)—occurred. (People v. Aledamat (2019) 
    8 Cal.5th 1
    , 7-9 (Aledamat).
    Senate Bill 775 allows Sandoval to raise this error on direct appeal. We assess
    alternative-theory error under Chapman v. California (1967) 
    386 U.S. 18
     and reverse
    unless we determine the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Aledamat,
    supra, at p. 13; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 851-852.)
    Applying the Chapman standard, we cannot conclude the error was harmless.
    The prosecutor argued the now-invalid natural and probable consequences theory during
    closing argument, urging jurors to convict “without even finding that [Sandoval] was
    intending on having Jeffrey Cooper killed.” As the parties agree, reversal is required.
    III.   DISPOSITION
    Sandoval’s murder conviction is reversed. We remand the matter to the trial court
    with instructions that the People may, if they choose, retry Sandoval on count 1 within
    the time limit prescribed by law. If the People choose not to retry, the trial court is
    directed to resentence Sandoval on count 2.
    7
    _________________________________
    ELIA, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    _______________________________
    GREENWOOD, P.J.
    _______________________________
    GROVER, J.
    People v. Sandoval
    H047410
    

Document Info

Docket Number: H047410

Filed Date: 12/27/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/27/2021