Starbbucks v. Outdoor Lifestyle CA4/1 ( 2014 )


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  • Filed 9/17/14 Starbbucks v. Outdoor Lifestyle CA4/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    STARBUCKS CORPORATION,                                              D064637
    Plaintiff and Appellant,
    v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. 37-2013-00033844-
    CU-BC-CTL)
    OUTDOOR LIFESTYLE, INC.,
    Defendant and Respondent.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Randa
    Trapp, Judge. Reversed.
    G&P Schick, Malcolm D. Schick and Tiffany A. LeMelle for Plaintiff and
    Appellant.
    Law Offices of Robert Tauler and Robert Tauler for Defendant and Respondent.
    This action arises from a warranty claim that plaintiff Starbucks Corporation
    (Starbucks) made against Outdoor Lifestyle, Inc. (Outdoor Lifestyle) based upon alleged
    defects in chairs that Starbucks purchased from Outdoor Lifestyle. When Outdoor
    Lifestyle rejected Starbuck's warranty claim, Starbucks filed an action in the Superior
    Court of San Diego County. In response, Outdoor Lifestyle brought a motion to stay or
    dismiss for forum non conveniens, based upon a forum selection clause in the warranty.
    The court granted the motion.
    Starbucks appeals, asserting that the forum selection clause on its face only applies
    to arbitration, not civil actions. We conclude that Starbuck's interpretation of the forum
    selection clause is correct. Accordingly, we reverse.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Outdoor Lifestyle is a North Carolina-based furniture company that assembles and
    distributes residential and commercial furniture to various places, including California.
    Between September 2008 and early 2012, Starbucks purchased patio furniture from
    Outdoor Lifestyle, including chairs, for the purpose of providing outdoor seating to
    patrons of its stores located in Southern California. Outdoor Lifestyle expressly
    warranted its patio furniture as long-lasting and free from defect.
    The express warranty specified the procedure whereby customers could submit
    warranty claims to the company in the event of product failures. Following these
    instructions is a forum selection clause which reads as follows:
    "Those purchasing furnishing from Outdoor Lifestyle, or obtaining
    services from the company, agree that should conditions arise where
    a situation needs to be redressed through arbitration, legal
    proceedings shall be pursued solely through the local courts of
    Gaston County, North Carolina."
    According to Starbucks, on about December 28, 2011, a Starbucks patron was
    sitting in an Outdoor Lifestyle chair when it collapsed, causing injuries to the patron.
    Starbucks's subsequent inspection of the failed chair and additional Outdoor Lifestyle
    2
    furniture revealed the existence of a welding defect in each piece of furniture inspected.
    Upon discovery of the defect, Starbucks removed all Outdoor Lifestyle furniture from its
    stores.
    Starbucks submitted a warranty claim to Outdoor Lifestyle, which Outdoor Life
    rejected. Thereafter, Starbucks filed a complaint against Outdoor Lifestyle in the
    Superior Court of San Diego County, asserting causes of action for breach of warranty.
    Outdoor Lifestyle specially appeared on April 8, 2013, to file a motion to stay or
    dismiss the action for forum non conveniens Outdoor Lifestyle argued that the forum
    selection clause applied not only to arbitral matters, but civil actions as well. Starbucks
    opposed the motion, arguing the plain meaning of the forum selection clause meant it
    applied only to arbitration, not civil actions. Starbuck also argued that rules of grammar
    limited its application to arbitration.
    The court granted the motion, and dismissed the action. In granting the motion,
    the court stated: "Construing the warranty at issue here as a whole and construed to
    effectuate the obvious intention, the court finds there is a forum selection clause in the
    warranty provided to plaintiff Starbucks by Outdoor Lifestyle that contains language
    showing the jurisdiction of this action is appropriate only in Gaston County, North
    Carolina."
    DISCUSSION
    I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    There is a split of authority as to the appropriate standard of review on a motion to
    enforce a forum selection clause. Some courts have applied the abuse of discretion
    3
    standard. (See Schlessinger v. Holland America (2004) 
    120 Cal. App. 4th 552
    , 557;
    America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 
    90 Cal. App. 4th 1
    , 9; Bancomer, S.A. v.
    Superior Court (1996) 
    44 Cal. App. 4th 1450
    , 1457.) Others have applied the substantial
    evidence standard of review. (Cal-State Business Products & Services, Inc. v. Ricoh
    (1993) 
    12 Cal. App. 4th 1666
    , 1680-1681; CQJ Original Products, Inc v. National Hockey
    League Players' Assn. (1995) 
    39 Cal. App. 4th 1347
    , 1354.) Starbucks asserts that
    because the underlying facts of this case are undisputed, the standard of review is de
    novo.
    We conclude that under any standard of review, the court erred in granting
    Outdoor Life Style's motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens.
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. Law Governing Forum Selection Clauses
    Under California law, mandatory forum selection clauses such as the one at issue
    in the present appeal are given effect unless they are deemed unfair or unreasonable.
    (Berg v. MTC Electronics Technologies Co. (1998) 
    61 Cal. App. 4th 349
    , 358.) A forum
    selection clause is mandatory when it "contains clear language showing that jurisdiction
    is appropriate in the designated forum and none other." (Id. at p. 360.) The burden of
    proof for enforcement of a mandatory enforcement clause rests with the party opposing
    the enforcement. (Cal-State Business Products & Services, Inc. v. 
    Ricoh, supra
    , 12
    Cal.App.4th at p. 1680.)
    4
    B. Analysis
    The definition of the term "arbitration" is "[s]ettling an issue with a third party to
    avoid court." (Black's Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary (2d ed.)
    http://www.thelawdictionary.org/arbitration-2/ (as of Sept. 15, 2014).) Thus, by
    definition, arbitration is not a proceeding in court.
    It is true that the forum selection clause at issue here is not a model of clarity.
    However, because Outdoor Lifestyle drafted the warranty, including the forum selection
    clause, any uncertainty must be construed against it. (Civ. Code, § 1654; Victoria v.
    Superior Court (1985) 
    40 Cal. 3d 734
    , 739; Maggio v. Winward Capital Management Co.
    (2000) 
    80 Cal. App. 4th 1210
    , 1215.)
    Here we conclude, construing the forum selection clause in Starbuck's favor, it
    applies only to arbitral matters, not civil actions such as this matter. If Outdoor Lifestyle
    had intended it to apply to civil actions it could have easily omitted reference to the term
    "arbitration" altogether so that the forum selection clause read "should conditions arise
    where a situation needs to be redressed, legal proceedings shall be pursued solely through
    the courts of Gaston County, North Carolina."
    Of course we must give a meaning to the phrase "legal proceedings." We interpret
    that to merely be referring to where the arbitration will take place.
    Moreover, when a phrase is set off from the rest of the main sentence by two
    commas, such as here, it should be read as a parenthetical phrase because "such a
    grammatical structure 'indicates an intent to segregate th[e phrase] from the rest of the
    sentence.'" (Dow v. Lassen Irrigation Co. (2013) 
    216 Cal. App. 4th 766
    , 783 (Dow).)
    5
    In Dow, the Court of Appeal reviewed a trial court's ruling which concerned the
    interpretation of a decree in the adjudication of water rights between Jay Dow and Lassen
    Irrigation Company. The trial court held that the decree gave Lassen Irrigation Company
    the right to divert water from a river for direct application to beneficial use. The Court of
    Appeal held that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the decree with respect to the
    reservoir owner's rights.
    At issue was the meaning of a contractual clause which utilized a parenthetical
    phrase, as follows: "'Irrigation Company shall be entitled to divert, or store up to the
    present capacity of its reservoirs, estimated at 31,500 acre-feet, from the natural flow of
    Susan River.'" 
    (Dow, supra
    , 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 783, italics added.)
    Lassen Irrigation Company argued that the contractual clause expressly gave it the
    right to either divert water from the Susan River or store water from the river up to the
    capacity of its reservoirs. Jay Dow argued that the provision should be construed as "'a
    parenthetical phrase explaining the meaning of the word "divert,"'" and as such, the
    clause meant that Lassen Irrigation Company could "divert, in other words, store up to
    the present capacity of its reservoirs." 
    (Dow, supra
    , 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 783.) The trial
    court ruled in favor of Lassen Irrigation Company's interpretation, and Jay Dow
    appealed.
    The Court of Appeal concluded that Lassen Irrigation Company's, and the trial
    court's, interpretation of the clause "fails to account for the two commas that set off the
    phrase 'or store up to the present capacity of its reservoirs, estimated at 31,500 acre-feet'
    from the remainder of the sentence." 
    (Dow, supra
    , 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 783.) As the
    6
    Court of Appeal explained: "Had the drafters of the decree intended the meaning that the
    Irrigation Company advances (and that the trial court found), there would have been no
    need for the comma before the word 'or.'" (Ibid.)
    The Court of Appeal concluded that the parenthetical phrase operated to give the
    word "or" its ordinary meaning (as a choice between alternatives). Under this
    interpretation, the parenthetical phrase was treated to mean "or store up to the present
    capacity of its reservoirs" as an alternative to the word "divert." 
    (Dow, supra
    , 216
    Cal.App.4th at p. 784.) Read in this manner, Lassen Irrigation Company did not have the
    broad scope in water rights it claimed.
    Likewise, in this case the court should have construed the forum selection clause
    as containing a parenthetical phrase which explained the subject of the provision. The
    following clause constitutes the parenthetical phrase in this case because it is separated
    from the rest of the sentence by two (2) commas: "agree that should conditions arise
    where a situation needs to be redressed through arbitration." Read in its segregated state,
    the parenthetical phrase demonstrates that the topic of the forum selection clause is
    arbitration, not civil lawsuits.
    Not only is the term "arbitration" isolated from the rest of the sentence, it is the
    only dispute process referred to in the parenthetical. Had Outdoor Lifestyle intended this
    clause to apply to proceedings other than arbitration, there would be no need to isolate the
    phrase with the use of two (2) commas. Instead, the clause would have simply stated the
    applicable proceedings were "arbitration, mediation, legal proceedings, or other actions."
    7
    As drafted, the commas separating the parenthetical phrase from the rest of the
    sentence create an order to the sequential elements of the sentence, as follows: (1)
    furnishings are purchased or services are obtained from Outdoor Lifestyle; (2) should a
    situation occur which needs to be redressed through arbitration; (3) legal proceedings
    shall be commenced in Gaston County, North Carolina. In other words, by isolating the
    clause concerning arbitration in a parenthetical, the sentence operates to instruct buyers
    of Outdoor Lifestyle furniture that, if conditions arise where grievances need redress
    through arbitration, then legal proceedings must be pursued in North Carolina.
    Moreover, the omission of the terms "and" and "or" evidence Outdoor Lifestyle's
    intent to limit the application of the forum selection clause. Outdoor Lifestyle could have
    included "and" or "or" in the forum selection clause so that it read " . . . should conditions
    arise where a situation needs to be redressed through arbitration and/or legal
    proceedings." Had the clause been constructed in this manner, the terms "and" and "or"
    would have distinguished arbitration from "legal proceedings" as separate and distinct
    dispute processes. In this light, the forum selection clause would have made clear its
    intention to encompass all legal proceedings.
    In sum, we conclude the court erred in granting Outdoor Lifestyle's motion to
    dismiss for forum non conveniens, and dismissing the action.
    8
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is reversed. Starbucks shall recover its costs on appeal.
    NARES, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
    AARON, J.
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: D064637

Filed Date: 9/17/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021