Henderson v. Carter CA2/5 ( 2013 )


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  • Filed 9/11/13 Henderson v. Carter CA2/5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FIVE
    BILL HENDERSON,                                                      B243220
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BC23154)
    v.
    DEXTER CARTER,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Rex
    Heeseman, Judge. Affirmed.
    Akudinobi & Ikonte, Emmanuel C. Akudinobi and Chijioke O. Ikonte, for
    Plaintiff and Appellant.
    Coleman & Associates, Lawyers, John M. Coleman and Eric R. Schaefer, for
    Defendant and Respondent.
    I. INTRODUCTION
    Defendant, Dexter Carter, appeals from an amended judgment on a special verdict
    awarding attorney fees to plaintiff, Bill Henderson. The award of attorney fees followed
    a favorable plaintiff’s verdict in a case litigated pursuant to title 42 United States Code
    section 1983 (“section 1983”).1 Plaintiff was awarded attorney fees of $109,977.
    Plaintiff eventually sought $549,885 in attorney fees. Defendant contends the trial court
    abused its discretion by not further reducing or denying plaintiff’s award of attorney fees.
    We affirm the amended judgment.
    II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    We provided a detailed factual background of this case in a prior opinion.
    (Henderson v. Carter (Aug. 20, 2013, B241994) [nonpub. opn.].) We need not repeat it
    here. Plaintiff previously appealed the trial court’s aforementioned reduction of his
    attorney fees request. We found the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
    On April 27, 2011, plaintiff prevailed in a jury retrial against defendant and was
    awarded $17,940.80. On August 25, 2011, plaintiff moved for an award of reasonable
    attorney fees pursuant to section 1988. Plaintiff’s attorney billed at a rate of $250 to
    $450 per hour over the course of the litigation. This amounted to $1,586,887.70 for
    5,054.8 hours. Plaintiff initially requested a multiplier of 1.5 for a total amount of
    $2,380,331.55.
    Following a hearing before the trial court, plaintiff’s attorneys submitted a
    supplemental brief. Plaintiff’s attorneys reduced their hours to 1,832.95 at a flat billing
    rate of $300 per hour. Plaintiff requested attorney fees in the amount of $549,885.
    On February 28, 2012, the trial court issued an order granting plaintiff’s attorney
    fees motion in part. The trial court noted plaintiff’s initial request of $2,380,331.55 was
    1
    Future statutory references are to title 42 of the United States Code.
    2
    an unfathomable fee award. The trial court accepted the figure of $549,885 as
    reasonable. However, the trial court further reduced plaintiff’s attorney fees award by 80
    percent, from $549,885 to $109,977. In reaching this figure, the trial court considered the
    critical factor of plaintiff’s limited success. On May 1, 2012, the trial court issued the
    amended judgment reflecting attorney fees and costs. On August 9, 2012, defendant
    appealed.
    III. DISCUSSION
    Section 1988(b) provides that in an action to enforce a provision of designated
    civil rights statutes, including section 1983, “[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the
    prevailing party, . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .” (
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
    (b).) The United States Supreme Court has held, “The purpose of § 1988 is to
    ‘ensure effective access to the judicial process’ for persons with civil rights grievances.
    [Citation.]” (Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 
    461 U.S. 424
    , 429 (“Hensley”); Harman v.
    City and County of San Francisco (2006) 
    136 Cal.App.4th 1279
    , 1307.) Section 1988
    attorney fees may be awarded in section 1983 cases litigated in state courts. (Maine v.
    Thiboutot (1980) 
    448 U.S. 1
    , 10-11; Sinclair & Valentine Co. v. County of Los Angeles
    (1988) 
    201 Cal.App.3d 1021
    , 1024, fn. 2.) We review the trial court’s award of attorney
    fees under section 1988 for an abuse of discretion. (Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010)
    
    47 Cal.4th 970
    , 989 (“Chavez”); Robbins v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (2005) 
    127 Cal.App.4th 653
    , 665.) A trial court abuses its discretion if its fee award is based on an
    inaccurate view of the law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact. (Benton v. Or. Student
    Assistance Com. (9th Cir. 2005) 
    421 F.3d 901
    , 904; Wilcox v. City of Reno (9th Cir.
    1994) 
    42 F.3d 550
    , 553.)
    Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by not further reducing or
    denying plaintiff’s attorney fees award. Defendant’s arguments are meritless.
    Defendant argues plaintiff’s recovery was de minimus and a Pyrrhic victory. Defendant
    relies on Choate v. County of Orange (2000) 
    86 Cal.App.4th 312
    , 324 (“Choate”). In
    3
    Choate, the plaintiffs prevailed in a civil rights claim for excessive force under section
    1983 against several sheriff deputies. (Id. at p. 320.) The plaintiffs were awarded
    $5,719 in compensatory and punitive damages. (Ibid.) The trial court awarded no
    attorney fees to the plaintiffs. (Id. at pp. 320-321.) The appellate court affirmed the
    decision to deny the plaintiffs’ attorney fees. (Id. at p. 318.) The appellate court found
    under United States Supreme Court precedent that recovering nominal damages merited
    no attorney fees. (Choate, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 324 quoting Farrar v. Hobby
    (1992) 
    506 U.S. 103
    , 115 [“When a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of
    his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, . . . the only
    reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.”].) Considering the plaintiffs’ limited success, the
    appellate court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding no
    attorney fees. (Choate, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 325.) We need not address the issue
    of the correctness of Choate in light of Lefemine v. Wideman (2012) 568 U.S. ___, ___
    [
    133 S.Ct. 9
    , 11-12].
    Defendant’s argument is unpersuasive. Here, the trial court correctly exercised its
    discretion and awarded fees. As noted in Choate: “[T]he determination whether a
    victory is de minimus is generally left to the sound equitable discretion of the trial court
    in the first instance ‘so as to avoid a second major litigation strictly over attorneys’ fees.’
    [Citation.]” (Choate, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 326; see Hensley, 
    supra,
     461 U.S. at p.
    437 [“We reemphasize that the district court has discretion in determining the amount of
    a fee award. This is appropriate in view of the district court’s superior understanding of
    the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially
    are factual matters.”].) Here, the trial court had discretion to award attorney fees.
    When a party submits an unreasonably inflated fee request, the trial court has
    discretion to reduce the fee award. (Chavez, 
    supra,
     47 Cal.4th at p. 990; Serrano v.
    Unruh (1982) 
    32 Cal.3d 621
    , 635.) The record supports the trial court’s decision.
    Plaintiff prevailed in this action against defendant and was awarded $17,940.80. The trial
    court opted to reduce the lodestar which was within its discretion.
    4
    Defendant contends he and Los Angeles County will be punished by awarding
    plaintiff attorney fees. Defendant cites to Perdue v. Kenny A. (2010) 
    559 U.S. 542
     ___,
    [
    130 S.Ct. 1662
    , 1676-1677] (“Perdue”). In Perdue, the United States Supreme Court
    reversed the lower court which permitted an enhancement of an attorneys fees award
    without providing a reasonably specific explanation. (Ibid.) The high court noted: “In
    many cases, attorney’s fees awarded under § 1988 are not paid by the individuals
    responsible for the constitutional or statutory violations on which the judgment is based.
    Instead, the fees are paid in effect by state and local taxpayers, and because state and
    local governments have limited budgets, money that is used to pay attorney’s fees is
    money that cannot be used for programs that provide vital public services.” (Ibid.)
    Defendant’s argument is unavailing. In Hensley, the United States Supreme Court
    found: “The purpose of section 1988 is to ensure ‘effective access to the judicial process’
    for persons with civil rights grievances. [Citation.]” (Hensley, 
    supra,
     461 U.S. at p. 429;
    see Hutto v. Finney (1978) 
    437 U.S. 678
    , 693-694 [finding states are not immune from
    paying attorney fees under section 1988]; EWAP, Inc. v. City of Ontario (1986) 
    177 Cal.App.3d 1108
    , 1118 [holding the fact attorney fees may be awarded from limited
    taxpayer funds is not a special circumstance precluding an award].) No abuse of
    discretion occurred.
    5
    IV. DISPOSITION
    The amended judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff, Bill Henderson, is awarded his costs
    and attorney fees on appeal from defendant, Dexter Carter. Any attorney fee request may
    be pursued pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 3.1702(c) and 8.278(c).
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    TURNER, P. J.
    We concur:
    MOSK, J.
    KRIEGLER, J.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B243220

Filed Date: 9/11/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014